“Capacity is controlled by [Rule 17], which defers questions of legal capacity to the law of [the relevant party’s] domicile, here Maryland.”
How later courts described this case
- “Capacity is controlled by [Rule 17], which defers questions of legal capacity to the law of [the relevant party’s] domicile, here Maryland.”
- observing, regarding lawsuit commenced by parent as “next friend” of minor child, that “Rule 17(c) permits an infant who lacks a general guardian to bring suit by his next friend, and no special appointment process for the next friend is required”
- “[Rule] 17(c) . . . provides that a general guardian may sue on behalf of a minor. A parent is a guardian who may so sue.”
- “[R]esponsibility for Rule 17 appears generally to be left to the discretion of the district courts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SANDRA RUTH MOORE, )
individually and on behalf of E.M., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25cv262
)
CABARRUS COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on the “Petition for
Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem” (Docket Entry 11) (the “GAL
Motion”) filed by Sandra Ruth Moore (the “Plaintiff”). For the
reasons that follow, the Court will deny the GAL Motion as moot.
BACKGROUND
Alleging state and federal claims related to an incident
involving E.M., her minor daughter, Plaintiff sued the Cabarrus
County Board of Education (the “Defendant”) and certain of its
employees in state court. (See Docket Entry 2 (the “Complaint”) at
1-24.)1 Contemporaneously with filing the Complaint (see id. at
2), Plaintiff filed a petition seeking appointment as a guardian ad
litem for E.M. (see Docket Entry 1-4 at 2). Defendant removed the
action to this Court prior to resolution of that petition. (See
Docket Entry 1 at 1-4; Docket Entry 1-1 at 1-4.) Thereafter,
1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
Plaintiff filed the GAL Motion, seeking appointment as a guardian
ad litem for E.M. pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(c). (See Docket Entry 11 at 1-2.) According to the GAL Motion,
“[Plaintiff] is a competent natural person suitable for appointment
as the natural mother and primary caretaker of E.M.” and “is
capable and willing to serve as guardian ad litem” in this matter.
(Id. at 2; see also Docket Entry 14 (the “Amended Complaint”) at 1
(asserting that Plaintiff “is the natural mother of E.M., a minor”
and “has moved this [C]ourt to be appointed GAL for her daughter
with respect to this litigation” (parenthetical omitted)).)
DISCUSSION
Under Rule 17, “a general guardian” may sue “on behalf of a
minor.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1)(A). In addition,
[a] minor or an incompetent person who does not have a
duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or
by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a
guardian ad litem — or issue another appropriate order —
to protect a minor or incompetent person who is
unrepresented in an action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). “These provisions permit, but do not
compel, a court to appoint a guardian ad litem for an unrepresented
minor.” Seibels, Bruce & Co. v. Nicke, 168 F.R.D. 542, 543
(M.D.N.C. 1996); see also Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 303 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“[R]esponsibility for Rule 17 appears generally to be
left to the discretion of the district courts.”). In other words,
“Rule 17(c) does not make the appointment of a guardian ad litem
mandatory. If the court feels that the infant’s [or incompetent
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person’s] interests are otherwise adequately represented and
protected, a guardian ad litem need not be appointed.” Adelman on
Behalf of Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1984)
(brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Westcott v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 158 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.
1946)).
Under Rule 17, “[c]lapacity to sue .. . is determined... by
the law of the individual’s domicile,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (1),
which for E.M. remains North Carolina (see Docket Entry 14 at 1).
See, e.g., Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 1986)
(“Capacity is controlled by [Rule 17], which defers questions of
legal capacity to the law of [the relevant party’s] domicile, here
Maryland.”). North Carolina recognizes parents as “the natural
guardians of the person of their minor children.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 35A-1201 (a) (6). Thus, “[i]n most cases, a parent qualifies as a
‘general guardian’ who may act on behalf of a minor without needing
a formal court appointment under Federal Rule 17(c).” Epic Games,
Inc. v. C.B., No. 5:19cv250, 2019 WL 8334611, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Sept.
27, 2019); see also, e.g., Communities for Equity v. Michigan High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006 (W.D. Mich. 1998)
(“[Rule] 17(c) . . . provides that a general guardian may sue on
behalf of a minor. A parent is a guardian who may so sue.”).
Moreover:
[n]othing else appearing, it may be presumed that a
parent acts in the best interest of the child.
Permitting the parent to act as a guardian saves the
expense of appointing a guardian which is also an
important policy consideration. . . . Furthermore, a
federal court should, as a matter of sound policy, be
cautious in attempting to step between the parent and his
or her child.
Seibels, 168 F.R.D. at 544 (citation and footnote omitted).
Here, the record reflects that Plaintiff, “the natural mother
of [E.M., a] minor” (Docket Entry 1-4 at 2), “is over the age of
21, is of sound mind, and is a fit and proper person to serve as”
the representative for “[E.M.] in this action” (id.). Moreover,
the record strongly implies that E.M.’s parents, including
Plaintiff, possess legal and physical custody of E.M., their minor
daughter. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 14 at 10 (“Patel forced
Plaintiff to choose between sending her daughter into the same
class with the student who had assaulted her or agreeing to
transfer her to a different school. . . . On the day of the
assault, when Plaintiff picked E.M. up from school, E.M. was very
sad and emotional. On the evening of the assault, when Plaintiff
needed to leave the home to attend an event, E.M. became distraught
as to her mother leaving, but E.M. was unable to communicate why.”
(paragraph numbering omitted)); see also Docket Entry 11 at 2
(asserting that Plaintiff “[i]s the natural mother and primary
caretaker of E.M.”).) In any event, nothing in the record
indicates an impediment to Plaintiff acting on behalf of E.M. in
this action. (See Docket Entries dated Apr. 4, 2025, to present.)
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Accordingly, Plaintiff does not require appointment as a
guardian ad litem in this matter. As a neighboring court has
explained, “Rule 17 (c) (1) provides that certain specified
representatives may sue on behalf of a minor, or if the minor ‘does
not have a duly appointed representative, the minor may sue by a
next friend or by a guardian ad litem.’” A.R. by & through D.R. v.
Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:22cv45, 2022 WL 16953620, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2022) (brackets omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 17(c)(2)). ™“[Plaintiff], as a parent, ‘qualifies as a general
guardian who may act on behalf of [her] minor [child] without
needing a formal court appointment under Federal Rule 17(c).’” Id.
(quoting Epic Games, 2019 WL 8334611, at *1); see also Genesco,
Inc. v. Cone Mills Corp., 604 F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1979)
(observing, regarding lawsuit commenced by parent as “next friend”
of minor child, that “Rule 17(c) permits an infant who lacks a
general guardian to bring suit by his next friend, and no special
appointment process for the next friend is required”).
In other words, Plaintiff “may bring suit on [E.M.]’s behalf
in federal court under Rule 17(c),” A.R., 2022 WL 16953620, at *3,
without the necessity of appointment as a guardian ad litem, see
id. at *2-3. Indeed, such appointment “would be a needless
formality.” Allen v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 55 F.R.D. 350,
352 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 473 F.2d 906 (Table) (4th Cir. 1973);
see also id. at 351-52 (explaining that parent plaintiffs lacked
standing to serve as “representatives of a class of taxpayers” and
that, “insofar as the [parents] complain on their own behalf and
not upon behalf of their children, as the natural guardians
thereof, they must also be held to lack standing,” but that, “[a]s
to the unquestioned standing of the [parents] to bring this action
as natural guardians for their own children, their appointment as
guardians ad litem would be a needless formality”). As such, the
Court will deny as moot the GAL Motion.
CONCLUSION
As E.M.’s parent, Plaintiff may proceed as E.M.’s guardian or
next friend in this action, rendering unnecessary her appointment
as E.M.’s guardian ad litem.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the GAL Motion (Docket Entry 11)
is DENIED AS MOOT.
This 13th day of May, 2025.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
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