“[S]o long as [plaintiff] can also satisfy [his] burden of showing that the Individual Defendants acted maliciously, [plaintiff] can assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities for negligen[ce].”
How later courts described this case
- “[S]o long as [plaintiff] can also satisfy [his] burden of showing that the Individual Defendants acted maliciously, [plaintiff] can assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities for negligen[ce].”
- “[T]he purchase of a bond precludes a sheriff from relying upon the protective embrace of governmental immunity . . . only where the surety is joined as a party to the action . . . and only to the extent of the amount of the bond.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
- granting public official immunity and dismissing claim at 12(b)(6) stage for failing to plausibly allege defendant’s malice
- “[W]e note that a conclusory allegation that a public official acted willfully or wantonly should not be sufficient, by itself, to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The facts alleged in the complaint must support such a conclusion.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
LARRY GRAY BLAKLEY, SR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, )
SERGEANT JOSHUA MABE, )
individually and in his )
official capacity, DEPUTY ) 1:24-cv-183
CODY SMITH, individually and )
in his official capacity, )
DEPUTY MONTY G. WOLFE, )
individually and in his )
official capacity, SHERIFF )
JOEY LEMONS, in his official )
Capacity, CAPTAIN TERRY )
DALTON, individually and in )
his official capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
)
********************************
)
SERGEANT JOSHUA MABE, )
individually and in his )
official capacity, )
)
Counterclaim )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
LARRY GRAY BLAKLEY, SR., )
)
Counterclaim )
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint asserting claims for
relief against various members of the Stokes County Sherriff’s
Office (“SCSO”) arising from an alleged warrantless search and
seizure at his home on the evening of March 4, 2021. (See
generally Compl. (Doc. 1).) The SCSO officers who conducted the
search and seizure - Sergeant Mabe, Deputy Smith, and Deputy
Wolfe - do not seek dismissal of the claims asserted against
them in their individual capacities at this stage of the
proceedings.
Before this court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendant
Joey Lemons, the Sheriff of Stokes County, (Doc. 17), and
Defendant Terry Dalton, a Captain in the Stokes County Sheriff’s
Office, (Doc. 20). These motions are ripe for adjudication and
for the reasons stated herein, Sheriff Lemons’ motion will be
denied, and Captain Dalton’s motion will be denied in part and
granted in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ray v. Roane,
948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The facts,
taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.
A. The Alleged Unconstitutional Search and Seizure on
March 4, 2021
Although Sheriff Lemons and Captain Dalton were not present
at Plaintiff’s home on the evening of March 4, 2021, those
allegations are summarized here in order to understand
forthcoming analysis of the issues Defendants Lemons and Dalton
raise in their motions.
On the evening of March 4, 2021, around 8:30 p.m.,
Plaintiff Larry Blakley, Sr. – a 75-year-old “frail, elderly”
man with Parkinsons’s disease who, at the time, lived alone in
Stokes County, North Carolina – was “in his home and drinking a
coffee when he heard loud knocks at his door by someone who
claimed to be law enforcement.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 62, 63, 66,
80, 88.) Plaintiff opened his door and was met by Sergeant Mabe,
Deputy Smith, and Deputy Wolfe. (Id. ¶ 67.)
The officers possessed an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s
son, Larry Blakley, Jr., although the warrant specified that
Blakley, Jr. lived at a different residence, (id. ¶ 68), almost
three miles away, (id. ¶ 73). Further, Blakley, Jr. is more than
twenty years younger than his father, has “vastly different
physical attributes,” and does not share his father’s birthdate.
(Id. ¶¶ 70–72, 79.) At the time of these events, Plaintiff “had
not been in contact with [Blakley, Jr.] since October of 2020.”
(Id. ¶ 79.)
When Plaintiff opened his door, one of the officers
“indicated he was looking for a suspect and asked to come
inside. [Plaintiff] said no.” (Id. ¶ 82.) Nonetheless, the
officers “proceeded to enter [Plaintiff’s] home.” (Id. ¶ 83.)
Plaintiff “produced identification to the deputies,
demonstrating that he was not the individual listed on the
warrant despite the similar name.” (Id. ¶ 84.) Even so, the
officers “began to search [Plaintiff’s] home” without consent.
(Id. ¶ 89.) Then, “without warning, [Officers Mabe, Smith, and
Wolfe], or some combination thereof, violently threw [Plaintiff]
to the floor.” (Id.)
“After throwing [Plaintiff] to the floor, Defendants Mabe,
Smith, and Wolfe placed [Plaintiff] in handcuffs. They continued
their assault on [Plaintiff], violently stomping on his hand and
kicking and punching him along his trunk, in the shins, abdomen,
hip, back, and even his forehead.” (Id. ¶ 90.) Plaintiff begged
them to stop. (Id. ¶ 109.)
The officers then “transported [Plaintiff], still
restrained in handcuffs, to the Stokes County Jail.” (Id. ¶ 93.)
However, they “failed to restrain [Plaintiff] in the police car,
leaving him to be thrown around in the back seat of the
vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 94.) Plaintiff was in pain but received no
medical attention. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 96.)
Later that evening, Plaintiff returned home, and “called
his daughter, Shannon Goins, to tell her about the incident” and
that “he was having trouble breathing.” (Id. ¶ 99.) Ms. Goins
“called for EMS and they arrived to transport [Plaintiff] to the
hospital.” (Id. ¶ 100.) At the hospital, Plaintiff “was
tachycardic and was provided IV medications for his obvious
pain.” (Id. ¶ 101.) Additionally, he was diagnosed with “one
broken rib and left-sided transverse process factures of the
vertebral bodies at L1 and L2 on his spine.” (Id. ¶ 102.) The
next day, Plaintiff’s granddaughter, Amanda Blakley, took
photographs of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 103.) Those photographs reveal
extensive purple bruising on the side of his body and marks on
his shins. (See id.)
Since the events of March 4, 2021, Plaintiff has suffered
chronic pain and “permanent[] injur[y] both physically and
mentally.” (Id. ¶¶ 113, 115.) He has been “unable to participate
in personal, social, or work activities,” no longer lives alone,
has felt “frustrated and depressed,” and has incurred medical
expenses totaling $96,198.70. (Id. ¶¶ 114, 116–17.)
B. Sheriff Lemons’ Training of Officers
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Lemons “holds final
policymaking authority with respect to the use of force by
deputies employed with by SCSO.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff further
alleges:
Defendant Lemons implemented, maintained, and enforced
the customs, practices, policies, or procedures that
directed, encouraged, or permitted Defendants Mabe,
Smith, and Wolfe to conduct unlawful searches and use
excessive force against individuals. Defendant Lemons
has a duty to ensure that the deputies working for SCSO
are qualified, credentialed, and trained.
SCSO does not provide deputies with training on
execution of warrants, use of force, written policies on
use of force, or guidance on what degree of force should
be used in different situations.
Defendant Lemons failed to train deputies on proper
procedures for lawful searches/obtaining consent to
enter private property, and proper use of force.
Defendant Lemons further failed to supervise and/or
failed to discipline deputies whose previous unlawful
searches/entry onto private property and uses of
excessive force implied tacit authorization for such
behaviors and created a widespread custom and practice
of unlawful entry onto property and use of excessive
force within the SCSO.
(Id. ¶¶ 147-149.) This court understands these allegations to
allege that (1) the Sheriff of Stokes County has a duty and
responsibility to ensure that his deputies are qualified,
credentialed, and trained, and (2) the Sheriff of Stokes County
does not provide any training or written policies on the use of
force. Plaintiff does not explain what “qualified” or
“credentialed” mean nor does he allege that the deputies lacked
qualifications or credentials.
In North Carolina, the State has undertaken a level of
responsibility for the training of sheriffs and deputy sheriffs.
The offices of sheriff and deputy sheriff are [] of
special concern to the public health, safety, welfare
and morals of the people of the State. The training and
educational needs of such officers therefore require
particularized and differential treatment from those of
the criminal justice officers certified under Article 1
of Chapter 17C of the General Statutes.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17E-1. In furtherance of that policy, the
State created the North Carolina Sheriff’s Education and
Training Standards Commission, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17E-3,
which has the “power[], dut[y], and responsibilit[y]” to
establish, for example, minimum training standards to qualify
for entry level employment in temporary status or in a permanent
position, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17E-4. The North Carolina
Sheriff’s Education and Training Standards Commission has
established regulations which address “Minimum Standards for
Justice Officers,” see 12 N.C. Admin. Code 10B.0301,
“Certification of Personnel,” see 12 N.C. Admin. Code 10B.0401,
and “Minimum Standards of Training for Deputy Sheriffs,” see 12
N.C. Admin. Code 10B.0500.
In light of the state’s statutory and regulatory scheme,
Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to plausibly allege a
separate duty or responsibility onto Sheriff Lemons, a publicly
elected official, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-1, to train his
deputies. As explained hereafter, this court will allow
Plaintiff’s “condonation” theory of Monell liability to proceed
against Sheriff Lemons. See infra Section III.A.i. However, this
theory of liability implicates whether the Sheriff failed to
“put a stop to or correct” an ongoing pattern of
unconstitutional conduct, see Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys
Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014), which is an issue
separate and apart from Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusion that
Sheriff Lemons had an underlying duty to train his deputies and
failed to provide them with any training. (See Compl. (Doc. 1)
¶¶ 147-149.)
C. Sheriff Lemons’ and Captain Dalton’s Supervision of
Officers
Plaintiff’s Monell claim, and several other claims, rely on
the conclusory allegation that Sheriff Lemons and Captain Dalton
“knew of prior excessive force complaints against Defendants
Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe . . . but failed to take any corrective
action to ensure the safety of the people of Stokes County,
North Carolina.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 18.) Determining whether
this conclusion is plausibly supported requires drawing
reasonable inferences from the well-pleaded facts in the
complaint.
Namely, Plaintiff alleges that after the incident on March
4, 2021, Ms. Goins and Ms. Blakley contacted Captain Dalton
“about filing a complaint against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and
Wolfe.” (Id. ¶ 104.) Captain Dalton “told them that he had
‘already seen the videos’ [and] that there was no need to file a
complaint,” (id.), which Plaintiff interpreted as “attempts to
dissuade [them] from filing a complaint,” (id. ¶ 105).
Plaintiff, Ms. Goins, and Ms. Blakley then traveled together to
the Stokes County Sheriff’s Office to speak with Captain Dalton
in person about the incident. (Id.)
After arriving at the Stokes County Sheriff’s Office,
Plaintiff, Ms. Goins, and Ms. Blakley showed Captain Dalton the
photographs of Plaintiff’s bruises. (Id. ¶ 106.) When Captain
Dalton saw the photographs, his “demeanor changed.” (Pl.’s Ex.
2, Pl.’s Decl. (Doc. 1-2) ¶ 19.)1 He requested email copies of
the photos, and he informed Plaintiff “that the Sheriff’s Office
had complaints about Defendants Mabe, Smith and Wolfe for
excessive force and that the offices [sic] would feed off one
1 Plaintiff has attached his own affidavit and the
affidavits of Shannon Goins and Amanda Blakley to the complaint.
It appears to this court that the allegations of the complaint
are similar or identical to the matters described in the
affidavits with one exception. Amanda Blakley attests that her
brother, who “has had interactions with law enforcement,
specifically Deputy Mabe,” has “complained about Mabe using
excessive force” in the past. (Pl.’s Ex. 4, Amanda Blakley
Decl.) (Doc. 1-4) ¶ 21.) That fact has been considered by this
court.
another when they worked together.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 106,
110.)
These factual allegations present a difficult question as
to what may be reasonably inferred about the past actions of
Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe as well as the knowledge that
Captain Dalton (and relatedly, Sheriff Lemons) possessed of
those actions. However, this court finds Plaintiff’s allegations
sufficient to support the following inferences: (1) there were
two or more prior complaints of excessive force lodged against
Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe; (2) Captain Dalton, and by
extension Sheriff Lemons, were aware of the prior complaints;
and (3) there was at least some merit to those prior complaints.2
In light of these inferences, Plaintiff’s allegation that
“Defendants Dalton and Lemons knew of prior excessive force
complaints against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe . . . but
failed to take any corrective action to ensure the safety of the
people of Stokes County, North Carolina,” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶
2 Defendant Dalton argues that Plaintiff has not alleged
“any facts indicating that any prior complaints had merit.”
(Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 4.) However, one reasonable
inference to draw from Captain Dalton’s statement that the
officers would “feed off one another when they worked together,”
(Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 110), is that this statement was an admission
that the officers were known to be more aggressive when they
work together. Discovery will afford Captain Dalton an
opportunity to refute or clarify this statement.
18), is plausibly supported by facts alleged. While there may be
other reasonable inferences to draw from the allegations
regarding Captain Dalton’s statements, at this stage, all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of Plaintiff. See
Ray, 948 F.3d at 226.
Additional facts will be raised and addressed as necessary
in the analysis to follow.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint on March 4, 2024,
(Compl. (Doc. 1)), asserting the following claims for relief.
First, he asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim
against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe in their individual
capacities alleging that these officers conducted an
unreasonable search and seizure, and used excessive force, when
they arrested Plaintiff at his home on the evening of March 4,
2021. (Id. ¶¶ 124–34.)
Second, he asserts a § 1983 supervisory liability claim
against Defendant Dalton in his individual capacity, (id. ¶
143), alleging that Captain Dalton failed to properly train,
discipline, and supervise Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe
despite knowing that the officers had incurred past complaints
of excessive force. (Id. ¶¶ 135–44.)
Third, he asserts a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim against
Defendant Lemons in his official capacity as Sheriff of the
Stokes County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”), (id. ¶ 152), which this
court construes as a Monell claim against the SCSO. (Id. ¶¶ 145–
52.)
Fourth, he asserts a § 1983 “failure to intervene” claim
against Defendant Wolfe in his individual capacity, (id. ¶ 158),
alleging that Deputy Wolfe “possessed the power to intervene and
stop the unlawful and brutal actions of Defendants Mabe and
Smith.” (Id. ¶¶ 153–59.)
Fifth, he asserts a state law claim for assault and battery
against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe in their individual
and official capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 160–68.)
Sixth, he asserts a state law claim for gross negligence
against Defendants Mabe, Smith, Wolfe, and Dalton in their
individual and official capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 169–73.)
Seventh, he asserts a state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional harm (“IIED”) against Defendants Mabe,
Smith, Wolfe, and Dalton in their individual and official
capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 174–78).
Eighth, he asserts a claim against Western Surety Company,
the surety of the SCSO’s bond, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
162-8, 58-76-5. (Id. ¶¶ 179–87.)
All Defendants, other than Western Surety Company, filed
motions to dismiss. Defendants Wolfe, Mabe, and Smith filed
identical motions, requesting dismissal of the official capacity
claims asserted against them. (Docs. 22, 27, and 31.) This court
issued an order on March 31, 2025, denying Defendants Wolfe,
Mabe, and Smith’s motions without prejudice as moot, after
reconstruing Plaintiff’s complaint to make it clear that his
claims against Defendants Wolfe, Mabe, and Smith in their
official capacities are claims against the Sheriff of Stokes
County and, thus, only the Sheriff has standing to respond to
those claims. (See Doc. 45 at 5.)
This memorandum opinion and order addresses the motions to
dismiss filed by Defendant Sheriff Lemons, (Doc. 17), and
Defendant Captain Dalton, (Doc. 20). Sheriff Lemons argues that
Plaintiff’s Monell claim (Claim III) should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18) at 6–
12.)3 Lemons also argues that Plaintiff’s state law tort claims
against the SCSO officers in their official capacities (Claims
V-VII) are barred by governmental immunity. (See id. at 13–21.)
Captain Dalton argues that all three claims asserted against him
3 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
documents filed within the court refer to the page numbers
located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they
appear on CM/ECF.
in his individual capacity (Claims II, VI, and VII) should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See Def. Dalton’s Br.
(Doc. 21) at 7–15, 17–20.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sheriff Lemons’ and Captain Dalton’s Arguments for
Dismissal of Claims Under Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is
plausible on its face if the plaintiff pleads “factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable” and demonstrates “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court accepts the
complaint’s factual allegations as true. See id. Further, this
court liberally construes the complaint and “draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ray, 948 F.3d
at 226. This court does not, however, accept legal conclusions
as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
i. Plaintiff has stated a plausible § 1983 Monell
claim against Sheriff Lemons (Claim III)
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Lemons, in his official
capacity, “implemented, maintained, and enforced the customs,
practices, policies, or procedures that directed, encouraged, or
permitted Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe to conduct unlawful
searches and use excessive force against individuals.” (Compl.
(Doc. 1) ¶ 147.) A claim against Sheriff Lemons in his official
capacity constitutes a claim against the Stokes County Sheriff’s
Office (“SCSO”). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66
(1985); see also Butterfield v. Gray, 279 N.C. App. 549, 554
n.4, 866 S.E.2d 296, 301 n.4 (2021) (citations omitted)
(explaining that, under the North Carolina Constitution, a
sheriff’s office is a local governmental entity distinct from
the county government).
Under Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a local governmental entity, such
as the SCSO, is “liable for its own illegal acts.” See Owens,
767 F.3d at 402. Specifically, the local entity is “liable under
§ 1983 if it follows a custom, policy, or practice by which
local officials violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Id.
To state a § 1983 Monell claim against the SCSO, Plaintiff
must “plausibly allege a constitutional harm that stems from the
acts of an [SCSO] employee taken in furtherance of some [SCSO]
policy or custom.” See Washington v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 457 F.
Supp. 3d 520, 532 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Milligan v. City of
Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Sheriff Lemons does not contest that
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a constitutional harm stemming
from acts committed by the SCSO officers on March 4, 2021. (See
generally Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18).) However, Sheriff Lemons
argues that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to
attribute these constitutional violations to a “policy or
custom” of the SCSO. (Id. at 6–12.)
“A policy or custom for which [the SCSO] may be held liable
can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a
written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a
person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that
‘manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens’;
or (4) through a practice that is so ‘persistent and widespread’
as to constitute a ‘custom or usage with the force of law.’”
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted); see also Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2022). Regarding the
fourth theory of liability, an entity’s failure “to put a stop
to or correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct”
can constitute a “custom by condonation.” See Owens, 767 F.3d at
402 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir.
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Monell liability under
any of the first three theories articulated in Lytle. As to the
first and second theories, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts
related to an express policy or to the decisions of a
policymaker. As to the third theory, Plaintiff alleges that the
“SCSO does not provide deputies with training on . . . use of
force,” (see Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 148), but as discussed supra
Section I.B., he has not plausibly alleged a duty or
responsibility on the part of Sheriff Lemons to train his
officers in light of North Carolina’s statutory scheme, nor has
he plausibly alleged “an affirmative causal link” between
Lemons’ alleged training omissions and Plaintiff’s injuries in
light of that scheme. See Washington, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
However, Plaintiff contends that his complaint establishes
a plausible Monell claim under the fourth theory of liability:
custom by condonation. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Lemons’ Mot.
(Doc. 29) at 7–9 (“Plaintiff alleges that prior complaints of
excessive force against these deputies were ignored . . . .”).)
1. SCSO “Custom By Condonation”
“Under this theory of liability, [a sheriff’s office]
violates § 1983 if [the sheriff] fail[s] to put a stop to or
correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct.” See
Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). To prevail on this theory, a “plaintiff must point to
a persistent and widespread practice of municipal officials, the
duration and frequency of which indicate that policymakers (1)
had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2)
failed to correct it due to their deliberate indifference.” Id.
(cleaned up). “Both knowledge and indifference can be inferred
from the ‘extent’ of employees’ misconduct. Sporadic or isolated
violations of rights will not give rise to Monell liability;
only ‘widespread or flagrant’ violations will.” Id. at 402-03
(internal citations omitted).
Given the above standard, “prevailing on the merits of a
Monell claim is difficult.” Id. at 403. However, “simply
alleging such a claim is, by definition, easier.” Id. In Owens,
the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff had plausibly alleged a
Monell claim against a state’s attorney’s office when he
alleged: (1) “[r]eported and unreported cases from the period of
time before and during the events complained of” show that the
office had a practice of “knowingly and repeatedly suppressing
exculpatory evidence in criminal prosecutions”; and (2) “a
number of motions were filed and granted during this time
period,” which demonstrates that the office “condon[ed] [this
behavior], and/or knowingly turn[ed] a blind eye to it.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court
reasoned that “[t]he assertions as to ‘reported and unreported
cases’ and numerous ‘successful motions’ are factual
allegations, the veracity of which could plausibly support a
Monell claim.” Id. These “brief, but non-conclusory” factual
allegations, “if true, would buttress [the plaintiff’s] legal
conclusion.” Id.
Similarly, here, Plaintiff has alleged that (1) “the [SCSO]
had complaints about Defendants Mabe, Smith and Wolfe for
excessive force” and was aware that the officers “would feed off
one another when they worked together,” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 110),
and yet, the SCSO (2) “failed to supervise and . . . discipline
[these] deputies” and allowed them to work together on the
evening of March 4, 2021, thereby “impl[ying] tacit
authorization for such behaviors and creat[ing] a widespread
custom and practice,” (id. ¶ 149; see also id. ¶ 139). As was
the case in Owens, Plaintiff will be required to prove the
veracity of these allegations and show, among other things, that
“the duration and frequency of [the SCSO officers’] conduct was
widespread and recurrent.” See Owens, 767 F.3d at 403. But to
survive Defendant Lemons’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff’s
“recitation of facts need not be particularly detailed, and the
chance of success need not be particularly high.” Id. Plaintiff
has therefore stated a plausible Monell claim against the SCSO
under a “custom by condonation” theory of liability. See id. at
402-03.
Defendant Lemons’ motion to dismiss will be denied as to
the Monell claim against him in his official capacity (Claim
III).
ii. Plaintiff has stated a plausible § 1983
supervisory liability claim against Defendant
Dalton in his individual capacity (Claim II)
Plaintiff contends that the alleged constitutional
violations committed by Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe on
March 4, 2021, are also imputable to the officers’ supervisor,
Captain Dalton. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 138–39.) Captain Dalton,
like Sheriff Lemons, does not contest that Plaintiff’s complaint
states a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendants Mabe, Smith,
and Wolfe in their individual capacities. (See generally Def.
Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21).) Captain Dalton argues that Plaintiff
has not plausibly alleged that the alleged constitutional
violations by Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe are imputable to
him. (See id. at 7–15.)
“[S]upervisory officials may be held liable in certain
circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their
subordinates.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994)
Specifically, a supervisor is liable when “(1) he knew that his
subordinate ‘was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury’; (2) his response
showed ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the
alleged offensive practices’; and (3) that there was an
‘affirmative causal link’ between his inaction and the
constitutional injury.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 224
(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). A subordinate
poses a “‘pervasive’ and ‘unreasonable’ risk of harm” when his
“conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several
different occasions and . . . poses an unreasonable risk of harm
of constitutional injury.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. A supervisor’s
response demonstrates “deliberate indifference” when it involves
“continued inaction in the face of documented widespread
abuses.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that after the events of March 4, 2021,
he visited the Stokes County Sherrif’s Office to “fil[e] a
complaint” with Captain Dalton - “the supervisor of Defendants
Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe.” (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 104–06, 136.)
During their conversation, Captain Dalton “informed [Plaintiff]
that the Sheriff’s Office had complaints about Defendants Mabe,
Smith and Wolfe for excessive force and that the offices [sic]
would feed off one another when they worked together.” (Id. ¶
110.) Citing these remarks by Captain Dalton, Plaintiff alleges
that Dalton “possessed actual and/or constructive knowledge that
Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe were the subjects of prior use
of force/excessive force complaints and posed a harm to
citizens.” (Id. ¶ 138.) Plaintiff further alleges that Captain
Dalton “consciously and intentionally failed to act or intervene
to prevent them from working together on March 4, 2021,” and
“was deliberately indifferent to his responsibility to train and
supervise these Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 139.) Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that Captain Dalton’s “failures” were “a direct and
proximate” cause of Plaintiff’s constitutional injuries. (See
id. ¶¶ 142–143.)
While this court need not accept Plaintiff’s legal
conclusions as true, it nonetheless finds that he has pleaded
facts sufficient to state a plausible § 1983 supervisory
liability claim for relief. Drawing all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor, see Ray, 948 F.3d at 226, he has plausibly
alleged that Defendant Dalton knew of the risk of harm posed by
Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe (especially when they worked
together), as evidenced by the prior complaints about the
officers and Dalton’s admission that the officers would “feed
off” one another. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 110.) These allegations
support the first supervisory liability element. See King, 825
F.3d at 224. He has also alleged that Captain Dalton failed to
correct the officers’ behavior or otherwise intervene to prevent
them from working together, (see id. ¶ 139), which plausibly
supports the second element. Regarding the third element, it is
reasonable to infer from the facts alleged that Defendant
Dalton’s supervisory omissions allowed his subordinates’ conduct
to continue unabated, ultimately causing Plaintiff’s
constitutional injuries on the evening of March 4, 2021.
Defendant Dalton’s motion to dismiss will be denied as to
the § 1983 supervisory liability claim (Claim II) brought
against him in his individual capacity.4
4 Defendant Dalton also states that he is entitled to
qualified immunity as to this § 1983 supervisory liability claim
on account of his not having violated any “clearly established”
constitutional right but he does not flesh out this argument.
(See Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 15.) Supervisory liability
is a well-established means of attaching § 1983 liability, see
generally King, 825 F.3d 206, and based on the facts Plaintiff
has alleged, it is plausible that Dalton fell short of the
standard for supervision placed on him by Fourth Circuit
precedent, see id. at 224. Further factual development is needed
to determine whether Defendant Dalton is entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim. Thus, it is premature to award qualified
immunity at this stage.
iii. Plaintiff’s claim for gross negligence against
Defendant Dalton in his individual capacity is
barred by public official immunity (Claim VI)
The factual allegations underlying Plaintiff’s gross
negligence claim against Captain Dalton overlap significantly
with those underlying his § 1983 supervisory liability claim.
(See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 171.)
“[A] claim for gross negligence requires that plaintiff
plead facts on each of the elements of negligence, including
duty, causation, proximate cause, and damages.” Land v. Whitley,
292 N.C. App. 244, 255, 898 S.E.2d 17, 26, review allowed, 900
S.E.2d 662 (2024) (citation omitted). Negligence becomes “gross
negligence” when it involves “wanton conduct done with conscious
or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.” Id.
at 255, 898 S.E.2d at 26 (citation omitted). “An act is wanton
when it is done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly,
manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.”
Cullen v. Logan Devs., Inc., 386 N.C. 373, 382, 904 S.E.2d 730,
737 (2024) (citation omitted).
Defendant Dalton argues that Plaintiff has not plausibly
alleged any “grossly negligent” conduct by Captain Dalton, and
that even if he has, Captain Dalton is protected by public
official immunity. (See Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 17.)
Public official immunity is a derivative form of
governmental immunity, which precludes suits against
public officials in their individual capacities as
follows: As long as a public officer lawfully exercises
the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by
virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his
official authority, and acts without malice or
corruption, he is protected from liability.
Wilcox v. City of Asheville, 222 N.C. App. 285, 288, 730 S.E.2d
226, 230 (2012) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). “Thus, a
public official is immune from suit unless the challenged action
was (1) outside the scope of official authority, (2) done with
malice, or (3) corrupt.” Id.; accord Bartley v. City of High
Point, 381 N.C. 287, 294, 873 S.E.2d 525, 533 (2022). “Sheriffs,
sheriff’s deputies, and jailers have all been recognized as
public officials . . . .” Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 554, 866
S.E.2d at 301.
Plaintiff alleges that “the actions of each Defendant”
named in this suit “constitute . . . malicious . . . and
improper police conduct.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 19.) “[A] malicious
act is one which is (1) done wantonly, (2) contrary to the
actor’s duty, and (3) intended to be injurious to another.”
Bartley, 381 N.C. at 296, 873 S.E.2d at 534 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Regardless of the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s pleadings as to the first two elements of malice,
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant Dalton’s
actions were taken with the “inten[t] to be injurious” to
Plaintiff, and thus he has not supported his conclusory
allegation that Dalton engaged in malicious police conduct. See
id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions.” (cleaned up)); Meyer
v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 114, 489 S.E.2d 880, 890 (1997) (“[W]e
note that a conclusory allegation that a public official acted
willfully or wantonly should not be sufficient, by itself, to
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The facts alleged
in the complaint must support such a conclusion.”).
For one, Plaintiff does not allege that Captain Dalton’s
discretionary decisions about how to supervise Officers Mabe,
Smith, and Wolfe were made with any actual intent to injure
Plaintiff. (See generally Compl. (Doc. 1).) Granted, in the
context of public official immunity, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina instructs:
We have held that “the intention to inflict injury may
be constructive” intent where an individual’s conduct
“is so reckless or so manifestly indifferent to the
consequences, where the safety of life or limb is
involved, as to justify a finding of willfulness and
wantonness equivalent in spirit to an actual intent.”
Bartley, 381 N.C. at 296, 873 S.E.2d at 534 (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted). Although this court found that
Plaintiff plausibly alleged Captain Dalton, through supervisory
omissions, was deliberately indifferent to the general risk of
harm that Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe posed to the citizens
of Stokes County, (see supra Section III.A.ii.), the same
allegations do not plausibly support a conclusion that Dalton
was “so reckless or so manifestly indifferent to the
consequences,” that he possessed a “spirit” that was “equivalent
. . . to an actual intent” to injure Plaintiff. See Bartley, 381
N.C. at 296, 873 S.E.2d at 534.
Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Captain
Dalton acted with malice, nor that he acted “outside the scope
of official authority” or “corrupt[ly],” see Wilcox, 222 N.C.
App. at 288, 730 S.E.2d at 230, his claim for gross negligence
is barred by public official immunity.5 Cf. Mitchell v. Pruden,
251 N.C. App. 554, 561–62, 796 S.E.2d 77, 83 (2017) (granting
public official immunity and dismissing claim at 12(b)(6) stage
for failing to plausibly allege defendant’s malice); Petrillo v.
5 Defendant Dalton appears to argue that public official
immunity categorically bars claims of gross negligence. (See
Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 17.) He cites to a Fourth Circuit
opinion, published in 1994, which states: “[T]he North Carolina
Supreme Court has never allowed a showing of gross negligence to
suffice to pierce an officer’s immunity, absent a statute
specifically abolishing the common law immunity.” Shaw, 13 F.3d
at 803. It is not certain how the Fourth Circuit might resolve
that issue today in light of recent North Carolina cases. See,
e.g., Wilcox, 222 N.C. App. at 301, 730 S.E.2d at 238 (“[S]o
long as [plaintiff] can also satisfy [his] burden of showing
that the Individual Defendants acted maliciously, [plaintiff]
can assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their
individual capacities for negligen[ce].”). Nonetheless, that
issue need not be resolved here.
Barnes-Jones, 291 N.C. App. 62, 68, 894 S.E.2d 772, 778 (2023)
(same).
For these reasons, Defendant Dalton’s motion to dismiss the
gross negligence claim brought against him in his individual
capacity (Claim VI) will be granted.
iv. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible IIED claim
against Defendant Dalton in his individual
capacity (Claim VII)
To state an IIED claim under North Carolina law, a
plaintiff must allege: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct [by
the defendant], (2) which is intended to cause and does cause
(3) severe emotional distress to another.” Turner v. Thomas, 369
N.C. 419, 427, 794 S.E.2d 439, 446 (2016) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). “The tort also may be established
when a ‘defendant’s actions indicate a reckless indifference to
the likelihood that they will cause severe emotional distress.’”
Id. “Conduct constituting this cause of action may be found in
an abuse by the actor of a position which gives him power to
affect the interests of another,” when that conduct “exceeds all
bounds of decency tolerated by society” and is “regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Id. (cleaned up) (citations omitted).
Following the events of March 4, 2021, Plaintiff sought to
file a “complaint” with the Stokes County Sheriff’s Office
against Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶
104-06, 111.) When Plaintiff arrived at the Sheriff’s Office,
Captain Dalton “assured [Plaintiff] that the matter would be
handled and heard [Plaintiff] and his family’s complaints.” (Id.
¶ 111.) However, “Defendant Dalton did not provide [Plaintiff]
with any forms, paperwork, of [sic] file number concerning his
complaint.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s IIED claim is founded upon the allegations,
“upon information and belief,” that Dalton “did [sic] open any
file or investigation of this matter despite receiving the
verbal complaints,” “lied” to Plaintiff to “discourage” him from
filing a complaint, “ignor[ed] [Plaintiff’s] complaints of
excessive force,” “destroy[ed] video evidence of [Plaintiff’s]
encounter[] with officers,” and “took active steps to conceal
[Plaintiff’s] report of excessive force.” (See Compl. (Doc. 1)
¶¶ 176, 111–12; see also Pl.’s Ex. 2, Pl.’s Decl. (Doc. 1-2) ¶¶
18–19.)6 In his response memorandum, Plaintiff argues that these
6 Plaintiff also incorporates his allegations about Captain
Dalton’s supervision of Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe into
the IIED subsection of his complaint. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶
174, 176(i).) However, those alleged supervisory failures by
Captain Dalton are not plausibly linked to any intent on behalf
of Dalton to cause emotional harm to Plaintiff. This court
focuses its analysis of Plaintiff’s IIED claim on the actions he
alleges Dalton took, directed at Plaintiff, after the events of
March 4, 2021.
allegations show that Captain Dalton “participated in a cover-
up.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Dalton’s Mot. (Doc. 33) at 14.)
Plaintiff’s allegations that Captain Dalton “lied,”
“discouraged,” “ignored,” and “destroyed” evidence are
conclusions not plausibly supported by the facts alleged.7
Plaintiff alleges as well-pleaded fact that Captain Dalton (1)
“heard [Plaintiff’s] and his family’s complaints,” (2) “assured
[Plaintiff] that the matter would be handled,” and (3) “did not
provide [Plaintiff] with any forms, paperwork, of [sic] file
number concerning his complaint.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 111.)
However, Plaintiff does not allege that the SCSO typically
adheres to a formal, written process for responding to citizen
complaints lodged against their deputies, nor that Plaintiff had
7 “Generally, conclusory allegations based solely ‘upon
information and belief’ are ‘insufficient to defeat a motion to
dismiss.’” Mystic Retreat Med Spa & Weight Loss Ctr. v.
Ascentium Cap. LLC, 615 F. Supp. 3d 379, 384 (M.D.N.C. 2022)
(citation omitted). The words “upon information and belief”
“will only make otherwise unsupported claims plausible when the
facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the
defendant or where the belief is based on factual information
that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” Id. at 385
(quoting Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 384–85
(2d Cir. 2018)). Here, even if some of the facts are within the
control of the Sheriff, Plaintiff does not allege any facts
which support his belief that a cover up occurred. Assuming
Plaintiff’s allegations can be construed to support an inference
that no internal, disciplinary action was taken against the
officers, that absence of disciplinary action does not plausibly
support an inference of any intent by Dalton to inflict
emotional distress upon Plaintiff.
a right to any follow up communication or other recourse after
lodging a verbal complaint. At bottom, this court is unable to
infer from the facts alleged that Defendant Dalton failed to
“handle[]” the matter, as he allegedly assured Plaintiff he
would, (id.), nor infer that he participated in the more
sinister conduct of “a cover-up,” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Dalton’s
Mot. (Doc. 33) at 14), the latter of which might give rise to an
IIED claim if plausibly supported by the facts alleged.
Defendant Dalton’s motion to dismiss will be granted as to
Plaintiff’s IIED claim (Claim VII) brought against him in his
individual capacity. However, in acknowledgement that the
internal actions Defendant Dalton took after receiving
Plaintiff’s verbal complaint are facts largely “within the
possession and control of the defendant,” see Mystic Retreat Med
Spa & Weight Loss Ctr., 615 F. Supp. 3d at 385, Plaintiff’s
claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
B. Sheriff Lemons’ Argument for Governmental Immunity
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts the following state law
claims against various officers of the SCSO in both their
individual and official capacities: assault and battery (Claim
V), (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 160–68); gross negligence (Claim VI),
(id. ¶¶ 169–73), and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (“IIED”) (Claim VII), (id. ¶¶ 174–78).
As opposed to an individual capacity suit where the
plaintiff “seeks recovery from the defendant directly[,] a suit
against a defendant in his official capacity means that the
plaintiff seeks recovery from the entity of which the public
servant defendant is an agent.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489
S.E.2d at 887 (citation omitted). Under North Carolina law,
“official-capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an
action against the governmental entity.” Mullis v. Sechrest, 347
N.C. 548, 554, 495 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1998). Sheriff Lemons argues
that Plaintiff’s state law claims, insofar as they are brought
against SCSO officers in their official capacities, are barred
by governmental immunity. (See Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18) at
13.)
A public official sued in his official capacity – including
a sheriff or sheriff’s deputy - “may raise the defense of
governmental immunity.” See Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 554,
866 S.E.2d at 301. “Under the doctrine of governmental immunity,
. . . public officials are immune from suits alleging negligence8
in the exercise of a governmental function, unless the plaintiff
shows that the . . . public officials waived immunity.” Id. A
8 “A county is also generally immune from suit for
intentional torts of its employees in the exercise of
governmental functions.” See Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 554,
866 S.E.2d at 301 (citation omitted).
county’s “purchase of liability insurance pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 153A-435 may waive governmental immunity for both a
county and a sheriff,” except to the extent “the applicable
liability insurance policy excludes a plaintiff’s claim from
coverage.” Id. at 556, 866 S.E.2d at 302. Additionally, a
sheriff’s purchase of a surety bond, as required by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 162-8, waives governmental immunity, but only “to the
extent of the coverage provided.” See id. at 559–60, 866 S.E.2d
at 304 (citations omitted).
Here, Defendant Sheriff Lemons has produced a copy of
Stokes County’s liability insurance policy for the 2020-2021
fiscal year. (See Def. Lemons’ Ex. 1, Insurance Policy (Doc. 18-
1).)9 The policy includes the same express language, (see id. at
82, 84), that North Carolina courts have repeatedly held does
not waive governmental immunity. See, e.g., Est. of Earley ex
rel. Earley v. Haywood Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 204 N.C. App.
338, 342–43, 694 S.E.2d 405, 409 (2010); Butterfield, 279 N.C.
App. at 556–57, 866 S.E.2d at 302–03. Plaintiff does not
challenge this point. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Lemons’ Mot.
9 Defendant’s liability insurance policy is “integral to the
complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s
authenticity” - thus, this court can consider the policy in
deciding Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Doriety for Est. of
Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670, 679 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir.
2016)).
(Doc. 29) at 12–13.) In accordance with the precedent
established by North Carolina state courts, this court finds
that Stokes County’s purchase of liability insurance did not
waive the SCSO’s governmental immunity.
“Though [this court] conclude[s] that Defendants did not
waive immunity by purchasing liability insurance, [it] must also
consider whether Sheriff [Lemons] waived immunity by purchasing
a sheriff’s bond.” See Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 559, 866
S.E.2d at 304. As stated above, purchase of a sheriff’s bond
“waives the sheriff’s governmental immunity, but only to the
extent of the coverage provided.” Id. at 559, 866 S.E.2d at 304
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).10 The North
Carolina legislature prescribes an avenue for citizens to
recover on these bonds: “Every person injured by the neglect,
misconduct, or misbehavior in office of any . . . sheriff . . .
may institute a suit or suits against said officer or any of
them and their sureties upon their respective bonds for the due
performance of their duties in office . . . .” See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 58-76-5.
10 This waiver also “extends to the acts of a sheriff’s
deputy, for ‘[t]he acts of the deputy are acts of the sheriff.’”
Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 230 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N.C. 558, 194 S.E. 305, 308
(1937)).
In the present case, “Sheriff Lemons concedes that [SCSO’s]
purchase of the sheriff’s official bond waives governmental
immunity, but . . . only for the $25,000 face amount of the
bond.” (Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 6 (cleaned up); see also
Def. Lemons’ Ex. A, Surety Bond (Doc. 37-1).) This court agrees
that the SCSO’s bond waives governmental immunity, and that it
does so only to the extent of its face value. See Butterfield,
279 N.C. App. at 560–61, 866 S.E.2d at 304–05; White v. Cochran,
229 N.C. App. 183, 190, 748 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2013); Pickens v.
Hendricks, No. 1:21-cv-30, 2024 WL 4181050, at *10 (W.D.N.C.
Sept. 12, 2024) (slip copy).
Defendant Lemons also argues that this waiver of
governmental immunity applies “only as to Plaintiff’s statutory
claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-76-5,” that is, Plaintiff’s
claim for relief asserted against Defendant Western Surety
(Claim VIII). (See Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 6; see also
Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 179–87.) Lemons argues that governmental
immunity has not been waived for the state law tort claims
(Claims V, VI, and VII), and that these claims should be
dismissed insofar as they are asserted against SCSO officers in
their official capacities. (See Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18) at
21, see also id. at 21 n.3.)
The procedure “to recover on a sheriff’s bond” is well
established under North Carolina precedent: “[A] plaintiff must
join the bond surety as a party to any action against the
sheriff.” Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (citation omitted); see also Summey v. Barker, 142 N.C.
App. 688, 691, 544 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2001). However, in the
present case, where Plaintiff has joined the bond surety
(Western Surety Company) as a party to the litigation, has
asserted a standalone claim against the surety (Claim VIII), and
has asserted official capacity state law claims against officers
of the SCSO (Claims V, VI, and VII), it is not immediately clear
whether Plaintiff’s claim against the surety, Plaintiff’s claims
against the officers in their official capacities, or both,
should represent his right to recover against the bond should he
prevail on the merits of those claims.
Defendant Lemons cites to authorities which emphasize that
a statutory claim against a bond is a distinct cause of action
from common law tort claims brought against officers in their
official capacities. See Stafford v. Barker, 129 N.C. App. 576,
584–85, 502 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1998); Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App.
29, 40, 407 S.E.2d 611, 617 (1991). Lemons argues that his
purchase of a surety bond waives immunity only for the statutory
claim. (See Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 6–8; Def. Lemons’
Br. (Doc. 18) at 21 n.3.) However, this court notes examples
where state courts appear to permit a plaintiff to rely on
official capacity claims as the vehicle for securing relief
against a surety bond. See, e.g., Summey, 142 N.C. App. at 690–
691, 544 S.E.2d at 265 (denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s negligence claim and citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58–76–
5 for the proposition that “public officers may be sued in their
official capacities”); Smith v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ, 168
N.C. App. 452, 468–69, 608 S.E.2d 399, 411–12 (2005) (affirming
denial of a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent supervision
and retention claim and permitting plaintiff to amend complaint
to add surety as defendant).11
Given this ambiguity, this court chooses to defer
determination – pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(i) – of whether Plaintiff’s eighth claim for relief asserted
against Western Surety, or his fifth, sixth, and seventh claims
for relief asserted against officers of the SCSO in their
official capacities, or both categories of claims, ought to
represent Plaintiff’s right to recover against the bond should
11 The North Carolina Supreme Court has examined the
operative statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58–76–5, in its current
form only once, in Wynn v. Frederick, 385 N.C. 576, 580, 895
S.E.2d 371, 376 (2023). In Wynn, however, the issue before the
court was whether the statute waives immunity for state
magistrates. Id. at 580–81, 895 S.E.2d at 376.
he succeed on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(i) (“[A]ny
defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)-(7) . . . must be heard and
decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until
trial.”).
At this stage, it is enough for this court to reaffirm well
established principles: “To the extent that the Plaintiff may
recover damages against [the SCSO pursuant to state law claims]
his recovery will be limited to the amount of the bond
[($25,000)].” See Pickens, 2024 WL 4181050, at *10; see also
White, 229 N.C. App. at 190, 748 S.E.2d at 339 (“[T]he purchase
of a bond precludes a sheriff from relying upon the protective
embrace of governmental immunity . . . only where the surety is
joined as a party to the action . . . and only to the extent of
the amount of the bond.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 561, 866 S.E.2d at 305
(holding that “governmental immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims in
excess of Sheriff[’s] statutory bond”).
Defendant Lemons’ motion seeking dismissal of the official
capacity tort claims brought against officers of the SCSO
(Claims V, VI, and VII) will be denied.
C. Plaintiff May Not Assert a Direct Cause of Action
Under the North Carolina Constitution
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts
[i]n the alternative, if it is determined that
Defendants [sic] Sheriff Lemons has not waived sovereign
or governmental immunity or that any such waiver does
not allow Plaintiff an adequate remedy at state law,
then Plaintiff asserts a direct cause of action for
violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the North
Carolina Constitution.
(Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 45; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Lemons’ Mot.
(Doc. 29) at 15–17; Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 8–12.)
This court found that Defendant Lemons has waived
governmental immunity via the purchase of a sheriff’s bond, at
least to the extent of the face value of the bond. Nonetheless,
it will briefly discuss below whether Plaintiff possesses “an
adequate remedy at state law,” and conclude that he does.
In Corum v. University of North Carolina Through Board of
Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992), the Supreme
Court of North Carolina instructed: “[I]n the absence of an
adequate state remedy, one whose state constitutional rights
have been abridged has a direct claim against the State under
our Constitution.” 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d, 276, 289
(1992). The court emphasized that the North Carolina
constitution allows for a direct claim only where “no other
remedy” exists. Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290. More recently,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s precedent and explained that a Plaintiff has an
“adequate remedy” where: (1) “the remedy addresses the alleged
constitutional injury,” and (2) “the remedy provides the
plaintiff an opportunity to enter the courthouse doors.” Taylor
v. Wake Cnty., 258 N.C. App. 178, 185, 811 S.E.2d 648, 654
(2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, because Plaintiff has a remedy against the SCSO’s
surety and against the SCSO officers in their individual
capacities, Plaintiff has an “adequate remedy” available to him
that both (1) addresses his alleged constitutional injury and
(2) allows him to “enter the courthouse doors.” See id.
Accordingly, Plaintiff may not assert a direct cause of action
under the North Carolina Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regarding Plaintiff’s four claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, this court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a
§ 1983 Monell claim against the Sheriff of Stokes County (Claim
III), as well as individual capacity § 1983 claims against
Defendant Dalton for supervisory liability (Claim II), against
Defendants Mabe, Wolfe, and Smith for an unreasonable search and
seizure (Claim I), and against Defendant Wolfe for failure to
intervene (Claim IV). Defendants Lemons and Dalton moved to
dismiss Claim III and Claim II, respectively, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). This court found that Plaintiff stated a plausible
Monell claim against Sheriff Lemons under a “condonation” theory
of liability, as well as a plausible § 1983 supervisory liability
claim against Dalton. The individual Defendants named in Claims I
and IV did not seek dismissal of those claims at this stage.
Thus, all four of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims will proceed to
discovery.
Plaintiff’s complaint additionally asserts state law claims
for assault and battery (Claim V), gross negligence (Claim VI),
and IIED (Claim VII), against officers of the SCSO in both their
individual and official capacities. Defendant Dalton, a named
defendant in Claim VI and Claim VII, moved to dismiss the claims
insofar as they are asserted against him in his individual
capacity. This court found that Claim VI is barred against
Defendant Dalton by public official immunity and Claim VII fails
on 12(b)(6) grounds. Both claims will be dismissed against
Defendant Dalton, although the dismissal of Claim VII will be
without prejudice. The other individual Defendants did not seek
dismissal of the state law claims brought against them in their
individual capacities. Thus, Claim V will proceed against all the
named Defendants in their individual capacities, and Claims VI
and VII will proceed against all the named Defendants in their
individual capacities except for Defendant Dalton.
Finally, Defendant Lemons moved to dismiss the state law
claims insofar as they were brought against the named Defendants
in their official capacities, arguing that these claims are
barred by governmental immunity. This court found that the Stokes
County Sheriff’s Office has waived governmental immunity up to
the amount of the face value of the bond and has deferred ruling,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(i), as to whether
that waiver applies to Plaintiff’s official capacity tort claims
(Claims V, VI, and VII) in addition to Plaintiff’s statutory
cause of action asserted against Western Surety (Claim VIII).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Joey Lemons’ Motion
to Dismiss, (Doc. 17), is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Terry Dalton’s Motion
to Dismiss, (Doc. 20), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It
is DENIED as to the claim for § 1983 supervisory liability. It is
GRANTED as to the claim for gross negligence, and this claim is
DISMISSED against Defendant Dalton. It is also GRANTED as to the
claim for IIED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
against Defendant Dalton.
This the 5th day of May, 2025.
Le Minin □□□ Webi
United States District Jud¢ge
=- 4? =-