Opinion

Com. v. Brown, J.

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
May 7, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Lazarus
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.1%

quashing appeal from interlocutory order denying return of seized property

How later courts described this case

  • quashing appeal from interlocutory order denying return of seized property
  • quashing interlocutory cross- appeal from order denying suppression of evidence
  • when counseled defendant files pro se document, courts do not act on filing but instead note it on docket and forward it to counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

J-S16007-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JACQUEZ DAVON BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 1715 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered November 18, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):

CP-67-CR-0004090-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and LANE, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED MAY 07, 2025

Jacquez Davon Brown appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of York County, denying his motions to suppress and

for return of property. As the order is interlocutory, we quash.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this matter

as follows:

On July 9, 2022, a criminal complaint was filed charging [Brown]

with criminal homicide. A preliminary hearing was held on

September 7, 2022, before Magisterial District Judge Joel Toluba

and the charge was bound over for trial. On September 28, 2022,

[a Criminal] Information was filed charging [Brown] with murder

of the first degree [] and murder of the third degree[.]

On March 14, 2023, [Brown, through counsel,] filed an omnibus

pre-trial motion that included a petition for writ of habeas corpus;

J-S16007-25

a motion for a Franks[1] hearing, and motions to suppress

evidence for various alleged violations. After taking testimony,

[the trial court] issued an order and opinion denying [Brown’s]

omnibus pre-trial motion for relief on February 2, 2024.

On July 25, 2024, [Brown, while still represented by counsel,] filed

a [pro se] document entitled “Motion for Return of

Property/Motion to Suppress” to the criminal docket. A hearing

was scheduled for September 16, 2024. On that date the parties

appeared and, after determining that [trial counsel] was retained

solely to represent [Brown] in the criminal matter and that his

representation did not extend to the quasi-civil return of property

matter, [the trial court] identified the issue before it as whether

or not the property in question is evidence in the pending criminal

case. Further, the [trial court] indicated that the suppression

motion was already litigated, extensively, in the criminal matter

and a ruling was issued. Therefore, suppression would not be

revisited. The hearing was continued to November 18, 2024, to

provide [Brown] the opportunity to properly subpoena and serve

the individuals necessary to give testimony.

On November 18, 2024, a hearing was conducted and evidence

taken. At the conclusion, [the trial court] issued an order granting

the return of specified, enumerated items and denying the return

of: U.S. currency in the amount of Nine Hundred Ninety Dollars

($990.00) from the wallet; U.S. currency in the amount of One

Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,650.00) contained in a

yellow envelope; the set of Acura keys; and [a] black [A]pple

iPhone[. The court dismissed] the motion to suppress as already

resolved in the criminal case.

On November 19, 2024, [Brown] filed a notice of appeal to the

Superior Court. On that same date[, the trial] court issued an

order directing [Brown] to file a statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to P[a].R.A.P. 1925(b).

____________________________________________

1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (requiring hearing be held at

defendant’s request where defendant makes substantial preliminary showing

that false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, included in search warrant affidavit, and allegedly false

statement necessary to finding of probable cause).

-2-

J-S16007-25

Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/25, at 2-4 (unnecessary capitalization and footnotes

omitted).

Brown and the trial court have both complied with Rule 1925. On

appeal, Brown raises six issues relating to the denial of his pro se motion to

suppress and one issue relating to the denial, in part, of his motion for return

of property. All of these claims are interlocutory and, as such, we lack

jurisdiction to consider them.

Generally, “an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a

governmental unit or trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A final order is one that

“disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). A pre-trial

order denying a motion to suppress is not final, but interlocutory, and does

not fall within any of the categories enumerated in Pa.R.A.P. 311 (interlocutory

appeals as of right) or Pa.R.A.P. 313 (collateral orders).2 See

Commonwealth v. Slaton, 556 A.2d 1343, 1350 (Pa. Super. 1989).

Similarly, “while a criminal action remains pending, an appeal from an

order denying the defendant’s motion to return property is interlocutory and

unappealable if the defendant’s motion relates in any way to the criminal

prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Bowers, 185 A.3d 358, 362 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

2 Moreover, the suppression motion in question was filed by Brown, pro se,

while he was represented by counsel and, as such, is a hybrid filing that

constitutes a legal nullity. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 353,

354 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2020). Accordingly, the trial court properly took no action

on the pro se motion. See id. (when counseled defendant files pro se

document, courts do not act on filing but instead note it on docket and forward

it to counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4)).

-3-

J-S16007-25

2018), citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 431 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super.

1981). Here, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the items

Brown seeks to have returned are related to his pending criminal prosecution

and are, in fact, the subject of Brown’s pro se motion to suppress. See Pro

Se Motion to Suppress, 7/25/24, at ¶ 71 (seeking suppression of, inter alia,

U.S. currency from Brown’s wallet in the amount $990.00, U.S. currency

contained in a yellow envelope in the amount of $1,650.00, and a set of Acura

keys). Accordingly, we quash. Slaton, supra (quashing interlocutory cross-

appeal from order denying suppression of evidence); Lewis, supra (quashing

appeal from interlocutory order denying return of seized property).

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/07/2025

-4-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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