“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”
How later courts described this case
- “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JEFFREY LUFFMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-CV-00842-SPM
COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT #10, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Before the Court is an ex parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Luffman. (Doc. 11).
In his Complaint, Luffman purports to brings claims against 34 named Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 based on alleged ongoing and conspiratorial civil
rights violations committed by multiple public officials, agencies, and law
enforcement officers. (Doc. 3, p. 2).1 In his Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Luffman seeks to restrain Defendants
from “further unconstitutional retaliation infringing Plaintiff’s First, Second, and
1 Specifically, Luffman names the following Defendants: Collinsville Community Unit School
District #10; Brad Skertich, Laura Bauer, Bradley Hyre, Dan Porter, Susan Frechman, Sarah
Gafford; School Board Members Soehlke, Peccola, Bronnbauer, Craft, Hasamear, Ruelecke, and
Stutts; Collinsville Police Officers Kuelche, Hunt, Lacroy, Edwards, Owen, Moore, Severne, and
Foley; School Resource Officer, FOIA Officer Wilke; Marryville Police Officer Leffler, FOIA Officer
Jolene Henry; City of Collinsville FOIA Officer Kimberly Wasser; Attorneys Tony Don Santos, David
Fahrenkamp, and Michel Wesley; Collinsville School District 10 Legal Counsel Dana Bond and Guin
Mundorf LLC; Madison County Illinois States Attorney Office, Illinois Attorney General’s Office
Civil Right [sic], Veteran Hiring, ADA Compliance, Public Access Bureau, and FOIA Compliance
Officer. (Doc. 3).
Fourteenth Amendment rights,” and requests this Court to immediately suspend the
enforcement of a Madison County “Stalking No Contact Order” and to enjoin
Defendants from further retaliatory actions against Plaintiff’s allegedly protected
activities. (Doc. 11). For the following reasons set forth, the Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED to the extent
Luffman seeks a Temporary Restraining Order. This Court reserves ruling on
Luffman’s Motion insofar as he seeks a preliminary injunction.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Luffman filed his Complaint on May 2, 2025, purporting to bring claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. He alleges willing violations of his First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights; a joint conspiracy by Collinsville Community Unit
School District #10, local and school-based law enforcement, state legal counsel and
public records officials, school board members, and private law firms to suppress,
retaliate, and cause procedural and reputational harm to him; and misconduct
including obstructing public records, interference with his veteran employment
rights and access to public programs and educational facilities, retaliatory use of the
judicial process and law enforcement against him, and collusion by Defendants to
retaliate against his advocacy efforts. (Doc. 3, p. 2). He seeks damages and injunctive
relief. (Id.).
On May 5, 2025, Luffman filed the instant Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 11). In his Motion, Luffman
makes new factual assertions not presented in his Complaint, now alleging ongoing
retaliation by Defendants for exercising his rights to “freedom of speech, press,
petition, and right to bare [sic] arms.” (Id., p. 2). He first alleges that Defendant
Officer Edwards appeared at his residence on December 3, 2024, and committed
official misconduct and obstruction of justice in violation of Illinois and federal law.
(Id.). Luffman next asserts that Defendants have issued citations for harassment and
criminal trespass and have obtained an allegedly unconstitutional ex parte “Stalking
No Contact Order” against him for what he claims are protected speech activities.
(Id.). He asserts that he operates an independent news media outlet focusing on
“government transparency, civil rights, public education accountability, and public
advocacy,” and that Defendants are attempting to restrict, silence, or chill his
protected speech and investigative journalism. (Id., pp. 4–5). Luffman attaches 13
Exhibits to his Motion spanning some 208 pages and including Madison County
orders of protection, criminal citations, statements and communications from
Collinsville Community Unit School District #10, the Collinsville Police Department,
and the Collinsville School Board, as well as email communications between Luffman
and his purported former attorney. (See id., p. 7).
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A preliminary injunction is “an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to
be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.” Finch v. Treto, 82 F.4th 572,
578 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021)).
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is “preserve the relative positions of the
parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Tully v. Okeson, 78 F.4th 377, 381 (7th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). The
issuance of a preliminary injunction should also “minimize the hardship to the parties
pending final judgment.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988).
Crucially, “[t]he party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of
showing that it is warranted.” Finch, 82 F.4th at 578 (quoting Speech First, Inc. v.
Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020)). In the Seventh Circuit, “a district court
engages in an analysis that proceeds in two distinct phases to decide whether such
relief is warranted: a threshold phase and a balancing phase.” Valencia v. City of
Springfield, 883 F.3d 959, 965 (7th Cir. 2018). In order to proceed beyond the
“threshold phase,” the party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy three
requirements via a showing that: “(1) it will suffer irreparable harm in the period
before the resolution of its claim; (2) traditional legal remedies are inadequate; and
(3) there is some likelihood of success on the merits of the claim.” HH Indianapolis,
LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis & Cnty. of Marion, 889 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir.
2018); see also Finch at 578 (citing Speech First, 968 F.3d at 637); Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).
Additionally, “[i]f it is plain that the party seeking the preliminary injunction
has no case on the merits, the injunction should be refused regardless of the balance
of harms.” Valencia, 883 F.3d at 966 (quoting Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River
Corp., 997 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 1993)). “The two most important considerations are
likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 434 (2009). Moreover, regarding the likelihood of success on the merits, “[i]t is
not enough that the chance of success on the merits be ‘better than negligible.’” Id.
(quoting and disapproving Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also
Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n applicant
for preliminary relief bears a significant burden, even though the Court recognizes
that, at such a preliminary stage, the applicant need not show that it definitely will
win the case. A ‘strong’ showing thus does not mean proof by a preponderance—once
again, that would spill too far into the ultimate merits for something designed to
protect both the parties and the process while the case is pending. But it normally
includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of
its case.”).
If the threshold requirements are met, “the court must balance the equities,
weighing the harm to the moving party if the requested injunction is denied against
the harm to the nonmoving party and the public—including third parties—if it is
granted.” Finch at 578 (citing Cassell, 990 F.3d at 545). In the second phase, “the
court weighs the harm of denying an injunction to the movant against the harm of
granting an injunction to the nonmovant.” Grubhub Inc. v. Relish Labs LLC, 80 F.4th
835, 844 (7th Cir. 2023). This is accomplished via “a sliding scale—the greater the
movant’s likelihood of success on the merits, the less the harms need be in its favor.”
Id. (citing Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2021). The
court must also consider the public interest. Id.
Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that in some limited
situations, a court may properly issue ex parte orders of brief duration and limited
scope to preserve the status quo pending a hearing.” Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742
F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S.
423, 438–39 (1974); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968)).
That being said, “the circumstances in which an ex parte order should be granted are
extremely limited” and “they should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose
of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is
necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Id. at 321; id. at 322 (citing Granny Goose
Foods at 438–39).
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule 65(b) is clear that a temporary restraining order will be issued
without notice to the other party only if (1) “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified
complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and (2) “the
movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons
why it should not be required.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). The Seventh Circuit has
recognized that “[e]x parte temporary restraining orders are most familiar to courts
where notice to the adversary party is impossible either because the identity of the
adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for a
hearing.” Mansukhani at 322; see FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
Even if notice can be provided, an exception is provided for the “very narrow
band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant
would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Mansukhani at 322
(citing In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979)). In Vuitton, the Second
Circuit granted the plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order because “it was
highly probable that the [defendant trademark] infringer would dispose of the
infringing goods in the few hours before the hearing.” Vuitton at 5; see Mansukhani
at 322 (citing Vuitton at 5).
Regarding his Motion and request for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 11),
Luffman has not met either of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(b)(1). Without addressing the question of whether Luffman has properly
submitted a verified complaint or affidavit to support his sweeping claims of
violations of his constitutional rights, he has failed to provide specific facts showing
that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” nor has he provided certification
as to the efforts made to provide notice and why notice should not be required in these
circumstances. See Vuitton at 5; see Mansukhani at 322 (citing Vuitton at 5). Here, as
in Mansukhani, the Defendants are clearly identifiable, as Plaintiff has been involved
in other proceedings with Defendants or otherwise indicated in his Motion that he
has contacted or is aware of the identity of the named Defendants. (See Doc. 11).
Further, Luffman has pursued remedies from the named Defendants
extemporaneously to the present suit via other channels, including those available to
him by Collinsville Community Unit School District #10, thus demonstrating that his
Motion does not fit the exception described in Mansukhani in which there is a
significant concern that notice to the Defendants would render this case “fruitless.”
742 F.2d at 322.
In short, the Court does not find that Luffman has provided sufficient
justification for as extraordinary a remedy as an ex parte temporary restraining
order. Therefore, the Court does not reach the merits of his arguments, which will be
addressed when the Court rules on his Motion to the extent it seeks preliminary
injunctive relief once the Defendants are provided an opportunity to respond. (See
Doc. 11).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Luffman’s ex parte
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is
DENIED to the extent it seeks a Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 11). This Court
RESERVES RULING on the Motion to the extent Luffman seeks preliminary
injunctive relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 6, 2025
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge