Cortez v. Hughes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HECTOR CORTEZ, )

R66371, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 25-cv-244-DWD

LATOYA HUGHES, )

BROOKHART, )

LT. LEARNER, )

JOHN DOE, )

M. RULOUBSUR, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Hector Cortez, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at Lawrence

Correctional Center (Lawrence) (Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the adequacy

of policies for prisoner transports during yard time, and he presents claims about an

incident when he was attacked during a yard transport on May 13, 2023. Plaintiff has

also filed a few motions, a letter, and an affidavit, that will all be addressed below.

The Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner

complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion

of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune

from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on May 13, 2023, he was being escorted thru the yard while

restrained by handcuffs. (Doc. 1 at 7). He alleges that during the transit, another inmate

approached him and stabbed him seven times. He became unresponsive and required

off-site medical care at a hospital. After four days at the hospital, he was returned to the

prison and was placed in the infirmary. Plaintiff faults Defendant Ruloubsur for violating

his rights by refusing adequate after care for his wounds. Specifically, he claims she was

informed that he was in unsanitary conditions and that his stitches were causing a

problem, but she refused any treatment and did nothing to mitigate his pain. (Doc. 1 at

9-10).

Plaintiff faults Defendants Hughes (the director of IDOC) and Warden Brookhart

from failing to create, implement, or enforce a sufficient policy to ensure that inmates can

be safely transported during yard time. Specifically, he alleges the existing policy

provides minimal deterrents to prevent an attack, and it does not set a minimum number

of staff required to be on the yard during transports. (Doc. 1 at 7). He alleges that these

defects led to the stabbing. Additionally, he faults Brookhart for responsibility for the

prison’s daily operations. He claims Brookhart failed to oversee staff doing yard escorts,

he failed to ensure that staff were following a protocol to “wand” inmates who attended

yard, and he failed to ensure there was adequate staffing. All of which led to his attack.

He characterizes Brookhart’s actions as gross negligence. (Doc. 1 at 8).

On the day in question, Defendant Learner was directly responsible for wanding

the inmates attending yard, and for supervising other staff working yard to ensure

adequate staff members were present. He alleges Learner did not wand inmates, and did

not ensure adequate staffing. He also faults Learner for failing to immediately intervene

in the assault, thus allowing him to suffer greater damages. He contends if Learner had

properly screened inmates coming to yard, a knife never would have made it onto the

yard to be used in an attack. (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff characterizes Learner’s conduct as

gross negligence. (Doc. 1 at 8).

As for John Doe, Plaintiff faults this individual for being the one who escorted him

at the time of attack. He claims John Doe did not immediately respond to protect him

from the attack. He also alleges that John Doe understands the policy that requires

wanding prisoners, and even if he was not responsible for this part of the operations, he

should have reported it was not being done or the yard was understaffed. He

characterizes John Doe’s alleged failure to protect him as gross negligence. (Doc. 1 at 9).

In support of the complaint, Plaintiff also submitted a memorandum of law that is

largely consistent with his factual allegations. In the memorandum, he adds that the

inmate who attacked him was known to be aggressive and violent. He claims that based

on this known danger, the Warden and other prison staff should have done more to

ensure he would not harm others. (Doc. 1 at 12-13). Plaintiff also submitted grievance

documents, and medical documents.

He seeks injunctive relief in the form of proper treatment and rehabilitation for his

physical and mental well-being, compensation, and a transfer to another state. (Doc. 1 at

15).

Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court designates the following claims:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment failure to protect or failure to intervene

claim against Defendants Learner and John Doe;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Brookhart for allowing inadequate staffing on

yard and for failing to implement the wand screening policy

for inmates attending yard;

Claim 3: Monell claim against Defendants Hughes and Brookhart for

maintaining an insufficient policy to avoid attacks on the

yard;

Claim 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Ruloubsur for providing inadequate care for

Plaintiff’s wounds when he returned from the hospital.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

DISCUSSION

It is important to note at the outset that Plaintiff characterized the actions of

Defendants Brookhart, Learner, John Doe, and Ruloubsur as gross negligence, but gross

negligence is not enough to establish a constitutional violation under § 1983. See e.g.

Tackett v. Dauss, 132 F.4th 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2025) (“gross negligence does not equate to

deliberate indifference.”). Given that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court read his

complaint more broadly and considered if his allegations could plausibly support more

than a finding of mere gross negligence.

Claim 1: Failure to protect/intervene

To establish a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege “(1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm and (2) that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his health

or safety.” Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the Eighth

Amendment, correctional officials have a constitutional duty to protect inmates from

violence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994). But “prisons are dangerous places.

Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more.”

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008). A failure to protect claim cannot

be predicated “merely on knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention facility.”

Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, the plaintiff must establish that

“the defendant had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that

a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's

failure to prevent it.” Santiago, 599 F.3d at 756. “[N]egligence, or even gross negligence

does not equate to deliberate indifference” and does not state a claim for a violation of

the Eighth Amendment. Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2021). Related to

the failure to protect, inmates may also allege that prison staff failed to intervene in an

ongoing assault. See Eddmonds v. Walker, 317 Fed. App’x 556, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2009). To

establish such a claim, an inmate must allege the onlooker had a reasonable opportunity

to intervene.

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of failure to intervene or failure to protect present a

close call. He alleges that Defendant Learner was responsible for the yard that day and

did not screen inmates attending yard with a wand, as was required by prison policy. He

also alleges Learner did not ensure adequate staffing on the yard. He adds in his

memorandum of law that the inmate who attacked him was known to be dangerous and

had a history of extreme violence. The mere failure to follow a prison policy is not

equivalent to a § 1983 claim. However, Plaintiff claims that by failing to wand inmates

or to ensure adequate staffing, Learner fostered an environment that he knew to be

unreasonably dangerous, because it allowed inmates to sneak contraband like a knife

onto the yard. He claims the John Doe escorting him condoned this risk by not alerting

other staff to the lack of wanding. He also faults Learner and John Doe for having

inadequate staff on hand to ensure the yard escort was safe on May 13, 2023.

At this early juncture, Plaintiff’s allegations are just enough to proceed. He

suggests an environment that fostered danger amongst already dangerous inmates. The

guards’ failure to wand inmates to ensure safety on the yard could ultimately be

negligence or deliberate indifference. See e.g., Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938-39 (7th

Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment and finding there was a genuine issue of

material fact as to if officers knew of risks on unit posed by co-mingling gangs that led to

an assault); Giles v. Tobeck, 895 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that guard’s failure to

escort a known dangerous inmate back to his cell after releasing other inmates to

dayroom was negligence at most); see also Williams v. Hulick, 2014 WL 1040953 (S.D. Ill.

Mar. 18, 2014) (finding at summary judgment that inmate had insufficient evidence to

demonstrate that the defendant-officer personally had knowledge of the danger posed

by uncuffing another violent inmate in a cell with him while he was still handcuffed and

could not defend himself from the subsequent assault). Here, Plaintiff’s claim will likely

turn on a fact-intensive determination about the knowledge that Learner and John Doe

had on May 13, 2023, when overseeing yard and his escort.

Plaintiff may also proceed for now on the additional theory that Defendants

Learner and John Doe failed to intervene during the assault. As with the failure to protect

claim, this theory will also turn closely on the facts developed later in the case.

Claim 2: Deliberate indifference by Defendant Brookhart

Unlike the allegations against Learner and John Doe who were both present on the

day of the attack, Plaintiff does not have any allegations that attribute personal

knowledge of the risk to Defendant Brookhart prior to the attack. Knowledge of the

particular risk posed either to Plaintiff, or by a particular assailant, is key to establishing

a failure to protect claim. Plaintiff does not assert that Brookhart knew on May 13, 2023,

or at any time prior, that the wanding procedure was not being used, that the assailant

was present on yard during escorts, or that the yard was inadequately staffed to safely

escort inmates. As such, Claim 2 is insufficiently pled to establish Brookhart’s personal

responsibility for the assault, and it will be dismissed without prejudice.

Claim 3: Monell claim against Hughes and Brookhart

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hughes and Brookhart caused him harm by

failing to have an adequate policy in place to ensure inmate safety during escorts.

Specifically, he claims that Hughes’ currently policy on escorts provides “minimal

deterrents” for inmate-on-inmate attacks at best. He faults the policy for not requiring a

minimum number of staff to be present during high-risk escorts. He further faults

Brookhart for failing to particularize the policy for the specific needs of Lawrence.

Plaintiff’s claims in this respect appear to sound under the Monell doctrine, which is often

applied to hold officials liable for policies or the lack of policies. In the context of a Monell

claim against a state prison employee, the claim is construed as one against the employee

in his or her official capacity, and the relief available is limited.

The Eleventh Amendment generally bars private suits in federal court against a

state for monetary damages. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); MCI

Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 336 (7th Cir. 2000). That immunity extends

to state agencies as well and, subject to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, to state employees

acting in their official capacities. MCI Telecomm., 222 F.3d at 336–37 (discussing Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Under the exception outlined in Ex Parte Young, the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar a lawsuit against an individual state official in their official

capacity for an ongoing violation of federal law if the remedy sought is prospective

injunctive or declaratory relief. MCI Telecomm., 222 F.3d at 345 (“[A] private party may

sue individual state officials in federal court to obtain prospective relief for an ongoing

violation of federal law.”). Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of

appropriate treatment to recover his physical and mental health after the attack, but he

does not seek any injunctive relief particularized to the inmate-escort policies (or the lack

thereof) at the prison. Thus, he does not qualify for the only sort of remedy he might be

eligible to receive from Hughes or Brookhart in their official capacities. Additionally, he

has been transferred from Lawrence to Menard, which further negates the notion that he

now needs protection via different policies at Lawrence.

The Court also considered if Plaintiff could recover against Hughes or Brookhart

in their individual capacity for the issues he describes with the policy, but it is not

persuaded his allegations are sufficient for any such recovery. As with Claim 2 against

Brookhart, he provides no allegations that show Hughes or Brookhart knew the yards

were understaffed for escorts, that the wanding policy was not being followed, or that a

particularly dangerous inmate was on yard and posed a risk. He also does not provide

any allegations whatsoever to demonstrate they had any reason to doubt his personal

safety at the time of the attack. As such, his allegations are insufficient to attribute

personal knowledge to Hughes or Brookhart, and he cannot proceed on Claim 3.

Claim 4: Deliberate indifference against Ruloubsur regarding medical needs

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ruloubsur refused to properly care for his wounds

after he was returned to the hospital. He may proceed against Ruloubsur for the alleged

failure to provide adequate care upon his return from prison, but he may not seek further

injunctive relief against her concerning his ongoing care because he interacted with her

at Lawrence and he his now at Menard.

MOTIONS

On March 5, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis because he had more than $800 in his inmate account. He paid $400.00 of the

$405.00 filing fee on March 21, but also filed a new motion to proceed IFP on the same

day (Doc. 7). In the Motion, rather than seeking a reduction in the fee, Plaintiff explains

he has tried to forward the remaining $5.00. As such, the motion is really a notice, and

not a request for any relief. Plaintiff also submitted a letter about the filing fee. (Doc. 8).

The Court also notes the full $405 has now been received, so the Motion is MOOT.

Plaintiff also filed a Motion (Doc. 10) on April 14, 2025, complaining that two

letters from the Court have been delivered to him already opened. An “inmate has the

right under the First Amendment to send and receive mail... but that right does not

preclude prison officials from examining mail to ensure that it does not contain

contraband.” Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2005). The documents

sent from the Court to Plaintiff and to the Court for filing are a matter of public record

and therefore not confidential. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F. 3d, 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996);

Martin v. Brewer, 830 F. 2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, Plaintiff’s request that the Court

mark outgoing mail as “legal mail” to evade review must be DENIED.

In addition to the motions and letter, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a fellow

inmate. (Doc. 9). The affidavit details a fellow inmate’s interactions with Plaintiff over

the years. The affidavit has no bearing on this order, so it will not be discussed further.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives

initial screening as described above against Defendants Learner and John Doe, and Claim

4 survives against Defendant Ruloubsur. By contrast, Claims 2 and 3 are insufficient to

state a claim against Brookhart or Hughes in either their official or individual capacities.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Hughes. By contrast, Brookhart shall remain

in the case in official capacity only to help identify John Doe.

Plaintiff must file a notice within 21 days providing as much descriptive

information as possible about John Doe, including a physical description, any known

nicknames, shift assignment information, or any other information he has. Once the

information is filed by Plaintiff, Brookhart shall have 30 days to respond, and then

Plaintiff shall have another 21 days to file a motion to substitute a named party or to

describe additional steps that can be taken to identify John Doe. Failure to do so will

result in the dismissal of John Doe.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Learner, Ruloubsur,

and Brookhart (official capacity to identify John Doe and for injunctive relief): (1) Form 5

(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6

(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of

the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of

Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the

Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 7 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this

order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court shall enter the standard HIPAA protective order.

Plaintiff’s Motions (Doc. 7 and 10) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2025 /s David W. Dugan

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.