Brown v. Cowan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT BROWN, N62623, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 25-cv-501-DWD

W. COWAN, )

JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, )

ANTHONY JONES, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Robert Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Cowan improperly disciplined him over a cell assignment issue.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on April 6, 2023, Defendant Cowan wrote him a disciplinary

ticket for refusing direct orders and delaying cellhouse operations. He claims he spent

approximately seven nights in segregation without a mattress or bed linens. The lack of

bedding caused him pain in his back, ankles, elbows, neck, shoulders, and hips. (Doc. 8-

1 at 6). He seeks to have the charge expunged, and he seeks monetary compensation.

(Doc. 8-1 at 7). In support of the Complaint, he submitted grievance documentation and

the underlying disciplinary documents.

In his grievance, he claimed Cowan should not have disciplined him because the

whole dispute about cell placement arose when Cowan tried to place him in a cell with

someone who was not quarantined while he was supposed to be quarantined for refusing

Covid tests. (Doc. 8-1 at 12-13). He claims by the time Cowan came to handcuff him and

take him to segregation, he was in his cell. In the disciplinary report, the committee

indicated that Plaintiff appeared, pled not guilty, and explained he believed the charge

was unfounded and fabricated based on his quarantine status. Plaintiff was sentenced to

seven days of segregation and one month of c-grade. (Doc. 8-1 at 14).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following

claim:

Claim 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process or false discipline

claim against Defendants Schoenbeck, Jones, and Cowan

related to the April 6, 2023, housing placement issue and

discipline.

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Analysis

As an initial matter, Plaintiff filed his complaint on April 2, 2025, and he submitted

a motion to “re-file” on April 28, 2025, with a pleading that contained two additional

defendants (Schoenbeck and Jones) and a copy of disciplinary documents. This Motion

(Doc. 8) is GRANTED, and the Court analyzed the Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) and

accompanying exhibits.

To establish a due process claim related to disciplinary proceedings, an inmate

must demonstrate: (1) the deprivation of a liberty interest; and (2) the procedures he was

afforded were constitutionally deficient. Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 720 (7th Cir. 2019).

Six months in segregation and six months’ loss or restriction of privileges—do not,

without more, implicate a protected liberty interest. See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d

740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (six-month disciplinary segregation alone); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d

602, 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2005) (temporary loss of contact visitation and restricted

commissary); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 n.7 (7th Cir. 1995) (six-month

disciplinary segregation and demotion to C grade). A plaintiff may also argue that the

combination of disciplinary measures deprived him of a protected liberty interest. See

Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015). There is no bright-line rule for the

duration or conditions of segregation that might invoke a protected liberty interest, but

generally a term of segregation approaching or exceeding a year may be considered

significant enough to invoke due process protections. See e.g., Marion v. Columbia

Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that a term of 240-days of

segregation was long enough to mandate an inquiry into the conditions of the

confinement). However, the imposition of disciplinary segregation without “additional

facts about the conditions of confinement, [does] not implicate a liberty interest.” Miller

v. Maue, 759 F. App'x 515, 516 (7th Cir. 2019).

Additionally, in a situation where an inmate complains of discipline such as

segregation, or anything other than the loss of good-time credit, the disciplinary

proceedings are subject to an informal due process inquiry. Informal due process

requires only that an inmate is provided (1) notice of the reasons for his placement in

segregation, (2) and an opportunity to present his views in a written statement or hearing.

Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2024).

Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient to state a claim for two reasons. First, the

conditions he describe—seven days with no mattress—are insufficient to invoke a

protected liberty interest. At most, his conditions suggest discomfort, but not an atypical

and significant hardship. Second, Plaintiff does not contend that he lacked advance

notice of the issue or an opportunity to present his views. The disciplinary report that he

submitted with his complaint shows that he was able to state his views at the disciplinary

hearing, and this is enough to satisfy informal due process. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint is

insufficient to state a claim related to the discipline he received in April of 2023.

Typically, the Court affords a pro se prisoner at least one opportunity to amend

his complaint if it is found to be insufficient to state a claim, but here any such

opportunity would be futile. There is simply no alteration that Plaintiff could make to

the facts alleged in his complaint to make a valid constitutional claim. Seven days in

segregation, even in uncomfortable conditions, is not enough to plead any sort of

conceivable claim for recovery under § 1983.

Disposition

Plaintiff’s Motion to Re-File is GRANTED, and the Court reviewed his Amended

Pleading (Doc. 8, 8-1). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 8-1) is dismissed with

prejudice for failure to state a claim under § 1915A. The Clerk of Court is directed to

enter judgment and to close this case. The obligation to pay the filing fee was incurred at

the time the case was filed, regardless of the outcome, so Plaintiff is still obligated to make

payments until he has satisfied the $350 fee.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of

the outcome of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v.

Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir.

1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. He must list each of the issues he intends to appeal in the

notice of appeal, and a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must set forth the

issues he plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). Moreover, if the

appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.” A proper

and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-

day appeal deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more

than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot

be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2025 dun L iv J

DAVID W.DUGAN

United States District Judge