The opinion
Judgment rendered August 5, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 54,891-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
NATHANIEL ROY WILLIAMS Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
GEORGE HARRISON Defendant-Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Richland, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 48,756-B
Honorable William R. Barham, Judge
*****
PROLIFIC LITIGATION GROUP, LLP Counsel for Appellant
By: Krystal J. Williams
NATHANIEL ROY WILLIAMS In Proper Person,
Appellee
*****
Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and HUNTER, JJ.
HUNTER, J., dissents with written reasons.
THOMPSON, J.
George E. Harrison appeals the ruling of the trial court disqualifying
him as a candidate for Chief of Police of the Town of Delhi, Louisiana. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 22, 2022, appellant George Elbert Harrison (“Harrison”),
qualified as a candidate for this office, listing his domicile address on a
“Notice of Candidacy (Qualifying Form),” as 203 Robinson Lane, a
residence within the municipality of Delhi, Louisiana. On that qualifying
form, Harrison also certified before a notary public and two witnesses, that
he was a “duly qualified elector” of Ward 00, Precinct 33 (Paragraph 4), and
that he was registered to vote in the precinct of the residence in which he
claimed a homestead exemption (Paragraph 8).
On July 28, 2022, Nathanial Roy Williams filed a petition in district
court objecting to the candidacy of Harrison on the grounds that Harrison
claimed a homestead exemption at a location outside of the municipality of
Delhi and was not physically domiciled at 203 Robinson Lane. Harrison did
not answer the petition. The matter was tried on August 1, 2022. Harrison
and Williams, both appearing pro se, were the only witnesses who testified.
With the exception of Harrison cross-examining Williams, the trial court
questioned both witnesses and placed all exhibits into evidence.
Prior to beginning the trial, and with the consent of both parties, the
trial court introduced into evidence C-2, copies of Harrison’s Notice of
Candidacy (Qualifying Form), and the documents he attached thereto which
included Harrison’s driver’s license which listed his address as 788 Hwy.
132, Delhi, LA, and Harrison’s Voter Information Report, which showed
that Harrison was registered to vote in Ward 00, Precinct 33 at a residence
address of 203 Robinson Ln., Delhi, LA. The trial court also noted that La.
R. S. 33:385.1 required the Chief of Police of a municipality to be an elector
of the municipality and domiciled for at least the immediately preceding
year in the municipality.
Williams was called by the court as a witness and testified that it was
brought to his attention that Harrison was “claiming homestead exemption in
Franklin Parish,” at the address of 634 Highway 132, which was not within
the municipality of Delhi. Williams also testified that Harrison also
maintained a residence at 788 Highway 132, in Franklin Parish. Williams
conceded that 203 Robinson Lane was within the “City Limits of Delhi,” but
asserted that Harrison was not actually domiciled there for the year
preceding his qualification. The factual basis for Williams’ claim included
his eyewitness accounts of the activities he saw take place at 203 Robinson
Lane. Williams stated that he lived down the block from that residence and
passed by there every day. Williams testified that he never saw anyone at
that residence and that Harrison “comes and mows the yard on occasion,”
but puts the mower on a trailer and does not stay in the residence. Williams
identified a document he attached to his pleadings from the Franklin Parish
Tax Assessor’s Office, which showed that as of July 26, 2022, Harrison’s
physical address was listed as 634 Highway 132, a location according to
Williams that was “known as Delhi, Louisiana, but it’s actually within
Franklin Parish.”1
1
This document, not formally entered in to evidence by the trial court, verified
that Harrison claimed his homestead exemption at this physical address. As noted below,
Harrison admitted this fact at the trial.
On cross-examination by Harrison, Williams testified that he went by
the Robinson street residence at 6:10 each weekday morning and between
5:00-5:30 each weekday evening and patrolled the area during the day.
Williams also stated that Harrison’s “garbage receptacle never moves, it
stays up under the carport.”
At the beginning of his testimony, Harrison confirmed that C-2
accurately depicted copies of his candidacy form, driver’s license and voter
information report. Harrison explained that he got a divorce in 1993 and
that his ex-wife has lived at the 634 Highway 132 residence since that time.
Harrison further explained that he “stayed” at 788 Highway 132 before he
moved to 203 Robinson Lane about five years ago. Harrison understood that
in Louisiana an individual can claim a homestead exemption in only one
place and conceded that the assessment of the Franklin Parish Assessor’s
Office attached to Williams’ petition showed that he claimed his homestead
exemption at the 634 Highway 132 address. Ultimately Harrison admitted
that as of 2022 he claimed his homestead exemption at 634 Highway 132,
and had not changed it because “once it’s signed—you file it, it’s just
constantly there.” Harrison nevertheless insisted that he rented and lived at
the Robinson Lane address and had the utilities placed in his name. 2
Harrison also conceded that the issue date on his driver’s license was June
15, 2022, and that he listed his address as 788 Highway 132. Harrison
explained that he “just never did change my driver’s license,” and “let it
stay, that 788.” Harrison identified a “print out form Google maps,” filed
2
Harrison further revealed that the owners of the home were deceased and that he
dealt with their daughter who lives in Michigan.
3
into evidence by the trial court, which showed “the entirety of Highway
132.” Harrison agreed that the “entirety of Highway 132 is within the
territorial jurisdiction of Franklin,” except for a small portion above
Mangham, Louisiana, and that it did not matter “what you address is on that
highway, it’s in Franklin Parish.”3
When shown his candidacy form, Harrison admitted that he listed his
domicile address as 203 Robinson Lane and stated that he was a qualified
elector of Ward 00 Precinct 33. Harrison also agreed that he signed that
portion of the form which stated that he was registered to vote in the precinct
where he claimed his homestead exemption, and that he signed the form
under oath before a notary and witnesses.
In support of his case, Harrison introduced documentary evidence
regarding his proof of domicile at 203 Robinson Lane, and offered testimony
about those documents as follows:
1) D-1--Harrison’s Entergy bill from the 203 Robinson Lane
residence from July 2022 in the amount of $34.06. Robinson
blamed the low amount of the bill on his not being there or
being on vacation. He also noted that he would “spend maybe a
week or so out in Houston with my daughter,” and that he did
not use a lot of electricity because he went to “ball games and
all that kind of stuff.” Harrison conceded, however, that the bill
showed comparable low usage from January 2021 through July
of 2022, with the exception of September of 2021, when he
used three times the electricity as any other time. Harrison
admitted that an Entergy bill from 788 Highway 132 was also
in his name, but could not remember if Entergy bill from 634
Highway 132 residence was still in his name.
2) D-2--A document showing taxes paid to the municipality of
Delhi on the Robinson Lane residence. Harrison admitted that
he did not pay the “assessment” on that residence to the tax
assessor.
3
Mangham and Delhi, Louisiana are located in Richland Parish.
4
3) D-3--Harrison’s “Utility Statement” for the 203 Robinson
Lane residence showing Harrison’s water usage for the month
of July, 2022 in the amount of $10.75. The total bill included a
composite total of water, sewer, garbage and a miscellaneous
charge. From July 2021, this document showed total bill
history amounts from $39.50-$40.75.4
4) D-4--An affidavit from Harrison’s son attesting to the fact
that Harrison resided at 203 Robinson Lane for the last five
years or so.
5) D-5--Robinson’s divorce decree of January 12, 1993.
Harrison admitted that the house at 634 Highway 132 was still
community property because there had been no property
partition.
Harrison showed the trial court photographs of the Robinson Lane house he
took the morning of and the Saturday before the hearing. 5 The trial court
inquired as to whether Harrison had any photographs from six months to a
year before the trial. Harrison did not. Harrison admitted to the trial court
that his dog lives at the 788 Highway 132 residence.
Upon completion of the presentation of evidence and argument of the
parties, the trial court orally ruled as follows:
[E]verything that I have seen indicates that you are a—not only
a resident but a domiciliary of the Parish of Franklin which
obviously is outside the jurisdiction of the Town of Delhi. I
searched diligently through cross—you know, through
examination of everything, trying to find something . . . I feel
like all I’ve got is some pictures that were taken this morning as
well as an Entergy bill that raised some very serious concerns
and questions with regard to the amount of consumption of
energy that took place over the last couple of—last year and a
half. But also what I’m going back to is the – the notice of
candidacy the qualifying form itself and that’s what I’m going
to restrict my ruling to. I have a driver’s license that was issued
and I guess it’s that it was requested by you to be issued on
June 15th of 2022 that loudly and clearly in no uncertain terms
whatsoever declares your address to be in Franklin Parish on
Highway 132. I do—I do see the voter information report that
4
Because the bill was composite of several different services, it is not possible to
determine actual water usage for those dates.
5
Although discussed in the record, copies of the photographs were never
introduced into evidence and are not before this Court on review.
5
you submitted that indicates Robinson Lane but that—that I
fear is the only thing and then I’m looking at this homestead
exemption form from Franklin Parish that was printed out July
26th of 2022 regarding the 2022 parcel listing that says you are
the owner of this residence and you claim homestead exemption
in Franklin Parish and that you are one hundred percent the
primary owner of that residence. So with all of those things
being introduced, we also have the other—other evidence that
was submitted and arguments that were made, the Court is
going to disqualify Mr. Harrison for running for office of Chief
of Police as the Court does find that he is not domiciled within
the Town of Delhi. So that will be the ruling of the Court.
We’ll introduce all of those exhibits into evidence. We thank
ya’ll all for your time in this.
These finding were memorialized by the trial court in a written ruling
on August 1, 2022. Harrison made a timely motion for appeal, and the
record lodged with this Court on Wednesday, August 3, 2022.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Harrison argues that the trial court erred in finding that
Williams established a prima facie case that Harrison was not domiciled at
203 Robinson Lane. Alternatively, Harrison argues that should this Court
find that Williams established a prima facie case, the trial court erred in
failing to find that Harrison rebutted that showing with the evidence he
presented. Finally, Harrison argues that the trial court was without authority
to restrict its ruling to the qualifying form, when that issue was not raised in
Williams’ petition.
La. R.S. 33:385.1(A) provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this Section, an elected chief
of police of a municipality shall be an elector of the
municipality. At the time of qualification as a candidate for the
office of chief of police, he shall have been domiciled for at
least the immediately preceding year in the municipality [.]
A challenge to the candidacy of a person may be based on the grounds
that the candidate “does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in
6
the primary election,” or that “the defendant failed to qualify for the primary
election in the manner prescribed by law.” La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) and (3).
Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the
widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy
bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified. Landiak v.
Richmond, 2005-0758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535; Russell v.
Goldsby, 2000-2595 (La. 9/22/00), 780 So. 2d 1048. Once the party bearing
the burden of proof in an objection to candidacy case has established a prima
facie case that the candidate is disqualified, the burden shifts to the party
opposing the disqualification to rebut the showing. Dist. Attorney v.
DeJohn, 2015-1478 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/15), 182 So. 3d 188.
Moreover, a court determining whether the plaintiff objecting to
candidacy has carried his burden of proof must liberally construe the laws
governing the conduct of elections “so as to promote rather than defeat
candidacy. Landiak, supra. Any doubt concerning the qualifications of a
candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for
public office. Id. In election cases as in other matters, the manifest error-
clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact’s findings
when such findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of
witnesses. Cleveland v. Williams, 49,664 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/8/14), 148 So.
3d 229.
When the qualification for an office include a residency or domicile
requirement, a candidate shall meet the established length of residency of
domicile. Sellar v. Nance, 54,617 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/22), 336 So. 3d 103.
Domicile of a natural person is defined as “the place of his habitual
residence.” La. C.C. art. 38. A person may reside in several places but may
7
have only one domicile. La. C.C. art. 39. A person’s domicile is his
principal establishment, wherein he makes his habitual residence and
essentially consists of two elements, namely residence and intent to remain
in place. McClendon v. Bel, 00-2011 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/7/00), 797 So. 2d
700. If a candidate has more than one residence, intention is the
determinative factor in ascertaining the location of his domicile. Martin v.
Robinson, 20-0687 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/6/20), 311 So. 3d 378.
A candidate sets out his qualifications in the initial filing of notice of
candidacy under La. R.S. 18:461. Kelley v. Desmarteau, 50,552 (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/28/15), 184 So. 3d 55. The purpose of the notice of candidacy is to
provide sufficient information to show a candidate is qualified to run for the
office he seeks. Sellar, supra; Percle v. Taylor, 20-244 (La. App. 5 Cir.
8/5/20), 301 So. 3d 1219, writ denied, 20-00983 (La. 8/10/20), 300 So. 3d
878; Trosclair v. Joseph,14-675 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So. 3d 315,
writs not cons., 14-1909 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So. 3d 572 and 14-1920 (La.
9/12/14), 148 So. 3d 937.
La. R. S. 18:463 sets forth the requirements for a notice of candidacy
in relevant part as follows:
(2)(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate,
signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:
....
(i) That he has read the notice of his candidacy.
(ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is
qualifying.
....
(viii) Except for a candidate for United States senator or
representative in congress or a candidate who resides in a
nursing home as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’
home operated by the state or federal government, that if he
claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to
8
Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is
registered and votes in the precinct in which that residence is
located.
(ix) That all of the statements contained in it are true and
correct.
The filing of a false certification in a notice of candidacy with respect
to the homestead exemption relates to the failure to qualify in the manner
prescribed by law in La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1), because the “manner for
qualifying” includes “the filing of an accurate notice of candidacy under
oath, accompanied by the qualifying fee.” Sellar, supra; Percle, supra. The
candidate’s certification by affidavit constitutes substantive and/or material
information and any inaccuracies or falsities made by the candidate
regarding this information is grounds for disqualification under La. R.S.
18:492(A)(1), because “what is at stake is no less than the integrity of the
process of qualifying for public office.” Id.
La. R.S. 18:101(B) addresses voter registration as it relates to
homestead exemption as follows:
For purposes of the laws governing voter registration and
voting, “resident” means a citizen who resides in this state and
in the parish, municipality, if any, and precinct in which he
offers to register and vote, with an intention to reside there
indefinitely. If a citizen resides at more than one place in the
state with an intention to reside there indefinitely, he may
register and vote only at one of the places at which he resides.
If a person claims a homestead exemption, pursuant to Article
VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, on one of the
residences, he shall register and vote in the precinct in which
that residence is located, except that a person who resides in a
nursing home as defined in [La.]R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a
veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government
may register and vote at the address where the nursing home or
veterans’ home is located. For purposes of voter registration
and voting, the residence of a married woman shall be
determined in the same manner as is required for any other
citizen. A citizen of this state shall not be or remain registered
or vote in more than one place of residence at any one time.
9
We find no merit to the first two of Harrison’s claims regarding
Williams’ prima facie proof and Harrison’s rebuttal of the evidence. It is
Harrison’s position that Williams’ testimony and the “Franklin Parish
Assessor 2022 Parcel Listing” was insufficient evidence to satisfy that initial
burden of proof and that Harrison was not required to present any further
evidence. Otherwise, Harrison argues that he sufficiently rebutted any
evidence presented by Williams at the trial of this matter. In this matter,
contrary to Harrison’s arguments, the totality of evidence favorable to
Williams consisted of more than his testimony and the tax assessor
document. With the parties’ consent and without objection, a copy of
Harrison’s driver’s license, notice of candidacy and voter registration report
were introduced into evidence prior to the testimony of the parties. Neither
party challenged the introduction of any of this evidence. The pro se litigant
assumes all responsibility for his own inadequacy and lack of knowledge of
procedural and substantive law. Stevens v. City of Shreveport, 49,437 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So. 3d 1071, writ denied, 2015-0197 (La.
4/17/15), 168 So. 3d 399.
Our full review of the evidence ultimately shows no clear error in the
trial court’s disqualification of Harrison as a candidate for Chief of Police of
the municipality of Delhi for the reasons that follow. Regarding the
domicile requirement, an issue of qualification for office, Williams gave
basically unrefuted eyewitness testimony showing that Harrison mowed the
grass at the Robinson Lane address with a mower he kept elsewhere, did not
stay at the house on a daily basis, and did not utilize the weekly trash
service. Harrison conceded that both residences at issue on Highway 132
were located in Franklin Parish and outside of the municipal limits of Delhi.
10
Harrison also admitted that he had previously lived at 788 Highway 132
prior to moving to the Robinson Lane address. Nevertheless, in June of
2022, Harrison renewed his driver’s license and listed his address as 788
Highway 132, the location at which his dog also stays. Although Harrison
claimed to rent the Robinson Lane residence, he paid no actual rent for his
alleged occupancy and failed to introduce any evidence to show that he truly
paid any taxes on that property. Documentation of water and electricity
usage at the Robinson Lane address, introduced into evidence by Harrison
himself, was sufficient to show only minimal water usage at the home for
the month of July 2022 and showed consistently low electricity usage for the
year preceding Harrison’s qualification. Harrison offered ambiguous
explanations for the low utility usage. Harrison was also able to produce
only recent photographic proof of his activities at the Robinson Lane home,
but nothing showing anything relating to his occupancy of this home one
year prior to his qualification. When considering the totality of this evidence
as well as the testimony of the parties, we find it sufficient to establish a
prima facie case that Harrison was not domiciled at the Robinson Lane
address at the time of his qualifying and that Harrison failed to rebut that
showing regarding the issue of domicile.
We also reject Harrison’s challenge to that portion of the trial court’s
ruling regarding the issue of Harrison’s notice of candidacy. We note that
the trial court’s oral ruling can clearly be read to address both the domicile
and notice of candidacy issues. Further, the law affords pro se litigants
leeway and patience in the form of liberally construed pleadings.
Greenwood Cmty. Ctr. v. Calep, 48,737 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So.
3d 470. A review of Williams’ pleading shows that he specifically raised
11
the issue of Harrison’s homestead exemption, attaching to his pleading a
document from the tax assessor relating to this issue. Further, as noted
above, neither party lodged any objection to the evidence introduced at trial
or the questions asked of Harrison regarding his homestead exemption and
candidacy form. In these circumstances, we find that the trial court was well
within its discretion to liberally construe Williams’ pleading as raising a
notice of candidacy claim. On the merits of that claim, the evidence clearly
showed that although at the time of his qualifying, Harrison claimed a
homestead exemption on property located outside the municipality of Delhi
located at 364 Highway 132, he nevertheless registered to vote in the
precinct in which the Robinson Lane address is located. On his July 27,
2022, candidacy form, Harrison inaccurately swore before a notary public
and two witnesses that he was registered to vote in the precinct of the
residence on which he claimed his homestead exemption. The manner for
qualifying includes the filing of an accurate notice of candidacy and
certification by affidavit constitutes substantive and material information.
This Court has previously held that any inaccuracy on a candidacy form
regarding the homestead exemption undermines the integrity attendant to the
process of qualifying for public office and is grounds for disqualification of
that candidate under La. R.S. 18:492, as a failure to qualify in the manner
prescribed by law. Sellar, supra. We adhere to that precedent in this matter.
For the reasons heretofore discussed, we find that the record before us
fully supports the trial court’s ruling disqualifying Harrison as a candidate
for Chief of Police of the Town of Delhi, Louisiana.
12
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to Harrison.
AFFIRMED.
13
Hunter, J. dissenting.
The laws governing the conduct of elections must be liberally
interpreted so as to promote, rather than defeat, candidacy. Any doubt as to
the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of permitting
the candidate to run for public office. Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So. 2d 679 (La.
1991); Cleveland v. Williams, 49,64 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/8/14), 148 So. 3d
229.
A person objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the
candidate is disqualified. Nocito v. Bussey, 20-0986 (La. 8/15/20), 300 So.
3d 862. In Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535, the
Supreme Court stated:
[W]hen the burden of proof has been specifically assigned to a
particular party, that party must present sufficient evidence to
establish the facts necessary to convince the trier of fact of the
existence of the contested fact. Stated another way, the party
on which the burden of proof rests must establish a prima
facie case. If that party fails to carry his burden of proof, the
opposing party is not required to present any countervailing
evidence.
Id., at 542 (Emphasis added). Further, a court determining whether the
person objecting to candidacy has carried his burden of proof must liberally
construe the laws governing the conduct of elections “so as to promote
rather than defeat candidacy.” Id. Any doubt concerning the qualifications
of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run
for public office. Id.
Further, it is well settled residence and domicile are not synonymous,
and a person can have several residences, but only one domicile. La. C.C.
art. 38; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595 (La. 9/22/00), 780 So. 2d 1048. A
person’s domicile is his principal establishment wherein he makes his
1
habitual residence and essentially consists of two elements, namely
residence and intent to remain. Id.
In the instant case, the evidence presented by the challenger
established the following:
Mr. Harrison qualified as a candidate listing his address as 203
Robinson Lane, Delhi, LA;
Mr. Harrison claimed a homestead exemption at 634 Hwy. 132,
Delhi, LA;
Mr. Harrison had another residence located at 788 Hwy. 132,
Delhi, LA; and
The challenger passed the residence located at 203 Robinson
Lane every morning and evening, and he only saw Mr. Harrison
there occasionally mowing the lawn; he had never seen a
vehicle at the residence overnight; and the trash cans at the
residence were never pulled to the curb for trash pickup.
In my view, the challenger did not establish a prima facie case Mr.
Harrison did not reside within the municipality. Therefore, the burden did
not shift to Mr. Harrison to present countervailing evidence.
Although Mr. Harrison never removed his name from the homestead
exemption with regard to the property located at 634 Hwy. 132, his
uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to establish he abandoned that
domicile in 1993, when he and his former wife divorced. While Mr.
Harrison candidly testified he sometimes “stayed” at the residence at 788
Hwy. 132, and the address was listed on his driver’s license, there was no
evidence he established a domicile at that location. For example, the
evidence did not establish Mr. Harrison paid rent, established utilities, or
received postal mail at that address.
The record established Mr. Harrison secured a residence at 203
Robinson Lane approximately five years ago. He testified the residence
2
needed repairs, and he agreed to make the requisite repairs in exchange for
the right to live in the residence. Additionally, Mr. Harrison established
electric and water service at the residence. Although the utility records
demonstrate sporadic usage, the evidence in this record does not prove the
usage was inconsistent with the habitation of the home as described by Mr.
Harrison, who testified he sometimes “stayed” elsewhere.
For these reasons, I believe any doubt as to Mr. Harrison’s domicile
should be resolved in favor of permitting him to run for office. Thus, the
judgment of the district court should be reversed, and Mr. Harrison should
be reinstated as a candidate for the Chief of Police for the Town of Delhi.
3