Rebecca Hudson v. Paul Gravette

05/08/2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

December 3, 2024 Session

REBECCA HUDSON ET AL. V. PAUL GRAVETTE ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hickman County

No. 20-CV-3 Michael E. Spitzer, Judge

No. M2022-01787-COA-R3-CV

A kennel technician filed a personal injury action against the owners of two dogs, asserting

a claim under the statute governing dog owners’ liability for injuries caused by their dogs

and a claim for common law negligence. The technician alleged that the dogs attacked and

injured her while they were boarded at her place of employment. The trial court granted

summary judgment to the dog owners on both claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision

to grant summary judgment on the statutory claim, but we reverse the court’s decision to

grant summary judgment on the common law negligence claim.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in

Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER

and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Brian Patrick Dunigan, Goodlettsville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rebecca Hudson.

Christopher M. Jones, Brentwood, Tennessee, and Richard J. Montes, Woodbury, New

York, for the appellees, Paul Gravette and Leigh Ann Gravette.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Paul and Leigh Ann Gravette own two English bulldogs, Winston and Duke. The

Gravettes frequently travel for business, which necessitates placing Winston and Duke in

a boarding facility. For some time, the Gravettes boarded the dogs at Belmont Pet Resort,

but in March 2018, the dogs allegedly bit one of the facility’s employees and scratched

another. Susan Lonardelli, the general manager of Belmont Pet Resort, submitted an

affidavit stating that she informed the Gravettes of these attacks and told them that the dogs

could not be boarded at that facility in the future. The Gravettes then began boarding

Winston and Duke at Chasing Tails Pet Farm (“Chasing Tails”). Between May 2018 and

February 2019, the dogs stayed at Chasing Tails for 134 days.

Chasing Tails is owned by Jeff Patton and provides numerous services for dogs

including daycare, boarding, exercising, training, feeding, administering medications,

grooming, and transportation. When Winston and Duke stayed at Chasing Tails, someone

from the facility would pick the dogs up from the Gravettes’ home and take them to the

facility. While the dogs were at Chasing Tails, the facility was responsible for their feeding

schedule and ensuring they were exercised. If Winston and Duke needed to go to the

veterinarian during their stay at the facility, a Chasing Tails employee would take them. At

the end of their stay, someone from the facility would bathe the dogs and drive them back

to the Gravettes’ home.

Rebecca Hudson worked at Chasing Tails as a dog trainer and kennel technician.

Her job duties included caring for the dogs, feeding them, bathing them, exercising them,

administering their medications, and taking pictures for Chasing Tails’s Instagram account.

On the morning of March 2, 2019, Winston and Duke were being boarded at Chasing Tails.

Ms. Hudson was the first to arrive at the facility, and she began taking dogs outside to

relieve themselves. Her routine consisted of letting a few dogs out at a time, and Winston

and Duke were in the last group to be let outside. As Ms. Hudson released Winston and

Duke from their crates, one of the dogs (she does not know which one) began nipping her

feet and bit through her shoe, puncturing her right foot. According to Ms. Hudson, she fell

to the ground, and both dogs proceeded to attack her for approximately five to ten

minutes—ending only when another dog intervened to pin down either Winston or Duke.

She was then able to return the dogs to their crates.

Ms. Hudson filed a complaint against the Gravettes on January 3, 2020, asserting a

claim for common law negligence and a claim for strict liability under Tenn. Code Ann. §

44-8-413, Tennessee’s dog bite statute. She claimed that, during the attack, she sustained

“countless bite wounds to her arms, legs, and other parts of her body” that required her “to

undergo emergency surgery,” that she is now covered in scars, and that she continues to

suffer from “incredibly painful” nerve damage, swelling in her feet, and debilitating post-

traumatic stress. The Gravettes filed an answer asserting comparative fault against Mr.

Patton, d/b/a Chasing Tails Pet Farm. Ms. Hudson amended her complaint to add Mr.

Patton as a defendant pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119. Mr. Patton filed a motion

to be dismissed from the case because he was Ms. Hudson’s employer and, therefore, was

immune from liability pursuant to the “exclusive remedy rule” of the Tennessee Workers’

Compensation Act. The trial court granted Mr. Patton’s request on July 27, 2020. Shortly

before Mr. Patton’s dismissal from the case, Trumbull Insurance Company moved to

intervene as a plaintiff to protect its subrogation interest for workers’ compensation

benefits paid to Ms. Hudson. The trial court granted the motion to intervene.

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After the parties engaged in discovery, the Gravettes filed a motion for summary

judgment on November 15, 2021, and a supplemental motion for summary judgment on

April 1, 2022. The Gravettes argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because

Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413 abrogated common law claims related to dog bite incidents

and that Ms. Hudson could not recover under Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413 because Chasing

Tails fell within the statute’s definition of “owner.”

The trial court denied the motion because it found that the record was insufficient

to establish whether Chasing Tails owned the dogs under the statute. After engaging in

additional discovery, the Gravettes renewed their motion for summary judgment, attaching

evidence related to the ownership issue. In particular, they submitted invoices from

Chasing Tails and Mr. Patton’s deposition testimony to support their argument that Chasing

Tails had exclusive control of the dogs at the time of the incident and that Chasing Tails

regularly exercised control over the dogs. Based on this additional evidence, the trial court

granted the Gravettes’ renewed motion for summary judgment on December 5, 2022. The

court held that Chasing Tails fell within the statute’s definition of “owner” because it kept

Winston and Duke “almost half of a nine-month period” and because keeping them was

for Chasing Tails’s benefit. The court further held that Ms. Hudson could not recover from

the Gravettes under the statute because Chasing Tails was the owner who failed to keep

the dogs under reasonable control. The court concluded that the statute controlled under

the facts of the case and, therefore, abrogated Ms. Hudson’s common law negligence claim.

Ms. Hudson appealed and presents the following issue for our review: whether the

trial court erred “in granting summary judgment based on a finding that the Gravettes, who

knowingly owned vicious dogs, could not be held liable[, under statutory law or the

common law,] to an employee of a boarding facility which regularly kept the dogs because

the boarding facility was a ‘statutory owner.’”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s summary judgment determination de novo, with no

presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d

235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). This means that “we make a fresh determination of whether the

requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.”

Id. We “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692,

695 (Tenn. 2002); see also Acute Care Holdings, LLC v. Houston Cnty., No. M2018-

01534-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2337434, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2019).

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04. A disputed fact is material if it is determinative

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of the claim or defense at issue in the motion. Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76,

84 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). When a party

moves for summary judgment but does not have the burden of proof at trial, the moving

party must submit evidence either “affirmatively negating an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s claim” or “demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the

summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or

defense.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264. Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement,

the nonmoving party “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading.’”

Id. at 265 (quoting TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.06). Rather, the nonmoving party must respond

and produce affidavits, depositions, responses to interrogatories, or other discovery that

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” TENN. R. CIV. P.

56.06; see also Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265. If the nonmoving party fails to respond in this

way, “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the [nonmoving] party.”

TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.06. If the moving party fails to show he or she is entitled to summary

judgment, however, “‘the non-movant’s burden to produce either supporting affidavits or

discovery materials is not triggered and the motion for summary judgment fails.’” Martin,

271 S.W.3d at 83 (quoting McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn.

1998)).

Determining whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case requires us to

interpret Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413. When interpreting a statute, our role “is to assign a

statute the full effect of the legislative intent without restricting or expanding its intended

scope.” Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tenn. 2016). We determine the legislature’s

intent by “look[ing] first and foremost to the text of the statute because the statutory

language is of primary importance.” Flade v. City of Shelbyville, 699 S.W.3d 272, 285

(Tenn. 2024). If a statute’s language is “clear and unambiguous, we derive the legislative

intent from the plain meaning of the statutory language and simply enforce the statute as

written.” Id. Statutory construction presents a question of law that we review de novo

without a presumption of correctness. State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2020).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether Chasing Tails was a statutory owner of the dogs

We begin with Ms. Hudson’s argument that the trial court erred in concluding that

Chasing Tails was an “owner” of the dogs under Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413. That statute

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The owner of a dog has a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control at

all times, and to keep that dog from running at large. A person who breaches

that duty is subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person

who is injured by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in or on the

private property of another.

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Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(a)(1). Thus, under this statute, a dog owner is “strictly liable

if the owner’s dog injures a person because the owner failed to exercise reasonable control

over the dog or the dog is running at large.” Searcy v. Axley, No. W2017-00374-COA-R3-

CV, 2017 WL 4743111, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2017).

When read in its entirety, the thrust of the statute is to encourage dog owners to

control their dogs in order to protect the public from harm. The question then is who

constitutes an “owner” of a dog with a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control. The

statute defines an “owner” as

a person who, at the time of the damage caused to another, regularly harbors,

keeps, or exercises control over the dog, but does not include a person who,

at the time of the damage, is temporarily harboring, keeping, or exercising

control over the dog.

Id. § 44-8-413(e)(1). We have previously interpreted this definition and held that it “should

be evident” from the statutory language that “the General Assembly did not delimit the

meaning of ‘owner’ to the common connotation of a dog owner, i.e., one with a property

interest in the dog. The statutory understanding of ‘owner’ is broader, implicating persons

who regularly harbor, keep, or exercise control over the dog.” Folad v. Quillco, LLC, 629

S.W.3d 134, 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). In other words, the statute expanded the meaning

of an “owner” of a dog beyond a dog’s legal owner to include anyone who regularly places

himself or herself in a position of control akin to that of a legal owner.

Ms. Hudson contends that the trial court should not have found that Chasing Tails

fell within the statute’s expanded definition of an “owner” of the dogs because nothing in

the record shows that it was “harboring or keeping the dogs on a permanent basis.” Reading

the definition of “owner” reveals no language stating that a person must permanently

harbor or keep a dog to constitute an “owner” of the dog. Rather, the statute states that a

person must “regularly harbor[], keep[], or exercise[] control over the dog” to be

considered an owner of a dog. Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(e)(1) (emphasis added). The

statute does not define the term “regularly.” Thus, our task is to ascertain whether the

legislature intended for the term “regularly” to mean “on a permanent basis” by looking at

the natural and ordinary meaning of the statute’s words. Flade, 699 S.W.3d at 285.

Courts often turn to dictionaries to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of

the words in a statute. English Mtn. Spring Water Co. v. Chumley, 196 S.W.3d 144, 148

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “regularly” as: (1) “in a

regular manner”; or (2) “on a regular basis: regular intervals.” Regularly, Merriam-

Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regularly (last

visited Apr. 22, 2025). Similarly, Cambridge Dictionary defines “regularly” as: (1)

“often”; or (2) “at repeated times, with equal or similar amounts of time between one time

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and the next.” Regularly, Cambridge Dictionary,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/regularly (last visited Apr. 22,

2025). We, therefore, conclude that the natural and ordinary meaning of the term

“regularly” shows that the legislature intended for an “owner” of a dog to be a person who

often or on a regular basis “harbors, keeps, or exercises control over the dog.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 44-8-413(e)(1). Thus, contrary to Ms. Hudson’s assertion, Chasing Tails did not

have to harbor or keep the dogs permanently to constitute an owner of the dogs.

In addition to the foregoing, we note that, because Chasing Tails is a business, the

principles set forth in Folad v. Quillco, LLC also apply. Folad involved two dogs that their

legal owner kept at the legal owner’s store, which was operated by Quillco, LLC. 629

S.W.3d at 136. The plaintiff sued the dogs’ legal owner and Quillco, LLC under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 44-8-413, alleging that she was injured by the dogs when they escaped from

the store. Id. After the dogs’ legal owner was dismissed from the case, Quillco, LLC filed

a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not fall within the statutory definition

of an “owner” of the dogs because, at best, it merely had temporary custody or control of

the dogs. Id. at 137. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment to Quillco, LLC

because it concluded that, at the time of the incident, the dogs were at the store with their

legal owner and, at all relevant times, the dogs were under the legal owners’ care, custody,

and control. Id.

On appeal, this Court reversed after determining that there was a genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether Quillco, LLC’s relationship with the dogs placed it within

the meaning of an “owner” of the dogs under the statute. Id. at 140. In making its

determination, the Folad court noted that it was undisputed that the dogs “had a regular

presence” in the store and that the store’s employees had been instructed to lock the store’s

back door when the dogs were in the store, but the court held that “a business entity should

[not] be considered a regular harborer, keeper, or controller of a dog within the meaning of

the statute solely by dint of a dog’s presence at the business.” Id. Rather, the court stated,

“whether status as harborer, keeper, or controller can attach to a business entity is entirely

dependent on the purpose of a dog’s presence at the business,” with importance placed on

whether the dog’s presence would benefit or further the entity’s business. Id. Because there

was evidence that the dogs were used in marketing the store and that they were regularly

in the store to “enhance the customer experience,” the court concluded that there was a

dispute of material fact regarding whether Quillco, LLC was an “owner” under the statute

because the business benefitted from the dogs’ presence at the store. Id. at 141.

Applying the foregoing reasoning to the present case, we conclude that the evidence

in the record supports the trial court’s determination that Chasing Tails regularly harbored,

kept, and exercised control over the dogs. It is undisputed that the Gravettes traveled

extensively for work and frequently boarded Winston and Duke at Chasing Tails from May

8, 2018, through May 2, 2019. During that time period, the Gravettes boarded the dogs at

Chasing Tails every month for stays that ranged from five to sixteen days each time.

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Indeed, the record contains fifteen invoices from Chasing Tails showing that, from May

2018 through February 2019, the dogs stayed at Chasing Tails 134 days out of the total 287

days—nearly fifty percent of the time. Further, at the time of the alleged attack on Ms.

Hudson, the dogs had already been at Chasing Tails for several days. The evidence,

therefore, establishes that, at the time of the alleged attack, Winston and Duke had been

staying at Chasing Tails on a regular basis. The evidence also shows that, during each stay,

Chasing Tails had exclusive custody and control of the dogs that was akin to that of their

legal owners. Specifically, during each stay, Chasing Tails lodged, trained, fed, and

provided all necessary care for the dogs, including grooming them and taking them to

veterinary appointments. Furthermore, when each stay ended, Chasing Tails, not the

Gravettes, would transport the dogs back to the Gravettes’ home.

Regarding the benefit element, Ms. Hudson contends that the Gravettes, not Chasing

Tails, benefitted from the dogs’ presence at Chasing Tails because the Gravettes boarded

the dogs at Chasing Tails to be cared for and socialized while they traveled. We respectfully

disagree. This is not a situation where Winston and Duke were at Chasing Tails because

Chasing Tails kindly opened its doors to them as a favor or goodwill gesture for the

convenience of the Gravettes. The dogs had a regular presence at Chasing Tails because

Chasing Tails is in the business of boarding and caring for dogs, and the Gravettes

compensated Chasing Tails very well for providing them with these services. The invoices

included in the record show that, over a nine-month period, the Gravettes paid Chasing

Tails $7,550 for these services. Additionally, Ms. Hudson testified that her job duties

included taking pictures of the dogs for the Chasing Tails Instagram account, which

promoted Chasing Tails’s business. We, therefore, agree with the trial court’s conclusion

that the dogs’ regular presence at Chasing Tails benefited Chasing Tails and furthered its

business. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Chasing Tails was an owner of the

dogs under Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413.1

II. Whether Chasing Tails’s status as an owner of the dogs precludes Ms. Hudson

from recovery under the Dog Bite Statute

With Chasing Tails considered an “owner” of the dogs under Tenn. Code Ann. §

44-8-413, we must next consider whether the trial court correctly determined that Ms.

Hudson could not recover from the Gravettes under the statute because it was Chasing Tails

who had the duty to control the dogs, not the Gravettes.

The language of the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that a dog owner

has “a duty to keep [a] dog under reasonable control at all times, and to keep that dog from

1

In her appellate brief, Ms. Hudson argues that the issue of whether Chasing Tails was an owner of the

dogs under the statute is not appropriate for summary judgment because “a question of fact still remains

regarding whether Chasing Tails was ‘temporarily’ keeping the Gravettes’ dogs.” Ms. Hudson admits,

however, that the Gravettes frequently boarded the dogs at Chasing Tails. She offers no evidence disputing

the Gravettes’ evidence showing that the dogs were regularly at Chasing Tails. This argument is unavailing.

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running at large,” and if the owner breaches that duty, he or she “is subject to civil liability

for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog while in a public place or

lawfully in or on the private property of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(a)(1). As

discussed above, the statute’s definition of “owner” establishes who constitutes an owner

with the duty to control a dog. Admittedly, the Gravettes could qualify as owners of the

dogs under the statute because, as the legal owners, they too regularly kept and harbored

the dogs. The statute, however, notably defines an owner of a dog as someone regularly

harboring, keeping, or exercising control over the dog “at the time of the damage caused

to another.” Id. (Emphasis added). By the terms of the statute, the issue of statutory liability

in this case turns on who, “at the time of the damage caused to another,” was in a position

to control the dog but failed to do so.

At the time of the alleged attack, Winston and Duke were being boarded at Chasing

Tails. The Gravettes were completely separated physically from the dogs, meaning they

were not in a position to exercise control of them. The dogs had been in Chasing Tails’s

sole possession and control for several days. As such, at the time of the damage caused to

Ms. Hudson, Chasing Tails was the owner who had the duty to keep the dogs under

reasonable control but failed to do so. We, therefore, agree with the trial court’s conclusion

that Ms. Hudson cannot prove her claim against the Gravettes under Tenn. Code Ann. §

44-8-413 when the Gravettes were not the owners with the duty to keep the dogs under

reasonable control at the time of her injuries. We affirm the portion of the trial court’s

decision granting summary judgment to the Gravettes on Ms. Hudson’s claim under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 44-8-413.

III. Whether the statute applying to Chasing Tails abrogated Ms. Hudson’s common

law claim

Ms. Hudson next contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Chasing

Tails’s status as an “owner” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413 controlled her ability to

recover and abrogated consideration of her common law claim against the Gravettes. Under

the common law, the general rule for dog bite cases, sometimes referred to as the one-bite

rule, provides that “where an animal is accustomed or disposed to injure persons, and the

owner or keeper has notice or knowledge of that fact, he is liable for any injury which such

animal may do to another person.” Missio v. Williams, 167 S.W. 473, 474 (Tenn. 1914). In

other words, where an owner “knowingly ke[pt] a vicious animal,” the common law

imposes absolute liability on the owner. Fletcher v. Richardson, 603 S.W.2d 734, 735

(Tenn. 1980). This absolute liability arises from “the mere keeping of an animal, after

notice of its vicious propensities.” Id. at 736; see also Missio, 167 S.W. at 474. Therefore,

if an owner has notice of a dog’s vicious habits, the common law imposes liability on the

owner even when the dog was “rightfully in the place where the injury [was] inflicted.”

Missio, 167 S.W. at 474.

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The Gravettes argue that the trial court correctly determined that, under the

circumstances of this case, the dog bite statute abrogated Ms. Hudson’s common law claim

because the plain language of the statute shows that it altered the common law one-bite

rule. When considering whether a statute changes the common law, we apply the rules of

statutory construction, which are especially stringent in this context. In particular,

“[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are generally strictly construed” with “a

presumption against the legislature’s intention to change existing law.” Jordan v. Baptist

Three Rivers Hosp., 984 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999). Thus, “[w]hile the legislature

possesses the plenary power to abrogate the common law by statutory enactment, the

existence of a statute in and of itself will not repeal a common law right absent a clear

legislative statement expressing an intent to do so.” Cellco P’ship v. Shelby Cnty., 172

S.W.3d 574, 591 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Lavin v. Jordan, 16 S.W.3d 362, 368

(Tenn. 2000)). “[W]ithout some clear indication to the contrary, [the court] will not

presume that the General Assembly intended to change the common law by implication.”

Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405, 423 (Tenn. 2013); see also Searcy,

2017 WL 4743111, at *4. Even if a statute clearly indicates that the General Assembly

intended to change the common law, courts do not interpret a statute as changing the

common law “any further than the statute declares or necessarily requires.” Shore, 411

S.W.3d at 423.

Since Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413 was enacted in 2007, only a few cases have

analyzed the statute, and none have considered whether a finding that a person other than

a dog’s legal owner was the owner who violated the duty to keep the dog under reasonable

control at all times abrogates any common law claim against the dog’s legal owner. In

concluding that Ms. Hudson’s common law negligence claim against the Gravettes was

abrogated by its finding that Chasing Tails was the owner of the dogs that violated the duty

to keep them under reasonable control, the trial court relied on this Court’s decision in

Searcy v. Axley. In Searcy, a dog bit a child while on the premises of the dog’s owners.

2017 WL 4743111, at *1. The child’s parents, on behalf of the child, filed suit against the

dog’s owners asserting a claim under the dog bite statute and a claim for common law

negligence “due to [one of the dog’s owners] striking and provoking the dog to bite the

minor child.” Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog’s owners after

concluding that the plaintiffs could not prove an element of the claim they filed pursuant

to the dog bite statute, and the court entered a subsequent order dismissing the plaintiffs’

common law negligence claim, reasoning that dismissal of the statutory claim required

dismissal of the common law negligence claim. Id. at *2.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the

dismissal of their statutory claim required dismissal of their negligence claim. The court

began by noting that the residential exception found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(c)(1)

applied because the damage caused by the dog occurred on property owned by the dog’s

owners. Id. at *4. That exception, the court explained, “‘codifie[d] the common law

requirement that a claimant “establish that the dog’s owner knew or should have known of

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the dog’s dangerous propensities.”’” Id. (quoting Moore v. Gaut, No. E2015-00340-COA-

R3-CV, 2015 WL 9584389, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (quoting Tenn. Code

Ann. § 44-8-413(c)(1))). Because the plaintiffs failed to submit sufficient evidence that the

owners of the dog “knew or should have known that their dog would have vicious

propensities,” the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the statutory claim. Id. at *7.

The Searcy court then considered “whether section 44-8-413 abrogates any common

law claim that may have existed prior to the statute’s enactment in which the claimant in a

dog bite case was not required to show that the owner knew or should have known of the

dog’s dangerous propensities.” Id. at *5. In examining the statute’s language, the court

focused on the phrase “any civil action” and concluded that the statute clearly and

unambiguously “applies to each and every civil suit falling within the specific category of

cases dealt with by section (c)(1).” Id. at *6. Thus, the court held, “section (c)(1) of the

Dog Bite Statute abrogates common law claims” that “involv[e] damage caused by a dog

on its owners’ property.” Id. at *4, *6. Because the plaintiffs alleged that the injury

occurred on the dog owners’ property, the Searcy court concluded that the dog bite statute

applied and barred the plaintiffs’ common law negligence claim against the dog’s owners.

Id. at *6.

In the present case, Ms. Hudson did not allege that the dogs caused her damages

while she was “on residential, farm or other noncommercial property” owned by the

Gravettes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(c)(1). She alleged that the dogs caused her

damages while she was on Chasing Tails’s property. Therefore, subsection (a), not

subsection (c), applies to this case. The language of subsection (a) states that, where an

owner of a dog breaches the duty to keep the dog under reasonable control, that owner “is

subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog

while in a public place or lawfully in or on the private property of another” regardless of

whether “the dog’s owner knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous

propensities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(a). A plain reading of this statutory language

shows that the legislature intended to alter the common law one-bite rule by broadening

the law to increase accountability for injuries caused by dogs that are not kept under

reasonable control. In particular, subsection (a) increases a dog owner’s accountability by

making him or her liable for injuries caused by his or her dog even in situations where the

owner did not know or have reason to know that the dog was vicious. Furthermore, as

previously discussed, the statute’s definition of “owner” broadened who could be held

accountable for injuries caused by a dog not kept under reasonable control.

Nothing in the plain language of the statute, however, shows that the legislature

intended to immunize or lessen the liability of owners who know or should know that their

dogs have vicious propensities. Therefore, we conclude that where a dog injures a person

on the property of someone other than the dog’s legal owner, a finding that the legal owner

is not subject to liability under the Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(a) does not abrogate a

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claimant’s common law negligence claim against the dog’s legal owner when the legal

owner knew of the dog’s vicious propensities.

We note that this holding comports with those from courts in other jurisdictions with

strict liability dog bite statutes. See Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848, 849-50 (Cal. 2006)

(holding that a kennel technician had no claim against a dog’s owner under California’s

strict liability dog bite statute but that did not “mark the end of the road for plaintiff”

because “[a] common law strict liability cause of action may also be maintained if the

[owner of a dog] that bites or injures another person knew or had reason to know of the

animal’s vicious propensities”); Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 549 N.W.2d 723,

725-26 (Wis. 1996) (holding that the employee of a boarding facility was an “owner” who

could not recover under Wisconsin’s strict liability dog bite statute but emphasizing that

its holding was limited to cases where “there is no evidence of negligence on the part of

the legal owners”); Murphy v. Buonato, 679 A.2d 411, 416 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (holding

that plaintiff who kept a dog while the dog’s owner was out of town was a “keeper” that

could not recover under Connecticut’s strict liability dog bite statute but acknowledging

that plaintiff could potentially recover in an “action sounding in negligence”); Khamis v.

Everson, 623 N.E.2d 683, 686-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the employee of a

boarding kennel could not sue a dog’s owner under Ohio’s strict liability dog bite statute

but observing that “‘keepers’ or ‘harborers’ of dogs that proximately cause injury to them

still have a common-law cause of action against the dog’s owner”); Tschida v. Berdusco,

462 N.W.2d 410, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that two people “who both meet the

statutory definition of owner” of a dog would not be liable to one another under

Minnesota’s strict liability dog bite statute but specifying that its holding was limited to

cases “where there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the legal owners”).

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment to the Gravettes as to Ms. Hudson’s common law negligence claim. We reverse

that portion of the court’s decision.

CONCLUSION

The portion of the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the

Gravettes on Ms. Hudson’s claim filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413 is

affirmed. The portion of the trial court’s judgment granting summary to the Gravettes on

Ms. Hudson’s common law claim is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed

equally against the appellant, Rebecca Hudson, and the appellees, Paul Gravette and Leigh

Ann Gravette, for which execution may issue if necessary.

/s/ Andy D. Bennett

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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