Byrd v. Brauer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

BRADLEY BYRD,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:24-cv-378-TJC-LLL

v.

DOUGLAS BRAUER, an individual,

DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES

OF FLORIDA STATE COLLEGE

AT JACKSONVILLE, SANTOS

TORRES, an individual, PATRICIA

CONWAY, an individual, and

DAVID DAGENAIS, an individual,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CASE is before the Court on Defendants Douglas Brauer and

David Dagenais’s Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint.1 Doc. 29. Defendants claim Plaintiff, Bradley Byrd, has failed to

state a claim for relief and that Dagenais and Brauer are entitled to qualified

immunity.

1 Counts I through IV allege discrimination and retaliation claims. The

other defendants are the District Board of Trustees of Florida State College at

Jacksonville; Santos Torres, former Aviation Program Instructor; and Patricia

Conway, Program Secretary for Aviation Maintenance Program. Count V is the

only claim against Brauer. Count II is the only other claim against Dagenais.

I. STANDARD

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts Byrd’s well-

pleaded facts as true. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043,

1057 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true.”).

II. FACTS

Byrd enrolled in the Aviation Maintenance Technical Certificate Program

offered by Florida State College at Jacksonville (“FSCJ”) in January 2021. Doc.

26 ¶¶ 15, 17. Brauer was the Dean of Engineering & Industry, and Dagenais

managed the aviation program. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Students who complete the twenty-

month program are eligible to seek Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)

Mechanic Certification within two years, but the separate FAA certification is

not required. Id. ¶ 15.

According to FSCJ’s student aviation handbook, students who want the

FAA certification are responsible to make arrangements, including selecting

and paying an examiner, but FSCJ would make its qualified instructors

available as examiners. See Doc. 26-2. The actual process, however, was that

the FAA certification fees were automatically added to FSCJ’s tuition and FSCJ

arranged the FAA certification testing.2 See id.; Doc. 26 ¶¶ 27, 32. Byrd

objected, alleging this prevented him from choosing the examiner or negotiating

fees. Id. Byrd also voiced concerns the arrangement posed a conflict of interest

and was perhaps fraudulent or unethical.3 See Doc. 26 ¶¶ 25, 27, 32, 39; Doc.

26-2.

In May 2021, Byrd started complaining. 4 See Doc. 26 ¶ 25. Byrd

discussed his ethical and conflict of interest concerns with Brauer, who shared

the concerns with Dagenais. Id. ¶¶ 25–32. Byrd also complained to Brauer

about poor instruction, including class time spent watching movies and playing

computer games. Id. ¶ 56. The next month, Byrd raised concerns about fraud

and conflict of interest to FSCJ’s financial aid office. See id. ¶ 39. The next

month, Byrd complained to the FAA’s Orlando Flight Standard District Office.

Id. ¶¶ 53, 57.

Shortly after Byrd’s first complaint, FSCJ’s Equity Office received an

anonymous student complaint about Byrd. Id. ¶ 41. Byrd believes Dagenais

2 Byrd alleges the extra tuition payments for FAA certification were a

windfall to FSCJ, because not all students in the aviation program sought FAA

certification. See Doc. 26 ¶ 49.

3 Dagenais was a FAA examiner used by FSCJ for the FAA certification.

See id. ¶ 6.

4 Byrd’s multiple complaints, made over the next several months, are

summarized here, with more detail in the Amended Complaint for Damages

and Demand for Jury Trial. See Doc. 26.

(and perhaps others) solicited the anonymous complaint. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. The

anonymous complaint lacked sufficient detail to investigate, and the Equity

Office suggested it be addressed by the aviation program, which involved

Brauer and Dagenais. See id. ¶¶ 44, 47. Brauer and Dagenais advocated

internally for Byrd to be disciplined based on the anonymous complaint and

solicited other complaints about Byrd, allegedly to undermine Byrd’s credibility

as the source of the FAA complaint. See id. ¶¶ 54, 62–63, 78–79.

Each complaint (to Brauer, financial aid office, and FAA) prompted its

own response or investigation, but there was overlap. See id. ¶¶ 28, 43, 45–46,

55–64. For instance, Brauer shared information about the anonymous

complaint with the person handling the financial aid investigation; Byrd shared

his FAA complaint with Brauer; and Dagenais, allegedly close friends with the

FAA investigator, worked with the FAA investigator to gather student input

about Byrd. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 45, 56, 61, 62. Byrd alleges Dagenais improperly shared

information with the FAA, violating privacy laws. Id. ¶¶ 79, 138.

During this same period, May 2021, Byrd requested and received an

accommodation, which allowed him to wear short pants, unless “welding or

cutting or forming sheet metal.”5 Id. ¶¶ 21, 30; Doc. 26-1. The accommodation

5 The program generally required long pants. Doc. 26 ¶ 19. The

accommodation request was made around May 13, 2021, due to Byrd’s leg

injuries from an earlier motorcycle accident. See id. ¶ 18.

specified if a “[p]rofessor encounters a specific activity that they feel full length

pants must be worn to complete for safety, student will need to comply for

safety, and this can be discussed further afterwards.” Doc. 26-1. In July 2021,

after Byrd had made at least three complaints, Dagenais told program

instructors the accommodation would no longer be allowed. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 65–69.

Byrd contacted student services about the accommodation issue and returned

to the classroom in long pants. Id. ¶ 70.

Dagenais told Byrd he was dismissed from the program due to his

disruptive behavior.6 Id. ¶ 71. Dagenais allegedly submitted a false complaint

to site security that Byrd had threatened him, resulting in campus security

detaining Byrd and escorting Byrd off campus in front of classmates. See id. ¶¶

72–73. At Dagenais’s direction, “kicked out” was written next to Byrd’s name

on a publicly posted student roster and complaints about Byrd were also

publicly projected within the training area. Id. ¶ 82.

Byrd complained again. Id. ¶ 85. FSCJ issued a written warning about

Byrd’s failure to comply with required attire, and stating Byrd could return to

class (and make up missed class time) if he signed the warning. Id. ¶ 86. Byrd

separately complained about the written warning. Id. ¶ 87. Byrd’s

accommodation was changed to generally require he wear pants, he appealed,

6 The dismissal appears to have been temporary. See Doc. 26 ¶ 82.

and the accommodation was modified—but was more restrictive than before.

Id. ¶¶ 89–94. Byrd completed the fall semester but alleges ongoing harassment,

primarily from Dagenais, made it was clear he was not welcome in the

program.7 Id. ¶¶ 95–97. Accordingly, Byrd did not continue and did not

complete the program. Id. ¶ 98.

III. ANALYSIS

Count V of the Amended Complaint alleges Dagenais and Brauer

retaliated against Byrd for exercising his free speech rights by making

complaints. “To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff

must show ‘first, that his speech or act was constitutionally protected; second,

that the defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected

speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory

actions and the adverse effect on speech.’” Doe v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Tr., 838

F.3d 1207, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664

F.3d 865, 878 (11th Cir. 2011)). “In order to establish a causal connection, the

plaintiff must show that the defendant was subjectively motivated to take the

adverse action because of the protected speech.” Keeton, 664 F. 3d at 878

(quoting Castle v. Appalachian Tech. Coll., 631 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir.

2011)).

7 Byrd alleges Dagenais, Torres, and Conway, all harassed him during

the fall semester. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 96–97.

Both parties treat Byrd’s complaints as “pure student speech” and apply

the Tinker standard.8 Doc. 29 at 10–12; Doc. 32 at 6. Under Tinker, “schools

must tolerate such expression unless they can reasonably forecast that the

expression will lead to ‘substantial disruption of or material interference with

school activities.’” Doe, 838 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.

Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).

Dagenais and Brauer argue the claim against them should be dismissed

because they have qualified immunity as government officials. Doc. 29. To

establish qualified immunity, a government official must establish the act

complained of was part of a discretionary function within his scope of authority.

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). If

established, plaintiff may overcome qualified immunity by showing: “(1) the

defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit,

applying Tinker, requires a court determine “two factors: (1) whether a student

is engaged in expression (either pure speech or expressive conduct) and (2)

8 Tinker considers “special characteristics of the school environment.”

Doe, 838 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503, 506, (1969)). Pure student expression is “student expression that

merely happens to occur on the school premises.” Doe, 838 F.3d at 1211 (citing

Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Other types of student speech in the classroom are vulgar expression,

government expression, and school-sponsored expression. Id.

whether the expression is having a non-negligible disruptive effect, or is likely

to have such an effect, on classroom order or the educational process.” Id. at

1278.

Byrd argues qualified immunity does not apply because some acts by

Dagenais were not within the scope of his authority. Doc. 32. Byrd argues

providing a false statement to law enforcement and sharing information

protected by statute are illegal acts, and therefore could not be within the

discretionary authority of Dagenais. Id. Byrd also argues Dagenais did not have

authority to revoke the dress requirement accommodation nor dismiss Byrd

from the program. Id.

Defendants argue Byrd fails to state a claim against them because Byrd

has not shown his complaints were constitutionally protected or that he suffered

an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness. Viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Byrd, he has a clearly established

constitutional right to make internal and external complaints. See Doe, 838

F.3d at 1211-12 (vacating dismissal and finding student complaints should have

been treated as “pure student expression” and were protected unless

substantially disruptive or could reasonably lead to “material interference with

school activities”); Castle, 631 F.3d at 1199 (noting the plaintiff/student’s

complaint about instructor was protected speech but affirming summary

judgment because of legitimate basis for student suspension). Dagenais’s and

Brauer’s dismissal of Byrd from the program, soliciting false statements about

Byrd, or their conduct in allegedly providing false information to law

enforcement resulting in Byrd’s removal from campus in front of others is

sufficient to allege a causally related adverse action.9

Given the limited record at this procedural stage and the requirement to

view facts in the light most favorable to Byrd, the Court agrees there are

sufficient allegations to prevent dismissal of Count V as to Dagenais and Brauer

based on qualified immunity. The Court emphasizes that this decision is based

solely on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, taken as true on a motion

to dismiss.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendants Douglas Brauer and David Dagenais’s Motion to

Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Doc. 26, is DENIED.

9 It is not necessary for the Court to decide if other alleged actions could

be an adverse action.

2. No later than May 23, 2025, Defendants Brauer and Dagenais will

answer Count V of the Amended Complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida the 7th day of May,

2025.

Cimotbeg g. Corrig on

Ww, TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

i Senior United States District Judge

ddw

Copies:

Counsel of record

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