Hendricks v. Bohm

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MICHAEL HENDRICKS )

and ARMOND MOORE, )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1321-SEM-EIL

)

RYAN BOHM, et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs pro se Michael Hendricks and Armond Moore have

filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that is before the

Court for screening. Plaintiff Hendricks has also filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9).

I. COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiffs’ Complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Facts Alleged

At all times relevant to his Complaint, Plaintiffs were inmates

at the Livingston County Jail (“Jail”).

Plaintiffs’ suit names as Defendants Livingston County Sheriff

Ryan Bohm, Jail Superintendent Draper, Lieutenant Harmon, Dr.

Lochard, John and Jane Doe Livingston County Board members,

and John and Jane Doe owners of Advanced Correctional

Healthcare.

In Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Plaintiffs state that they both suffer

from Type 2 Diabetes. While at the Jail, Plaintiffs allege they have

suffered from hypoglycemia overnight because they are prescribed

large doses of insulin without eating for approximately 12 hours

each day (5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.).

Plaintiffs requested diabetic snacks, which were approved by

Defendants on the Jail staff but were allegedly denied by the

medical department because these snacks were not in the budget.

Plaintiffs requested glucatabs, to be carried on their persons for

hypoglycemia. The glucatabs were allegedly approved by medical

but then denied by Jail staff as prohibited items.

Plaintiffs claim that all Defendants knew that Plaintiffs

needed, but did not have, either diabetic snacks or emergency

gluctabs and that Defendants did not take any action in response to

these medical needs.

C. Analysis

Based on the Court’s review, the facts alleged in the Complaint

are sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for

unreasonable medical care against Defendants Bohm, Draper,

Harmon, and Lochard. See McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 569

(7th Cir. 2022), citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400

(2015) (Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause governs

medical care claims of detainees in jail).

When evaluating whether a defendant’s conduct is objectively

unreasonable in the context of a medical needs case, courts may

look to four factors: (1) whether the official has notice of the

detainee’s medical need, either by word or through observation of

the detainee’s physical symptoms; (2) the seriousness of the medical

need; (3) the scope of the requested treatment, which is balanced

against the seriousness of the medical need; and (4) state interests,

including administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.

Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983 solely based upon

an employer or supervisory relationship. See Monell v. Department

of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978);

Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017). Still, “[i]n the

case of those responsible for setting policy, liability will result from

the institution of a ‘policy that, when enforced, causes a

constitutional deprivation.’” Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 440

(7th Cir. 2015), quoting Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000,

1013 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that each of the individual

Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs

(diabetes, with a risk of hypoglycemia) but denied them necessary

medical care, either in the form of diabetic snacks or glucotabs.

In addition, at this stage, when the Court must liberally

construe the factual allegations in the Complaint in Plaintiffs’ favor,

the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged they were

denied diabetic snacks and/or glucotabs due to budgetary and

other policies of Livingston County and/or Advanced Correctional

Healthcare.

Therefore, Plaintiffs may proceed with Monell claims against

Livingston County and Advanced Correctional Healthcare.1 See

Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1981) (Monell

claim against institutional defendants arise when a plaintiff alleges

“(1) that he…suffered a deprivation of a constitutionally protected

interest, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by an official

policy, custom or usage” of the institutional defendant, acting under

color of state law).

1 Plaintiffs have listed John/Jane Doe members of the

Livingston County Board and John/Jane Doe owners of Advanced

Correctional Healthcare as Defendants. However, the Clerk is

directed to substitute Livingston County and Advanced Correctional

Healthcare in place of these individual Doe Defendant members and

owners. See Olson v. Champaign County, 874 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th

Cir. 2015); Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 982 (7th

Cir. 2013); Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235

(7th Cir. 2021); Iskander v. Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir.

1982).

II. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Plaintiff Hendricks has also filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, asking that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus ad

testificandum to the United States Marshals and Jail

Superintendent Lisa Draper so that he may testify in person during

a hearing in an unrelated case in Adams County, Illinois, Circuit

Court.

This Court has no authority to order relief that is unrelated to

the legal claims and injuries alleged in this case, nor does this

Court have any jurisdiction over state court proceedings. In

addition, Plaintiff Hendricks’ request appears to be moot, as it

related to a hearing that was scheduled for October 2024. For

these reasons, Plaintiff’s Petition is denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court’s Merit Review of Plaintiffs’

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiffs have alleged

enough facts to proceed with a Fourteenth Amendment

claim of unreasonable medical care against Defendants

Bohm, Draper, Harmon, and Lochard, and a Monell claim

against Livingston County and Advanced Correctional

Healthcare. Additional claims shall not be included in the

case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party

for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to substitute Livingston County in

place of John and Jane Doe members of the Livingston

County Board and to substitute Advanced Correctional

Healthcare in place of John and Jane Doe owners of

Advanced Correctional Healthcare.

3) Plaintiff Hendricks’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [9]

is DENIED as MOOT.

4) The Motion for Status [10] is DENIED as MOOT.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiffs to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions, to give Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiffs need not submit evidence to the Court unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing

waivers of service. Defendants have sixty days from

service to file their Answers. If a Defendant has not filed

an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days

of the entry of this Order, Plaintiffs may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have

been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiffs, the entity for whom that

Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to

the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not

known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This

information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the

public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The Answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth a

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until a Defendant

files a motion. Therefore, no response to an Answer is

necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after Defendants’ counsel have filed an appearance,

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiffs do not need to mail copies of motions

and other documents that Plaintiffs have filed with the

Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not

apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery

requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk.

Instead, Plaintiffs must mail their discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery

requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a

motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, and the

Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain

the discovery process in more detail.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiffs.

Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the

depositions.

11) Plaintiffs shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

A Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in the

dismissal of his case with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendants under the standard procedures.

ENTERED May 5, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE