Sharp v. Miller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SCOTT SHARP, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 25-1139-CSB

)

)

SERGEANT MILLER and )

WARDEN CHANCE JONES, )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

COLIN S. BRUCE, U.S. District Judge:

Plaintiff Scott Sharp, proceeding pro se, is an inmate with the Illinois Department

of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is incarcerated at the IDOC’s Illinois River Correctional

Center (“Illinois River”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

and the case is now before the Court for a merit review of his claims.

Because he is a prisoner for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), the Court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint

and, through such process, to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the

entire action, if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,

liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th

Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts

must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v.

United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that, on November 19, 2024, Defendant Sgt. Miller entered into

his cell early in the early morning and removed a piece of cardboard from the cell’s

window that Plaintiff’s cellmate had placed there. Sgt. Miller, then, angrily slammed the

cell door, and Plaintiff attempted to return to sleep.

Approximately twenty (20) minutes later, three other correctional officers arrived

at Plaintiff’s cell, placed Plaintiff and his cellmate in handcuffs, and escorted them to the

segregation unit. The correctional officers told the two inmates that they were being

placed on investigative status and that they would need to speak with the internal

affairs department about the situation. Upon arriving at the segregation unit, Plaintiff

was forced to remove his clothing and was placed in a cell with no bedding for two

hours. Plaintiff remained in segregation for two days and was not allowed to take a

shower for these two days. Plaintiff was also provided minimal food for these two days,

which was ice cold upon receipt. Plaintiff also claims that his cell was very cold and that

the cell was without any heat.

On November 21, 2024, Plaintiff received a disciplinary report that Sgt. Miller

had written against him, alleging that he had threatened the safety and security of the

institution. According to Plaintiff, Sgt. Miller had feigned being exposed to an illegal

chemical or substance when she touched the piece of cardboard that Plaintiff’s cellmate

had used to block the window to the cell. Plaintiff was returned to his original cell on

November 21, 2024.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff could be attempting to state four claims against Sgt. Miller and/or Warden

Chance Jones, but none of Plaintiff’s potential legal claims are sufficient to allow him to

proceed in this case.

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a Due Process claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment based upon being placed into segregation for two days,

Plaintiff’s stay in segregation was too short in duration to invoke the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protections. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials

shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .

.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due Process is only required when punishment extends

the duration of confinement or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484 (1995). The Seventh Circuit has “concluded that inmates have no liberty interest

in avoiding transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for

administrative, protective, or investigative purposes.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765,

771 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“[R]eassignment from the general population to discretionary segregation does not

constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest.”)).

In fact, some courts have concluded that placement in non-punitive segregation

can “never implicate a liberty interest.” E.g., Williams v. Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 157 n.3

(7th Cir. 2021). Regardless, timing plays a part in the analysis, even when conditions are

significantly harsher. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not

have a constitutional right to remain in the general population, but both the duration

and the conditions of the segregation must be considered in determining whether due

process is implicated.”); Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697–98, 697 n. 2 & 3

(7th Cir. 2009) (“In a number of other cases, we have explained that a liberty interest

may arise if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals

that the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.”); Lekas, 405 F.3d at 612 (finding

that up to ninety days in segregation does not affect liberty).

In the instant case, even assuming that Plaintiff’s placement into segregation

triggered his Due Process rights, the Seventh Circuit has held that such a minimal

period of time cannot, as a matter of law, violate a prisoner’s liberty interests under the

Fourteenth Amendment. This Court is bound by the Seventh Circuit’s holding, and

therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim based upon the violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights for being placed into segregation for two

days.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s attempts to state a claim for a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights based upon the conditions of his confinement in segregation fails as

a matter of law. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he Eighth

Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions;’ it outlaws cruel and

unusual ‘punishments.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This means that “an

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as an infliction of

punishment.” Id. at 838.

Accordingly, “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

This type of deliberate indifference “implies at a minimum actual knowledge of

impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the

harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.” Duckworth v. Frazen,

780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985). “[M]ere negligence or even gross negligence does not

constitute deliberate indifference,” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996), and

it is not enough to show that a prison official merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v.

Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, Haley v. Gross, 86

F.3d 630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, discomfort is constitutionally insignificant. Chandler v. Crosby, 379

F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment is concerned with both the

‘severity’ and the ‘duration’ of the prisoner’s exposed to inadequate cooling and

ventilation.”); Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992) (objective component

met where prison conditions were “so strikingly reminiscent of the Black Hole of

Calcutta”); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17

F.3d 1574, 1581 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he Constitution does not require prison officials to

provide the equivalent of hotel accommodations or even comfortable prisons.”).

Further, prisoner must also show that he sustained some degree of harm in order

to prevail on a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment.

Without a showing of any harm resulting from the alleged deprivations, a prisoner

plaintiff cannot prevail. Vasquez v. Frank, 2008 WL 3820466, * 2-3 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008)

(holding that ventilation that allegedly caused dizziness, migraines, nasal congestion,

nose bleeds and difficulty breathing did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation); Jasman v. Schmidt, 2001 WL 128430, * 2 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2001) (rejecting a

prisoner’s complaint about poor ventilation where plaintiff failed to allege harm caused

by the ventilation); Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1290-98 (citing cases and concluding that a

ventilation system that allowed summer temperatures to average eighty-five or eighty-

six degrees during the day and eighty degrees at night was not sufficiently extreme to

violate the Eighth Amendment where such temperatures were expected and tolerated

by the general public in Florida).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was cold and that he was served cold food for two

days. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that, although these conditions were

unpleasant, they did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. E.g., Darden v.

Martini, 2024 WL 3621126, * 2 (S.D. Ind. July 31, 2024) (holding that placement in a dirty

cell for two days did not violate the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights); Newmones v.

Ransom, 2024 WL 624239, * 4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2024) (two days in cell covered in

inmate’s feces did not state an Eighth Amendment claim); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d

1232, 1235–36 (7th Cir. 1988) (five day stay in “filthy, roach-infested cell” not

unconstitutional).

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a Constitutional claim for being

issued a false disciplinary ticket, Plaintiff claim also fails as a matter of law. “[A] false

disciplinary ticket does not give rise to a due process violation.” Sanders v. Hutchings,

2024 WL 3673163, * 2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2024). This is because “due process safeguards

associated with prison disciplinary proceedings are sufficient to guard against potential

abuses[,] [and a] hearing before a presumably impartial Adjustment Committee

terminates an officer’s possible liability for the filing of an allegedly false disciplinary

report.” Hadley v. Peters, 841 F. Supp. 850, 856 (C.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 117 (7th Cir.

1995) (citations omitted); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied any procedural Due Process

safeguards during his disciplinary hearing; he only alleges that he should not have

received a disciplinary ticket. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s purported claim is insufficient to

state a Due Process violation.

As for his claim against Warden Jones that he failed to train or to supervise Sgt.

Miller properly, Plaintiff’s claim too fails as a matter of law. “Liability under § 1983 is

direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for

those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks

correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

Although “[s]upervisors may be liable under § 1983 for a failure to train, . . . the

circumstances are extremely limited. Negligence, or a ‘should have known' standard, is

not enough. Rather, the plaintiff must [allege] that the defendant knew that his failure

to train was likely to lead to constitutional violations.” Ghashiyah v. Frank, 2007 WL

5517455, * 2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2007) (citing Kitzman–Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 459

(7th Cir. 2000)).

Furthermore, “failure to train claims are usually maintained against

municipalities [or corporations], not against individuals, and, in the Eighth Amendment

context, such claims may only be maintained against a municipality [or corporation].”

Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d

724, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2001)). More specifically, liability for failure to train or to supervise

may be maintained only against a municipality or corporation, and the claim must be

maintained pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v.

Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Here, Plaintiff argues that the Warden at Illinois River failed to train and to

supervise a state employee (i.e., Sgt. Miller) properly. But neither Defendant is a

municipality or an officer of a municipality. They are both employees of the State of

Illinois. Therefore, Plaintiff’s potential Monell claim against either Defendant in this suit

may not be maintained because Monell does not apply to states, state agencies, or state

departments. Joseph v. Board of Regents, 432 F.3d 746, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The

Supreme Court has been clear, however, that Monell’s holding applies only to

municipalities and not states or states’ departments.”); Huspon v. Indiana Dep’t of

Correction, 2011 WL 4730545, * 3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 7, 2011).

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to maintain any claims against

Defendants based upon alleged violations of Illinois law, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over those alleged claim. The Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s

federal claims, and therefore, the proper course of action is for this Court to decline to

exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.

635, 639 (2009) (“A district court's decision whether to exercise [supplemental]

jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely

discretionary.”). Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007)

(describing a “sensible presumption that if the federal claims drop out before trial, the

district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the state-law claims.”).

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and any attempt by Plaintiff to amend his Complaint based upon the

asserted facts would be futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

2. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to add this case to the “three-strikes list” as a potential strike against

Plaintiff under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

3. The Clerk is further directed to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor

and against Plaintiff. All other pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is

terminated. All deadlines and settings on the Court’s calendar are vacated.

4. If he wishes to appeal this judgment, Plaintiff must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within thirty (30) days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(4).

5. If he wishes to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must identify the issues that he will present on

appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith.

See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an

appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for

appealing so that the district judge “can make a responsible assessment of the issue

of good faith.”); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a

good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person could suppose . . . has some

merit” from a legal perspective).

6. If he chooses to appeal, Plaintiff will be liable for the $605.00 appellate

filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2025

s/ Colin S. Brue

COLIN S. BRUCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE