WELLS v. LYNCH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHRISTOPHER M. WELLS and )

LESLIE M. WELLS, on behalf of )

their son, MATTHEW WELLS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV412

)

THE MOORE COUNTY SCHOOLS )

BOARD OF EDUCATION and )

JEFFREY LEE LYNCH, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on two motions: a Motion filed by Defendant Jeffrey Lee

Lynch (“Mr. Lynch”) entitled “Defendant Jeffrey Lee Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(1) – Court’s Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction” (Docket Entry 38) (“Mr. Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint”), and

Mr. Lynch’s Motion entitled “Defendant Jeffrey Lee Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Second

Amended Complaint” (Docket Entry 41) (“Mr. Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended

Complaint”). Plaintiffs Christopher M. Wells and Leslie M. Wells (“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of

their son, Matthew Wells (“Matthew”), have filed a Response in opposition to both motions

(Docket Entry 43) and Mr. Lynch has filed a Reply thereto (Docket Entry 44). For the following

reasons, the undersigned recommends that both Mr. Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint and Mr. Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants the Moore County Schools Board of

Education (“the Board”) and Mr. Lynch on behalf of their son Matthew who they allege was

assaulted by Mr. Lynch at Pinecrest High School (“Pinecrest”)1 in Southern Pines, North

Carolina, on September 16, 2021.2 (See generally Second Amended Complaint, Docket Entry

40 (“Second Am. Compl.”).) More specifically, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that

during the relevant period, Matthew was a 17-year-old non-verbal autistic student with an

intellectual disability attending Pinecrest. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 21, 24, 46, 49.) While at Pinecrest, Matthew

had an Individual Education Program (“IEP”), and “participated in Pinecrest’s Extended

Content Standard Course of Study, which is a program intended to serve students who, as a

result of their disabilities, exhibit behaviors that require the most behavioral support.” (Id.

¶¶ 27-28.) In educational settings, Matthew required “a safe and therapeutic environment free

from the threat of physical harm or restraint[,]” thus he was assigned a one-on-one teaching

assistant (“TA”), who was under the guidance of a classroom teacher. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54.)

In mid-September 2021, Sierra Cobb (“Ms. Cobb”) was Matthew’s teacher and Mr.

Lynch was his TA. (Id. ¶ 56.) Mr. Lynch, having just begun employment as a TA at Pinecrest,

received information on Matthew’s intellectual and developmental disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 85-86.)

On September 10, 2021, Mr. Lynch informed the director of Pinecrest’s Exceptional

1 Pinecrest is in the Moore County Schools district. (See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-32).

2 The Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint are nearly identical. The

only differences between the two are that in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs identify

themselves as Matthew’s “next of friend and guardians,” and that in the Second Amended Complaint

punitive damages are only sought from Mr. Lynch instead of from both he and the Board. (Compare

Docket Entry 20 with Docket Entry 40; see also Docket Entry 30 at 11-13, 24-25.)

Children’s Program of his lack of background and training to work with Matthew; however,

he remained assigned to do so and reported to Matthew’s classroom on September 16, 2021.

(Id. ¶¶ 87-88, 90.)

Ms. Cobb showed Mr. Lynch Matthew’s classroom, including certain padded and

calming areas used for Matthew’s classroom instruction. (Id. ¶ 91.) Ms. Cobb informed Mr.

Lynch that “Matthew’s autism can manifest itself, at times, in aggressive behavior, including

physical manifestations.” (Id.) Ms. Cobb and Mr. Lynch reviewed Matthew’s intervention plan.

(Id. ¶ 92.) However, Mr. Lynch, unaware of how to interact with Matthew, was uncomfortable

after beginning to work with him, and in turn, caused Matthew to become agitated. (See id. ¶¶

93-94.) Plaintiffs allege that, at one point, “[Mr.] Lynch pushed Matthew into the padded area

of the classroom.” (Id. ¶ 95.) Matthew was frightened by Mr. Lynch’s actions, could not verbally

advocate for himself, and responded by throwing items in the classroom. (Id. ¶¶ 96-97.)

Mr. Lynch subsequently spoke with the Program Director, expressing “that he was not

adequately trained and did not want to continue working with Matthew.” (Id. ¶ 100.) After being

instructed to continue working with Matthew, Mr. Lynch returned to the classroom, which was

in disarray from the items thrown by Matthew. (Id. ¶¶ 100-01.) Ms. Cobb then instructed Mr.

Lynch “to take Matthew for a walk” and “to help keep Matthew calm” by using a sensory

compression blanket, which Mr. Lynch had not been trained to use. (Id. ¶ 102.) As a result,

“Matthew lost his balance while using the blanket and inadvertently knocked [Mr.] Lynch into a

wall.” (Id.) After returning to the classroom, Matthew was again agitated, and Plaintiffs allege that

[Mr.] Lynch—instead of employing calming techniques with

Matthew, and while ignoring Ms. Cobb’s instructions to back

away from Matthew—picked up a beanbag chair and used it to

aggressively push Matthew around the classroom and then picked

up a classroom chair and aggressively thrust the chair’s metal legs

at Matthew as if Matthew was an animal to be tamed, repeatedly

yelling, “get back beast!” at Matthew all the while. While doing

so, and while flustered, [Mr.] Lynch expressed to Ms. Cobb that

he did not know how to handle the situation.

Shortly thereafter, [Mr.] Lynch approached Matthew and struck

Matthew with an open hand across Matthew’s face and neck,

knocking Matthew to the ground and causing him to hold his face

and neck in pain. [Mr.] Lynch then stood over Matthew, looking

down at him.

(Id. ¶¶ 104-05.) Plaintiffs allege that after the incident, Matthew laid on the floor crying, Ms.

Cobb ran for help, and Mr. Lynch ran out the classroom. (Id. ¶¶ 106-09.)

Plaintiffs allege that Pinecrest’s school resource officer responded to Ms. Cobb and that

the school’s principal and two other assistant principals came to the classroom shortly thereafter.

(Id. ¶¶ 108, 112.) After Ms. Cobb explained what happened, the principal first suggested that

Ms. Cobb “retract her assault accusation against [Mr.] Lynch.” (Id. ¶¶ 112-13.) Plaintiffs further

allege that “administration immediately went to work in seeking to conceal what happened to

Matthew, knowing that Matthew could not verbalize what had occurred.” (Id. ¶ 115.) Plaintiffs

go on to allege that “no member of Pinecrest’s administration sought to meaningfully examine

Matthew’s injury, assess his medical needs, or offer him comfort.” (Id. ¶ 114.) When Matthew

was picked up from school that day, the principal only indicated “that there was ‘an incident’

between Matthew and his TA, but that ‘everything was fine.’ ” (Id. ¶ 116.)

Plaintiffs allegedly sought additional information the next day, but were told only that

Mr. Lynch would no longer be working with Matthew. (Id. ¶¶ 120-22.) Two weeks later,

Plaintiffs learned of the alleged assault by Mr. Lynch after being contacted by the Moore

County Schools Police Department, although no details were given. (Id. ¶ 123.) Plaintiffs

then contacted Ms. Cobb seeking further information, who told them that she had been

instructed not to speak to them about the incident. (Id. ¶ 124.) “Ms. Cobb eventually told the

Wells family that [Mr.] Lynch had struck Matthew.” (Id.) Mr. Lynch returned to school as a

TA in another Exceptional Children’s Program classroom on September 17, 2021, but

voluntarily resigned from his position that day. (Id. ¶¶ 128-29.) With Plaintiffs’ support,

criminal charges for assault and battery were filed by the Moore County District Attorney

against Mr. Lynch for the September 16, 2021, incident involving Matthew. (Id. ¶ 131.) Ms.

Cobb resigned from her position at Pinecrest on September 27, 2021. (Id. ¶ 130.)

Plaintiffs allege that Matthew has been traumatized as a result of the incident, that he

has “returned home with inexplicable bruises on several occasions” before and after the

assault, and that ultimately Matthew has been forced to attend a school in another jurisdiction

due to the Board’s failure to meet its obligations to Matthew. (Id. ¶¶ 132-40.)

Plaintiffs allege two claims—violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq.—against the Board only. (Id. ¶¶ 141-176.) The Board moved to dismiss said claims (Docket

Entry 23; see also Docket Entry 24); this Court recommended that said motion should be granted

as it relates to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, but that it should be otherwise denied

(Docket Entry 30);3 said recommendation was subsequently adopted in an order by District

Judge Thomas D. Schroeder (Docket Entry 39). Wells v. Moore Cnty. Sch., No. 1:23CV412, 2024

WL 3845347, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Wells v.

Moore Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:23CV412, 2024 WL 4344948 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2024).

3 Mr. Lynch filed a partial objection to said recommendation. (Docket Entry 34.)

In addition to those two claims, Plaintiffs bring three claims against Mr. Lynch only,

alleging that he is liable for assault, battery, and false imprisonment as a result of the September

16, 2021, incident. (Id. ¶¶ 186-227.) For each of the three claims, Plaintiff alleges that that as

a direct and proximate result of the tort alleged, “Matthew has been damaged in an amount to

be established at trial.” (Id. ¶¶ 205, 217, 227.) Mr. Lynch denies Plaintiffs’ allegations. (See

generally Docket Entry 22; see also Docket Entry 34 at 1-2.)4

II. DISCUSSION

a. Summary of the Parties’ Arguments

As a threshold matter, the undersigned notes that Mr. Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint and Mr. Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint are

essentially identical, with only minor differences between the two that do not materially affect this

Court’s analysis of the arguments presented therein. (Compare Docket Entry 38 with Docket Entry

41; see also Docket Entry 43 at 1 n.1.) The latter addresses the Second Amended Complaint, which

is the operative pleading in this action, and the undersigned will therefore recommend that the

former be denied as moot. James v. Bartow Cnty., Georgia, No. 1:16-CV-01381-WSD, 2017 WL

748738, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2017) (unpublished), aff’d, 798 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2020);

Santos v. Keenan, No. 17-CV-0984 LJV-HKS, 2020 WL 2859202, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2020)

(unpublished), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-984, 2020 WL 1025189 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.

3, 2020). Accordingly, the undersigned will proceed with its analysis as to Mr. Lynch’s Motion to

Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”).

4 Unless otherwise noted, all citations herein refer to the page numbers at the bottom right-

hand corner of the documents as they appear in the Court’s CM/ECF system.

The Motion to Dismiss seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ three claims against Mr. Lynch for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (“Rule

12(b)(1)”). Specifically, Mr. Lynch argues that

[the ADA] is a civil rights law - Not a criminal statute. Thus, the primary legal

repercussions of [Plaintiffs’] un-proven allegations of assault, battery, [and false

imprisonment] against Defendant Mr. Lynch would occur at the North Carolina

(NC) State level of court system. [Plaintiffs’] un-substantiated and un-proven

allegations of 16 September 2021 regarding assault, battery, [and false

imprisonment], (allegedly involving Defendant Mr. Lynch) are violations of

North Carolina (NC) State criminal statutes. Jurisdiction of NC State statutes

therefore resides with NC State courts.

(Docket Entry 41 ¶ 5 (emphasis removed).) Mr. Lynch goes on to argue that

for Federal Court jurisdiction to apply in this case, [Plaintiffs’] allegations of

assault, battery, [and false imprisonment] against Defendant Mr. Lynch would

have needed to occur either: 6.a. On a Federal Installation or Property (18 U.S.C.

§ 113); and/or, 6.b. Involve a victim that is a Federal Officer or Federal Employee

performing their duties (18 U.S.C. § 111); and/or, 6.c. Involve citizens of separate

U.S. States (known as “diversity of citizenship”) [(28 U.S.C. § 1332)].

(Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis removed).) Mr. Lynch concludes that because none of these three criteria

are met, this Court lacks subject jurisdiction to hear the action against him and that it should

be dismissed. (Id. ¶¶ 7-11.) Mr. Lynch notes that on May 25, 2022, he was found not guilty

in state criminal court “regarding the allegations contained in [Plaintiffs’] original and twice

amended complaints.” (Id. ¶ 7.d. (emphasis removed).) Notably, he argues that the claims

against him “belong under the NC State Courts’ jurisdiction” and that Plaintiffs’ “allegations

of assault, battery, [and false imprisonment] against Defendant Mr. Lynch, do not concern

Federal Law, but rather State of North Carolina criminal statutes.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.)5

5 Mr. Lynch argues that “The applicable statute is North Carolina General Statute § 14-

32.1(f)[.]” (Id. ¶ 7.d.1.) Plaintiffs do not make any reference to § 14-32.1(f) in their filings.

In their Response, Plaintiffs contend that an additional basis beyond the three argued

by Mr. Lynch exists for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the instant action. (See

Docket Entry 43 at 3-5.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that this Court has federal-question

jurisdiction over the claims they bring against the Board pursuant to Title II of the ADA and

the Rehabilitation Act, because they are “laws of the United States over which district courts

have original jurisdiction” as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See Docket Entry 43 at 4.)

Plaintiffs further argue that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

claims they bring against Mr. Lynch, because said claims derive from a common nucleus of

operative fact and are so related to the federal claims against the Board conferring original

jurisdiction that they “form part of the same case or controversy” as contemplated by 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a). (Docket Entry 43 at 4.) Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that factually similar

previous decisions issued from this Court support a finding of supplemental jurisdiction, since

the state law claims against Mr. Lynch “appear to overlap substantially” with the federal law

claims against the Board. (Id. at 4-5 (citing Shaughnessy v. Duke Univ., No. 1:18-CV-461, 2018

WL 6047277, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2018) (unpublished); Sciacca v. Durham Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., 509 F. Supp. 3d 505, 514 (M.D.N.C. 2020)).)

In his Reply, Mr. Lynch references case law pertaining to federal-constitutional

substantive due process. (Docket Entry 44 ¶¶ 1, 9-11, 13.d.) Mr. Lynch reiterates his position

that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims against him because federal jurisdiction can

be conferred by only the three bases (18 U.S.C. § 113, 18 U.S.C. § 111, “and/or” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332) argued in his Motion to Dismiss. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 13, 14-15.) Mr. Lynch further argues

that Plaintiffs’ allegations upon their “information and belief” are not facts, that “under the

guise of their ‘information and belief,’ they assert these allegations as fact[,]” and he disputes

the veracity of said allegations. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 4.a.) Mr. Lynch argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations are

made without accompanying “proof” and “evidence[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 4.a, 4.b, 4.c., 6, 7.)

Mr. Lynch then argues, in reference to Plaintiffs’ allegation that his choice to sit in a

chair over Matthew “caused Matthew to feel threatened and to become agitated and physically

aggressive” (Second Am. Compl ¶ 94), that “no reasonable person could expect anyone to

realize that the act of sitting in a chair in a school classroom would cause a student or any

other person to ‘feel threatened and become physically aggressive.’ ” (Docket Entry 44 ¶ 4.b.1.

(emphasis removed).) Mr. Lynch further contends the following:

Except for Defendant Mr. Lynch, none of the parties to this claim were present

in the Pinecrest High School classroom on 16 September 2021. I find it difficult

for Plaintiffs (or anyone, for that matter) to state what they know happened, when

they were not even there. Thus, Plaintiffs do not provide any credible evidence

of their allegations of an assault, battery, [or false imprisonment] taking place

against [Matthew] on 16 September 2021 involving Defendant Mr. Lynch. …

Of persons who were actually present at Pinecrest High School on 16

September 2021, a sworn peace officer, SRO of the county schools police

department stated on the witness stand, under oath, in a court of law, that he

“… saw absolutely no evidence that indicated any assault took place,” against

[Matthew], and Defendant Mr. Lynch. …

North Carolina State trial in May 2022 witness sworn testimony, under oath, stated

the only indications of something wrong on 16 September 2021 with [Matthew],

was he came home and napped longer than usual. There was no testimony of any

signs of a physical assault whatsoever. … There were no marks, abrasions,

bruising, no physical problems requiring any medical attention whatsoever, no need

of medical treatment, and no physical injuries whatsoever[.] …

In short, Defendant Mr. Lynch committed no assault, battery, [or false

imprisonment], against [Matthew] on 16 September 2021 at Pinecrest High

School - and real facts (not Plaintiffs’ “information and belief”) bear this out.

(Id. ¶¶ 4.c.-4.f. (emphasis removed); see also id. ¶ 7.) Mr. Lynch attempts to distinguish the

instant action from Sciacca, 509 F. Supp. 3d 505, by arguing that here Plaintiffs do not allege

any criminal conspiracy, do not allege any illegal payments made to commit a crime, and that

there were “no physical or medical injuries to [Matthew].” (Docket Entry 44 ¶¶ 8.a.1., 9.a.)

Mr. Lynch also argues that “Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against Defendant Mr.

Lynch should be dismissed” because “punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits

brought under the [ADA] or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act[.]” (Id. ¶ 12.) Ultimately,

Mr. Lynch requests that the instant action be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 16.b.)

b. Several of Mr. Lynch’s Arguments are Misplaced and Thus Fail

At the outset, the undersigned refutes several misplaced arguments made by Mr. Lynch.

In doing so, the court is mindful that because Mr. Lynch appears pro se, his filings “[are] to be

liberally construed,” and “must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.’ ” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520–21 (1972)); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

First, Mr. Lynch has not filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), and so the sufficiency of the Second Amended Complaint is not at issue

here. Cf. Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 983 F.3d 112, 119 (4th Cir. 2020). Even if it was,

neither proof nor evidence is required at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,

255 (4th Cir.2009); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, at this stage, well-pleaded

allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true and all reasonable factual influences are

drawn in the plaintiff’s favor; so long as said allegations are plausible and more than

speculative, they are sufficient. See id. Therefore, taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, the undersigned finds that the facts Plaintiffs

allege against Mr. Lynch are sufficiently plausible to survive Mr. Lynch’s motion to dismiss,

even if, construing his filings generously, he had made said motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Second, the Court rejects [Mr. Lynch’s] motion to the extent it seeks dismissal

because [Plaintiffs] base[ ]some of [their] allegations on “information and belief.”

A plaintiff is generally permitted to plead facts based on “information and belief”

if such plaintiff is in a position of uncertainty because the necessary evidence is

controlled by the defendant. See Raub v. Bowen, 960 F.Supp.2d 602, 615 (E.D.Va.

2013) (noting that although “information and belief” pleadings are “tenuous at

best,” such practice is permitted under Rule 8(a) when relying “on second-hand

information to make a good-faith allegation of fact”); Arista Records, LLC v. Doe

3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The Twombly plausibility standard … does

not prevent a plaintiff from pleading facts alleged ‘upon information and belief’

where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the

defendant”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 2–8 Moore’s Federal

Practice § 8.04[4] (3d ed.) (“Nothing in the Twombly plausibility standard prevents

a plaintiff from pleading on information and belief.”).

Ridenour v. Multi-Color Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 2015). Here, Plaintiffs allege that

Matthew is nonverbal (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 90) and specifically unable to verbally communicate

about the alleged incident on September 16, 2021 (see id. ¶ 114). Furthermore, Plaintiffs were

not present for said incident, and although they include a Declaration from Ms. Cobb that

contains a statement that Mr. Lynch “improperly used physical force against Matthew Wells in

my classroom on September 16, 2021” (Docket Entry 40-2 ¶ 25) said Declaration and the

Second Amended Complaint do not explicitly specify whether Ms. Cobb witnessed the incident

firsthand (see generally id.; see also Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90-111; Docket Entry 44 ¶¶ 4.c.-4.d.).

Accordingly, since Plaintiffs allege that he assaulted, battered, and falsely imprisoned

Matthew, and since Mr. Lynch alleges that “[e]xcept for Defendant Mr. Lynch, none of the

parties to this claim were present in the Pinecrest High School classroom on 16 September

2021[,]” it is plausible that the pertinent facts here are peculiarly within the possession and

control of Mr. Lynch, and Plaintiffs’ pleadings on information and belief are thus permitted at

this juncture by the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ridenour, 147 F. Supp. 3d at

456-57 (“Accordingly, drawing on this Court’s ‘judicial experience and common sense,’ … and

considering the factual allegations located throughout the complaint, the Court finds that [the

relevant claims] survive [the defendant’s motion to dismiss] even though the allegations against

[said defendant] are strongly contested.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Next, Mr. Lynch’s attempt to rely on case law pertaining to federal-constitutional

substantive due process is inapposite and unavailing here because no such claim against him

has been brought by Plaintiffs. (See generally Second Am. Compl.) Similarly, Mr. Lynch’s

contentions that the instant action has already been adjudicated in state criminal court and that

Plaintiffs’ claims against him “belong under the NC State Courts’ jurisdiction” fare no better.

See Hussey v. Cheek, 31 N.C. App. 148, 149, 228 S.E.2d 519, 520-21 (1976) (“The plaintiff in

this civil action for personal injury resulting from assault and battery by the defendant is not

estopped by the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal prosecution for the same alleged

assault. This same result may be reached in the present case by focusing on the burdens of

proof in the two trials. … In no way can the State’s failure to carry its burden in the criminal

case be dispositive of the defendant’s burden in the civil case. When the burden of proof at

the second trial is less than at the first, the failure to carry that burden at the first trial cannot

raise an estoppel to carrying the lesser burden at the second trial.”); Relationship between civil

actions and criminal prosecutions, 8 American Law of Torts § 26:3 (similar, collecting cases).

Furthermore, the undersigned clarifies that Mr. Lynch’s argument regarding punitive

damages fails because Plaintiffs bring no claims under the ADA or the Rehabilitation act against

him. (See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 186-227.) Rather, the sole allegations against Mr. Lynch here

are that he is liable under North Carolina state law for three torts: battery, assault, and false

imprisonment (Id.). Cf. Tort, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“It might be possible to

define a tort by enumerating the things that it is not. It is not crime ….”) Though these torts

share names with North Carolina state crimes,6 each tort is a civil wrong that requires adjudication

separate from his previously adjudicated state criminal matter. Hussey, 31 N.C. App. at 149.

c. This Court Has Supplemental Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Over Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims Against Mr. Lynch

Again, Mr. Lynch contends that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See generally Docket Entry 41; see also Docket Entry 44.)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the federal rules provides for dismissal where the court lacks jurisdiction over

the subject matter of the lawsuit. Should a defendant challenge the existence of federal subject-

matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists. Adams v.

Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). A defendant may assert a facial challenge or factual

challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).

“In pursuing a facial challenge, the defendant must show that a complaint fails to allege facts

upon which subject-matter jurisdiction can be predicated. In a factual challenge, on the other

6 State v. Fulcher, 34 N.C. App. 233, 242, 237 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1977), affirmed by State v. Fulcher,

294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978) (“The common-law crime of false imprisonment, a general

misdemeanor, has not been superseded by the new kidnapping statute because there may be an

unlawful restraint without the purposes specified in the statute.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-1 (common

law declared to be in force); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-33 (criminal misdemeanor assault and battery);

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-32.1 (criminal felony assault on individual with disability).

hand, the defendant maintains that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint are not true.”

Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 621 n.7 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations

omitted). A “court should grant the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss ‘only if the material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of

law.’ ” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg

& Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).

This Court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further, “[federal] district courts

shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This jurisdictional

grant extends to “claims that involve the joinder … of additional parties[,]” id., provided they

form part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the court has original

jurisdiction. Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 615 (4th Cir. 2001). State claims

are part of the same case or controversy as federal claims when they “derive from a common

nucleus of operative fact … such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all

in one judicial proceeding.” Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 145 F.3d 660, 662 (4th

Cir. 1998); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966) (noting that

“considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants” motivate 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367 and justify supplemental jurisdiction).

Here, although Mr. Lynch does contest the veracity of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding his

interactions with Matthew, he does not argue that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint

are untrue (see generally Docket Entries 41, 44); the Court therefore construes his Motion to Dismiss

as asserting a facial challenge. Again, Plaintiffs argue that this Court has original jurisdiction over

their federal-law claims against the Board pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental

jurisdiction over their state-law claims against Mr. Lynch pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

(Docket Entry 43 at 3-5.) Mr. Lynch does not attempt to refute said arguments. (See generally

Docket Entry 44.) Rather, again, Mr. Lynch argues that jurisdiction can be conferred only by

18 U.S.C. § 113, 18 U.S.C. § 111, “and/or” 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and that since none of those

three is satisfied, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the state law claims against him. (See generally

Docket Entries 41, 44.)

The undersigned finds Mr. Lynch’s argument unpersuasive. Here, the plain text of 28

U.S.C. § 1331 clearly confers the Court original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims

against the Board brought pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and for the

following reasons the Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims

against Mr. Lynch. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Mr. Lynch are closely intertwined with their federal-law

claims against the Board. Indeed, Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that involved Mr. Lynch in

their claims against the Board to permit an inference that Matthew was discriminated against

due to his disability in violation of federal law. (See Docket Entry 30 at 19.) Said facts include

allegations that Matthew was “subject to improper uses of force by untrained and unqualified

staff,” particularly by Mr. Lynch, whose assignment to Matthew Plaintiffs allege caused

Matthew to be subjected to an assault, battery, and false imprisonment. (See id.; see also Second

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90-111; ¶¶ 186-227.) Furthermore, the Court stated that

the Amended Complaint alleges that the Board had knowledge of improper

physical force being used against disabled students by untrained and unqualified

TAs[, including Mr. Lynch.] … Despite the Board’s awareness of the importance

of the proper training[,] … [Plaintiffs] allege that the Board ignored Ms. Cobb[’s]

requests that properly qualified and trained TAs be hired or be trained before

beginning work, and that the Board[ ]knows its practice of employing unqualified

and untrained TAs has resulted in and will continue to cause the improper use of

physical force against students with intellectual disabilities, including Matthew. …

Further, [Plaintiffs] allege that despite the Board’s knowledge regarding the TAs,

it acted with deliberate indifference as it did nothing to prevent a violation of

rights from occurring. (Id. ¶¶ 75-78.) Thus, at the pleading stage, the undersigned

finds that the Amended Complaint … sufficiently alleges facts[, some of which

directly implicate Mr. Lynch, to give] rise to a plausible inference of deliberate

indifference [against the Board].

(See id. at 23 (some citations omitted); see also id. at 19, 21.) Crucially, this Court found

that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the September 16, 2021, incident in which Mr. Lynch

allegedly improperly used physical force against Matthew stated a sufficient claim against the

Board under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. (See id., see also Second Am. Compl ¶ 78.)

Therefore, at least some of Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims against the Board arise from the same

common nucleus of operative facts as their state-law claims against Mr. Lynch. Shaughnessy, 2018

WL 6047277 at *6 (“The facts underlying [the plaintiff’s] state[-]law claims against [one

defendant] appear to overlap substantially with his [federal-law claims for] disability

discrimination and retaliation against [another defendant]. … Because the state claims against

[one defendant] and federal claims against [another defendant] derive from a common nucleus

of operative fact, exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate under § 1367(a).” (citations

omitted)); Sciacca, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 514 (in action wherein student with IEP was attacked by

other students while riding school bus and wherein parents sued county school board and

individuals who attacked student, there was sufficient factual nexus between state law claims

(including assault and battery) against all defendants and federal law claims (including violations

of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act) against some defendants to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction; all claims formed part of the same case or controversy pursuant to § 1367(a)).

Ultimately, therefore, “the Court concludes that the federal and state claims here derive

from a common nucleus of operative facts and that it is in the interest of economy, convenience,

and fairness for [Plaintiffs’] state and federal claims … to remain in federal court. Accordingly,

the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over [Plaintiffs’] state

law claims against [Mr. Lynch].” Lerma v. NTT McKee Retail Ctr., LLC, No. 5:11-CV-02161-

LHK, 2011 WL 4948667, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (unpublished); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

Plaintiffs have carried their burden of alleging facts that make it plausible that jurisdiction exists

and that Mr. Lynch is not entitled to prevail as a matter of law at this stage. Thus, the

undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 41) should also be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Lynch’s

Motion entitled “Defendant Jeffrey Lee Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint –

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(1) – Court’s Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction” (Docket Entry 38) should be DENIED as moot, and that Defendant Lynch’s

Motion entitled “Defendant Jeffrey Lee Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended

Complaint” (Docket Entry 41) should be DENIED.

/s/ Joe L. Webster

United States Magistrate Judge

May 8, 2025

Durham, North Carolina