The opinion
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY MICHAEL CASTELLO, : CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-1032
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
TYLER ARBOGAST, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
We foreshadowed this memorandum opinion in addressing a motion for
summary judgment filed by the pro se plaintiff in this case, Anthony Castello.
Castello initiated this case in June 2024, alleging, among other claims that have since
been dismissed, that the defendants, State Troopers Tyler Arbogast, Jennifer Bowers,
and Jacob Horan, used excessive force against him in effectuating his May 4th, 2023,
arrest. On April 25th, 2025, we held that the plaintiff’s motion arguing he was entitled
to summary judgment on his excessive force claims failed to overcome a number of
legal, factual, and procedural obstacles, specifically finding that he had not met the
exacting burden of proving there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his excessive force claims, which
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judgment phase. (Doc. 46).
The defendants have now moved for summary judgment, arguing that the force
they used in effectuating Castello’s arrest was objectively reasonable as a matter of
law and no jury could find in the plaintiff’s favor. They rely heavily on the video
evidence of the incident, in the form of the mobile video recording (MVR) from
Trooper Arbogast and Trooper Bowers’ vehicles. As we previously noted in
addressing the plaintiff’s motion, while this video, taken from a distance and mostly
obstructed by the civilian onlookers, could support the defendants’ version of events
that Castello was not entirely compliant with commands, it is also difficult to
ascertain exactly what force was used by the officers in attempting to obtain
compliance. Moreover, in our view, the video does not unequivocally prove that the
plaintiff acted with the level of aggression that the defendants allege in their motion.
As explained in more detail below, we are cautioned to refrain from a reflexive
reliance on equivocal video evidence when reaching ultimate legal conclusions, See
Jessica Silbey, Cross–Examining Film, 8 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class
17 (2008); Martin A. Schwartz et al., Analysis of Videotape Evidence in Police
Misconduct Cases, 25 Touro L.Rev. 857 (2009) and should decline to grant summary
judgment based upon video evidence with inherent ambiguities. See e.g., Velez v.
2
Breeland v. Cook, No. 3:12-CV-2511, 2014 WL 820167, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3,
2014); Abney v. Younker, No. 1:13-CV-1418, 2019 WL 7812383, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 3, 2019). Accordingly, since claims of excessive force are inherently fact-bound
in nature, and the video evidence is inconclusive as to the precise force used by the
defendants, a fact upon which the Court would have to find in the defendants favor
as a matter of law, this claim still hinges upon the differing accounts of the opposing
parties and is not appropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, we will deny the
defendants’ motion.1
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Anthony Castello is a prisoner housed in the Union County Prison. According
to state court records, Castello was convicted of resisting arrest, public drunkenness,
criminal mischief, and harassment in August of 2024 and received a nine-to-twenty-
four-month sentence. Commonwealth v. Castello, CP-60-CR-0000190-2023.
Castello alleged in his complaint that these charges arose out of a May 4, 2023,
1 We note that this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for pretrial
management in anticipation of the appointment of a new magistrate judge who will
ultimately preside over this matter should it proceed to trial. Given this procedural
posture, we deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice to
the parties seeking reconsideration of the summary judgment matter upon the
appointment of a new judge in this case.
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responded to this emergency, and according to Castello, he was brutally beaten at the
scene. (Id.) Castello alleges that he suffered facial fractures, hematoma, pinched
nerves, lacerations, contusions, and a concussion at the hands of the arresting
troopers. (Id.)
Castello filed this complaint on June 24, 2024, the factual allegations in which
spoke solely in terms of an excessive force claim lodged against the arresting
troopers, but also alleged that the defendants engaged in false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution and named, in addition to the three
arresting troopers, the Pennsylvania State Police and State Police Troop F command
center as institutional defendants. (Id.) The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint on September 5, 2024. (Doc. 21). This Court granted the
defendants’ motion and dismissed all of Castello’s claims except for the Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim against the three arresting troopers, a claim which,
at the time, the defendants did not challenge. (Docs. 33, 34). Thus, as of December
2024, the instant case proceeded forward only on the Fourth Amendment excessive
force claim brought against Defendants Arbogast, Horan, and Bowers in their
individual capacities. (Doc. 34).
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plaintiff’s excessive force claims fail as a matter of law because each of the troopers
used only the force required to subdue and arrest the plaintiff. On this score, the
defendants allege that, on May 4, 2023, Troopers Arbogast and Bowers received a
call that a white male dressed in black was attempting to break into several cars
parked at a hotel and restaurant. (Doc. 42, ⁋ 3). They arrived at the scene and found
Castello face down on the road, screaming incoherently, foaming at the mouth, and
sweating profusely. (Id., ⁋⁋ 6-12). Trooper Arbogast testified that he believed, based
on his expertise and training, that Castello was high on PCP or meth. (Id., ⁋ 12).
According to the defendants, Castello got up and began walking toward the officers
and several civilians at the scene and both Trooper Arbogast and Bowers warned him
to get down or be tased. (Id., ⁋⁋ 15-18). Castello then got on the ground but did not
comply with orders to roll over and put his hands behind his head. (Id., ⁋⁋ 27-28).
The troopers testified they were concerned about potential hidden weapons and being
struck by the plaintiff while he was on the ground. (Id., ⁋ 33). After a struggle,
Trooper Arbogast tased the plaintiff, after which he continues to struggle and swing
at Trooper Arbogast. (Id., ⁋⁋ 32-36). The troopers then begin striking the plaintiff,
and stated they had to “go hands” in order to prevent more harm and place in him
restraints as fast as possible. (Id., ⁋⁋ 36-42). Trooper Horan arrived on the scene
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arms out from under him until they are able to handcuff him and get him up. (Id., ⁋⁋
43-50). Emergency services arrived and troopers notified them he needed a sedative
because he was out of control. (Id., ⁋ 54).
Trooper Arbogast admitted to striking Castello in the face three times “to
achieve pain compliance.” (Id., ⁋ 56). Trooper Bowers admitted to kicking Castello
in his thigh. (Id., ⁋ 57). Trooper Horan testified that a substantial amount of force was
required to place the plaintiff in handcuffs but that he did not utilize any “pain
compliance” techniques nor observe other troopers doing so. (Id., ⁋ 60-61).
To support their version of events, the defendants have submitted the mobile
video recording (MVR) from Trooper Arbogast and Trooper Bowers’ vehicles. (Doc.
42-2, 42-3). The Arbogast video, (Doc. 42-3, Exhibit C), which has the best view,
does show a seemingly disoriented Castello on the ground before getting up and
walking toward the Troopers and then again dropping to the ground where officers
attempt to get him to put his hands behind his back while telling him to “stop
resisting.” After he is tased, it is difficult to see precisely what transpires while the
plaintiff is on the ground with the troopers on top of him, but there is clearly a struggle
until the officers are able to handcuff him. After an ambulance arrives, the plaintiff
can still be heard screaming incoherently. In our view this video, taken from a
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defendants’ version of events that Castello was not entirely compliant with
commands although it is difficult to ascertain exactly what force was used by the
officers in attempting to force compliance. And, of course, at this juncture we must
construe the video in the light most favorable to Castello, the non-movant.
The pro se, incarcerated plaintiff, Castello, has not provided his own rebuttal
statement of material facts or much factual evidence or argument in opposition to the
defendants’ motion. His brief in opposition simply states that he can only send four
pages per envelope and that the Court should rely upon the previously submitted
exhibits and brief in support of his motion for summary judgment.2 As previously
2 We acknowledge here, as we did in denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, that the manner in which the plaintiff is conducting his summary judgment
practice runs afoul of Rule 56.1 in that he has failed to provide his own statement of
material facts or, here, appropriately respond to the defendant’s statement of material
facts. Nonetheless, we are cognizant of the limitations upon Castello as an
incarcerated pro se litigant and acknowledge that we have an obligation to construe
pro se pleadings liberally. See Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d
Cir. 2011). This “policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the
understanding that implicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the
part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from
inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training.” Id.
(quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). On this score, we note that Castello has
also filed an “affidavit,” in which he states that his allegations were made under the
penalty of perjury. (Doc. 39-3). Thus, liberally construed, we will treat Castello’s
brief in opposition and the attached exhibits to his own motion for summary judgment
as his allegations in opposition to the instant summary judgment motion.
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Castello in support of his motion for summary judgment, but as for his version of
events, his affidavit states that, on the date of the incident he was in a medical
emergency and in dire need of medical attention when the troopers arrived. (Doc. 39-
3, ⁋ 1). Castello states that none of the officers identified themselves in their official
capacity3 but that he nonetheless complied with their orders and never attempted to
punch, kick, push, or flee. (Id., ⁋ 2). According to Castello, the video evidence
demonstrates that most of the blows occurred while both of his arms and legs were
under the control and grasp of all three of the troopers. (Id., ⁋ 3). He alleges that, as
a result of the assault, he suffered acute metabolic encephalopathy, multiple facial
fractures, hematoma of his right eye, pinched nerves in both wrists from the
handcuffs, lacerations, huge contusions of both whole upper arms, abrasions on the
whole upper half of the left side of his face, rhabdomyolysis, osteomyelitis, and a
severe concussion leaving him “incapable of any decision-making skills” including
knowing his own name for 48 hours. (Id., ⁋ 4).
Castello was ultimately arrested and convicted of resisting arrest, disorderly
conduct (engaging in fighting), public drunkenness, criminal mischief (property
3 In the video of the incident, the troopers are easily identifiable, having arrived in
full uniform in their police vehicles.
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is currently incarcerated at SCI-Laurel Highlands. (Doc. 48).
The parties in this case have filed opposing motions for summary judgment,
each arguing that no jury could find in the other’s favor as to the question of whether
the Troopers used excessive force in effectuating Castello’s arrest. On April 25, 2025,
we denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that issues of
material fact existed as to this question. The defendants’ motion for summary
judgment has now been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Docs. 42, 45, 48).
While, at the time we ruled on the plaintiff’s motion, we deferred the question of
whether the defendants could meet the exacting burden of showing whether the force
they used was objectively reasonable as a matter of law, after a renewed review of
the record, we conclude that questions remain as to the type and level of force used
by the defendants and whether it was excessive under the circumstances. These
questions simply cannot be resolved by the Court at this juncture based upon the
equivocal video evidence. Accordingly, we will deny the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment – Standard of Review
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
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judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that
do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), and
for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co.
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law
identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis
that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes
shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown
that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s claims, “the
non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest
solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.”
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment
is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the
non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence
supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey
City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing
to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual
disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne
cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing
any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App’x
11
judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere
allegations or denial.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676
F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697
F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue
of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is
also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969).
Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon
bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338,
341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Further, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or
assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in
adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most
favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc.
v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-
moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be
taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence
unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations,
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plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple
BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has
instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match,
item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In
practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla”
threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court
cannot credit the movant’s version of events against the opponent, even
if the quantity of the movant’s evidence far outweighs that of its
opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the
believability and weight of the evidence.
Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d
464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
Finally, as we have observed in the past, in a case such as this, where critical
events at issue have been captured on videotape, the Court is obliged to consider that
videotaped evidence in determining whether there is any genuine dispute as to
material facts. See Breeland v. Cook, No. 3:12-CV-2511, 2014 WL 820167, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2014); Abney v. Younker, No. 1:13-CV-1418, 2019 WL 7812383,
at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2019). In fact, it is clear that, in this setting, we must view the
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81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (reversing court of appeals ruling with
respect to application of qualified immunity in an excessive force case, noting that
the court of appeals erred by accepting a version of facts that was shown to be a
“visible fiction” and admonishing that the lower court “should have viewed the facts
in the light depicted by the videotape”).
On this score, any assessment of the probative value of video evidence must
take into account that the camera, while an immutable witness, can only describe
events from the particular perspective of the video's lens. Thus, the camera only
allows us to see what the camera observed and recorded, and our assessment of the
evidence must be undertaken through the prism of the camera's perspective, subject
to all of the vagaries and limitations of that perspective. This fact has led
commentators to caution courts to refrain from a reflexive reliance on equivocal video
evidence when reaching ultimate legal conclusions. See Jessica Silbey, Cross–
Examining Film, 8 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 17 (2008); Martin A.
Schwartz et al., Analysis of Videotape Evidence in Police Misconduct Cases, 25
Touro L.Rev. 857 (2009).
Moreover, where a video has inherent ambiguities, courts have declined
invitations to grant summary judgment based upon that video evidence. See e.g.,
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29, 2016); Breeland v. Cook, No. 3:12-CV-2511, 2014 WL 820167, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 3, 2014); Abney v. Younker, No. 1:13-CV-1418, 2019 WL 7812383, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2019). It is against this legal backdrop that we review the plaintiff’s
motion in this case.
B. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Will Be Denied.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the force used
by Troopers Arbogast, Bowers, and Horan was objectively reasonable and that no
jury could find in favor of the plaintiff based upon the evidence presented by the
parties. As we noted in denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
excessive force claims frequently entail a fact-specific inquiry. On this score, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that claims against law enforcement
officers that allege the use of excessive force in the context of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other “seizure” are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's “reasonableness”
standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Indeed, “[t]he use of
excessive force is itself an unlawful ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Couden
v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006). In assessing such a claim for a Fourth
Amendment violation under § 1983, the inquiry is whether the force used by the law
enforcement officers was objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the
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Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing
of “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests’” against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)
. . . Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447
(1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the
facts and circumstances of each particular case[.]
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Thus, when considering such claims, the reasonableness of
a particular use of force is often dependent upon factual context and must be “judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396-97.
Against this standard, the parties competing accounts of the arrest, neither fully
supported by the objective video evidence, present precisely the type of factual
dispute which precludes summary judgment. It is undisputed that some force was
used in effectuating Castello’s arrest. But the defendants argue that the amount of
force applied was necessary to restrain Castello, who they believed was high on PCP
or meth and was out of control. The troopers all testified that Castello was “large,
strong, and forcefully resisting their attempts to restrain him and that substantial force
was necessary to final[lly] subdue him.” (Id., ⁋ 62). Thus, they allege that they were
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upon their knowledge at the time and their view that Castello presented as violent and
dangerous, had been reported attempting to break into cars and was actively resisting
arrest and refusing to obey orders.
This case strikes us as a close call. Indeed, the video evidence, while
incomplete, does not appear to show the officers using significant force in an attempt
to subdue Castello. Moreover, the medical evidence demonstrated that, although he
suffered mild injuries to his head and body from the force used by the troopers, he
was placed in critical care due to complications from drug overdose, including acute
renal failure, dehydration, drug overdose impairing vitals, lactic acidosis, and “life-
threatening toxidrome.” (Doc. 39-6, at 4). The medical notes state that he “required
an excessive amount of sedation to control his agitation.” (Id., at 5).
However, in our view, the video also does not show the level of violence and
aggression on the part of Castello as characterized by the defendants. Indeed,
although the video shows that Castello was seemingly not putting his hands behind
his back, he was also clearly not fully in control of his motor functions, was stumbling
and rolling around on the ground, and screaming and speaking incoherently, facts
that could support the plaintiff’s view that he was suffering a medical emergency in
the form of a drug overdose at the time of the arrest. Moreover, the plaintiff appears
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onlookers elevated the level of risk and thus force necessary to subdue the plaintiff,
was seemingly not aggressive toward these bystanders.
As we noted in denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, these
two versions of events presented by the parties as to whether the force applied by the
officers was reasonable pose profound, irreconcilable, and unresolved factual
questions that prevent us from determining whether Castello’s excessive force claims
fail as a matter of law at this juncture. Indeed, although the defendants rely upon the
video evidence in supporting their version of events, the video simply does not
unquestionably bear out these lingering questions which must be resolved by an
impartial fact-finder and not by the Court, particularly when we are required to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to Castello. Therefore, the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 41), will be denied without prejudice to the
parties renewing their motions following the reassignment of this case.
An appropriate order follows.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: May 12 , 2025
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