Maney v. BNA Airport

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEBORAH MANEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 3:24-cv-01143

v. )

)

BNA AIRPORT, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney filed this complaint against BNA Airport. (Doc. No. 1).

I. FILING FEE

Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP

Application”). (Doc. No. 2). According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals

$923 from Supplemental Social Security (“SSI”) payments, she has $0 in cash, her monthly

expenses are covered by SSI, she has no discretionary income, and she does not expect any

major changes to her monthly income or expenses in the next 12 months (Id.) Plaintiff did not

provide a residential address. It appears that Plaintiff may be unhoused. Because her IFP

Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the full filing fee without

undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is

DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under

§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any

complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.

2010).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a

short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the

relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th

Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin, 765 F.2d at 85). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v.

Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as

counsel or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they

“required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F.

App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003). And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).

III. ALLEGED FACTS

As best the Court can discern,1 the complaint alleges that, on an unspecified date,

unidentified BNA Airport owners, operators, guards, police, and pilots violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Plaintiff was yelled at and called a racial slur. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 3-4).

Much of the complaint is undecipherable, including her request for relief.

IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT

After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds

that the complaint does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 and cannot survive

screening under Section 1915(e)(2).

By naming “BNA Airport” as a Defendant, the Court understands Plaintiff to be referring

to the Nashville International Airport which is operated by the Metropolitan Nashville Airport

Authority (“MNAA”). However, the complaint does not explain how the airport or any of its

employees violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. “[A] complaint must allege that the

defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002).

The complaint does not identify the individual who allegedly yelled at Plaintiff and called

her a racial slur. Even if it had, “vulgar and/or threatening language does not give rise to a

constitutional issue.” Jefferson v. Afison, No. 4:24-CV-2, 2025 WL 379875, at *5 (E.D. Tenn.

Feb. 3, 2025) (citing Jones Bey v. Johnson, 248 F. App’x 675, 677 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that

the occasional use of racial slurs, “although unprofessional and reprehensible, does not rise to the

level of constitutional magnitude”)); Alderson v. Shelby County Gov’t, No. 11-2024-STA-dkv,

1 Plaintiff has filed many pro se lawsuits in this Court since 2024. Her handwritten complaints

are so skeletal and nonsensical that it is difficult to distill her statements into coherent narratives

and causes of action.

2012 WL 566934, at *14 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2012) (finding plaintiff had not stated a

cognizable constitutional violation . . . as relates to [defendant’s] utterance of the phrase ‘Arian

Nation.’”).

Moreover, as Defendant points out, more than 180 days have passed since Plaintiff filed

her complaint, and Plaintiff has yet to serve Defendant. (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 23). For that

reason alone, this action is subject to dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m),

which provides: “If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the

court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without

prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the

plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an

appropriate period.” Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is well taken.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief can be

granted. Alternatively, the complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(m). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) therefore is GRANTED.

Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an

appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED. We

□□ Osho

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE