ROGERS v. UPMC ALTOONA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LYNN ROGERS, )

) Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-174

Plaintiff, )

) District Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand

v. ) Magistrate Judge Kezia O. L. Taylor

)

UPMC ALTOONA d/b/a UPMC )

ALTOONA FAMILY PHYSICIANS, and ) ECF No. 26

DONALD BECKSTEAD, )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and

denied in part. Specifically, it is recommended that the Motion be GRANTED as to the Retaliation

Claim and DENIED as to the Equal Pay Act Claim, the Gender Discrimination Claim, and the

Hostile Work Environment Claim. In addition, to the extent that Defendants have moved to strike

parts of the Amended Complaint, we recommend that request be DENIED.

II. REPORT

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Lynn Rogers (“Plaintiff”) filed an amended complaint on February 6, 2023,

against her former employers, Defendant UPMC Altoona (“UPMC”) and Defendant Donald

Beckstead (“Beckstead”), claiming that they subjected her to discrimination, hostile work

environment, and retaliation based on her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended; that UPMC Altoona paid her unequally on the basis of Plaintiff’s gender in

violation of the U.S. Equal Pay Act of 1963; and violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Act. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff submitted her Opposition, and Defendants

filed an allowed Reply Brief. ECF Nos. 27, 31, 32-2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is now ripe

for review.

B. Factual Allegations

Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, in this section,

we only briefly recite the facts. Plaintiff is a woman who began working with UPMC in December

2010. In 2014, she was hired to work as a Behavioral Science Faculty member with Defendant

UPMC Altoona Family Physicians, reporting to Beckstead, a UPMC employee. ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 7,

11 – 15. She is a member of a protected class and qualified for the position. ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 7, 17-

18. Each year from June 2015 through June 2019, skits were presented at an annual luncheon

portraying women in a degrading, demeaning, and harassing manner. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 21. Though

numerous female residents and Plaintiff complained to her superiors, including to Beckstead, id.

¶¶ 25, 27, Defendants allowed the skits to continue, condoning them, laughing at them, and

showing that Defendants did not respect women. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. In 2017, Defendants hired a male

Behavioral Science Faculty member, James Mercuri, who, as Plaintiff learned in 2018, had

substantially the same employment duties and responsibilities, the same degree and licensure, and

a similar number of people reporting to him, as did Plaintiff; Plaintiff, however, had more

experience than Mercuri. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31, 32. Plaintiff discovered that Mercuri’s starting salary was

$80,000, significantly higher than her $60,000 salary, though she was more experienced. Id. ¶¶

30 – 33. Though she pursued the pay disparity with HR and with Beckstead, neither provided a

satisfactory explanation. Id. ¶ 33 – 38. Beckstead, rather, sought to pacify her so that she would

stop complaining. Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.

At least until 2022, problematic episodes at the workplace continued, including: remarks

such as Beckstead’s public remark, after his assertion that women do not act to solve problems but

are typically overemotional and ruminate, “Oops, I forgot that the hashtag #MeToo police is in the

room;” id. ¶¶ 42-43, Beckstead’s mocking a patient as young and stupid for becoming pregnant

from a sexual assault, id. ¶ 92, Beckstead’s 2021 joke about “one-night stands,” id. ¶ 141,

Beckstead and Joseph Hines, the Associate Program Director, referring to women who reported

sexual harassment as “a Lipka” or “Lipka-esque” (after a woman medical resident who reported

harassment at the workplace), id. ¶¶ 79-80; women employees’ fear of reporting sexual

harassment, id. ¶ 89; a menstrual pad covered in ketchup being placed in the office, id. ¶ 85;

Beckstead’s persistent failure to address the complaints presented to him about the hostile work

environment, id. ¶¶ 102, 107-8; a supervisor’s joke about “one-night stands,” id. ¶ 141, and

derision directed at Plaintiff for hosting an antidiscrimination event. Id. ¶¶ 162-165, 167. Plaintiff

was also assigned additional responsibilities after engaging in protected activity, id. ¶ 61-67 and

was removed from a faculty retreat. Id. ¶¶ 114-117.

Throughout all of this, Plaintiff complained to Beckstead and reached out to HR. As but

one example, Plaintiff continued to email Beckstead about the pay disparity between herself and

Mercuri, but Beckstead ignored them and did not approach HR, id. ¶¶ 35, 46, even when Plaintiff

confronted him in person. Id. ¶¶ 47, 48. In 2019, Plaintiff formally asked to initiate a Job

Evaluation Request (“JER”) and Beckstead informed Plaintiff that he would speak to the Altoona

CEO about it, but never did. Id. ¶¶ 49 – 52. Plaintiff continued to get the runaround from

Beckstead regarding the JER, a potential denial, and whether the matter had been raised with HR,

id. ¶¶ 39, 40, and the refusal to address the issue was in order to continue Defendants’

discriminatory practices. Id. ¶ 57. HR did not contact Plaintiff during 2019, leading her to

conclude that Beckstead had not reported her complaint. Id. ¶¶ 59. In 2018 after the Program

Coordinator (“PC”) left UPMC, in retaliation for her complaints, Beckstead required Plaintiff to

do the PC’s job as well as her own for several months without additional compensation. Id. ¶¶ 60

– 68.

Plaintiff found the described discriminatory acts “degrading, demeaning, and harassing,”

ECF 24 ¶ 21, was “extremely upset,” id. ¶ 25, and suffered by being paid less unfairly, id. ¶ 33-

34, 37-38. All of this contributed to Plaintiff suffering from exhaustion, id. ¶ 21, having to work

long hours to keep up with the extra duties that had been put upon her, and functioning on little

sleep. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. She sought out a therapist who found that she had been traumatized and

exhausted by Defendants’ actions and recommended that she leave her position, though she

remained, in part because she was the sole support of herself and her children. Id. ¶¶ 71-73.

C. Legal Standards

1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in

the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines

Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the

allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and

documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering a motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of

Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114

F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).

In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the

plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp.

235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint

should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule

12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a

plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub.

Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions

disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York,

Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way,

in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in

the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences,

unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly and Iqbal line of

cases, the Third Circuit has articulated this three-step approach:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations

that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to

the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster

Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679.

2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f). Immaterial allegations have no essential or important relationship to the claim for

relief or the defenses being pleaded. Conklin v. Anthou, 2011 WL 1303299, at* 1 (M.D. Pa. Apr.

5, 2011). Impertinent allegations consist of “statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary,

to the issues in question.” In re Shannopin Mining Co., 2002 WL 31002883, at *28 (W.D. Pa. Jul.

25, 2002). Scandalous allegations “cast[s] a derogatory light on someone, use[s] repulsive

language, or detract[s] from the dignity of the court.” Carone v. Whalen, 121 F.R.D. 231, 232

(M.D. Pa. 1988). This Court recently provided a recitation of applicable standards for deciding

motions to strike:

“Motions to strike are decided on the pleadings alone, and should

not be granted unless the relevant insufficiency is ‘clearly

apparent.’” Thomas v. Keystone Real Estate Grp., No. 14-cv-00543,

2015 WL 1471273, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting

Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1986)).

Therefore, as a general rule, motions to strike are disfavored, and

“should be denied unless the challenged allegations have no possible

relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the

controversy and may cause some significant form of prejudice to

one of the parties to the action.” See Mifflinburg Tel., Inc. v.

Criswell, 80 F. Supp. 3d 566, 572 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citations

omitted)

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Katz, 2:23-CV-00912-MJH, 2024 WL 4443991, at *3 (W.D. Pa.

Oct. 8, 2024). “Even when challenged materials meet the definitions in [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(f), a

motion will not be granted in the absence of clear prejudice to the adverse party.” Jenkins v. Veney,

No. CV 23-954, 2023 WL 4295824, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2023).

D. Discussion

1. Equal Pay Act

Plaintiff alleges Defendants have violated the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et

seq., (EPA) because Defendants paid her a lower salary than was paid to a male performing the

same duties and with less seniority. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred. ECF

No. 27 at 6. Violations of the EPA are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, unless the

violation is shown to be willful, in which case the statute of limitations is extended to three years.

29 U.S.C. § 255. Plaintiff pleads that the violation was willful. ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 128, 214. The

limitations period is also three years for continuing violations. Id. at 842. See also Kravitz v.

Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 2:23-CV-00888, 2023 WL 4980936, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2023) (The

statute of limitations for an EPA claim begins to run on the date that the plaintiff received her last

allegedly discriminatory paycheck.) Plaintiff may have filed within three years, a fact which can

be determined by establishing, through discovery, the date that the plaintiff received her last

allegedly discriminatory paycheck.

We find, too, that Plaintiff has pled a substantive case under the Equal Pay Act sufficient

to survive a motion to dismiss, having listed her title, duties, and responsibilities and alleging that

Mercuri, a man, was paid more than she was for the same work. ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 17, 30 – 33.

Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (“employees of the opposite sex were

paid differently for performing ‘equal work’—work of substantially equal skill, effort and

responsibility, under similar working conditions.”). We recommend that the Equal Pay Act claim

proceed to discovery and suggest an inquiry into the statute of limitations on a more fully

developed record pinpointing more precisely the date of the accrual of the cause of action.

2. Retaliation

Defendants argue that the retaliation claim should be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII and the PHRA. We agree. Plaintiff’s EEOC

charge, through the PHRC, alleged gender discrimination and equal pay violations, ECF No. 27-

1, but did not allege retaliation or set forth facts suggesting retaliation, which are required for

exhaustion. See Barzanty v. Verizon PA, Inc., 361 F. App’x 411 (3d Cir. 2010) (a claim not

included in the formal charge is not exhausted). See also Yarnall v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist., No.

CIV.A. 11-3130, 2013 WL 1389757, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2013), on reconsideration in part, No.

CIV.A. 11-3130, 2013 WL 5525297 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2013) (“By failing to include . . . retaliation

claims in their formal charge, Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust these claims.”) Plaintiff concedes

that the retaliation box is not checked on the EEOC charge, though “sex” and “other/equal pay”

are. We disagree with Plaintiff’s assertion that retaliation falls within the EEOC charge and with

Plaintiff’s assertion that ongoing retaliation is material to the exhaustion inquiry. We recommend

that the retaliation claim be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and need not,

therefore, discuss the substance of a retaliation claim.

3. Gender Discrimination

The parties agree on the elements required for Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination:

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for

the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)

the circumstances could give rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination. Such an inference may be drawn if the plaintiff

identifies “a similarly situated individual outside of the protected

class, who engaged in the same conduct but was treated more

favorably.”

Cooper v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 743 F. App’x 499, 502 (3d Cir. 2018). We agree with

Plaintiff, however, that to survive a motion to dismiss, she need not make out a prima facie case,

but rather that the “post-Twombly pleading standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element[s].” Connelly

v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff, a

woman Behavior Scientist, alleges that she is a member of a protected class and qualified for the

position. ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 7, 17-18. She alleges that she suffered adverse employment actions when

she was paid less than a comparable male colleague, id. ¶¶ 30, 57-58, 128, when she was assigned

additional responsibilities after engaging in protected activity, id. ¶ 61-67, and when she was

removed from a faculty retreat id. ¶ 114-117. Plaintiff alleges that non-members of the protected

class were treated more favorably under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination. As but one example, Plaintiff offers that female residents, physicians, and staff

were subjected to skits degrading women despite the supervisor having been put on notice, id. ¶

21-25, while male physicians, residents, and staff were not. Id. ¶ 26. The pay disparity with

Mercuri is another example. Id. ¶¶ 17, 30 – 33. We agree with Plaintiff that, in light of the further

evidence of discrimination that she has supplied, her ability to perform her job duties and garner

positive reviews do not contradict that she may have suffered adverse employment action. See

Newman v. Point Park Univ., No. 2:20-CV-00204, 2022 WL 969601, at *24 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31,

2022) (plaintiff’s ability to perform her job duties satisfactorily, without more evidence of

discrimination, does not violate Title VII). We find that Plaintiff has pled enough facts to make it

likely that discovery will solidify the necessary elements and recommend that the gender

discrimination claim be permitted to proceed to discovery.

4. Hostile Work Environment

Though Defendants so urge, at this point we decline to find Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim time barred and recommend that discovery be allowed on the matter. The

allegations in her Complaint sufficiently allege that this claim constitutes a “continuing violation.”

Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2013) (To allege a continuing

violation, the plaintiff must show that all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same

unlawful employment practice and that at least one act falls within the applicable limitations

period.) See also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105 (court may consider “entire scope of a hostile work

environment claim ... so long as any act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within

the statutory time period”). Plaintiff’s allegation of a continuing violation relies not only upon

demeaning skits ending in 2019, but also upon acts happening as late as 2021 and 2022, including

a supervisor’s joke about “one-night stands,” id. ¶141, and derision directed at Plaintiff for hosting

an antidiscrimination event. id. ¶¶162-165, 167.

Next, to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment:

the plaintiff must establish that 1) the employee suffered intentional

discrimination because of his/her sex, 2) the discrimination was

severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the

plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a

reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of

respondeat superior liability.

Id. Plaintiff has alleged intentional sex-based discrimination and describes pervasive hostility

toward women from each Defendant. Among the incidents she describes are: 1) derogatory skits

continuing from 2015 through 2019, despite several complaints about their offensiveness, ECF

No. 24 ¶¶ 19, 28-29; 2) pay inequity relative to a male in her same position, id. ¶¶ 30, 128; 3)

remarks such as Beckstead’s public remark, after his assertion that women do not act to solve

problems but are typically overemotional and ruminate, “Oops, I forgot that the hashtag #MeToo

police is in the room”; id. ¶¶ 42-43, Beckstead’s mocking a patient as young and stupid for

becoming pregnant from a sexual assault, id. ¶ 92, Beckstead’s 2021 joke about “one-night

stands.” id. ¶ 141, and Beckstead and Hines referring to women who reported sexual harassment

as “a Lipka” or “Lipka-esque” (after a woman medical resident who reported harassment at the

workplace), id. ¶¶ 79-80; 4) women employees’ fear of reporting sexual harassment, id. ¶ 89; 5)

incidents including a menstrual pad covered in ketchup placed in the office, id. ¶ 85; and 6)

Beckstead’s persistent failure to address the complaints presented to him about the hostile work

environment, id. ¶¶ 102, 107-8. Plaintiff claims that she found the described discriminatory acts

“degrading, demeaning, and harassing,” ECF 24 ¶ 21, that she was “extremely upset,” id. ¶ 25,

and suffered by being paid less unfairly, id. ¶¶ 33- 34, 37-38. All of this contributed to Plaintiff

suffering from exhaustion, id. ¶ 21, having to work long hours to keep up with the extra duties

that had been put upon her and functioning on little sleep. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. She sought out a therapist

who found that she had been traumatized and exhausted by Defendants’ actions and recommended

that she leave her position, though as the sole support of herself and her children, she remained.

Id. ¶¶ 71-73. This recitation is sufficient to plead that the alleged discrimination detrimentally

affected Plaintiff and also, sufficient to raise the possibility an objectively reasonable person in

Plaintiff’s place might be detrimentally affected by the alleged incidents. See Mandel, 706 F.3d

at 168. So, too, we find that Plaintiff’s identification of Beckstead as an employee of UPMC, and

that he in turn was her supervisor, id. ¶¶ 11-14, sufficient at this stage to establish the possibility

of respondeat superior liability.1 Thus, we recommend that the hostile work environment claim

proceed to discovery.

5. Strike Allegations

Defendants assert that the court should strike “the numerous allegations. . . in the Amended

complaint that are irrelevant, immaterial, impertinent, scandalous” and without an important

relationship to the claim. ECF No. 27 at 18. The following are some of the many allegations that

they wish to see stricken: the skits portraying women in a demeaning light, the menstrual pad

covered in ketchup, and the bullying of female interns and staff, as well as some allegations that

relate to race, sexual orientation, and disability discrimination. Id. at 18 – 20. Plaintiff responds

by stating each of the examples Defendants provide “directly relate to [her] claims regarding . . .

gender discrimination . . . , hostile work environment. . ., or facts that give rise to an inference that

Defendant retaliated.2 ECF No. 31 at 15. Customarily, when a party requests the removal of

particular statements complaint, it is accomplished by a Rule 12(f) motion to strike. See C.M. by

& through McMillen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 3:23-CV-00119, 2024 WL 1382760, at *10–

11 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2024). Though Defendants fail to reference Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(f), the Court will nevertheless construe argument (g) of the Motion to Dismiss as a Motion to

Strike the complained-of material. See id.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has “repeatedly stated [the] preference that cases

be disposed of on the merits whenever practicable.” Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181

1 Because Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and hostile environment may proceed against both

Defendants, we need not address Defendants’ argument (e), Brief in Support of Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 27 at 17, that we should dismiss claims against Beckstead as an aider

and abettor. Nor will we now decide the appropriateness of punitive damages, see id. at 17-18,

but will do so, when necessary, upon a more fully developed record.

2 We have recommended above that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation be dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies.

(3d Cir. 1984). On that score, the Court must be “mindful of the admonition that motions to strike

under Rule 12(f) are highly disfavored,” Hadek Protective Sys. B.V. v. Ergon Asphalt &

Emulsions, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-01421, 2023 WL 7002567, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2023); see also

C.M., supra. and Wirt v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 852, 857 (M.D. Pa. 2015)

(“[d]istrict courts possess great discretion in disposing of a motion to strike.”). Keeping in mind

that motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are highly disfavored and that we possess great discretion

in a motion to strike, see C.M. supra., we cannot recommend that the objected to allegations be

stricken. For one reason, the allegations objected to do not rise to the level of “scandalous” matter.

See Thomas v. Keystone Real Est. Grp. LP, 4:14-CV-00543, 2015 WL 1471273, at *7 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 31, 2015) (striking from plaintiff’s complaint paragraphs alleging criminal drug use as

immaterial and prejudicial); id. at *8 (striking as scandalous plaintiff’s motion and accompanying

submissions where “[t]he prose in the documents [wa]s riddled with hyperbolic characterizations

and profane language that ha[d] no relation whatsoever” to matters before the court); id.

(“submission of irrelevant scandalous material on the public record . . . is an affront” to the Court’s

dignity). Compare Wermann v. Excel Dentistry, P.C., 13-7028, 2014 WL 846723, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 25, 2014) (declining to strike profane and sexually explicit language attributed to defendant

where they were material to plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims). We are mindful that motions

to strike should be denied unless the objected to statements both (1) have “no possible relation or

logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy; and (2) “may cause some significant

form of prejudice to one of the parties to the action.” State Farm supra. (emphasis supplied). As

to the first prong, we cannot conclude definitively that the objected to allegations are immaterial

to the remaining claims, even those that tend to show retaliation. As to the second, Defendants

have made no claim at all that the continued inclusion of the objected to statements would cause

any prejudice, let alone significant prejudice. Accordingly, if Defendants intend its request to

sound in a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny that

request.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

be granted in part and denied in part: It is recommended that the Motion be GRANTED as to the

Retaliation Claim and DENIED as to the Equal Pay Act Claim, the Gender Discrimination Claim,

and the Hostile Work Environment Claim. In addition, to the extent that Defendants have moved

to strike parts of the Amended Complaint, we recommend that request be DENIED.

In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C),

and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party

opposing such objections have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond

thereto. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights.

Dated: April 8, 2025

s/ Kezia O. L. Taylor_____________

Kezia O. L. Taylor

United States Magistrate Judge