The opinion
Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT May 02, 2025
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
JASON CANALES, §
Plaintiff,
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-cv-04599
HARRIS COUNTY, SHERIFF ED
GONZALEZ, DEPUTY JOHN DOES 1-10,
INMATE JOHN DOES 1-10, §
Defendants. :
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jason Canales’ (“Canales” or “Plaintiff’) Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, (Doc. No. 21), Defendant Harris County responded (Doc. No. 22).
Upon consideration of the arguments of the parties, the Court DENIES the Motion to Alter or
Amend. (Doc. No. 21).
I. BACKGROUND
This motion asks the Court to reconsider a previous Order granting Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss. (Doc. No. 20). Incorrectly, the Court’s Order was titled “Order Granting Summary
Judgment,” rather than “Order Granting Motion to Dismiss.” See (Jd. at 1). Nevertheless, the
Court’s analysis made clear that it was applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, and dismissed the claims
based on the pleadings alone. (/d. at 15). Still, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration, or to alter or
amend the Order, on the grounds that the Court “converted the Motion to Dismiss to a Summary
Judgment without notice and granted the Motion.” (Doc. No. 21 at 2). While the Order itself makes
clear that the Court did not convert the Motion to Dismiss into a summary judgment, the Court
will enter an Amended Order to clarify its ruling.
Plaintiff was held in the Harris County Jail as a pretrial detainee after a dispute with his
girlfriend. While in custody, he alleged that several inmates “beat him up twice and stabbed him.”
(Doc. No. 9 at 1). He alleged that unnamed guards on duty that day (identified only as John Does
1-10) failed to intervene and protect him during the assault in violation of his constitutional rights.
Canales identified Sheriff Ed Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) as the chief policymaker for Harris County
and alleged that Gonzalez “continues to place pretrial detainees and convicted inmates in
conditions that result in preventable attacks and injuries.” (Doc. No. 9 at 5). Canales also pointed
to violent incidents involving other pretrial detainees and inmates in the Harris County Jail.
Ultimately, he alleged that the officers’ failure to intervene during assaults reflected a municipal
pattern or practice, and that “the understaffing of the jail is the moving force behind the failures to
protect pre-trial detainees and inmates while in custody.” (Doc. No. 9 at 9).
The County moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which the Court granted. The
Court found that: (1) Plaintiffs claims against the Unnamed Defendants were barred by the statute
of limitations; (2) Plaintiff failed to adequately allege a Monell claim against Harris County; and
(3) Plaintiff's claim against Sheriff Gonzalez was barred by qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 20 at
4-15). Plaintiff then filed this Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. (Doc. No. 21).
II. Legal Standard
Rule 59(e) motions call into question the correctness of a judgment. Jn re Transtexas Gas
Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (Sth Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that Rule 59(e)
motions are “not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could
have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d
473, 479 (Sth Cir. 2004); Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990). Instead,
such motions “serve the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Waltman v. Int’! Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (Sth
Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted).
Rule 60(b), titled Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding,
states that:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. Clv. P. 60(b). The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to balance the principle of finality of a judgment
with the interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of all the facts. Seven Elves, Inc.
v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (Sth Cir. Jan. 1981). “[T]he decision to grant or deny relief under
Rule 60(b) lies within the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed only for abuse
of that discretion.” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 995 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(citations omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Hesling v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005).
Hil. Analysis
Plaintiff's motion fails to raise any of the grounds for reconsideration that are listed in the
Federal Rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b). Plaintiff points to no newly discovered evidence
or manifest errors of law. Rather, Plaintiff makes conclusory statements that “Jason Canales’s
complaint did not need to supply an answer to the legal question for example the specific identity
of the county’s policy maker under the relevant statutory scheme.” (Doc. No. 21 at 3). Further,
Plaintiff states that “[i]f some of Plaintiff's claims as pleaded do not meet the heightened pleading
requirements for qualified immunity, courts will generally allow one chance to amend a deficient
pleading before dismissing with prejudice.” (/d. at 2). While true, the Court’s Order dismissed
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint—Plaintiff had already been given leave to amend his
Original Complaint. See (Doc. No. 9). Thus, the Court finds no actual grounds to reconsider the
Order other than the error in its title.
Plaintiffs motion seems to be based primarily on the belief that the Court applied the Rule
56 standard in summary judgment motions to the Plaintiffs pleadings. To be clear, it did not. The
Court laid out the appropriate analysis under Rule 12(b)(6), and the applied that standard against
Plaintiff's pleading. Finding that the pleading did not plausibly state a claim on which relief could
be granted, the Court then dismissed Plaintiffs claims without prejudice. (Doc. No. 20). Still, the
Court’s incorrect title has clearly caused confusion. On that ground, the Court voluntarily amends
its prior order with a corrected title.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend
the Judgment. (Doc. No. 21).
~A&
Signed this et day of May, 2025. / ] |
Andrew S. Hanen
United States District Judge