Monroe v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CODY RICHARD MONROE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:25-CV-173-DCLC-DCP

)

CAPTAIN WILLIAMS, SGT. DUNCAN, )

SGT. LONGMIRE, C.O. FOX, C.O. JOSH )

BROWN, SGT. SANDRA, CPL. VON )

RICKER, and CPL. GRAHAM, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Monroe County Justice Center, filed a complaint for violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2] and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion [Id.] will be GRANTED, and this action will be

DISMISSED because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

§1983.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

As it appears that Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee in a lump sum, his motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis [Id.] is GRANTED.

Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The custodian

of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800

Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as an initial partial payment, whichever is

the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to his inmate trust account;

or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-

month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(b)(1)(A) and(B). Thereafter,

the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent (20%) of his

preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding month), but

only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee has been

paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order to the Court’s

financial deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s facility to ensure payment

of the filing fee.

II. COMPLAINT SCREENING

A. Screening Standard

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner

complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim

for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by

the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to

survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible

claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief

“above a speculative level” fails to state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However,

courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than lawyer-

drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person

acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff has been sleeping on the floor of the Monroe County Justice Center since the end

of October 2024 [Doc. 2 p. 3]. Plaintiff made a verbal request to Defendants Brown and Graham

about this issue [Id.]. Plaintiff also sent a kiosk request to Defendants Graham and Duncan asking

to be moved to a cell with an open bunk “and was told no” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff additionally wrote

requests and filed a grievance and appeal regarding this issue with Defendant Williams, but this

Defendant did not respond [Id.]. “[Plaintiff has] multiple fractures to his scapula and being on the

floor hurt [his] back and shoulder” [Id.]. According to Plaintiff, even though “there ha[ve] been

multiple open cells and bunks, . . . they would not move [him],” and unspecified jail officials also

told him there are no “boats” at the facility when he requested one [Id.]. Also, the toilet leaks onto

Plaintiff’s mat, “causing unsanitary conditions” [Id.].

Plaintiff has sued Captain Williams, Sgt. Duncan, Sgt. Longmire, C.O. Fox, C.O. Brown,

Sgt. Sandra, Cpl. Von Ricker, and Cpl. Graham [Id. at 1, 3]. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages and injunctive relief [Id. at 5].

III. ANALYSIS

In evaluating whether Plaintiff’s complaint states a plausible § 1983 claim, the Court

presumes that Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and therefore analyzes his claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021). For Plaintiff’s complaint

to state a plausible claim for failure to protect him as a pretrial detainee, he must set forth facts

from which the Court can infer that a Defendant “acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also

recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that

it should be known.’” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (citations

omitted). Plaintiff has not done so.

First, Plaintiff’s complaint contains no allegations from which the Court can plausibly infer

that Defendants Longmire, Fox, Sandra, or Von Ricker were personally involved in any incident

underlying his complaint. As such, his complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted as to these Defendants. Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)

(providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the

alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §

1983); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that Government officials may not

be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior”).

Also, while Plaintiff’s complaint, liberally construed in his favor, alleges that he has

repeatedly requested better sleeping arrangements from Defendants Brown, Graham, Duncan, and

Williams, but these Defendants denied those requests or did not respond [Id. at 3–4], these

allegations do not allow the Court to plausibly infer that any of these Defendants violated

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the mere fact that Plaintiff has been

sleeping on a mat on the floor does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Jenkins v.

Dillion, No. 4:24-CV-P69-JHM, 2024 WL 4447231, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 8, 2024) (“Simply

having to sleep on the floor does not violate the Constitution.”) (citing Hubbard v. Taylor, 538

F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that a pretrial detainee sleeping on a mattress on the floor

for three to seven months was not a constitutional violation) and Bartlett v. Woosley, No. 4:22CV-

P158-JHM, 2023 WL 4306911, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2023) (“Plaintiff's allegation that he was

housed in an overcrowded cell and required to sleep on the floor is not a deprivation of the minimal

civilized measure of life's necessities.”); Rishton v. Sullivan Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:07-CV-

78, 2010 WL 1257989, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2010) (“A prisoner has no right to sleep on an

elevated bed”) (internal citations omitted). And while Plaintiff states in his complaint that he has

fractures in his scapula, that sleeping on a mat on the floor hurts his shoulders and back, and that

a toilet leaks onto his mat [Id.], even if the Court assumes that these allegations sufficiently assert

that sleeping on a mat on the floor creates an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff, his complaint

does not suggest that any Defendant knew or should have known of any of these conditions. As

such, the Court cannot reasonably infer that any Defendant has deliberately and recklessly

disregarded any risk of harm to Plaintiff from these conditions.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

under § 1983 as to any named Defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is GRANTED;

2. This action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A,

and

3. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good

faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

SO ORDERED:

s/Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge