Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Louisiana International Marine LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRAILER BRIDGE, INC. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS CASE NO. 22-5358

LOUISIANA INTERNATIONAL MARINE, LLC SECTION: “G”(5)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This matter came before this Court for trial without a jury on December 16, 2024. Plaintiff

Trailer Bridge, Inc. (“Trailer Bridge”) brings this action challenging the validity of Defendant

Louisiana International Marine, LLC’s (“LIM”) maritime liens for towage and related necessaries

against two barges owned by Plaintiff, namely the ATLANTA BRIDGE and MEMPHIS BRIDGE,

in rem, for the principal amount of $1,917,785.72.1 The substantive law applicable to this case is

the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (“CIMLA”), 46 U.S.C. § 31301, et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the testimony of all of the witnesses and the exhibits

entered into evidence during the trial, as well as the record. After reviewing all of the evidence and

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a), the Court issues the following findings of

fact and conclusions of law. To the extent that any finding of fact may be construed as a conclusion

of law, the Court hereby adopts it as such and to the extent that any conclusion of law constitutes

a finding of fact, the Court hereby adopts it as such.

1 Rec. Doc. 1.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

On December 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court against Defendant seeking

declaration that the claims of lien asserted by Defendant are invalid.2 On January 23, 2023,

Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim against Plaintiff seeking recognition of the liens and

judgment in rem against the barges.3

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff owned two deck barges, ATLANTA BRIDGE and

MEMPHIS BRIDGE.4 On August 4, 2020, Plaintiff and Work Cat Florida, LLC (“Work Cat”)

executed a BIMCO Standard Barge Charter Party Agreement (“the Trailer Bridge/Work Cat

charter agreement”) for the time charter of the barges to Work Cat.5 The charter agreement

allegedly contained a no-lien and indemnity provision.6 The Complaint alleges that a copy of the

charter agreement was maintained in the line lockers of the ATLANTA BRIDGE and MEMPHIS

BRIDGE and was available upon request.7

On November 12, 2020, Work Cat and Defendant entered into two identical BIMCO

Supplytime 2005-time charter party agreements for certain offshore service vessels (collectively

“the LIM/Work Cat charter agreements”), namely the LA COMMANDER and the LA INVADER

owned by Defendant.8

2 Rec. Doc. 1 at 11.

3 Rec. Doc. 5.

4 Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

5 Id. at 3.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

Beginning in January 2021, Work Cat, pursuant to the LIM/Work Cat charter agreements,

utilized the services of the LA COMMANDER and the LA INVADER to perform various services

including towage of the chartered barges owned by Plaintiff.9 According to the Complaint,

Plaintiff was not a part of, did not consent to, and lacked knowledge of these arrangements.10

Defendant regularly invoiced Work Cat for payment for the services rendered from January

16, 2021 through June 18, 2021.11 On May 18, 2021, Work Cat filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida – Tampa Division.12 On

June 22, 2021, Work Cat converted its bankruptcy proceedings from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.13

On May 25, 2021, Defendant filed a proof of claim in the Work Cat bankruptcy

proceedings for the unpaid invoices to Work Cat totaling $1,364,214.17.14 Defendant alleged that

this amount was for “towage services and supplies” rendered to Work Cat for the use of the LA

COMMANDER and LA INVADER.15

On June 4, 2021, Defendant filed two claims of lien with the National Vessel

Documentation Center (“NVDC”) against the ATLANTA BRIDGE for $1,264,214.16 and against

9 Id. at 4.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 5.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 6.

the MEMPHIS BRIDGE for $1,362,214.16.16 Both claims of lien allege a maritime lien for

necessaries for towage against the respective barges.17

On August 1, 2022 and November 28, 2022, Plaintiff entered into Purchase and Sale

Agreements to sell the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and the ATLANTA BRIDGE.18 Both agreements

require Plaintiff to indemnify and defend the purchasers.19 On November 30, 2022, Defendant sent

a Notice of Lien and Demand for Payment to the purchaser of the MEMPHIS BRIDGE.20 On

December 16, 2022, the purchaser made demand to Plaintiff seeking defense and indemnity against

the claim asserted by Defendant.21

B. Procedural Background

On January 8, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking summary

judgment in its favor recognizing the validity of the maritime liens for towage and related

necessaries against the two barges.22 On June 13, 2024, the Court denied summary judgment,

finding that (1) Defendant provided necessaries for the barges; (2) Defendant was not entitled to

fuel costs; and (3) a presumption exists that Defendant relied on the credit of the vessel.23 The

Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Defendant intended to

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 7.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 8.

22 Rec. Doc. 33.

23 Rec. Doc. 43.

forego the lien.24

A trial without a jury was held from December 16, 2024 through December 17, 2024.25 At

the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for Judgment of Partial Findings that

Defendant did not have actual notice of the no-lien provision, which was taken under advisement.26

At the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for partial judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), that Plaintiff had not met its burden of proving actual notice.27 The

Court took this matter under advisement.28 On day two of trial, the Court ruled that Defendant did

not have actual notice of the no-lien clause.29 After Defendant rested, Plaintiff moved for Judgment

as a Matter of Law on the claims asserted against Plaintiff in personam.30 Defendant conceded that

it does not intend to assert a claim against Plaintiff in personam.31 Second, Plaintiff moved for

Judgment as a Matter of Law in its favor finding that the maritime liens asserted by Defendant

were invalid.32 This issue was taken under advisement.33 Third, Plaintiff made an oral motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that Defendant did not have actual notice of the no-lien clause,

which was taken under advisement.34 Fourth, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law as

24 Id. at 27–28.

25 Rec. Docs. 88–89.

26 Rec. Doc. 88.

27 Trial Transcript, Day One.

28 Id.

29 Rec. Doc. 89.

30 Trial Transcript, Day Two.

31 Id.

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 Id.

it relates to whether Defendant’s liens were incorrect and invalid, which was taken under

advisement.35 Fifth, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as a Matter Law in its favor finding that LIM’s

claims were discharged in bankruptcy court, which was denied by the Court.36 Sixth, Plaintiff

moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to the reasonableness of the claim of lien asserted by

LIM, which was denied.37 Seventh, Plaintiff moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law in its favor

finding that LIM did not rely on the credit of the vessels, which was denied.38

II. Findings of Fact

1. Trailer Bridge, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of

Delaware with its principal place of business located in Florida.39 Trailer Bridge, Inc. is a

supply chain company that specializes in logistics.40

2. Louisiana International Marine, LLC is a limited liability company organized under the

laws of the State of Louisiana.41

3. The MEMPHIS BRIDGE is a flat deck cargo barge bearing U.S. official number

1067458.42 At all relevant times, the MEMPHIS BRIDGE was owned by Trailer Bridge,

Inc.43

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 2.

40 Trial Day One, Plaintiff’s Opening Statement.

41 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 2.

42 Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

43 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 5.

4. The ATLANTA BRIDGE is a flat deck cargo barge bearing U.S. official number

1067457.44 At all relevant times, the ATLANTA BRIDGE was owned by Trailer Bridge,

Inc.45

5. Work Cat and Trailer Bridge entered into a BIMCO Standard Barge Charter Party

Agreement (“Work Cat/Trailer Bridge Charter”) on August 4, 2020.46 The Work

Cat/Trailer Bridge charter agreement contained a no-lien and indemnity clause.47 The no-

lien and indemnity clause states, “The Charters shall not suffer nor permit to be continued,

any lien or encumbrance incurred by them or their agents, which might have priority over

the title and interest of the Owners in the Barge.”48

6. LIM was a contractor for Work Cat. Work Cat engaged LIM to pull the barges [MEMPHIS

BRIDGE and ATLANTA BRIDGE] from Tampa, Florida to Brownsville, Texas and back

to Tampa, Florida.49

7. It was customary for Work Cat to maintain binders upon the vessel towing the respective

barge. Said binders usually contain a copy of the charter agreement.50

8. Work Cat’s CEO, Christopher Raley, did not perform an inventory of the contents of the

binders upon the respective tugboats which towed the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and

44 Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

45 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 5.

46 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 5.

47 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Christopher Raley.

48 Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 1.

49 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Christopher Raley.

50 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Christopher Raley.

ATLANTA BRIDGE.51

9. On November 12, 2020, Work Cat chartered two tugboats owned by LIM, the LA

INVADER and LA COMMANDER, via two identical BIMCO Supplytime 2005 Time

Charter Part Agreements for Certain Offshore Service Vessels (“Work Cat/LIM

Charter”).52

10. LIM invoiced Work Cat a daily rate for towage services of the LA INVADER and LA

COMMANDER to work as directed with liner service between Tampa and Brownsville.53

The invoices include dates of service beginning from December 11, 2020 through June 18,

2021.54 The LA MADONNA was formerly used in connection with the towage services

but was substituted by the LA INVADER.55

11. The LA INVADER was used to tow the MEMPHIS BRIDGE, and the LA COMMANDER

was used to tow the ATLANTA BRIDGE.56

12. LIM did not rely on Work Cat as the sole source of recovery in the event LIM was not paid.

LIM acknowledged it also had the opportunity to lien the cargo, the equipment, or the barge

for its protection.57

13. On December 20, 2020, Christopher Raley, CEO of Work Cat, sent an email to Anthony

Roberts, LIM’s operations manager, which included the Work Cat/Trailer Bridge charter

51 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Christopher Raley.

52 Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 2.

53 Trial Day One; Direct Examination of Christopher Raley; Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 3.

54 Defendant’s Trial Exhibits 1 and 2; Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Christopher Raley; Trial Day

One, Direct Examination of Anthony Roberts; Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Anthony Roberts.

55 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Christopher Raley.

56 Defendant’s Trial Exhibit 3.

57 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Anthony Roberts.

agreement.58

14. Anthony Roberts, LIM’s operations manager, did not read the no-lien provision contained

in the Work Cat/Trailer Bridge charter agreement.59 No one discussed with Anthony

Roberts the no-lien clause contained in the Work Cat/Trailer Bridge charter agreement.

Anthony Roberts was not aware of the no-lien clause.60

15. Anthony Roberts testified that Christopher Raley sent over a copy of the Work Cat/Trailer

Bridge charter agreement because Christopher Raley was unhappy with having to pay

Trailer Bridge in advance, and he wanted Anthony Roberts to review the contract regarding

the advance payment.61

16. Barges do not require fuel. Fuel was provided for the tugboats.62

17. Work Cat contracted with Glander International Bunkering for fuel and lube. Glander

International Bunkering invoiced Work Cat for fuel and lube.63

18. Glander International Bunkering asserted a lien against LIM’s vessels for nonpayment of

fuel and lube.64 LIM paid to release the liens.65 Glander assigned its bankruptcy claim

against Work Cat to LIM after LIM paid to release the liens.66

58 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Christopher Raley.

59 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Anthony Roberts.

60 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Anthony Roberts.

61 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Anthony Roberts.

62 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Christopher Raley.

63 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Christopher Raley.

64 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Anthony Roberts.

65 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Anthony Roberts.

66 Trial Day Two, Direct Examination of Elizabeth Autin.

19. On May 18, 2021, Work Cat filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida – Tampa Division.67

20. On May 25, 2021, LIM filed a proof of claim in the Work Cat bankruptcy proceeding for

unpaid invoices for towage services and supplies totaling $1,364,214.17.68

21. On June 4, 2021, LIM filed two notices of lien claims with the National Vessel

Documentation Center (“NVDC”) – one against the ATLANTA BRIDGE in the amount

of $1,362,214.16, and another against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE in the amount of

$1,362,214.16.69

22. The notice of liens against both the ATLANTA BRIDGE and the MEMPHIS BRIDGE

state that the date the liens were established is January 16, 2021.70

23. The notice of lien in the amount of $1,364,214.17 asserted against the ATLANTA

BRIDGE was reflective of the total unpaid invoices in connection with both the

ATLANTA BRIDGE and the MEMPHIS BRIDGE.71

24. The notice of lien in the amount of $1,364,214.17 asserted against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE

was reflective of the total unpaid invoices in connection with both the ATLANTA

BRIDGE and the MEMPHIS BRIDGE.72

25. On June 22, 2021, Work Cat converted its bankruptcy proceedings from Chapter 11 to

67 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 5.

68 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 6; Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 5.

69 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 6; Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 6.

70 Trial Day One, Cross Examination of Christopher Raley; Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 6; Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit

7.

71 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Anthony Roberts.

72 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Anthony Roberts.

Chapter 7.73

26. On August 1, 2022, Trailer Bridge entered into an agreement to sell the MEMPHIS

BRIDGE. On November 28, 2022, Trailer Bridge entered into an agreement to sell the

ATLANTA BRIDGE.74

27. Following the notice of liens asserted by LIM against the ATLANTA BRIDGE, a potential

buyer backed out of a prospective sale to buy the ATLANTA BRIDGE.75

28. On November 20, 2023, Trailer Bridge and LIM entered into a Lien Escrow Agreement.76

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Whether LIM is Entitled to a Maritime Lien Against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and

ATLANTA BRIDGE

To be entitled to a maritime lien under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens

Act (“CIMLA”), LIM must show that it provided necessaries to the vessels “on the order of the

owner or a person authorized by the owner.”77 The CIMLA defines “necessaries” as including

“repairs, supplies, towage, and the use of a dry dock or marine railway…”78 CIMLA provides that

the following individuals are presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for a vessel:

1. The owner;

2. The master;

3. A person entrusted with the management of the vessel at the port of supply; or

4. An officer or agent appointed by-

i. The owner;

ii. A charterer;

iii. An owner pro hac vice;

73 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 6.

74 Uncontested fact, Rec. Doc. 87 at 6.

75 Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Joseph Kvasnicka.

76 Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 9.

77 46 U.S.C. § 31341, et seq.

78 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4).

iv. An agreed buyer in possession of the vessel.79

Under the CIMLA, a person providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person

authorized by the owner (1) has a maritime lien on the vessel; (2) may bring a civil action in rem

to enforce the lien; and (3) is not required to allege or prove in the action that credit was given to

the vessel.80

1. Whether LIM Provided Necessaries to the Barges

First, the Court finds that the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that LIM provided

necessaries to the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and the ATLANTA BRIDGE on the order of Work Cat,

the charterer. The CIMLA defines “necessaries” as including “repairs, supplies, towage, and the

use of a dry dock or marine railway…”81 Charterers, like Work Cat, “are presumed to have

authority to procure necessaries for a vessel.”82 The evidence presented shows that LIM provided

towage services for the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and the ATLANTA BRIDGE as directed by Work

Cat in connection with liner services between Tampa and Brownsville from December 2020

through June 2021. Christopher Raley, Work Cat’s CEO, and Anthony Roberts, LIM’s Operations

Manager, testified that LIM provided towage and invoiced Work Cat a daily rate for towage

services of the LA INVADER and LA COMMANDER which towed the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and

ATLANTA BRIDGE to work as directed with liner service between Tampa and Brownsville.83

For these reasons, the Court finds that LIM provided necessaries to the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and

79 Id.

80 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a).

81 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4).

82 46 U.S.C. § 31341(a).

83 Trial Day One; Direct Examination of Christopher Raley; Trial Day One, Direct Examination of Anthony

Roberts.

the ATLANTA BRIDGE.

2. Whether LIM had Actual Knowledge of the No-Lien Clause

Next, the Court finds that Trailer Bridge has not met its burden of showing that LIM had

actual knowledge of the no-lien clause contained in the Work Cat/Trailer Bridge charter

agreement. As stated above, charterers, like Work Cat, “are presumed to have authority to procure

necessaries for a vessel.”84 Trailer Bridge may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that LIM

had actual knowledge of the no lien clause.85 Federal courts have uniformly construed no lien

clauses in charters as without effect to bar a lien in favor of a supplier, unless it is proved that, at

the time the contract was entered into, the supplier had actual knowledge of the prohibition of lien

clause.86 “The party seeking to bar a supplier’s maritime lien has the burden of proving that the

supplier actually knew of a no lien clause in the charter party or other contract.”87 Actual

knowledge that the vessel is under charter will not bar a lien unless the prohibition of lien clause

itself is brought to the supplier’s attention.88

84 46 U.S.C. § 31341(a).

85 World Fuel Servs. Trading, DMCC v. M/V Hebei Shijiazhuang, 12 F. Supp. 3d 792, 808 (E.D. Va. 2014)

(quoting Belcher Oil Co. v. M/V Gardenia, 766 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985)).

86 Bomin Greece S.A. v. M/V Genco Success, 2017 AMC 1716 (N.D. N.Y. 2017); Cal Dive Offshore

Contractors, Inc. v. M/V Sampson, 2017 AMC 1871 (S.D. N.Y. 2017); World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC v. Hebei

Prince Shipping Co., 783 F.3d 507, 522 (4th Cir. 2015); Stevens Shipping & Terminal v. Japan Rainbow II MV, 334

F.3d 439, 2003 AMC 1647 (5th Cir. 2003); Lake Union Drydock Co. v. M/V Polar Viking, 446 F. Supp. 1286, 1978

AMC 1477 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Caribe Mar, 757 F.2d 743, 1985 AMC 2726 (5th Cir.

1985); TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc. v. M/V Jagat Vijeta, 696 F.2d 1135, 1983 AMC 1980 (5th Cir. 1983); see

also Memphis Boat Refueling Service, Inc. v. Ole Man River Towing, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Redcliffe

Americas Ltd. v. M/V Tyson Lykes, 806 F. Supp. 69, 1993 AMC 1027 (D. S.C. 1992), reversed on other grounds 996

F.2d 47, 1993 AMC 2294 (4th Cir. 1993); American Oil Trading, Inc. v. M/V Sava, 47 F. Supp. 2d 348, 1999 AMC

1729 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).

87 Id.

88 See Ramsay Scarlett & Co., Inc. v. S.S. Koh Eun, 462 F. Supp. 277, 1979 AMC 970 (E.D. Va.

1978); Belcher Oil Co. v. M/V Gardenia, 766 F.2d 1508, 1986 AMC 1745 (11th Cir. 1985); Ferromet Resources, Inc.

v. Chemoil Corp., 5 F.3d 902, 1995 AMC 157 (5th Cir. 1993).

For example, in Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V CARIBE MAR,89 the Fifth Circuit found that

a supplier of necessaries had actual notice of a prohibition of lien clause after the supplier received

a letter specifically advising them of the prohibition of lien clause. Similarly, in Stevens Shipping

& Terminal Co. v. M/V JAPAN RAINBOW II, the district court found actual knowledge of the no-

lien provision after the managing agent for the vessel “faxed a two-page Notice of the prohibition

of liens clause contained in the subject charter party” to the supplier.90 In Belcher Oil Co v. M/V

Gardenia, the Eleventh Circuit found that a supplier of necessaries had actual notice of a

prohibition of lien clause when its representative was advised of the prohibition of lien clause by

the charterer’s agent.91 In Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Freedom, the district court found no actual

notice where bunker receipts were stamped with a prohibition of lien notice, were received by the

bunker supplier’s billing department, and “there [was] no evidence that anyone at [the bunker

supplier’s company] noticed the no-lien stamp on the one prior invoice which contained it or that

any clerk understood its meaning.”92

There has been no evidence presented that the prohibition of lien clause was brought to

LIM’s attention. Anthony Roberts testified that Christopher Raley emailed him a copy of the Work

Cat/Trailer Bridge charter agreement, but the email failed to specifically reference the prohibition

of lien clause.93 Anthony Roberts testified that Christopher Raley emailed him the Work

Cat/Trailer Bridge charter agreement for the specific purpose of reviewing the advance payment

provision. Anthony Roberts testified that he had no knowledge of the no-lien clause, that he did

89 757 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1985).

90 2002 WL 1339145 at *2 (E.D. La. June 17, 2002), aff'd, 334 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2003).

91 766 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985).

92 1985 WL 4787, at *3 (D. Or. July 25, 1985).

93 Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 4.

not read the Work Cat/Trailer Bridge charter agreement in full, nor did he read the no-lien

provision contained in the charter agreement. Anthony Roberts further testified that no one

discussed the no-lien clause with him. “It is not enough for [the supplier] to have knowledge that

the [vessel] was under charter, there must be actual knowledge of the no-lien provision in the

charter party.”94 As such, the Court finds that LIM did not have actual knowledge of the no-lien

clause.

3. Whether LIM Relied on the Credit of the Vessel

Third, the Court finds that Trailer Bridge has not met its burden of showing that LIM

purposefully intended to forego the lien. As stated above, LIM provided necessaries to the vessels,

and thus, a presumption exists that LIM relied on the credit of the vessels. If the burden is carried

that goods or services qualifying for a lien were furnished to a vessel, Section 31342(a)(3) creates

a presumption of reliance on the credit of the vessel, and there is no need to allege or prove this

fact.95 The party opposing the lien rather has the burden of negating this by establishing that the

personal credit of the owner or charterer was solely relied upon.96 To meet this burden, evidence

must be submitted that the supplier of goods or services purposefully intended to forego the lien.97

The Fifth Circuit has “consistently held that it is necessary that a litigant arguing for such a waiver

prove that the creditor deliberately intended ‘to forego the valuable privilege which the law accords

and look solely to the owner’s personal credit.’”98

94 Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Freedom, No. CIV. 84-425FR, 1985 WL 4787, at *2 (D. Or. July 25, 1985).

95 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 9:3 Liens for “necessaries”: the Commercial

Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (2023).

96 TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc. v. M/V Jagat Vijeta, 696 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1983).

97 Maritrend, Inc. v. Serac & Co. (Shipping). Ltd, 348 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2003).

98 Gulf Oil Trading Co., a Div. of Gulf Oil Co. v. M/V CARIBE MAR, 757 F.2d 743, 750 (5th Cir. 1985).

Trailer Bridge failed to present evidence that LIM solely relied on the credit of Work Cat.

To the contrary, Anthony Roberts testified that LIM did not rely on Work Cat as the sole source

of recovery in the event LIM was not paid. Anthony Roberts acknowledged LIM had the

opportunity to lien the cargo, the equipment, or the barge for its protection. Thus, Trailer Bridge

fails to rebut the presumption that LIM relied on the credit of the vessels.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that LIM is entitled to a maritime lien against

the MEMPHIS BRIDGE and the ATLANTA BRIDGE under the CIMLA.

B. Trailer Bridge’s Conversion Claim

Trailer Bridge brings a claim against LIM for conversion. “Under the general maritime

law, as under the common law of torts, a person may be liable for certain intentional wrongs, such

as conversion[.]”99 The Fifth Circuit looked to the “landside context” for this maritime tort to

define it as “the unlawful and wrongful exercise of dominion, ownership or control over the

property of another, to the exclusion of the same rights by the owner.”100 The Court finds that

Trailer Bridge has failed to show a prima facie case for conversion. Because the Court has found

that LIM is entitled to a maritime lien against the ATLANTA BRIDGE and MEMPHIS BRIDGE

under the CIMLA, LIM’s exercise of dominion, ownership or control was not unlawful. For these

reasons, the Court dismisses Trailer Bridge’s conversion claim.

C. Damages

Given the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this opinion, the Court hereby finds

the damages as follows:

99 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5:3 (6th ed., Nov. 2024 update) (Westlaw) (citing

The Lydia (Hugh D. MacKenzie Co. v. Steamship Lydia), 1 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1924)).

100 Goodpasture, Inc. v. M/V Pollux, 602 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Scurlock

Oil Co., 447 F.2d 997, 1004 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Texas law)).

1. LIM?’s Unpaid Invoices

First, LIM prays for judgment in rem against the ATLANTA BRIDGE in the amount of

$889,575.73, and against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE in the amount of $1,028,219.99, plus

interest.!°! Based on the invoices presented at trial,'°? the Court finds that LIM is entitled to

judgment in rem against the ATLANTA BRIDGE in the amount of $630,402.10, and against the

MEMPHIS BRIDGE in the amount of $863,162.50 for towage services provided from January 16,

2021 through June 18, 2021. The Court further finds that LIM is not entitled to judgment against

the barges for fuel and lube costs. Fuel may qualify as a “necessary” to a vessel under CIMLA

when it is supplied to refuel that vessel.!™ It is undisputed that barges do not consume fuel. As

such, LIM is not entitled to costs for fuel and lube. The amount of damages is calculated as follows:

TR □□□ ce

12590 $56,562

12593 $82,500

12594 $71,500

12601 $82,500

12602 $88,000

12615[Apr1-15,2021 |laCommander | 8 $85,300

12616

12606 $93,000

12607

12621[May1-12,2021 |laCommander | 8 $71,039

12625

12626

12632

12635

12636

$863,162.50 $630,402

Trailer Bridge argues that the CIMLA only provides for maritime liens for towage, and the

day-rate invoiced by LIM includes times in which the barges were not being towed, for example,

101 Rec. Doc. 5 at 11.

102 Defendant’s Exhibit 3.

103 Martin Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Bourbon Petrel M/V, 962 F.3d 827, 831 (Sth Cir. 2020).

stand-by time. The Fifth Circuit instructs courts to “apply the provisions of CIMLA stricti juris to

ensure that maritime liens are not lightly extended by construction, analogy, or inference.”104

Necessaries “includes most goods or services that are useful to the vessel, keep her out of danger,

and enable her to perform her particular function. These are items useful to vessel operations and

necessary to keep the ship going.”105 “Necessaries are the things that a prudent owner would

provide to enable a ship to perform well the functions for which she has been engaged.”106 Courts

look to the “particular function” and requirements of a ship to determine what is a necessary for

that ship.107

Towage is traditionally defined as the act of assisting a vessel in moving from one place to

another.108 However, Trailer Bridge has not provided any authority that states stand-by time is not

lienable under the CIMLA, nor can the Court locate any such authority. To the contrary, in Trico

Marine Operations, the district court found that stand-by time was lienable.109 In that case, the

contract between the parties explicitly included stand-by time. While the Trailer Bridge/Work Cat

charter agreement here does not explicitly reference stand-by time, LIM’s tugboats, like the vessels

in Trico Marine, manned the barges and could not perform work for any company other than Work

Cat during the periods charged. The provisions of the charter agreement and the agreed upon day

104 Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. M/V Almi Sun, IMO No. 9579535, 893 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir.

2018) (internal quotations omitted).

105 Martin, 962 F.3d at 831 (internal quotations omitted).

106 Equilease Corp. v. M/V Sampson, 793 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

107 Martin, 962 F.3d at 832–33. See also Equilease, 793 F.2d at 603 (“What is a ‘necessary’ is to be

determined relative to the requirements of the ship.”).

108 46 C.F.R. § 136.110; Cont'l Ins. Co. v. L&L Marine Transportation, Inc., 882 F.3d 566, 570–71 (5th Cir.

2018); Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 328, 47 S. Ct. 368, 369, 71 L. Ed. 663 (1927) (“Towage service is

the employment of one vessel to expedite the voyage of another.”).

109 Trico Marine Operations, Inc. v. Falcon Drilling Co., 1996 WL 96883 (E.D. La. 1996).

rate clearly envision that the towage services would necessitate both transit time and standby time.

Further, as stated above, necessaries “includes most goods or services that are useful to the vessel,

keep her out of danger, and enable her to perform her particular function. These are items useful

to vessel operations and necessary to keep the ship going.”110 During the disputed stand-by periods,

the barges were kept out of danger, and the stand-by periods were necessary for the performance

of the underlying liner services. During stand-by periods, the tugboat and crew are typically

waiting for cargo to be loaded or unloaded, waiting for weather delays, unsafe conditions, or traffic

control delays. In any event, it would be virtually impossible for the Court to separate the periods

of transit from the stand-by periods based on the day-rate included in the invoices. For these

reasons, the Court must reject Trailer Bridge’s argument.

2. Pre-judgment and Post-judgment Interest

“As a general rule, prejudgment interest should be awarded in admiralty cases.”111 The

“[d]iscretion to deny prejudgment interest is created only when there are ‘peculiar circumstances’

that would make it inequitable for the losing party to be forced to pay prejudgment interest.”112

Here, there are no peculiar circumstances that would make it inequitable for Trailer Bridge to pay

prejudgment interest. Therefore, LIM is entitled to prejudgment interest.

“Prejudgment interest should commence from the date of loss, i.e., the date the invoice[]

became overdue.”113 “Admiralty courts in setting the[] rates [of prejudgment interest] have broad

discretion and may look to state law or other reasonable guidelines indicating a fair level of

110 Martin, 962 F.3d at 831 (internal quotations omitted).

111 Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. 1980).

112 Id. at 728–29.

113 ING Bank, N.V. v. M/V Charana Naree, 446 F. Supp. 3d 163, 177 (W.D. La. 2020).

compensation.”114 Given that this Court sits in Louisiana, the Court will apply the Louisiana

prejudgment interest rate, which is currently set at 8.25% per year.115 Prejudgment interest will

commence from the date of the last invoice, June 18, 2021. Finally, post-judgment interest shall

be assessed as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

3. Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2), “[t]he court may award costs and attorneys fees to

the prevailing party, unless the court finds that the position of the other party was substantially

justified or other circumstances make an award of costs and attorneys fees unjust.” The Court

finding no circumstances which would make an award of costs and attorneys fees unjust, awards

the prevailing party, LIM, attorney’s fees and costs.

114 Reeled Tubing, Inc. v. M/V Chad G, 794 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1986).

115 The Louisiana rate of legal interest is fixed by Louisiana Revised Statute § 13:4202.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Louisiana

International Marine and against the MEMPHIS BRIDGE, in rem, in the amount of $863,162.50,

plus court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Louisiana

International Marine and against the ATLANTA BRIDGE, in rem, in the amount of $630,402.10,

plus court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Louisiana International Marine is awarded

pre-judgment interest in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute § 13:4202 from June 18, 2021

to the date of judgment, and post-judgment interest in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen days of this Judgment Defendant

Louisiana International Marine must file a motion addressing the amount of attorney’s fees to be

awarded.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 9th day of May, 2025.

NANNETTE JOLIV E BROWN

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT