The opinion
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Children of the Court, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
No. 24 CV 8785
v.
Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins
Timothy C. Evans, et al.,
Defendants.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiffs, Children of the Court and Conor Paris, sued Defendant Abby
Romanek, Cook County, and Iris Y. Martinez for violation of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights. [Dkt. 29.]1 The Court dismissed their complaint
against Romanek with prejudice and against Cook County and Martinez without
prejudice, giving Plaintiffs leave to amend. [Dkt. 23.] Plaintiffs amended, naming
Cook County and Chief Judge Timothy Evans. [Dkt. 29.] Cook County moved to
dismiss the amended complaint, and the Court granted their motion. [Dkt. 35.] Chief
Judge Evans separately moved to dismiss [dkt. 39], and Plaintiffs filed a brief in
opposition. [dkt. 41].
For the reasons explained, the motion is granted.
Background
Children of the Court is a non-profit corporation that works to reunite “adult
children of divorce” with “the courtrooms and judges that often had an outsized
impact on their youth.”2 [Dkt. 29 at 1.] Conor Paris is one of the organization’s
beneficiaries. [Id.] Children of the Court’s mission is to advocate for administrative
changes to judicial systems to prioritize the assignment of cases to judges with
relevant personal experience in order to ensure that children’s best interests are
always considered. [Id. at ¶ 9.] Doing so, according to Children of the Court, will
increase the esteem the public has for the judiciary. [Id. at ¶ 11.]
Children of the Court works with “adult beneficiaries” like Conor to facilitate
visits to the courtrooms where crucial decisions were made that impacted their lives.
1 Citations to docket filings generally refer to the electronic pagination provided by
CM/ECF, which may not be consistent with page numbers in the underlying documents.
2 For Judge Evans’s motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pled
allegations set forth in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint [Dkt. 29] and draws all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 920 F.3d
479, 481 (7th Cir. 2019). In setting forth the facts at the pleading stage, the Court does not
vouch for their accuracy. See Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018).
notifying them that an “adult beneficiary” would be visiting their courtroom and
soliciting the judge to “offer appropriate advice for the visit.” [Id. at ¶ 14.] While
Judge Abby Romanek received one of these letters, neither she nor Timothy Evans,
nor any of her other “superiors” responded. [Id. at ¶ 17.]
On August 5, 2024, Conor attempted to attend a public hearing via Zoom before
Judge Romanek concerning his parents’ post-dissolution case. [Id. at ¶ 2.] Although
Conor’s parents are now divorced, Judge Romanek presides over their post-decree
proceedings. [Id. at ¶ 21.] Conor wished to observe the proceedings to gain a better
understanding of Judge Romanek’s decisions and observe the representation of his
minor siblings by a Guardian Ad Litem. [Id. at 2, ¶ 24.]
When his parents’ case was called, Judge Romanek refused to admit Conor into
the Zoom hearing, remarking: “Conor Paris is here. He has no business being here
and he shouldn’t be here and I am not letting him in. He shouldn’t know about court
dates.” [Id.] Conor was not admitted into the Zoom proceedings that day. [Id.] Edward
Weinhaus, Executive Director and Founder of Children of the Court, who attended
the August 5, 2024, hearing, heard Judge Romanek’s remarks. [Id. at ¶ 29.]
On September 24, 2024, after Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, their
attorney emailed Judge Romanek’s chambers notifying her that Children of the Court
and Conor would be attending proceedings in her courtroom the following day. [Dkt.
29, at ¶ 31.] The next day, Judge Romanek denied Weinhaus entry into the
courtroom, preventing him from observing “an otherwise public hearing” for the
benefit of Conor and other “Adult Beneficiaries.” [Id. at ¶ 32.] The complaint does not
allege whether Conor attempted to or was able to attend.
Plaintiffs contend that Judge Romanek’s actions injured them in a variety of
ways. [Id. at ¶ 33.] According to Plaintiffs this was Judge Romanek’s “opening salvo
in plans to limit accessibility to the … Domestic Relations Division;” and
subsequently, a supervising judge “instituted a plan to terminate any virtual
appearances.” [Id. at ¶ 40, n.1.] Plaintiffs allege that Evans, the Chief Judge of the
Circuit Court, was Romanek’s supervisor and had the responsibility to ensure
litigants and the public have access to the Court. [Id. at ¶ 42.] According to Plaintiffs,
the fact that Conor was excluded from the Zoom hearing on August 5, 2024 and
Weinhaus was denied entry on September 24, 2024 shows that Judge Evans failed to
discharge his responsibilities. [Id. at ¶¶ 42–44]. While Plaintiffs’ complaint includes
only one count for violation of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, included within
it is an allegation that the same conduct violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Id. at 10–11.]
Judge Evans moves to dismiss the amended complaint on several bases. First,
he argues that the claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity, including for
supervisory tasks; and second, he argues that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim against
[Dkt. 39.]3
Standard of Review
“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff’s complaint must
allege facts which, when taken as true, plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right
to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Cochran v. Ill. State Toll
Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). This occurs when “the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Garrard v. Rust-Oleum Corp.,
575 F. Supp. 3d 995, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal citations omitted)).
Analysis
Before reaching Judge Evans’s arguments in favor of dismissal, the Court
addresses the antecedent issue: Plaintiffs’ right of access claim.
To determine whether the right of access exists, courts apply the Press–
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court two-part test. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). The first inquiry is
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general
public.” Id. at 8. The second is whether “the Court has traditionally considered
whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit applied the test in Courthouse News Service v. Brown, a
case where a news service challenged Cook County Court’s policy of administratively
processing newly filed complaints before making them publicly available. 908 F.3d
1063, 1065 (7th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs were allegedly injured because the delay caused
by processing impacted their ability to timely summarize and publicize “newsworthy
new civil complaints.” Id. at 1066. The parties agreed there was a qualified right of
access to civil complaints but disagreed over whether the right attached the moment
a complaint was filed or after processing. Id. at 1070. Applying a modified Younger
abstention theory, the Seventh Circuit explained that it was “not appropriate for the
federal courts” to “supervis[e] … state court operations.” Id. at 1074. Principles of
cooperation and comity weighed in favor of abstention so that state courts could “craft
an informed and proper balance between the state courts’ legitimate institutional
needs and the public’s … substantial First Amendment interest.” Id.
In this case, neither party proposes how to apply the Press–Enterprise factors
nor addresses why the Younger abstention doctrine would counsel a different outcome
here than it did in Courthouse News. This is particularly salient given that Plaintiffs
suggest their alleged injury due to a general movement by the Cook County Domestic
3 Evans’s motion also argues that Children of the Court lacks standing. [Dkt. 39 at 4.]
The Court does not find that argument persuasive and resolves this motion on other grounds.
Seventh Circuit’s disinclination to meddle in Cook County’s efforts to transition from
paper to electronic filing in Courthouse News, so too here: the Court is wary to extend
any right of access to Zoom appearances by nonparties in Domestic Relations cases.
Plaintiffs’ complaint also indicates that they are looking for more than access to
courtrooms; they want judges within the Domestic Relations division to work with
them, supporting their efforts with respect to educating and rehabilitating “adult
children of divorce.” While the “Supreme Court has … cautioned against any narrow,
literal conception of the First Amendment’s terms,” the Court finds no basis to extend
it to constitutionally mandate a relationship between state court judges and legal
organizations. Id. at 1069. These considerations counsel in favor of the Court
abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over this case and dismissing the action
without prejudice. Id. at 1075.
Putting these issues to the side, even if Plaintiffs had a meritorious access-to-
courts claim, they failed to state a claim against Judge Evans for two reasons.
First, Judge Evans has absolute judicial immunity for actions taken within the
scope of his employment. Jackson v. Evans, 2024 WL 4252798, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
20, 2024); Stagman v. Evans, 2017 WL 1105491, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2017). That
includes Judge Evans’s role as a supervisor of other judges. Immunity falls away only
where a judge acts in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiffs’ arguments that Judge Evans was acting in a supervisory and
therefore administrative capacity are inapposite. The case they cite, Forrester v.
White, establishes only that judicial immunity does not extend to administrative
decisions. 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988). They cite no case for the antecedent principle:
that supervising is administrative. They ask the Court to infer that controlling who
is permitted into a courtroom is administrative because it could just as easily be done
by a clerk. [Dkt. 41 at 5.] True, some actions taken by clerks are not covered by quasi-
judicial immunity. For example, the Seventh Circuit found immunity did not cover a
clerk’s refusal to file a divorce pleading “in absence of explicit judicial direction.”
Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 287 (7th Cir. 2004). But judges have “wide latitude to
control [the] courtroom atmosphere.” United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 857 (7th
Cir. 2007). Accepting a filing is not akin to determining who should be permitted into
a courtroom. The latter is an act that requires the use of judgment and discretion.
Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2005) (outlining factors to consider
when applying judicial immunity). This is especially true where Plaintiffs admit that
Judge Romanek presides over any post-dissolution matters that arise in conjunction
with Conor’s parents’ divorce, indicating that she is familiar with the parties and
issues due to repeated contact. [Dkt. 29 at ¶ 21.]
As Judge Evans argues, numerous courts agree that judicial immunity extends
to supervisory tasks. Brown v. Maine, 2012 WL 5463087, at *5 (D. Me. Nov. 7, 2012),
aff’d (May 8, 2013). These courts theorize, persuasively, that holding supervising
judges liable for the actions of judges under their supervision would be “an end-run
around [judicial] immunity.” Higdon v. Tusan, 2017 WL 552779, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb.
10, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Higdon v. Fulton Cnty., Georgia, 746 F. App’x 796 (11th Cir.
2018), and aff'd, 746 F. App’x 805 (11th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs offer no basis to believe
that Judge Evans was acting administratively when overseeing Judge Romanek.
This argument dovetails with the second issue: Plaintiffs have failed to state a
claim against Judge Evans for Rule 8(a) purposes. They do not explain what actions
he took or failed to take with respect to Judge Romanek’s decision or even allege that
he was aware of Judge Romanek’s decision. They do not cite sufficient facts to
plausibly believe that Judge Evans acted in an administrative manner with respect
to his supervision of Judge Romanek. They don’t explain the extent of his supervision
at all.
Rather, Plaintiffs seem to press a respondeat superior theory. They argue that
Judge Romanek violated the First Amendment, and, because Judge Evans was her
supervisor, he must be liable for permitting her to do so. But “[t]here is no such thing
as respondeat superior liability for government officials under § 1983.” Taylor v.
Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2021); Stagman, 2017 WL 1105491, at *3. “A
government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Taylor, 999 F.3d at
A498.
In order to state a claim, Plaintiffs would have to allege facts demonstrating
Evans’s personal involvement in Romanek’s decision. Jd. at 494. Judge Evans would
need to have “know[n] about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approvel[d] it, condone[d]
it, or turn[ed] a blind eye’ to it. Jd. Plaintiffs’ allegations fall far short. They allege no
conduct by Judge Evans at all with respect to Judge Romanek’s decisions. As
explained, they do not even allege that Judge Evans was aware of those decisions.
Conclusion
While the Court is skeptical of Plaintiffs’ ability to state a claim against Judge
Evans consistent with their Rule 11 obligations, given the Seventh Circuit’s guidance,
it permits them one final opportunity to amend. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl
Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2015). The
Court emphasizes, however, that if Plaintiffs cannot in good faith allege facts
supporting Judge Evans’s personal involvement in Judge Romanek’s decisions, going
beyond a respondeat superior theory of liability, then the action will be dismissed with
prejudice.
Enter: 24 CV 8785
Date: May 2, 2025 Ze
Lindsay C. Jenkins