GOLLIDAY v. WELLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

TERRYON GOLLIDAY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00433-JPH-MG

)

WELLS Sgt., )

MASSEY Sgt., )

STEPHANIE EDWARDSON Sgt., )

JOHNSON C.O., )

LOUDER C.O., )

TROUTMAN C.O., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DIRECTING FILING OF AMENDED

COMPLAINT, AND ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff Terryon Golliday is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Westville

Correctional Facility; he was in Putnamville Correctional Facility when he filed

this civil action. The complaint alleges that officers at the Vigo County Jail (the

Jail) stole trade secrets of his when he was a pretrial detainee there.1 Because

the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the complaint before service

on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The Court also addresses Mr.

Golliday's motion to reconsider the requirement that he pay an initial partial

filing fee for this action, his three motions for counsel, and two other motions.

1 On the same date this action was filed, the Court also received a "Motion for Acceptance

of Plaintiff's 1983 Civil Action Claim." Dkt. 2. Mr. Golliday later clarified that this was

intended to be a complaint for a separate cause of action, so the Court directed the

opening of another case based on that document, dkts. 12 and 14, which is now

proceeding under cause number 2:24-cv-00583-JMS-MJD.

I. Motion to Reconsider Initial Partial Filing Fee

Mr. Golliday's motion to reconsider the imposition of an initial partial filing

fee in this case is GRANTED. Dkt. [18]. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has

no assets and no means to pay even an initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(4) ("In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action

. . . for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay

the initial partial filing fee."). Although Plaintiff is excused from pre-paying the

full filing fee, he still must pay the three hundred and fifty ($350.00) filing fee

pursuant to the statutory formula set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) when able.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) ("the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount

of a filing fee."). The Court will enter a separate order to collect the filing fee for

this action from Plaintiff's custodian.

II. Screening of Complaint

A. Screening Standard

When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To

determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same

standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720

(7th Cir. 2017).

B. The Complaint

The complaint names as defendants: (1) Sgt. Wells; (2) Sgt. Massey; (3) Sgt.

Stephanie Edwardson; (4) Correctional Officer Louder; (5) Correctional Officer

Johnson; (6) Correctional Officer Troutman; (7) Correctional Officer Volpatti.

The complaint alleges that on September 9, 2022, while Mr. Golliday was

a pretrial detainee at the Jail, Officers Johnson, Louder, Troutman, and Volpatti

moved Mr. Golliday to a segregation cell based on a conduct report written by

Officer Volpatti. While searching Mr. Golliday's property as part of the move,

Officer Johnson seized a dictionary that Mr. Golliday alleges contained trade

secrets. He describes the secrets as "written ideas of material, for use of certain

prefabricated aftermarket parts to be one of a kind production parts . . . ." Dkt.

1 at 3. Mr. Golliday received some of his property back but not the dictionary

containing the alleged trade secrets. He wrote grievances to Sgt. Edwardson

about the missing dictionary, but she did not provide any relief. Mr. Golliday also

alleges that Sgt. Wells deliberately stole and destroyed the trade secrets and also

200 pages of legal documents that Mr. Golliday accumulated between July 2020

and September 2023.

Mr. Golliday's complaint seeks damages under the federal Defend Trade

Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq. He also asserts that Defendants violated

the federal Hobbs Act and engaged in a criminal conspiracy against him. He also

cites a number of other federal statutes, and alleges he was retaliated against,

and was subjected to intentional infliction of emotional distress, and was

deprived of the ability to file grievances.

C. Dismissal of Complaint

Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the complaint, the

complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

1. Trade Secrets Claims

First, regarding the alleged theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)

authorizes suits for damages for the misappropriation of trade secrets. To the

extent Mr. Golliday attempts to assert such a claim, the complaint falls short in

the following respects.2

Mr. Golliday's allegations do not support a reasonable inference that any

property seized from him contained "trade secrets" within the meaning of the

statute. Broadly, the term applies to "financial, business, scientific, technical,

economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations,

program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,

2 The Court notes that this is the second lawsuit Mr. Golliday has filed alleging Vigo

County law enforcement officers stole his trade secrets, though the allegations in the

previous case were that arresting officers had stolen a phone containing the trade

secrets. Golliday v. Lewis, et al., 2:22-cv-00398-JRS-MKK (S.D. Ind.).

procedures, programs, or codes." 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). Such information only

becomes a trade secret, however, if its owner "has taken reasonable measures to

keep such information secret." 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A). Moreover, the information

must derive "independent economic value" from not being generally known or

readily ascertainable by others. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). Mr. Golliday has provided

only vague and conclusory allegations about the information he characterizes as

trade secrets. Nothing in the complaint supports a reasonable inference that

whatever information was in Mr. Golliday's dictionary had actual or potential

economic value, that it was information not generally known or ascertainable by

others, that he took reasonable measures to keep the information secret, or that

the information's value increased by virtue of being kept secret.

Also, damages are only available to compensate the owner for the actual

loss he suffered from the misappropriation or for any unjust enrichment the

misappropriator gained. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B). Without any information

about the nature of Mr. Golliday's "trade secrets" or how he might have profited

from them, or about how the person who allegedly stole the secrets has been

enriched by them, the Court cannot reasonably infer that a qualifying loss or

unjust enrichment has taken place.

2. Property Loss Generally

To the extent Mr. Golliday seeks damages for the confiscation or loss of his

property, he has not presented a plausible claim for relief. The Fourteenth

Amendment prohibits the deprivation of property without due process, but "an

adequate state remedy for a deprivation for a deprivation of property provides all

the due process that a plaintiff suing state officers for such deprivation is entitled

to." See DKCLM, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 794 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2015).

Mr. Golliday may bring claims regarding the confiscation or loss of his personal

property in state court. See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592–593

(7th Cir. 2001) (“The district court properly dismissed Wynn’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims for deprivation or destruction of personal property . . . . Wynn

has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no

more process was due.”).

3. Retaliation Claims

Next, to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Mr. Golliday "must

ultimately show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment;

(2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in

the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was 'at least a motivating factor'

in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557

F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).

"We emphasize, however, that not every claim of retaliation by a disciplined

prisoner, who either has had contact with, or has filed a lawsuit against prison

officials, will state a cause of action for retaliatory treatment. Rather, the prisoner

must allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be

inferred." Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988). See also

Santiago v. Anderson, 496 F. App'x 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that inmate's

claim "that every ill befalling him must be retaliatory because everyone knows

him to be litigious and a frequent correspondent with the grievance officer—falls

short of stating a claim even under notice pleading"); Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d

335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that "alleging merely the ultimate fact of

retaliation is insufficient").

Mr. Golliday's complaint seems to blame anything that happened to him

at the Jail that he did not like upon alleged retaliation by multiple Defendants

(in addition to them engaging in a conspiracy against him). But his allegations

are too vague and conclusory to state a claim. The mere fact that Mr. Golliday

was a frequent grievance filer and was also sometimes subjected to things he did

not like is not by itself enough to plead a retaliation claim—specifically, the

element of Defendants' conduct being motivated by a wish to retaliate against

Mr. Golliday. In other words, there is not a "chronology of events" from which an

inference of retaliation might plausibly be inferred.

4. Hobbs Act/Criminal Conspiracy Claims

Mr. Golliday seems to invoke federal criminal statutes in support of his

claims. But only the United States may commence federal criminal charges, and

a private individual has no right to compel such a prosecution. See Leeke v.

Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981) (holding that inmates lacked standing to force

issuance of arrest warrants of correctional officers for beatings); Ragsdale v.

Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 509 (7th Cir. 1991) (private persons generally have no

right to enforce criminal statutes or to sue under them unless the statute also

creates a private right of action). (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

1035 (1992).

5. Grievances

Inmates do not have a freestanding right under federal law to an

administrative remedy process. The Seventh Circuit has "specifically

denounc[ed] a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an

inmate grievance procedure." Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir.

2008). "Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment

and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due Process

Clause." Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007)).

As explained in Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430-31 (7th Cir.

1996), "any right to a grievance procedure is a procedural right, not a substantive

one. Accordingly, a state's inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a

liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 1430-31 (internal

citations omitted). Because Mr. Golliday had no expectation of a particular

outcome of his grievances or complaints there is no viable claim that can be

vindicated through a federal lawsuit. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n.1

(7th Cir. 1992).

6. Other Claims

Although Mr. Golliday mentions many other federal statutes in his

complaint, he fails to explain how any of the other statutes are relevant to his

claims, nor is their relevance apparent to the Court. That leaves only an

attempted claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. But, that would

be a state law claim. Because the Court has been unable to identify any

actionable federal claims in this case, the Court would lack jurisdiction over a

standalone state-law claim—there is no diversity of citizenship between Mr.

Golliday and the Defendants, and supplemental jurisdiction would be

unavailable.3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-

37 (1974); In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754,757-58 (7th

Cir. 2006).

Because the Court has been unable to identify a viable claim for relief

against any particular defendant, the complaint is subject to dismissal.

D. Opportunity to File an Amended Complaint

The dismissal of the complaint will not in this instance lead to the

dismissal of the action at present. "The usual standard in civil cases is to allow

defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where

amendment would not be futile." Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726,

738 (7th Cir. 2018). In the interest of justice, the court will allow plaintiff to

amend his complaint if, after reviewing this court's order, he believes that he can

state a viable claim for relief, consistent with the allegations he has already

made. See Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015) ("We've

often said that before dismissing a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) a judge

should give the litigant, especially a pro se litigant, an opportunity to amend his

complaint."); Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013).

3 The Court offers no opinion on whether Mr. Golliday has adequately stated a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The plaintiff shall have through June 6, 2025, to file an amended

complaint.

The amended complaint must (a) contain a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, which is sufficient to

provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis; (b) include a

demand for the relief sought; and (c) identify what injury he claims to have

suffered and what persons are responsible for each such injury. In organizing

his complaint, the plaintiff may benefit from utilizing the Court's complaint form.

The clerk is directed to include a copy of the prisoner civil rights complaint form

along with the plaintiff's copy of this Order, which he should use if he files an

amended complaint. See Local Rule 8-1 (requiring pro se plaintiffs to use the

clerk-provided form for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Any amended complaint should have the proper case number, 2:24-cv-

00433-JPH-MG, and the words "Amended Complaint" on the first page. The

amended complaint will completely replace the original. See Beal v. Beller, 847

F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) ("For pleading purposes, once an amended

complaint is filed, the original complaint drops out of the picture."). Therefore, it

must set out every defendant, claim, and factual allegation the plaintiff wishes

to pursue in this action.

If the plaintiff files an amended complaint, it will be screened pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). If no amended complaint is filed, this action will be

dismissed without further notice or opportunity to show cause.

III. Motions for Counsel

Mr. Golliday has filed three motions for recruitment of counsel. Dkts. 9,

11, 19. Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory

right to court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir.

2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request"

counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a

practical matter, there are not enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a

pro bono assignment in every pro se case. See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708,

711 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Whether to recruit an attorney is a difficult decision: Almost

everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent

litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.").

"'When confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel,

the district court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff

made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from

doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear

competent to litigate it himself?'" Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)). These two

questions "must guide" the Court's determination whether to attempt to recruit

counsel. Id. These questions require an individualized assessment of the

plaintiff, the claims, and the stage of litigation. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655-56.

The Seventh Circuit has specifically declined to find a presumptive right to

counsel in some categories of cases. McCaa v Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1037

(7th Cir. 2018) (Hamilton, J., concurring); Walker, 900 F.3d at 939.

The Court first notes that none of Mr. Golliday's motions for counsel are

on the form that the Court requires plaintiffs to use when requesting counsel.

The use of the form is mandated in part because it lists a number of conditions

for recruitment of counsel to which a plaintiff must agree before the Court will

attempt to recruit counsel. Additionally, the Court notes that Mr. Golliday

essentially threatens the Court with criminal prosecution for also becoming part

of the Defendants' conspiracy against him if it denies his motions for counsel.

Those threats are entirely baseless, and they do nothing to support his requests

for counsel.

The Court finds that Mr. Golliday has made a reasonable effort to recruit

counsel on his own before seeking the Court's assistance. He should continue

his efforts to find counsel.

"The second inquiry requires consideration of both the factual and legal

complexity of the plaintiff's claims and the competence of the plaintiff to litigate

those claims himself." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).

"Specifically, courts should consider 'whether the difficulty of the case—factually

and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to

coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d

at 655). "This assessment of the plaintiff's apparent competence extends beyond

the trial stage of proceedings; it must include 'the tasks that normally attend

litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other

court filings, and trial.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).

Mr. Golliday's filings with the court thus far have indicated an ability to

understand and follow basic legal procedures. He clearly can write and

understand English at a high level. Furthermore, this case is at a very early

stage, with the Court just now screening Mr. Golliday's original complaint. The

Seventh Circuit has found that "until the defendants respond to the complaint,

the plaintiff's need for assistance of that counsel . . . cannot be gauged."

Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Mapes v.

Indiana, 932 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging "the difficulty in

accurately evaluating the need for counsel in the early stages of pro se litigation").

That statement from Kadamovas is not a "bright-line rule," but in this case, Mr.

Golliday has not shown a need for counsel to assist him at this time to

"investigate and flesh out any claim that may exist." Mapes, 932 F.3d at 971-72.

For these reasons, Mr. Golliday's motions for assistance recruiting counsel

are denied without prejudice. Dkts. [9], [11], [19]. The Court will remain alert

to changes in circumstances that may warrant reconsideration of the motion,

such as a settlement conference or trial. Also, the clerk is directed to attach a

form motion for assistance recruiting counsel to Mr. Golliday's copy of this Order.

IV. Motions to Correct Errors and for Court Assistance

Mr. Golliday's "motion to correct errors" notes that Officer Volpatti is not

currently listed as a defendant on the docket, despite being named in his

complaint. The motion, dkt. [22], is GRANTED to the extent the clerk is directed

to add Correctional Officer Volpatti as a defendant on the docket.

Mr. Golliday's other pending motion for assistance, requesting "acceptance

of certificate of service,” is DENIED. Dkt. [23]. It requests service of process on

the named defendants in Mr. Golliday's complaint. But, as discussed, the Court

is required to first screen the complaint before any Defendants may be served,

and the Court at this time has not identified any viable claims that warrant

service of any Defendant.

V. Conclusion

Mr. Golliday's motion to reconsider imposition of an initial partial filing fee

is GRANTED. Dkt. [18]. No initial partial filing fee is due at this time.

Mr. Golliday has through June 6, 20285, to file an amended complaint as

discussed in part II of this Order. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this

action without further notice or opportunity to show cause. The clerk is directed

to attach a pro se prisoner complaint form to Mr. Golliday's copy of this Order.

Mr. Golliday's motions for counsel are DENIED without prejudice. Dkts.

[9], [11], [19]. The clerk is directed to attach a form motion for assistance

recruiting counsel to Mr. Golliday's copy of this Order.

Mr. Golliday's motion to correct error at dkt. [22] is GRANTED. The clerk

is directed to add Correctional Officer Volpatti as a defendant on the docket.

Mr. Golliday's motion for assistance, dkt. [23], is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/7/2025 SJamu Patrick lanl

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

14

Distribution:

TERRYON GOLLIDAY

295044

WESTVILLE – CF

WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

5501 South 1100 West

WESTVILLE, IN 46391