United States v. Arturs Spila

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13913

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ARTURS SPILA,

a.k.a. Arturs Clare,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00375-MLB-JEM-3

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and GRANT and KIDD, Circuit

Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether sufficient evi-

dence supported a conviction for conspiracy to commit money

laundering. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Arturs Spila, an alien, entered the

United States in May 2018. Over the next three months, he depos-

ited hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash in three separate bank

accounts. The cash came from a scheme in which fraudsters hired

people for fake work-from-home positions. As one of their first as-

signments, the new hires cashed checks made payable to them and

mailed the cash to Spila’s address. The fraudulent checks inevitably

bounced, but the victims’ purported employers never paid or reim-

bursed them. And when Spila received the cash, he deposited it in

his accounts. He then wired over $200,000 from those accounts in

small transactions, mostly to international recipients. A jury con-

victed Spila of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Because

sufficient evidence supported Spila’s conviction and he fails to iden-

tify any reversible error, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2018, Arturs Spila, a Latvian national, arrived in

the United States. Upon his arrival, Customs and Border Protection

officers interviewed and screened him. Spila told the officers that

he was on vacation and showed them a return airline ticket for June

6. But Spila did not board that flight. Instead, he stayed in the

United States until August 14.

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23-13913 Opinion of the Court 3

During his stay in the United States, Spila opened three per-

sonal bank accounts—two within days of his arrival. He initially

reported his home address as 2052 South Hobart Boulevard, Los

Angeles, California, but later updated the address associated with

all three bank accounts to 1538 North Martel Avenue, Apartment

411, Los Angeles, California.

Meanwhile, several people across the country fell victim to

a fraud scheme. For example, Francis Cassady, a 70-year-old from

Minnesota, thought that he had been hired for a remote job by a

foreign company called SOTRAD. As his second assignment, he

was told to cash a check from a customer company and mail the

cash to a SOTRAD representative. As instructed, Cassady cashed

the check (about $2,400), placed the cash in an envelope, and

mailed it to “Artur Cole” at 1538 North Martel Avenue, Apartment

411, Los Angeles, California. Cassady did not place any invoice,

contract, or other document in the envelope with the cash. Alt-

hough the check initially cleared, it later bounced, and Cassady’s

bank deducted the fraudulent amount from his account. When

Cassady’s alleged employer asked him to repeat the task with new

checks, he declined. SOTRAD never repaid him for the over $2,000

now missing from his bank account and never paid him a salary for

the work he performed.

The same basic story repeated—with different employment

companies and different aliases for Spila—for Jacqueline Penning-

ton from Georgia, Andrew Kledzik and Daniel O’Connor from

Florida, and Enze Bai from New Jersey. Each victim was hired for

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

remote work and received a check-cashing assignment. And each

victim was instructed to send the cash to Spila’s North Martel Ave-

nue address. Fortunately, some of the victims saw through the

scheme and declined to cash the checks. Pennington, for example,

mailed the check to Spila’s address with the name “Arturs Clare”

instead of cashing it.

On the receiving end of those mailings, Spila served as a con-

duit for hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash from these vic-

tims and others. In the 83 days he spent in the United States, Spila

deposited over $284,000 in cash across his three bank accounts and

wired over $256,000 out of his accounts. Despite the large total,

Spila never deposited more than $10,000 in cash in a single transac-

tion—the amount that would trigger mandatory reporting. After

he made the deposits, Spila wired nearly all the money from his

account, often to international recipients, also keeping the transfers

under $10,000. Spila deposited only one check: the one Pennington

had mailed to him in lieu of cash, made payable to her name. Spila’s

bank accounts also showed no signs of legitimate business activity.

As he made these deposits and transfers, Spila communi-

cated by email with Ivan Kanunnikov, who used the alias Jef Jordan

in his Gmail account. The emails contained invoices “[f ]or [f ]low-

ers” and for “[p]ayment of services,” and, despite purportedly com-

ing from different companies, those invoices often had identical

formatting. And the invoice amounts and descriptions often

matched Spila’s outgoing wire transfers. Kanunnikov in turn

emailed Dmitrii Zherebiatev photographs, including at least one

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23-13913 Opinion of the Court 5

photograph showing an envelope of cash addressed to Spila’s first

United States address, and receipts from wire transfers showing

Spila’s account information.

On April 5, 2022, a federal grand jury issued a superseding

indictment against Spila on one count of conspiracy to commit

money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (h). Spila pleaded

not guilty and proceeded to trial.

Before trial, the government moved to authenticate several

emails sent between Spila, Kanunnikov, and Zherebiatev as Google

business records with a Google certification under Federal Rule of

Evidence 902(11). Spila objected that the government was attempt-

ing to “authenticate an entire email . . . including substance and at-

tachments.” But, at the pretrial conference, Spila conceded that the

emails “came from Google and . . . Google did not fabricate them

nor did the government.” The district court granted the motion to

authenticate, but it clarified that the government would still have

to prove that the emails’ substance was admissible as not hearsay

or under a hearsay exception.

At trial, the government introduced the emails, and Spila re-

newed his objection to the emails’ authenticity and added objec-

tions for hearsay. The district court overruled the objections and

admitted the emails and attachments.

The government then called Danie Saint Cyr, a forensic ac-

countant at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as a lay witness.

Before she testified, Spila objected that the government had not dis-

closed Saint Cyr as an expert. The government explained that Saint

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

Cyr’s testimony would “summarize the various types of bank

transactions” in Spila’s bank statements and would not “offer an

opinion as to fraud.” The district court allowed Saint Cyr to testify

and informed Spila’s counsel that he would “have to object” if her

testimony crossed the line into expert opinion.

Saint Cyr’s testimony explained her professional and educa-

tional background and that she had reviewed bank records from

the Spila investigation and prepared analyses and charts. She ex-

plained that those documents “summarize[d] certain transactions,

such as cash deposits, non-cash deposits, and outgoing wire trans-

fer[s]” for Spila’s accounts. She testified that Spila made 100 cash

deposits. And her charts showed that Spila deposited $284,233 in

cash in his three bank accounts and wired $256,506 from his ac-

counts.

Saint Cyr also observed that none of Spila’s deposits ex-

ceeded $10,000. When asked about the significance of this pattern,

Saint Cyr explained that $10,000 transactions often trigger report-

ing. Spila objected that there was insufficient foundation for Saint

Cyr’s knowledge of this point, but he did not object to it as an ex-

pert opinion. Indeed, Spila did not object during Saint Cyr’s testi-

mony that any specific part of that testimony was an improper ex-

pert opinion.

Spila moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the

government’s evidence, and the district court denied that motion.

The district court then instructed the jury on the elements of con-

spiracy to commit money laundering as follows:

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Money laundering under . . . 18 U.S.C. [§] 1956 . . . oc-

curs where a person knowingly conducted or tried to

conduct a financial transaction, the person knew that

the money or property involved in the transaction

were the proceeds of some kind of unlawful activity,

the money or property did come from an unlawful

activity, specifically wire fraud, and the person knew

that the transaction was designed in whole or in part

to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source,

ownership, or control of the proceeds.

A conspiracy, as I’ve just used that term, is an agree-

ment by two or more persons to commit an unlawful

act.

...

To know that the money or property involved in the

transaction came from some kind of unlawful activ-

ity is to know that the money or property came from

an activity that’s a felony under state, federal, or for-

eign law.

At closing, Spila argued that the government had not proved

that Spila knew that the cash came from an underlying felony.

Spila’s counsel told the jury that there was “no evidence that any-

thing was done that would be a felony under state[,] . . . federal[,]

. . . [or] foreign law,” and that the government “had to bring . . . ev-

idence that a felony was in the works.”

The prosecutor argued that although defense counsel “said

that there was no evidence that the scheme here was a felony[,]

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

[w]ire fraud is a felony.” Spila’s counsel objected that no evidence

supported this point, and the district court overruled that objec-

tion. The government continued to argue that the evidence estab-

lished a fraudulent scheme:

Receiving $280,000 through the mail in cash from in-

dividuals all over the country who have addressed

their letters to people that are not you, to names that

are not you, that shows you know that it’s a fraud

scheme because these people have nothing to do with

you. They don’t even know your real name, and they

are mailing you cash with no explanation. You know

they’ve been defrauded, and you know that that

fraud is a felony. All of these facts show that the de-

fendant knew that what he was doing was illegal.

Spila did not object to any of these statements or the rest of the

government’s rebuttal. But he moved for a mistrial based on the

statement that “wire fraud is a felony” made at closing. The district

court denied the motion.

The jury convicted Spila on one count of conspiracy to com-

mit money laundering. Spila moved for judgment of acquittal and

for a new trial on the grounds that the government had failed to

prove Spila knew that the money came from a felonious activity

and that the government’s statement in rebuttal was improper. The

district court denied those motions, entered final judgment, and

sentenced Spila to 32 months in prison and one year of supervised

release.

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Three standards govern our review. We review the suffi-

ciency of the evidence de novo and “view all evidence in the light

most favorable to the government, resolving any conflicts in favor

of the government’s case.” United States v. Watts, 896 F.3d 1245,

1250–51 (11th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a jury verdict “if any

reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the

jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

1251 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “We review

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hen-

derson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). And we review unpre-

served evidentiary challenges and unpreserved challenges to pros-

ecutorial misconduct for plain error. United States v. Edouard, 485

F.3d 1324, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272,

1283 (11th Cir. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion into four parts. First, we explain

that the government presented sufficient evidence of Spila’s

knowledge that the cash came from unlawful activity. Second, we

explain that the government’s closing rebuttal involved no prose-

cutorial misconduct. Third, we explain that the district court did

not abuse its discretion by authenticating the emails through the

Google certification. Finally, we explain that the district court did

not err in allowing Saint Cyr to testify as a lay witness.

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

A. The Government Presented Sufficient Evidence to

Convict Spila of Conspiracy to Launder Money.

Spila argues that the government failed to present evidence

at trial that proved that “Spila or his co-conspirators knew that the

conspiracy involved proceeds from a ‘felony.’” But Spila misinter-

prets the elements of money laundering. To prove that Spila know-

ingly participated in the conspiracy, the government needed to

prove only that Spila knew that the source of the money was some

unlawful activity, not that he knew that it was a felony. The govern-

ment satisfied that burden.

To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit money

laundering, the government had to prove two elements: “(1) agree-

ment between two or more persons to commit a money-launder-

ing offense; and (2) knowing and voluntary participation in that

agreement by the defendant.” United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d

1260, 1280 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing in part 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)). The

substantive crime of concealment money laundering in turn pro-

vides that a money-laundering defendant must have some

knowledge that the property involved in his crime came from an

illegal source:

Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a fi-

nancial transaction represents the proceeds of some

form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to

conduct such a financial transaction which in fact in-

volves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . .

knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or

in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the

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location, the source, the ownership, or the control of

the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . shall be

sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment.

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). And the statute defines the term

“‘knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction rep-

resents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity’” as requir-

ing that “the person knew the property involved in the transaction

represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily

which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Fed-

eral, or foreign law.” Id. § 1956(c)(1).

Spila argues that a defendant must know that the underlying

activity is a felony to have knowledge that the proceeds are from

“some form . . . of activity that constitutes a felony.” But a plain

reading of the statute establishes that a defendant need not know

that the money came from a felonious source. Section 1956(a)(1)’s

knowledge element requires that the defendant know only that the

money “represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.”

Id. § 1956(a)(1) (emphasis added). And section 1956(c)(1)’s defini-

tion of that term reiterates that the defendant might not know

“which form” of unlawful activity produced the money. Id.

§ 1956(c)(1). The defendant need not know the exact nature of the

underlying criminal activity to be guilty of money laundering—or

to knowingly join a money-laundering conspiracy. And if a defend-

ant need not know the exact nature of the unlawful activity, he cer-

tainly need not know that the activity was a felony. That the statute

does not require that a defendant know which crime produced the

money necessarily defeats Spila’s argument.

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

The Second Circuit has persuasively explained these two

statutory provisions. Writing for our sister circuit, Judge Kearse

stated that “[t]he first paragraph of [section] 1956(a)(1) is plainly

crafted to distinguish between the actual source of laundered

money and the defendant’s knowledge as to the source of that

money.” United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1526 (2d Cir. 1997).

That conclusion followed because “[t]he language of that para-

graph requires proof that the laundered property ‘in fact’ involved

the proceeds of ‘specified unlawful activity,’ . . . but it does not re-

quire proof that the defendant knew what that unlawful activity

was.” Id. If we interpreted the statute to require that the defendant

know “the nature of the . . . unlawful activity,” we “would nullify

the careful wording of the first paragraph of [section] 1956(a)(1)

which evinces the clear intent to reach a person who knows that he

is dealing with the proceeds of ‘some’ crime even if he does not

know precisely which crime.” Id. As our sister circuit explained, sec-

tion 1956(c)(1) confirmed that the knowledge element did not re-

quire the defendant to know which criminal activity produced the

money because that subsection reiterated that the defendant need

not know “‘which form[]’ of criminal activity” produced the prop-

erty. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1)).

This reading also comports with our precedents. We have

explained that money laundering has four elements: the defendant

(1) “conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction”;

(2) “the transaction involved the proceeds of a statutorily specified

unlawful activity”; (3) the defendant “knew the proceeds were

from some form of illegal activity”; and (4) the defendant “knew a

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23-13913 Opinion of the Court 13

purpose of the transaction was to conceal or disguise the nature,

location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds.” United

States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1999); accord United

States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2001); cf. United States v.

Frazier, 605 F.3d 1271, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing the ele-

ments of a section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) charge). As the Sixth Circuit has

explained, we would have to “conflate[ the] elements” to conclude

that money laundering requires “knowledge of a felony.” United

States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In other words, because the government need not

prove that the defendant “knew that the property involved in the

transaction represent[ed] the proceeds of a specific type of unlaw-

ful activity,” it need not prove that “the defendant knew the precise

nature of the unlawful activity; i.e., that he knew it was felonious

as opposed to misdemeanor activity.” Id. (citation and internal quo-

tation marks omitted).

Spila alternatively contends that the jury instructions re-

quired the government to prove that he knew that the underlying

crime was a felony. The government did not object to the instruc-

tions, so they constitute the “law of the case” and the government

had to prove the elements of conspiracy to commit money laun-

dering as outlined by the instructions. See United States v. Spletzer,

535 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1976) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); accord United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 590

(11th Cir. 2015).

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

The instructions were consistent with our interpretation of

the money-laundering statute. The district court instructed the

jury that “[t]o know that the money or property involved in the

transaction came from some kind of unlawful activity is to know

that the money or property came from an activity that’s a felony

under state, federal, or foreign law.” This instruction restates the

statutory language and requires the government to prove that the

defendant knew that the money came from an unlawful activity

and to prove that the unlawful activity is a felony. It did not require

Spila to know that the unlawful activity was classified as a felony.

With that interpretation in mind, we conclude that the gov-

ernment presented sufficient evidence to prove each element of

conspiracy to commit money laundering. Circumstantial evidence

can prove the knowledge element of an offense. See Frazier, 605 F.3d

at 1282; see also United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th

Cir. 2020) (using circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion

that the defendant knew that he had been convicted of felonies).

The evidence of Spila’s behavior allowed a reasonable inference

that he knew that the money he deposited came from unlawful ac-

tivities. Spila opened two bank accounts within days of arriving in

the United States; he received over $280,000 in cash through the

mail and deposited that cash into his bank accounts in amounts that

never exceeded $10,000; the cash was not addressed to Spila’s name

but did use his address; Spila wire transferred almost all the money

from the cash deposits out of his accounts, mostly to international

accounts; and Spila received emails relating to his activities—often

in Russian—from another person.

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Taken in the light most favorable to the government, this

evidence is sufficient to prove that Spila agreed to commit money

laundering by (1) conducting financial transactions in the form of

cash deposits and wire transfers that (2) involved proceeds of felo-

nious wire fraud, with (3) knowledge that the money came from

an unlawful activity and (4) knowledge that the transactions were

meant to conceal the nature of the proceeds because his transac-

tions never exceeded $10,000. A reasonable jury could find that

Spila agreed to commit money laundering and knowingly and vol-

untarily participated in that agreement. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at

1280; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); see also United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d

1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the receipt and deposit of

“checks containing false memos” and the “disburse[ment of ] funds

. . . through withdrawals under $10,000,” among other evidence,

was “sufficient to prove that [a coconspirator] knew that the money

was the proceeds of unlawful activity”).

B. The Government’s Statement at Closing Argument

Did Not Constitute Prosecutorial Misconduct

Spila next attacks a statement made during the govern-

ment’s closing rebuttal. As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute

the appropriate standard of review. On appeal, Spila specifically ob-

jects to the government’s rebuttal argument that the circumstantial

evidence was sufficient to prove knowledge that the underlying

wire fraud was a felony. But Spila objected before the government

presented this argument. Spila’s counsel interjected after the pros-

ecutor stated, “Wire fraud is a felony.” And, after trial, Spila’s mo-

tion for a mistrial again argued only that the statement “that wire

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

fraud is a felony” constituted “[t]he [g]overnment . . . testifying to

evidence.” Based on this mismatch in arguments, the government

contends that we should review the prosecutor’s statement for

plain error. Spila submits that we should review the misconduct de

novo.

We agree with the government. Spila objects to a different

set of comments on appeal and raises that objection on a different

basis, so we review for plain error. See Hano, 922 F.3d at 1295 (noting

that plain-error review applies because the defendant “did not ob-

ject to this remark at trial” (emphasis added)). “For there to be plain

error, there must (1) be error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects the

substantial rights of the party, and (4) that seriously affects the fair-

ness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.” United

States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 637 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and inter-

nal quotation marks omitted).

“Prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial only if we

find the remarks (1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the defend-

ant’s substantive rights.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). During closing, “[a] prosecutor is expected to refrain

from offering his personal views on a defendant’s guilt or on the

evidence.” United States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084, 1100 (11th Cir.

2015). But “a prosecutor is free to suggest . . . what the jury should

conclude from the evidence before it.” Id. So long as “the attorney

makes it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclusions to

be drawn from the evidence,” he may offer “inferences fairly sug-

gested by the evidence or by matters of common knowledge

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outside the evidence.” United States v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 663 (11th

Cir. 1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

prosecutor’s comments “are evaluated to determine whether the

comments so unfairly affected the trial as to deny the defendant

due process when considered in the context of the entire trial in

light of any curative instructions.” Parker v. Allen, 565 F.3d 1258,

1273 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-

ted).

On appeal, Spila objects to comments that pointed to cir-

cumstantial evidence that Spila knew that the cash came from un-

lawful sources. And the prosecutor’s arguments that the jury

should find that Spila knew that the envelopes of cash with large

sums of money from unknown people across the country came

from unlawful activity “urg[ed] the jury to draw certain conclu-

sions from the evidence.” Rivera, 780 F.3d at 1100. The prosecutor

was entitled to argue that kind of reasonable inference to the jury

based on the evidence presented at trial.

And even if we looked to the prosecutor’s comment that

“[w]ire fraud is a felony,” that comment was also proper. In addi-

tion to commenting on a reasonable inference from the evidence,

prosecutors are also “entitled to make a fair response to defense

counsel’s arguments, and issues raised by the defendant in his clos-

ing argument are fair game for the prosecution on rebuttal.” United

States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 1215, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019). The prosecutor’s

comment responded to defense counsel’s contention that there was

“no evidence that anything was done that would be a felony.”

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

Defense counsel’s statement suggested that none of the activities

were in fact felonies, not just that Spila may not have known that

they were felonies. The prosecutor did not err in rebutting that

statement.

Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct requires that the al-

leged misconduct affected the defendant’s substantial rights despite

any curative instructions the district court offered. See Parker, 565

F.3d at 1273. “[S]tatements and arguments” offered by a prosecutor

“are not evidence,” so “improper statements can be rectified by the

district court’s instruction to the jury that only the evidence in the

case be considered.” United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 976 (11th

Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the

close of the trial, the district court instructed the jury that “any-

thing the lawyers have said or will say is not evidence and is not

binding on you,” so Spila’s argument that the statement “[w]ire

fraud is a felony” constitutes evidence falls flat. “[E]ven if there

were something wrong with the prosecutor’s closing argument,

the district court cured the problem, and the prosecutor’s state-

ments do not warrant a new trial.” Id.

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting

the Emails as Self-Authenticating Documents.

Spila contends that the district court abused its discretion

when it allowed the government to admit the Google-certified

emails as self-authenticating documents under Federal Rule of Ev-

idence 902(11). The government offered certifications from

Google representatives that the emails, which came from Gmail

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accounts, were authentic documents. Spila argues that the district

court erroneously authenticated the substantive content of the

emails and their attachments, which Google did not write or create.

We disagree.

For most pieces of evidence introduced at trial, “the propo-

nent [of the evidence] must produce evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” FED. R.

EVID. 901(a). But for some evidence, this additional work is unnec-

essary. Federal Rule of Evidence 902 governs “evidence [that is]

self-authenticating,” that is, evidence that “require[s] no extrinsic

evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted.” For this evi-

dence, the proponent need not submit additional evidence of the

item’s authenticity.

Original or copies of domestic business records that are ac-

companied “by a certification of the custodian” are considered

“self-authenticating.” Id. R. 902(11). A record may qualify for this

special treatment only if it meets the requirements for a business

record under Rule 803(6)(A) through (C). Rule 803(6) provides that

a business record qualifies as an exception to hearsay if “(A) the rec-

ord was made at or near the time by—or from information trans-

mitted by—someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in

the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business . . . ; [and]

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity.” If a

record satisfies these requirements, the certification establishes the

document’s authenticity, and the proponent need not offer addi-

tional evidence laying that foundation. Cf. United States v. Deverso,

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

518 F.3d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing Rule 902(3)’s re-

quirements for self-authenticating foreign public documents and

explaining that “[b]ecause the [g]overnment met the requirements

for self-authentication of the foreign document, it did not have to

lay a foundation for admission of the document as a business rec-

ord”). Importantly, authenticity does not equal admissibility. In-

stead, “authentication . . . of a document [is] a condition precedent

to its admissibility.” United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th

Cir. 1990).

The government presented certifications from Google that

the emails were authentic. In other words, a Google employee cer-

tified that on a specific day, at a specific time, the recorded account

sent the recorded message, along with its attachments, to the recip-

ient account. The certifications stated, “The Document is a record

made and retained by Google.” They explained that “Google serv-

ers record this data automatically at the time, or reasonably soon

after, it is entered or transmitted by the user, and this data is kept

in the course of this regularly conducted activity and was made by

regularly conducted activity as a regular practice of Google.”

Spila argues that the district court “authenticated” the sub-

stance of the emails even though Google did not “create” that con-

tent when it authenticated the entire messages, including the mes-

sage content and attachments. But Spila misunderstands the role

of authentication under Rule 902. As the Fifth Circuit has ex-

plained, self-authenticating documents contain two “statements”

for admissibility purposes: the first is the “email provider’s

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23-13913 Opinion of the Court 21

statement that one user wrote and sent a message to another user

at the recorded time”; the second is the content of the emails.

United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2019). The self-

authentication provision does not absolve the proponent of the

email content from the burden to prove that the statements it con-

tains are admissible. Id. It instead relieves them of the burden to lay

the foundation supporting the authenticity of the record.

The district court did not err in authenticating the emails

based on the Google certification. Google kept records of the ad-

dresses, accounts, timing, and contents of the emails sent using its

server in the regular course of its business. That attestation satisfies

the requirements of Rule 902(11). And Spila does not argue on ap-

peal that the contents of the emails offended any other rule of evi-

dence. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

D. The District Court Did Not Err in Permitting

the Forensic Accountant to Testify as a Lay Witness.

Spila next contends that the district court erred in allowing

a forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The parties again

dispute the standard of review. Spila argues that we should review

for an abuse of discretion. The government counters that we

should review for plain error.

We agree with the government. Spila made only a general

objection that Saint Cyr had not been disclosed as an expert. That

objection failed to preserve his specific arguments on appeal that

her testimony about “the bank records analysis that she con-

ducted,” the exhibits she created, the charts she prepared, and the

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-13913

information she explained about those charts constituted expert

opinions. When a party fails to make the specific objection he chal-

lenges on appeal or to “move[] to strike any of [the] problematic

testimony[,] . . . [t]he plain error standard . . . applies.” United States

v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a

party failed to object to improper expert testimony except for

“tepid objections” that “were not sufficient to preserve the issue of

the propriety of [the] testimony”).

The standard of review matters little here because Spila can-

not show error under either standard. In United States v. Chalker, this

Court stated that lay witness opinions are those opinions that are

“‘rationally based on the witness’s perception’; ‘helpful to clearly

understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in

issue’; and ‘not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.’” 966 F.3d 1177, 1191

(11th Cir. 2020) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701). “Notably, Rule 701

does not prohibit lay witnesses from testifying based on particular-

ized knowledge gained from their own personal experiences.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Testimony based

on professional experience that does not require specialized or

technical knowledge can be considered lay testimony.

Chalker forecloses Spila’s argument. There, the defendant

challenged the admission of lay opinion testimony from a forensic

accountant at the Federal Bureau of Investigation who, after de-

scribing her education and job experience, “provid[ed] the jury

with a summary of [the defendant’s] bank and wage records” and

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23-13913 Opinion of the Court 23

did not stray into the defendant’s conduct or any opinion about the

records. Id. at 1191–92. We held that none of her testimony “im-

permissibly crossed over the line into expert testimony.” Id. at 1192;

see also United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1330–32 (11th Cir.

2006) (concluding that analyst testimony, assisted by charts and ex-

hibits, “simply reviewed and summarized over seven thousand fi-

nancial documents” and did not “express any expert opinion”).

So too here. Saint Cyr’s brief testimony covered her educa-

tion and experience, described and explained six charts that she cre-

ated about information from three bank accounts, and offered basic

descriptions of how bank transfers work and the records that cor-

respond to those transfers. Only once did Saint Cyr potentially

stray beyond describing what she reviewed during the investigation

into Spila: when asked why the absence of $10,000 transactions was

significant to her review, Saint Cyr explained that a transaction over

$10,000 must be reported. Spila objected that the government had

not laid a sufficient foundation for that statement. The government

then clarified that Saint Cyr’s job required her to have familiarity

with these transaction reports. Like the testimony of the account-

ant in Chalker, this testimony about Saint Cyr’s organization of the

data involved no expert opinions. Spila fails to establish any error.

See Chalker, 966 F.3d at 1191–92 (finding no “clear abuse of discre-

tion” in the admission of lay testimony).

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM Spila’s conviction.