Luffman v. Collinsville Community Unit School District 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEFFREY LUFFMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-CV-00842-SPM

COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT

SCHOOL DISTRICT #10, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court for the issue of docket management. Before the

Court is a Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Luffman. (Doc. 3). Luffman

purports to brings claims against 34 named Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1985 based on alleged ongoing and conspiratorial civil rights violations committed by

multiple public officials, agencies, and law enforcement officers. (Doc. 3, p. 2).1 This

Court now sua sponte raises the issue of its own subject-matter jurisdiction to hear

Luffman’s claims, as well as the issue of whether Luffman’s Complaint sufficiently

states a claim for relief. As explained below, Luffman is ORDERED to SHOW

1 Specifically, Luffman names the following Defendants: Collinsville Community Unit School

District #10; Brad Skertich, Laura Bauer, Bradley Hyre, Dan Porter, Susan Frechman, Sarah

Gafford; School Board Members Soehlke, Peccola, Bronnbauer, Craft, Hasamear, Ruelecke, and

Stutts; Collinsville Police Officers Kuelche, Hunt, Lacroy, Edwards, Owen, Moore, Severne, and

Foley; School Resource Officer, FOIA Officer Wilke; Marryville Police Officer Leffler, FOIA Officer

Jolene Henry; City of Collinsville FOIA Officer Kimberly Wasser; Attorneys Tony Don Santos, David

Fahrenkamp, and Michel Wesley; Collinsville School District 10 Legal Counsel Dana Bond and Guin

Mundorf LLC; Madison County Illinois States Attorney Office, Illinois Attorney General’s Office

Civil Right [sic], Veteran Hiring, ADA Compliance, Public Access Bureau, and FOIA Compliance

Officer. (Doc. 3).

CAUSE why his case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,

for failure to meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, and

failure to properly state a claim upon which this Court may grant him relief.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Luffman filed his Complaint on May 2, 2025, purporting to bring claims under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. (See Doc. 3). He alleges willing violations of his First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; a joint conspiracy by Collinsville

Community Unit School District #10, local and school-based law enforcement, state

legal counsel and public records officials, school board members, and private law

firms to suppress, retaliate, and cause procedural and reputational harm to him; and

misconduct including obstructing public records, interference with his veteran

employment rights and access to public programs and educational facilities,

retaliatory use of the judicial process and law enforcement against him, and collusion

by Defendants to retaliate against his advocacy efforts. (Id., p. 2). He seeks damages

and injunctive relief. (Id.).

On May 5, 2025, Luffman filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 11). In this Motion, Luffman

brought new factual assertions not presented in his Complaint, alleging ongoing

retaliation by Defendants for exercising his rights to “freedom of speech, press,

petition, and right to bare [sic] arms.” (Id., p. 2). This Court denied Luffman’s request

for an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order against Defendants, and reserved

ruling on his request for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 13).

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

This Court has an independent duty to ensure that it has subject matter

jurisdiction to hear cases brought before it. Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,

33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has long instructed that “federal

courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, must make their own inquiry to ensure that

all statutory requirements are met before exercising jurisdiction.” Page v. Democratic

Nat’l Comm., 2 F.4th 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2021). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be

waived and may be “raised sua sponte by the court at any point in the proceedings.”

Hawxhurst v. Pettibone Corp., 40 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1994). In other words, this

court cannot hear this action if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have the

burden to prove that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330

F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992)).

In addition, a district court has the authority to sua sponte dismiss a complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so long as a sufficient

basis for the court’s action is apparent from the Plaintiff’s pleading. Eades v.

Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 1987). The court has the power to dismiss a

claim when it appears beyond doubt that the litigant is unable to prove any set of

facts that would entitle them to relief. Apostol v. Landau, 957 F.2d 339, 343 (7th Cir.

1992) (citing Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985); Benson v.

Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1985)).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). Additionally, Rule 8 requires that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise,

and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 10 further requires “each

claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . be stated in a separate

count or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). These rules, while not setting a high bar at

the pleading stage, do require that plaintiffs abide by them at risk of pleading

themselves out of a case. That may occur “where the lack of organization and basic

coherence renders a complaint too confusing to determine the facts that constitute

the alleged wrongful conduct.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011);

see also Mohammed v. Prairie State Legal Servs., Inc., No. 20-2419, 2021 WL 4962988

at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (“unintelligibility justifies dismissal.”). Further, these

rules exist “to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds

supporting the claims.” Stanard, 658 F.3d at 797; see Intercom Ventures, LLC v.

FasTV, Inc., No. 13 C 232, 2013 WL 2357621 at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2013) (“First, a

complaint must describe the plaintiff’s claims and the ground supporting them in

‘sufficient detail to give the defendants fair notice’ of the claim alleged against

them.”).

ANALYSIS

This Court begins with an analysis its subject matter jurisdiction. Luffman’s

Complaint does not state a basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction on its

face. While Luffman purports to bring his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,

a provision of federal law which otherwise might invoke the Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, a district court may still decline to entertain a complaint “where such a

claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Ricketts v. Midwest Nat. Bank, 874 F.2d

1177, 1180 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1946).

Examining Luffman’s Complaint in the light most favorable to him, assuming

facts as true, and drawing any reasonable inferences, it is evident that his Complaint

fails to state a claim, flouts Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, and appears

to assert a host of claims against a cast of Defendants with little to no factual support.

To begin, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to follow Rule 8’s requirements that he make a

short and plain statement for relief and simple, concise, and direct allegations. (See

Doc. 3). Furthermore, his Complaint fails to comply with Rule 10, as he fails to state

each claim in a separate count or occurrence. Luffman’s Complaint has four

numbered paragraphs containing various bullet points each that allege a wide range

of claims, legal conclusions, and violations of various provisions of law. (See id.). For

instance, in his first paragraph, Luffman alleges First Amendment violations

including retaliation for protected speech, press activity, and public petitioning;

Fourth Amendment violations for unlawful searches and welfare checks based on

retaliatory narratives; and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection

violations. (See id.). His third paragraph cites violations of the Illinois Freedom of

Information Act, various provisions of Illinois state records retention laws, the federal

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, laws related to veteran’s employment

rights (it is unclear if these are purportedly based on state or federal law), the

Americans with Disabilities Act, and other claims of retaliation, abuse of the legal

system, and collusion that do not contain any citation to any provision of law. (See

id.). Plaintiff has thrown together numerous allegations within his paragraphs,

making it difficult for this Court (as well as the Defendants) to ascertain the scope of

the allegations being brought.

Moreover, Luffman’s Complaint lacks any connections between the claims he

purports to bring to many of the named Defendants. For instance, in his second

paragraph, he alleges that Defendants, jointly and severally, conspired to act against

him, stating that Collinsville Community Unit School District #10, “[l]ocal and school-

based law enforcement,” “[s]tate legal counsel and public records officials,” and

“School Board Members and private law firms acting under public authority” all

colluded together in this effort. (See id., p. 2). Yet, aside from naming one Defendant

by name in this paragraph, this Court, as well as the Defendants, are left to guess as

to who Luffman claims is liable for this purported conduct, particularly given that his

Complaint appears to name some 34 Defendants.2 His Complaint wholly fails to

mention the basis for suing Attorneys Tony Dos Santos, David Fahrenkamp, and

Michael Wesley, as well as the Madison County Illinois States Attorney Office and

the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.

On top of this, Plaintiff’s sweeping allegations lack any factual support beyond

the conclusory allegations he makes that Defendants have violated his civil rights.

Luffman’s Complaint consists essentially entirely of legal conclusions and purported

2 This Court notes that it is not entirely clear the number of named Defendants in this action, based

on the drafting of the case caption and lack of clarity in the Complaint as to which Defendants are

accused of what conduct. For example, Plaintiff’s case caption lists various Defendants in groups of

listings; one such listing reads: “Collinsville Police Officer Kuelche, Officer Hunt, Officer Lacroy,

Officer Edwards, Officer Owen, Officer Moore, Officer Severne, Officer Foley, School Resource

Officer; and FOIA Officer Wilke.” (Doc. 3, p. 1). It is not clear, for example, whether Officer Foley is

the School Resource Officer, or whether the School Resource Officer is an unnamed individual

defendant distinct of Officer Foley or any other named Defendant.

legal violations with no information as to what events, conduct, transactions, or

occurrences gave rise to any of these violations, much less when, where, or how they

occurred. Even construing Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11) together with his Complaint, this Court

still does not find, drawing all reasonable inferences, that Plaintiff has stated any

viable claims. In his Motion, Plaintiff brings new allegations, including violations of

his Second Amendment rights, and attaches some 208 pages worth of emails,

communications from what appears to be some of the named Defendants, and various

court documents and filings. Yet it remains unclear to the Court which Defendants

are liable for violations of which particular rights Plaintiff is asserting, and even

construing factual allegations in his favor (of which there are few, as most of his

Motion contains the same allegations in the form of legal conclusions and mere

recitations of provisions of law), he has not stated claims against the Defendants in a

way that puts Defendants on notice of what claims are brought nor the scope of those

claims.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Complaint (Doc. 3) fails to comply

with Rule 8 and 10, and, therefore, must be DISMISSED without prejudice.

Accordingly, all other pending motions are DENIED as moot and the deadlines

related to them are terminated. See Venezia v. Robinson, 16 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir.

1994) (“[A] preliminary injunction cannot survive the dismissal of a complaint.”).

Luffman is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE in a written response received no

later than May 21, 2025 why his case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. He is also ORDERED to file an amended complaint no later than

May 21, 2025 that meets the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and

10 and properly states a claim upon which this Court may grant him relief. Plaintiff

is WARNED that failure to file an amended complaint by the deadline shall result

in dismissal of this action with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and

for failure to prosecute their claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); see also generally James

v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 2005); Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d

1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Lucien v. Breweur, 9 F.3d 26, 29 (7th Cir. 1993) (dismissal for

failure to prosecute is presumptively with prejudice).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2025

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge