RAYNER v. THE COUNTY OF CHESTER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARQUIS LEE RAYNER, :

:

Plaintiff, :

: Civil Action

v. :

: No. 23-5187

THE COUNTY OF CHESTER and :

DETECTIVE HAROLD DUTTER, :

:

Defendant. :

:

MEMORANDUM

Younge, J. May 6, 2025

I. INTRODUCTION

Marquis Lee Rayner was found guilty of murder, robbery, and other related charges. After

the District Court denied his habeas petition, the Third Circuit reversed that decision and ordered

the court to issue the writ for his release on remand. See Rayner v. Superintendent Forest SCI, No.

21-3230, 2023 WL 1433610, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2023). Now, in a civil lawsuit, Rayner alleges

that omissions by a County of Chester detective in his affidavit of probable cause, and subsequent

testimony consistent with that document, caused him to spend nearly ten years in prison for a crime

that he claims he did not commit. These actions, according to Rayner, violated his constitutional

rights and protections afforded by state law. Because there are issues of fact for a jury to decide

that are material to Rayner’s claims, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31) is

granted in part and denied in part. 1,2

1 When applicable, the Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system,

which does not always match the document’s internal pagination.

2 The Court finds this Motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P.

78; L.R. 7.1(f).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Home Invasion, Robbery, and Murder

On June 29, 2012, around 12:30 a.m., three men broke into Dominick William’s and Aaron

Crawford’s apartment in Coatesville, Pennsylvania. (Def.’s Facts in Support of their Motion for

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 30 (“Def’s Facts”) ¶¶ 1, 5). All three intruders carried guns, and all

were disguised by t-shirts worn across their faces. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 2). Tragically, upon confronting

Williams in the living room of his apartment, one of the gunmen fatally shot him. (Def.’s Facts ¶¶

1, 3).

The intruders continued through the apartment and confronted Crawford in his bedroom.

(Def.’s Exhibit A, Trial Transcript, ECF No. 30-2 (“Def.’s Ex. A”), p. 22). There, one of the

gunmen pistol-whipped Crawford and demanded him to “give it up.” (Def.’s Facts ¶ 5). After

Crawford opened his dresser drawer for him, this gunman, who was not wearing gloves, took a

clear plastic jar of marijuana from Crawford’s bedroom. (Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 5-6). All three intruders

subsequentially fled the apartment. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 6).

B. The Criminal Investigation

Around 2:00 a.m. that morning, Coatesville City police officers located a clear plastic jar

and a black t-shirt in a row of hedges approximately a block and a half from the crime scene.

(Def.’s Facts ¶ 7; Def.’s Ex. A, p. 37-38). Officers then took Crawford to these hedges, where he

identified the jar as the one taken from his bedroom and the t-shit as the type of shirt the intruders

used to cover their faces. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 8).

A few days later, Detective Kenneth Beam of the Chester County Detectives Forensic

Services Unit recovered fingerprints from the jar, which matched those belonging to Dominique

Lee, Rayner’s half-brother. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 9; Def.’s Exhibit C, Crim Compl. and Affidavit, ECF

No. 30-4 (“Def.’s Ex. C”), p. 9). Thereafter, Detective Bean collected DNA evidence from the t-

shirt, and sent it to the State Police Laboratory for analysis. (Def.’s Ex. C, p. 10; Def.’s Facts ¶

10). The DNA was entered into the CODIS database and identified Rayner as a match with one of

at least three DNA profiles on the t-shirt.3 (Def.’s Ex. C, p. 9; Pl.’s Exhibit A, Boyd Expert Report,

ECF No. 36-1 (“Pl.’s Ex. A”), p. 5). Police subsequently corroborated this match by later matching

the DNA profile with a buccal swab of DNA from Rayner. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 13).

On January 16, 2013, State Police produced a forensic DNA report that provided several

key conclusions. First, “[t]he DNA profile obtained from the lower front of the black t-shirt (item

Q1) is consistent with a mixture of at least three (3) individuals.” Second, “the major component

of this DNA mixture of profile matches the DNA profile obtained from the known reference

standard from Marquis Rayner (item K3).”4 Third, “[t]he probability of randomly selecting an

unrelated individual exhibiting this combination of DNA types is approximately… 1 in 7.9

quintillion from the African American population.” And finally, “[a]dditional minor/less intense

alleles were also present,” but “[n]o further interpretation could be made due to the complexity of

the mixture from this minor component.” (Def.’s Exhibit Q, PSP DNA Analysis, ECF No. 30-18

(“Def.’s Ex. Q”), p. 2-3).

In addition to this report, and over the course of several months, Detective Harold Dutter

of the Chester County Detectives and other officials investigated the underlying crimes by

collecting evidence and conducting interviews. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 12).

C. The Affidavit of Probable Cause

3 CODIS is an acronym for Combined DNA Index System, which is a computer software program

that operates local, state, and national databases of DNA profiles from convicted offenders,

unsolved crime scene evidence, and missing persons. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 11 n.2).

4 The report lists Item K3 as “One (1) sealed envelope containing a buccal sample from Marquis

Rayner[,]” (Def.’s Ex. Q).

On March 11, 2013, a Criminal Complaint was filed in the County of Chester against

Rayner, which included an Affidavit of Probable Cause (the “Affidavit”) that requested arrest

warrants for Rayner, his half-brother Lee, and Camren Horne.5 (Def.’s Ex. C., p. 2). Detective

Dutter signed every page of the Affidavit as the affiant, swearing that the facts in the Affidavit

were “true and correct.” (Def.’s Ex. C., p. 8).

The Affidavit outlined the officers’ investigation and the evidence that was collected. In

pertinent part, with reference to the DNA evidence, the Affidavit said “the CODIS database

identified Marquis A. Rayner, B/M, DOB: 2/22/1990, PA SID Number [XXXXXXXXX], as a

contributor for the major component of the DNA profile.”6 (Def.’s Ex. C., p. 10). The Affidavit

does not mention the other key findings from the State Police report, including that the DNA from

t-shirt was a mixture of at least three individuals. (Def.’s Ex. C., p. 8-10).

The Affidavit was reviewed and approved by four attorneys before it was submitted to

Magisterial District Judge Lori Novak Donatelli. (Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 28, 30). On March 11, 2013,

Judge Donatelli reviewed and approved the Affidavit. (Def.’s Facts. ¶ 33).

D. Grand Jury, Trial, and Appellate Proceedings

On May 9, 2013, a Grand Jury was convened to hear the evidence against Rayner, including

testimony from Detective Dutter. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 16; Def.’s Exhibit H, Grand Jury Transcript, ECF

No. 41 (“Def.’s Ex. H”), p. 2). The Grand Jury voted to indict Rayner for the murder of Williams

and the connected robbery. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 16).

On November 20, 2014, after a three-day trial from November 17th to the 19th, a jury found

Rayner guilty of five charges, including murder, robbery, and burglary. (Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 47-48).

5At some point during the investigation, a witness identified Camren Horne in a photo line-up as

one of the disguised assailants. (Def.’s Ex. C., p. 10).

6 Out of caution, the Court removed Rayner’s social security number from this quote.

On April 17, 2015, Judge James MacElree sentenced Rayner to life in prison plus 90 months to 20

years. (Def.’s Facts ¶ 49).

Over the subsequent years, Rayner appealed his conviction up through the Pennsylvania

Courts, concluding with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denying Rayner’s Petition for Appeal.

See Commonwealth v. Rayner, 642 Pa. 63 (2017). Rayner’s subsequent Petition for Writ of

Certiorari of his conviction was also denied by the United States Supreme Court. See Rayner v.

Pennsylvania, 583 U.S. 1122 (2018).

Then, on November 9, 2018, Rayner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court. (Def.’s Facts ¶61). On November 23, 2021, Judge Gallagher dismissed the petition with

prejudice and issued a certificate of appealability. See Rayner v. Overmyer, No. 18-04909, 2021

WL 5495812 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2021). However, on February 1, 2023, the Third Circuit reversed

this decision and the remanded the case to the District Court to issue the writ and order Rayner’s

release. See Rayner, 2023 WL 1433610, at *2.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2023, Rayner filed the present lawsuit against the County of Chester

(hereinafter “Chester County”) and Detective Dutter. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Based on the above

facts, the Complaint asserted the following claims: (1) Count I—malicious prosecution in violation

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Det. Dutter; (2) Count II—deprivation of liberty

without due process and denial of a fair trial against Det. Dutter; (3) Count III—municipal liability

claim against Chester County; (4) Count IV—civil rights conspiracy claim against Det. Dutter and

unnamed Chester County employees; and (5) Count V—"state law claim” against Det. Dutter.

(Compl, ECF No. 1). On February 24, 2025, Defendants filed the present Motion for Summary

Judgment to have these claims decided in their favor. (Def.’s Brief in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 31-2 (“Def.’s Brief”)). The Court reviews the parties’ arguments

below.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). To defeat a motion for

summary judgment, there must be a factual dispute that is both material and genuine. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 24-49 (1986); Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225,

229 (3d Cir. 2008). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if, based

on the evidence, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of

a material fact. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016). When the

movant is the defendant, they have the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff “has failed to

establish one or more essential elements of her case.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425

(3d Cir. 2013). If the movant sustains their initial burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party to go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986)).

At the summary judgment stage, the court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).

In doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. See Horsehead Indus., Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 140 (3d

Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, the court must be mindful that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which

the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Detective Dutter

1. Malicious Prosecution

To plead a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment,7 Rayner must

establish that:

(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended

in [the plaintiff's] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without

probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other

than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of

liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal

proceeding.

7 Defendants move for summary judgment on Count I, which includes the malicious prosecution

claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl., p. 11). In his response briefing,

Plaintiff makes no mention of the malicious prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Pl.’s Brief, p. 4-18). Even if he had, Det. Dutter would be protected from the claim through

qualified immunity because “it cannot be said that a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from

malicious prosecution was clearly established in [2012].” Lazar v. City of Philadelphia, No. 24-

907, 2025 WL 886952, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2025) (concluding that “[a]lmost every judge in

this District has concluded that after Albright, there was no clearly established right under the

Fourteenth Amendment to be free of malicious prosecutions); see also Thorpe v. City of Phila.,

No. 19-5094, 2020 WL 5217396, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020) (“Because a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process right against malicious prosecution was not clearly established

in 2008—and is still not clearly established for that matter—the Court grants qualified immunity

as to this claim on behalf of all moving individual defendants.”). Accordingly, summary judgment

for the malicious prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is granted.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). Malicious prosecution

claims against police officers (as opposed to prosecutors) generally arise where an officer “fails to

disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, makes false or misleading reports to the prosecutor,

omits material information from the reports, or otherwise interferes with the prosecutor's ability to

exercise independent judgment in deciding whether to prosecute.” Thorpe v. City of Phila., No.

19-5094, 2020 WL 5217396, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020).

As an initial matter, Defendants insist that Rayner’s malicious prosecution claim is a

disguised false arrest claim that the Court must dismiss as time-barred. Defendants are correct in

one respect. At the time his Complaint was filed (December 29, 2023), if Rayner had alleged a

Section 1983 false arrest claim based on his 2014 arrest, the claim would run afoul of the statute

of limitations. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007) (“We hold that the statute of

limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the

claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.”); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir.

2009) (“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.”).

However, contrary to Defendants’ position, Rayner is appropriately asserting a malicious

prosecution. He claims that Det. Dutter provided false information, through omission, to the

Magisterial District Judge in the Affidavit and to the Grand Jury in his testimony. These allegations

taken prior to and after Rayner’s arrest are consistent with a malicious prosecution claim. See

Halsey, 750 F.3d at 297 (“If the officers influenced or participated in the decision to institute

criminal proceedings, they can be liable for malicious prosecution.”)

Turning to the merits of Rayner’s malicious prosecution claim, Defendants argue that the

claim fails as a matter of law because Rayner cannot satisfy the third and fourth elements—lack

of probable cause and malice, respectively. To the contrary, there are factual disputes that are

material to these elements that a jury must decide.8

i. Probable Cause

Defendants attest that Rayner’s criminal proceeding was initiated with probable cause,

which would “negate[]a claim for malicious prosecution.” Teeple v. Carabba, No. 07-2976, 2009

WL 5033964, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2009), aff'd, 398 F. App'x 814 (3d Cir. 2010). Probable

cause for an arrest “exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that the person committed the crime at

issue.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wilson v. Russo,

212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000)). This happens “when the facts and circumstances within the

arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe

that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d

at 467 (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, a fact

finder’s determination of probable cause must adhere to a “totality-of-the-circumstances

approach,” which is “necessarily fact-intensive[.]” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468.

8 Defendants assumed that Count V, titled as “state law claim,” was a malicious prosecution claim

under state law and argued that it “fails for the same reasons as the Federal malicious prosecution

claim fails.” (Def.’s Brief, p. 34). Rayner does not contest this interpretation of Count V, and

presented argument in support of a malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law. “A

malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff to show all but the fifth

element (deprivation of liberty).” Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-4196, 2019 WL

4039575, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019) (citing Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782,

791 (3d Cir. 2000)). “The Pennsylvania and federal standards regarding the existence of probable

cause are the same.” DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp. 2d 255, 280 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Renk v.

City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (1994)). Accordingly, the Court will analyze

these claims together for the probable cause factor and will explain the standards for malice under

both laws.

Generally, under this analysis, the court would ask whether a reasonable officer would have

found a fair probability that Rayner had committed the murder and robbery. “But when, as here, a

judge issues an arrest warrant, [the court must] defer to it unless the officer misrepresented material

information to get the warrant.” Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir.

2024). This determination requires the court to analyze the following two questions: (1) Did

Detective Dutter “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, ma[k]e

false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant?”; and (2) Were

those false statements and omissions in the affidavit “material, or necessary, to the finding of

probable cause?” Id. (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also

Cook v. Tustin, No. 24-0431, 2024 WL 3460112, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2024) (applying this

analysis to a malicious prosecution claim); Jacobs v. City of Philadelphia, No. 23-1880, 2025 WL

991023, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2025) (same). Further, a Grand Jury voted to indict Rayner, so this

“grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute… but that

presumption may be rebutted by a plausible allegation that the indictment was procured by fraud,

perjury or other corrupt means[.]” Xi v. Haugen, 68 F.4th 824, 841 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Rose

v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted).

a. Reckless Disregarded for the Truth

Rayner argues Det. Dutter recklessly omitted information about the DNA evidence and

descriptions of the alleged suspects in his Affidavit of Probable Cause. “[O]missions are made

with reckless disregard when an officer ‘omits facts that any reasonable person would know that a

judge would want to know.’” Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575, at *8 (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212

F.3d 781, 783, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Here, the Affidavit included some facts that were relevant to determining the fair

probability that Rayner was culpable for the underling crimes, but not all of them. The Affidavit

included the following information: (1) Rayner was adjudicated delinquent for an armed robbery

in 2005; (2) Witness #1 described the three suspects, including that some covered their faces with

a black t-shirts, and a timeline of their actions in the apartment; (3) A black-t-shirt and a jar were

found in close proximity to the apartment and were collected as evidence; (4) Witness #2 identified

the jar that was found as something that one of the suspects had taken; (5) CODIS database

identified Rayner as a “contributor for the major component of the DNA profile” collected from

the black t-shirt; (6) The DNA found on the black t-shirt matched DNA collected from a buccal

swab that Rayner provided the police; (7) Rayner and Dominique Lee are brothers that are living

together; (8) Witness #4 said that they had information related to the murder/robbery, including

that Camren Horne told Witness #4 that he and three other people (four total) were involved in the

crime. Horne told Witness #4 that Lee was one of the assailants; and (9) Lee’s fingerprints matched

the prints on the jar. (Def.’s Ex. C, p. 8-10). Detective Dutter did not include the following facts

from the State Police’s DNA Report in the Affidavit: (1) The DNA mixture extracted from the

black t-shirt contains DNA from at least three individuals; and (2) The “[a]dditional minor/less

intense alleles were also present,” but “[n]o further interpretation could be made due to the

complexity of the mixture from this minor component.” (Def.’s Ex. Q, p. 2-4).

Because of the gravity of DNA evidence in a fact finder’s determination of culpability, see

Dist. Attorney's Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (“While of course

many criminal trials proceed without any forensic and scientific testing at all, there is no

technology comparable to DNA testing for matching tissues when such evidence is at issue. DNA

testing has exonerated wrongly convicted people, and has confirmed the convictions of many

others.”) (internal citations omitted), a reasonable jury could conclude that “a judge would want

to know” these additional details about the DNA evidence. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783. Specifically,

a jury could infer that this information would have provided Judge Donatelli a complete

understanding of the DNA evidence—that DNA from three individuals were present on the t-shirt

and the portions that did not match with Rayner were too complex to interpret. Thus, on account

of these omissions in the Affidavit, a jury could find that Det. Dutter recklessly disregarded the

truth. See Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 748.

Defendants argue that “the affidavit of probable cause clearly identified Plaintiff as [a]

major contributor which unambiguously means there is a minor contributor.” (Def.’s Brief, p. 19).

In essence, Defendants dispute whether there was an omission of information. In support of their

claim, Defendants note that several individuals involved in the criminal proceedings understood

that “major” meant that there was other DNA found as a minor contributor. (Def.’s Brief, p. 19).

Defendants point to the testimony of Samuel Stretton, Rayner’s defense attorney at his trial, to

make this point. When asked what “major component” meant to him, Mr. Stretton said the

following:

“Major component meant to me at that time the things that really counted in making

the evaluation. Maybe there was some minor things that was different, but the major

things, put it in his family and according to them, couple trillion probabilities that

it was him. That's how I interpreted it.”

(Def.’s Exhibit P, Stretton Deposition, ECF No. 30-17 (“Def.’s Ex. P”), p. 10). Mr. Stretton’s

conclusion that “maybe there was some minor things that were different” cannot be clearly

understood as him claiming that the phrase implied that the DNA mixture was from at least three

individuals and the minor contributor’s profiles could not be interpreted. To the contrary, his

testimony highlights that the phrase falls short of a complete explanation of the DNA evidence. At

minimum, the question of whether the statement in the Affidavit implies the omitted information,

as Defendants argue, is a disputed fact for a jury to decide.

Defendants also claim, without pointing to any caselaw, that Det. Dutter could not have

recklessly disregarded the truth in the Affidavit because multiple attorneys from the Chester

County District Attorney’s office reviewed it prior to its submission to the Judge Donatelli.

However, this Court has not found precedent that requires courts in this Circuit to apply such a

rule. Det. Dutter affixed his signature attesting to the truth of facts contained in the Affidavit,

(Def.’s Ex. C, p. 8-10), so this Court must assume that he had the final review of the information

that was included or omitted. Ultimately, it is this final decision to present the information in the

Affidavit to the Judge Donatelli that a jury could consider a reckless a disregard of the truth.

b. Material/Necessary for Finding Probable Cause

Having found that there can be a determination that Det. Dutter recklessly disregarded the

truth by omitting facts related to the DNA evidence, the Court must now determine whether those

omissions were “material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789.

First, “[t]o determine the materiality of the misstatements and omissions,” the Court must “excise

the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted.” Id. Then, the Court “consider[s]

whether the revised facts and circumstances would have suffic[ed] in themselves to warrant a

reasonable person to believe” that there was a fair probability that Ranyer committed the

murder/robbery. Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 749.

The Third Circuit notes that a “certain tension exists when probable cause is at issue in a

motion for summary judgment,” and specifically highlights this tension “for analyses that center

upon misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit of probable cause.” Andrews v. Scuilli, 853

F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 2017). Thus, “where the question is one of probable cause, the summary

judgment standard must tolerate conflicting evidence to the extent it is permitted by the probable

cause standard.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468. The court must “view all such facts and assess whether

any reasonable jury could conclude that those facts, considered in their totality in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, did not demonstrate a ‘fair probability’ that a crime occurred.”

Id. Only under this evaluation, could “the existence of conflicting evidence rise to the level of a

‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ such that summary judgment would be inappropriate.” Id.

Here, if the Affidavit were to include the omitted information about the DNA evidence, the

following paragraph that outlined the DNA evidence would have the bolded insertions:

The DNA profile from the lower front of the black t-shirt (item Q1) is

consistent with a mixture of a at least three (3) individuals. DNA collected from

the tee-shirt was entered into CODIS, a known offender database. The CODIS

database identified Marquis A. Rayner, B/M, DOB: 2/22/1990, PA SID Number

[XXXXXXXXX], as a contributor for the major component of the DNA profile.

There were additional minor/less intense alleles present, but no further

interpretation could be made due to the complexity of the mixture from this

minor component. On December 4, 2012, a buccal swab was obtained from

Marquis Rayner for a confirmatory check with the CODIS match. On a report dated

January 16, 2013, the Pennsylvania State Police DNA Lab confirmed that the DNA

found on the black tee shirt matched the known DNA buccal sample obtained from

Marquis Rayner.

(Def.’s Ex. C, p. 8-10; Def.’s Ex. Q, p. 2-4).

After these facts are added to the Affidavit and considered in conjunction with all the facts

therein, a jury could determine that “no reasonable competent officer would conclude that probable

cause exist[ed]” to initiate a criminal proceeding against Rayner. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789–90

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In an

area close to the crime scene, officers found two things: (1) a jar that one witness identified as an

item that was stolen from his apartment; and (2) a black t-shirt that matched the description of an

item that one witness said the suspects were wearing to cover their faces. A sample extracted from

said t-shirt contained a mixture of DNA from at least three people, of which, police were able to

match the major component of the mixture with Rayner’s DNA. However, as pointed out by the

Third Circuit in its opinion of Rayner’s habeas case, the presence of Rayner’s DNA does not

conclusively mean that Rayner wore it in the commission of the crime because “there was no way

to determine when Rayner's DNA had been deposited on the shirt.” Rayner, 2023 WL 1433610, at

*2. In fact, “[t]he DNA could have been left on the t-shirt—an easily movable object—at any

time.” Id. The probability that the DNA from Rayner was left on the t-shirt during the crime is

complicated by the fingerprints from the jar that matched Dominique Lee, who was Rayner’s half-

brother and roommate at the time. As the Third Circuit notes, “Lee could have easily borrowed

Rayner's t-shirt sometime before the commission of the crimes.” Id. This scenario is supported by

information from Witness #4, who identified Lee and Camren Horne as potential assailants,

explaining that they were dressed in black clothes at Lee’s apartment prior to the murder/robbery.

In other words, because Witness #4 placed Lee at the apartment he shared with Rayner, it is more

likely that Lee could have used one of Rayner’s t-shirts that already contained Rayner’s DNA. The

omitted evidence, which explains that at least two other DNA profiles were present on the t-shirt,

further supports that someone else was using his shirt. Whether one of those DNA profiles

belonged to Lee could not be confirmed or denied because the complexity of said profiles did not

allow for interpretation. Nevertheless, the presence of another DNA profile alone fits this plausible

scenario, which then undermines probable cause against Rayner. Accordingly, when the Affidavit

includes information that at least two other DNA profiles were present on the t-shirt, Rayner’s

culpability for the murder/robbery can be understood as speculation rather than a fair probability.

Absent the direct link to the crime through Rayner’s DNA that the original Affidavit suggests,

which is undermined by the omitted evidence, the Affidavit does not include other evidence that

reasonably links the murder/robbery to Rayner. This evidence could allow a jury to find that no

officer could have reasonably found that there was probable cause against Rayner.

In support of a finding of probable cause, Defendants outline an interpretation of the facts

in the Affidavit that would lead a jury to find in their favor. They argue that when information

about the “two other unidentified ‘minor’ contributions” are added, it “negate[s]” probable cause

because of the “DNA evidence on the t-shirt which was linked to the jar taken during the robbery,

fingerprints identified as Dominque [sic] Lee, who was Plaintiff’s half-brother and roommate.”

(Def.’s Brief, p. 12-13). As explained above, when reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff’s

favor as the nonmoving party, a jury could find that this evidence “undermine[s] a finding of

probable cause.” Bircher v. Pierce, 610 F. App'x 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2015). Information about the

two other DNA profiles complicates the link to Rayner that the Defendants sets out. While “some

unreliability or exculpatory evidence will not fatally undermine probable cause otherwise

established,” absent that evidence, the standard must still be “otherwise established.” Dempsey,

834 F.3d at 478 (internal quotations omitted and insertion accepted). Because there is a genuine

dispute over how this added information impacts the existence of probable cause, the question

must be presented to a jury.

c. Grand Jury Indictment

Finally, Defendants argue that there is prima facie evidence of probable cause because a

Grand Jury voted to indict Rayner. (Def.’s Brief, p. 16). This “presumption of probable cause” can

be overcome if there is evidence that the indictment was the result of “fraud, perjury or other

corrupt means.” Costino v. Anderson, 786 F. App'x 344, 347 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit has

“previously held that when a grand jury [indictment] contains facts supporting probable cause, a

failure to provide exculpatory evidence to the grand jury does not demonstrate that the [indictment]

was procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.” Rodgers v. Pennsylvania State Police, No.

24-1759, 2025 WL 729497, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 7, 2025) (citing Camiolo v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003)). In Camilo, the Third Circuit granted summary

judgment for a malicious prosecution claim because the plaintiff could not rebut the presumption

of probable cause. 334 F.3d at 363. The Circuit first held that there “were ample facts to support a

finding of probable cause.” Id. Then, when plaintiff argued that the presumption was overcome

because “exculpatory evidence was not presented to the grand jury,” the Circuit declined to

override the presumption because (1) the exculpatory evidence was presented; and (2) courts have

no authority to require a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to a jury. Id. Accordingly, the

Circuit held that the plaintiff “did not demonstrate that he was prosecuted without probable cause.”

Id.

In this case, unlike Camilo, there is a dispute of fact whether there were ample facts to

support a finding of probable cause against Rayner. Without this determination, Det. Dutter’s

failure to present exculpatory information could indicate fraud. In the Affidavit, as outlined above,

Det. Dutter omitted crucial details about the DNA evidence (i.e. that the DNA mixture was from

three individuals and that no interpretation could be made of the minor contributors to that

mixture), which disguised a line of reasoning that would have seriously disrupted a showing of

probable cause. After Judge Donatelli issued the arrest warrant for Rayner, Det. Dutter then

omitted the same exculpatory facts about the DNA evidence in his testimony to the Grand Jury.

(Def.’s Exhibit H, p. 137-151; Pl.’s Exhibit B, Dutter Deposition, ECF No. 36-2 (“Pl.’s Ex. B”),

p. 247). Just like in the Affidavit, as previously explained, the evidence against Rayner presented

to the Grand Jury lived and died with the DNA found on the black t-shirt. When the omitted

exculpatory information on the DNA is considered, similar to the Court’s analysis of the Affidavit,

there is a dispute of fact whether probable cause for Rayner still exists. Det. Dutter’s decision to

withhold exculpatory information, and ultimately generate a showing of probable cause that might

not have been corroborated but for this omission, could allow a jury to find that the indictment was

obtained by fraud or other corrupt means.

i. Malice

Defendants argue that Rayner not only fails to meet his burden of proof on the “probable

cause” prong of the malicious prosecution standard, he also cannot demonstrate that Det. Dutter

acted maliciously or with a purpose other than bringing Rayner to justice. (Def.’s Brief, p. 18). In

other words, Defendants pose the following question—why or for what purpose would Defendants

seek to pin this charge on Plaintiff, when there is no evidence that Detective Dutter knew anything

about the Plaintiff or even the victim in this case? After all, there is no evidence that Detective

Dutter and Rayner had ever previously had any contact with one another. Only the Finder of Fact

can ponder why Detective Dutter either failed or refused to alert the Magistrate Judge in the

Affidavit of Probable Cause about the presence of DNA from multiple individuals on the sole

piece of evidence that connected Plaintiff to the scene of this heinous crime, or whether it mattered.

Plaintiff may be able to prove what Detective Dutter did and did not do, but will probably not be

able to conclusively prove why he failed to provide this most important detail to the neutral

Magistrate Judge considering the issuance of the warrant. Proving his actions alone may, however,

be enough because under this prong, “[a]n officer's decision to omit crucial exculpatory

information from [an] affidavit of probable cause can equate to malice.” Staten v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 24-1380, T203 (3d Cir. 2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Harvard,

for example, an officer omitted and misrepresented important information regarding exculpatory

facts in his affidavit of probable cause. See 973 F.3d at 203-204. The Third Circuit could not find

a “valid reason for why [the officer] would include such grave misrepresentations and falsehoods

in the affidavit,” so it held that a jury could find that the officer acted maliciously. Id. at 204.

Further, under Pennsylvania law, “[m]alice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause”

or “from a reckless and oppressive disregard of a plaintiff's rights.” Hall v. Peters, No. 248 C.D.

2017, 2017 WL 5893388, at *11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 30, 2017).

Here, as explained, Det. Dutter omitted information about the DNA evidence, which, if

otherwise included in the Affidavit, would have created serious doubts about whether Rayner was

present during the commission of the crime. A jury can, and perhaps should, interpret Det. Dutter’s

decision to remove this exculpatory information as Det. Dutter simply choosing to actively mold

a finding of probable cause against a third of the possible four suspects. After all, he had more than

enough evidence against Lee and Horne (i.e. a fingerprint match and a witness statement describing

a confession) to put in the Affidavit, but as for Rayner (Lee’s brother and roommate), a man with

a history of committing the crime of robbery, he only had a DNA report that provided

circumstantial evidence at best. Detective Dutter knew there was at least one other perpetrator that

had not been identified. Perhaps he believed that circumstantially it was more likely than not that

Rayner was the shadowy, elusive third man and that he could strengthen his Affidavit of Probable

Cause by simply directing the Magistrate Judge’s attention to the only other person that had a

personal connection with Lee. Again, this is a question for the jury as it seeks to determine whether

Plaintiff has met his burden of proof. All that we know for certain is that months after the DNA

report was created, Det. Dutter excludes the exculpatory information in the Affidavit of Probable

Cause that would clearly articulate that there were at least three DNA profiles on the t-shirt, and

that exclusion ultimately made it appear that Rayner put the DNA on the t-shirt during the crime.

Thus, out of this act, probable cause was crafted, and Det. Dutter had his third suspect. And

notably, Det. Dutter provides no explanation for why he did not include the omitted facts. (Pl.’s

Ex. B, p. 15-19). Having already determined that a jury could find that this decision was a reckless

disregard of Rayner’s constitutional rights, a jury could infer that Det. Dutter’s alleged attempt to

bolster his theory was done with malice.

ii. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that Det. Dutter is entitled to qualified immunity, which “shield[s] an

officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies

with the law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009). In the Third Circuit, courts conduct

a two-step inquiry to determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Morgan

v. Fiorentino, 811 F. App'x 798, 802 (3d Cir. 2020). First, courts ask “whether the plaintiff

sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right.” Id. Second, when the facts do show a

violation, as the Court has already determined a jury could find here, courts ask “whether the right

was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official's conduct.” Morgan, 811 F. App'x at 802. “If a

court concludes that an officer's conduct did violate a clearly established constitutional right, then

it must deny him the protection afforded by qualified immunity.” Curley, 298 F.3d at 277. At

summary judgment, as here, if there are disputed facts that are material to the qualified immunity

determination, then the official is not entitled to the immunity at that stage. See Ciardiello v.

Sexton, 390 F. App'x 193, 201 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Q.M. v. Cty. of L.A., No. 21-9382, 2025

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49466, at *26-27 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2025) (“[T]he facts necessary to

establish whether the Deputies committed a constitutional violation are in dispute which makes

granting summary judgment on qualified immunity improper.”).

For a court to find that a right is clearly established, “there must be sufficient precedent at

the time of action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put defendant on notice that his

or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (Mar. 21, 2016). The clearly

established right “must be particularized to facts of the case,” rather than “defined at a high level

of generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). Absent this particularity, qualified

immunity would become “a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of

extremely abstract rights.” Id. Thus, “for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates

the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular

conduct is clearly established.” Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169.

In this Circuit, by the time the Affidavit was submitted in 2012, and when the Grand Jury

was convened in 2013, there is no question that Rayner had a “right to be from prosecutions on

criminal charges that lack probable cause.” Andrews, 853 F.3d at 705 (citing Donahue v. Gavin,

280 F.3d 371, 380 (3d Cir. 2002)). This right was “grounded in well-settled law and thus, on the

record of this case, ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that [Det. Dutter’s] conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Andrews, 853 F.3d at 705 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).

Defendants argue that the Third Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle requires

this Court to conclude that Det. Dutter is entitled to qualified immunity because his decision to

omit information was done in reliance of advice from prosecutors. 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). In

Kelly, the Third Circuit explained when to apply qualified immunity if an officer’s decision was

guided by legal advice:

Accordingly, we hold that a police officer who relies in good faith on a prosecutor's

legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is presumptively entitled to

qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claims premised on a lack of probable

cause. That reliance must itself be objectively reasonable, however, because “a

wave of the prosecutor's wand cannot magically transform an unreasonable

probable cause determination into a reasonable one.” Id. at 34. Accordingly, a

plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing that, under all the factual and legal

circumstances surrounding the arrest, a reasonable officer would not have relied on

the prosecutor's advice.

Id. at 255-256. Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, Kelly does not establish a per se rule granting

qualified immunity when a decision is made in reliance on prosecutorial advice. Instead, Rayner

“may rebut the reasonableness of the officers’ reliance—and therefore their presumptive

immunity—by establishing that ‘the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” Handy v.

Palmiero, 836 F. App'x 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651,

663–64 (3d Cir. 2012)). Here, as explained when the omitted facts are added to the reconstructed

Affidavit and into Det. Dutter’s testimony at the Grand Jury, a jury could find that no reasonable

officer would find that probable cause existed against Rayner. Because there is a factual dispute

with respect to the existence of probable cause, it is premature to decide whether Det. Dutter’s

reliance was objectionably reasonable, thus precluding this Court from entitling Det. Dutter to

qualified immunity. See Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006)

(“Although qualified immunity is a question of law determined by the Court, when qualified

immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be determined by the jury.”).

Absent qualified immunity, summary judgment is denied for Count I and Count V.

2. Due Process Deprivation

Next, Rayner claims that Det. Dutter fabricated evidence, violating his due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants argue that the claim fails because there was no

fabricated evidence, and even if there was, Rayner, through his counsel at trial, was aware of the

alleged fabricated information. (Def.’s Brief, p. 23-24). In response, Rayner explains that Det.

Dutter’s pre-trial conduct—the omissions in the Affidavit and in Det. Dutter’s testimony to the

Grand Jury—is “the fabricated evidence [that] was used to evade [his] right to due process.” (Pl.’s

Brief, p. 20). Further, Rayner directs the Court to Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358 (3d

Cir. 2016) to explain that “[t]he fact that this evidence was evaluated at trial does not cure the

constitutional injury.” (Pl.’s Brief, p. 20).

In Halsey, the Third Circuit clarified that “a state actor can be liable on a stand-alone claim

for fabrication of evidence” under the Fourteenth Amendment, instead of the fabrication

allegations only proceeding as “an aspect of a malicious prosecution claim.” 750 F.3d at 289.

When a criminal defendant “has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has used

fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under § 1983 based on the Fourteenth

Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant

would not have been convicted.” Id. at 294. A few years later, in Black, the Circuit explained that

there was “no meaningful reason why due process protections precluding fabricated evidence

should turn on whether or not one is convicted at trial,” so the Circuit extended the use of this

claim to defendants whose criminal trials ended in an acquittal. Id. at 370, 372. The constitutional

source of this claim is the Fourteenth “Amendment… for two reasons:” (1) “[I]ts due process

guarantee ensures criminal defendants a fair trial;” and (2) “[I]t guards against unlawful seizures

post-conviction.” Mervilus v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 193-194 (3d Cir. 2023).

Here, Rayner’s criminal trial ended in a conviction, see Rayner, 2023 WL 1433610, at *1,

so the Court is guided by Halsey, not Black. See Bracken v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 760 F. App'x 81,

85 (3d Cir. 2019) (“As previously discussed, however, [plaintiff] was not acquitted of the criminal

charges. Rather, the undisputed public record reveals that he paid restitution and the charges were

withdrawn as a result. Black is therefore inapposite.”) (internal citations omitted). Even though

Rayner was granted a writ for habeas corpus from the District Court, as ordered by the Third

Circuit, his original trial concluded in a conviction, putting the analysis of his claim under Halsey.

See, e.g, Lazar v. City of Philadelphia, No. 24-907, 2025 WL 886952, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21,

2025) (analyzing fabrications at trial using Halsey where a defendant was convicted and later

granted habeas relief). That said, Rayner’s fabrication claim fails the standard articulated in

Halsey.

Rayner cannot provide evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use

of that evidence, he would not have been convicted. To Defendants’ point, the alleged “fabricated

evidence” here was presented at trial. Samuel Stretton, Rayner’s attorney during the criminal trial,

testified that he had the DNA report and knew the omitted DNA information. (Def.’s. Facts ¶ 41).

Stretton brought out this information to the jury on cross examination of the DNA expert and in

his closing argument at trial. (Def.’s. Facts ¶ 44). Rayner does not dispute these facts, which, on

their face, demonstrate that a jury heard this evidence and chose to convict Rayner. In fact, the

jury’s evaluation of this evidence was the basis of the Third Circuit’s order to grant Rayner habeas

relief. See Rayner, 2023 WL 1433610, at *1. The Circuit found that “the evidence introduced at

trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” which included the

omitted DNA evidence. Id. However, the Circuit’s determination in Rayner’s habeas case does not

satisfy the Halsey standard for a due process claim. Instead, it affirms that a jury already heard this

evidence and convicted Rayner, precluding Rayner’s ability to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood

of non-conviction in the face of the conviction that already occurred. Accordingly, summary

judgment for Rayner’s due process claim (Count II) is granted. See, e.g. Brackbill v. Ruff, No. 22-

1628, 2023 WL 5447271, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2023) (“And even if Brackbill had produced

evidence of fabrication, Ruff would still be entitled to summary judgment because the challenged

testimony could not have affected the traffic court verdict.”).

3. Civil Conspiracy

Det. Dutter also contests the civil conspiracy claim that Rayner asserts against him. A civil

conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish the following: “(1) The

existence of a conspiracy; (2) An agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional or

civil rights; and (3) A deprivation of those rights in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Thomas v. City

of Philadelphia, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2018); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale,

904 F.3d 280, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2018) (“To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff

must prove that persons acting under color of state law “reached an understanding” to deprive him

of his constitutional rights.”). Det. Dutter argues that there was no constitutional violation and that

there was no agreement to deprive Rayner of his constitutional rights. (Def.’s Brief, p. 33). Having

already ruled that a jury could find a constitutional violation, the Court will address whether there

was an agreement.

To establish “agreement” under this claim, Rayner “must demonstrate that ‘the state actors

named as defendants in the complaint somehow reached an understanding to deny [him] his

rights.’” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295. Where there is no “direct proof,” a “meeting of the minds or

understanding or agreement to conspire can be infer[ed] from circumstantial evidence.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). This “evidence may include that the alleged conspirators ‘did or said

something ... to create an understanding,’ ‘the approximate time when the agreement was made,

the specific parties to the agreement[,] the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the

conspiracy.’” Id. Here, as mentioned, several attorneys from the Chester County District

Attorney’s Office “reviewed and approved the language and contests of [the] Affidavit of Probable

Cause, prior to the submission to the magistrate.” (Def.’s Exhibit D, Hogan Affidavit, ECF No.

30-5, p. 3; Def.’s Exhibit E, Noone Affidavit, ECF No . 30-6, p. 3; Def.’s Exhibit F, Gaza Affidavit,

ECF No. 30-7, p. 3). This review and approval process, indicating that state actors in the District

Attorney’s office “knew about [the] misrepresentations,” could lead a jury to reasonably infer that

there was an agreement to deprive Rayner of his constitutional rights. Cf. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973

F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding no civil conspiracy because there was no evidence that one

defendant knew about the misrepresentations made by the other). Accordingly, with respect to the

conspiracy claim, summary judgment for Defendants is denied.

B. Monell Liability

Rayner asserts a Section 1983 claim against Chester County through Monell liability. A

plaintiff can advance such a claim by demonstrating that their injuries were either (1) caused by

“an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality;” or (2) “that they were caused by a

failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest

v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rayner invokes the

later theory, which applies to failures or inadequacies by municipalities related to the training,

supervision and discipline of its police officers. See id. Rayner specifically argues that Chester

County was deliberately indifferent to training Chester County detectives on probable cause.

Generally, “a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is

necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Thomas v.

Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (insertions accepted and internal quotation

marks omitted). A municipality’s “continued adherence to an approach that they know or should

know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard

for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal

liability.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407

(1997)). However, in select cases, “a single constitutional violation may amount to deliberate

indifference.” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 685 F. App'x 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2017). To establish

liability in such cases, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following:

“[I]n light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need

for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result

in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”

Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). Stated otherwise, Rayner must

demonstrate “that the risk of injury was a ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the failure to train.”

Williams v. Ponik, 822 F. App'x 108, 113 n. 24 (3d Cir. 2020). A single-violation can only

demonstrate deliberate indifference “in a narrow range of circumstances,” whereas the Supreme

Court has only provided a hypothetical example of this liability—"if a city armed its police with

guns and set them loose without any legal training on when to use them.” Hightower v. City of

Philadelphia, 130 F.4th 352, 357 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10).

Rayner attempts to demonstrate a failure to train claim seemingly under both a pattern-of-

violations theory and a single-violation theory. He points the Court to the following evidence: (1)

a single prior allegation of police misconduct in Brison v. Police Officer Tester, (2) the deposition

testimony of Det. Dutter and Sheriff Kevin Dykes, who was a Lieutenant in the Major Crime Unit

of the Chester County Detectives at the time Rayner was prosecuted and convicted; and (3) an

expert report from Christopher Chapman on the police practices in this case. (Pl.’s Brief, 22-31).

Review of this evidence, whereupon all reasonable inferences are construed in Rayner’s favor as

the non-moving party, leads this Court to find that Rayner cannot establish liability under Monell.

First, the single case that Rayner points the Court to cannot sufficiently demonstrate a

pattern that would have put Chester County on “notice that specific training was necessary to avoid

this constitutional violation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2011) (“Without notice

that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to

have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”).

In Brison v. Police Officer Tester, the alleged notifying case, Dale Brison was arrested and

convicted for a 1990 kidnapping and rape, whereupon there was DNA evidence that was available

for testing, but detectives and prosecutors failed to do so despite Brison’s repeated request while

awaiting trial. See No. 94-2256, 1994 WL 709401, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1994). Two years

after Brison was convicted, DNA testing was completed and exonerated Brison. Id. at *3. This

failure to perform a DNA test formed the basis of Brison’s Section 1983 claims in his lawsuit. Id.

While this case involves DNA, it does not involve the failure to provide complete information

about DNA evidence in an affidavit of probable cause or in one’s grand jury testimony. The failure

to conduct DNA testing is not analogous to a failure to adequately explain DNA results in a

probable cause analysis. Accordingly, “[b]ecause [this] incident[ is] not similar to the violation at

issue here, [it] could not have put [Chester County] on notice that specific training was necessary

to avoid this constitutional violation.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62–63. Moreover, even if it was

analogous, one prior case is not a pattern that would put Chester County on notice.9 See, e.g.

Carroll v. Lancaster Cnty., 301 F. Supp. 3d 486, 511 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“Two isolated incidents do

not constitute a pattern, policy, or custom of failing to properly train.”); McAndrew v.

Northumberland Cnty., No. 4:22-CV-00834, 2023 WL 5351994, at *8 n. 88 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 21,

2023) (finding one prior incident is not sufficient to demonstrate a patter for Monell purposes); cf.

Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-4196, 2019 WL 4039575, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019)

(holding that eight prior incidents was enough to establish a pattern of misconduct); Beck v. City

of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that five complaints of similar excessive force

incidents was sufficient to establish a pattern).

Next, Rayner highlights deposition testimony and an expert report to demonstrate that

inadequacies in Chester County’s training makes the municipality liable. Det. Dutter testified that

he did not know that he had to include exculpatory information in an affidavit of probable cause.

(Pl.’s Ex. B, p. 22-25). Christoper Chapman’s review of this testimony, and additional evidence in

the case, led him to opine that Det. Dutter’s understanding of DNA evidence and probable cause

is below the level of a reasonable officer. (Pl.s’ Exhibit E, Chapman Report, ECF No. 36-5 (“Pl.’s

Ex. E”), p. 4-5). Rayner argues that Det. Dutter’s deficiency can be attributed to inadequate training

9 In Defendants’ opening brief, they mention another case that they anticipated Rayner would use

to establish a pattern— Teeple v. Carabba, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119937 (E.D. Pa 2009). (Def.’s

Brief, p. 8). Rayner makes no mention of the case in his briefing, so the Court will understand this

decision as abandoning the use of said case. Accordingly, the Court does not analyze it here.

by Chester County. He points the court to Sheriff Dykes testimony, where he makes the following

representations about the training in Chester County:

• New detectives come in and go through an orientation period. In their specific office, they

are then provided directives (on clipboards) and are told to familiarize themselves with the

information. (Pl.’s Exhibit F, Dykes Deposition, ECF No 36-6 (“Pl.’s Ex. F”), p. 24-25).

• Changes in the law are communicated in “all-hands meetings.” This information

sometimes would be communicated by the prosecutor’s office. Usually, the policy changes

were presented verbally and then communicated in writing, but the policies were not

always reduced to writing. (Pl.’s Ex. F, p. 57-58).

• He has no knowledge of there ever being a training on what the constitutional minimal

standards of probable cause during his tenure. (Pl.’s Ex. F, p. 154-155).

• He does not recall if there was a written policy that defined probable cause. (Pl.’s Ex. F, p.

74).

• When Chester County hired a detective, the detective already had experience with

investigations, so there was a presumption that they knew what they were doing, including

with respect to probable cause. (Pl.’s Ex. F, p. 75-76).

• It was a regular practice for Chester County detectives to meet with prosecutors to make

probable cause determinations and prepare their affidavit of probable cause, including

determining when to reveal exculpatory information. (Pl.’s Ex. F, p. 98-101).

• It was a policy that no arrest warrant would be submitted for judicial approval until a

prosecutor had given it final approval. (Pl.’s Ex. F, p. 49-50).

In review of this testimony, and other evidence, Christopher Chapman opined that “it was

foreseeable that Detective Dutter and other detectives would continue to request warrants without

first making an independent determination if probable cause existed based upon the totality of the

investigators and departments knowledge regarding criminal cases.” (Pl.’s Ex. E p. 91).

Contrary to Rayner’s position, this evidence does not demonstrate that this case falls within

the narrow circumstances where a single incident can show Chester County’s deliberate

indifference. Sheriff Dykes testimony reveals that he was not aware of a training on probable cause

and that Chester County did not define the standard in its policies. If Chester County’s deliberate

indifference were based on these facts alone, then a jury could reasonably find that the risk of a

constitutional violation was obvious. However, the rest of Sheriff Dykes’ testimony paints a

different picture. Sheriff Dykes points out several practices by Chester County that created

safeguards for potential constitutional violations: (1) they hired detectives that had experience

conducting investigations and determining probable cause; (2) their affidavits of probable cause

were reviewed by prosecutors prior to its submission to a judge; and (3) there were meetings where

updates on the law were provided. Because of these practices, it would not be obvious to Chester

County that there would be a constitutional violation. While a jury could infer negligence on the

part of Chester County for relying on these practices, the evidence would not allow them to find

that Rayner’s injury was a “highly predictable consequence of the municipality's failure to train

and supervise its officers.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 225 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64).

Accordingly, Rayner cannot demonstrate that Chester County was deliberately indifferent,

so summary judgment is granted for the Monell claim.

C. Punitive Damages

Finally, Defendants argue that the Court should deny Rayner’s request for punitive

damages for his claims against Det. Dutter. (Def.’s Brief, p. 34). Individual municipal officials can

be held liable for punitive damages under Section 1983. See Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167,

172 (3d Cir. 1984). In this Circuit, “[a] court cannot impose a punitive damages award against an

official acting in his or her individual capacity unless the actor's conduct is, at a minimum, reckless

or callous.” Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-05287, 2007 WL 172400, at *22 (E.D. Pa.

Jan. 18, 2007) (citing Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 428-29 (3d Cir.2003)). Therefore, “[i]t is

sufficient for the plaintiff to show either that the defendant acted . . . with actual knowledge that

he was violating a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws,’ or that the defendant acted with

reckless disregard of whether he was thus violating such a right.” Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d

102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978). However, “despite its utility as a deterrent, the punitive damage remedy

must be reserved, we think, for cases in which the defendant's conduct amounts to something more

than a bare violation justifying compensatory damages or injunctive relief.” Id. Here, the Court

has outlined in detail that a jury could find that Det. Dutter recklessly disregard the truth in

violation of Rayner’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, such a finding could allow a jury to find

that punitive damages are warranted here, so summary judgment for Defendants on this issue is

denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part

and denied in part.

An appropriate Order follows.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

Judge John Milton Younge