Opinion

BLAKELY v. WESTERN SURETY COMPANY

Court
District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Filed
May 5, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.1%

“[S]o long as [plaintiff] can also satisfy [his] burden of showing that the Individual Defendants acted maliciously, [plaintiff] can assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities for negligen[ce].”

How later courts described this case

  • “[S]o long as [plaintiff] can also satisfy [his] burden of showing that the Individual Defendants acted maliciously, [plaintiff] can assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities for negligen[ce].”
  • “[T]he purchase of a bond precludes a sheriff from relying upon the protective embrace of governmental immunity . . . only where the surety is joined as a party to the action . . . and only to the extent of the amount of the bond.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
  • granting public official immunity and dismissing claim at 12(b)(6) stage for failing to plausibly allege defendant’s malice
  • “[W]e note that a conclusory allegation that a public official acted willfully or wantonly should not be sufficient, by itself, to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The facts alleged in the complaint must support such a conclusion.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

LARRY GRAY BLAKLEY, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, )

SERGEANT JOSHUA MABE, )

individually and in his )

official capacity, DEPUTY ) 1:24-cv-183

CODY SMITH, individually and )

in his official capacity, )

DEPUTY MONTY G. WOLFE, )

individually and in his )

official capacity, SHERIFF )

JOEY LEMONS, in his official )

Capacity, CAPTAIN TERRY )

DALTON, individually and in )

his official capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

)

********************************

)

SERGEANT JOSHUA MABE, )

individually and in his )

official capacity, )

)

Counterclaim )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

LARRY GRAY BLAKLEY, SR., )

)

Counterclaim )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint asserting claims for

relief against various members of the Stokes County Sherriff’s

Office (“SCSO”) arising from an alleged warrantless search and

seizure at his home on the evening of March 4, 2021. (See

generally Compl. (Doc. 1).) The SCSO officers who conducted the

search and seizure - Sergeant Mabe, Deputy Smith, and Deputy

Wolfe - do not seek dismissal of the claims asserted against

them in their individual capacities at this stage of the

proceedings.

Before this court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendant

Joey Lemons, the Sheriff of Stokes County, (Doc. 17), and

Defendant Terry Dalton, a Captain in the Stokes County Sheriff’s

Office, (Doc. 20). These motions are ripe for adjudication and

for the reasons stated herein, Sheriff Lemons’ motion will be

denied, and Captain Dalton’s motion will be denied in part and

granted in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of

the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ray v. Roane,

948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The facts,

taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.

A. The Alleged Unconstitutional Search and Seizure on

March 4, 2021

Although Sheriff Lemons and Captain Dalton were not present

at Plaintiff’s home on the evening of March 4, 2021, those

allegations are summarized here in order to understand

forthcoming analysis of the issues Defendants Lemons and Dalton

raise in their motions.

On the evening of March 4, 2021, around 8:30 p.m.,

Plaintiff Larry Blakley, Sr. – a 75-year-old “frail, elderly”

man with Parkinsons’s disease who, at the time, lived alone in

Stokes County, North Carolina – was “in his home and drinking a

coffee when he heard loud knocks at his door by someone who

claimed to be law enforcement.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 62, 63, 66,

80, 88.) Plaintiff opened his door and was met by Sergeant Mabe,

Deputy Smith, and Deputy Wolfe. (Id. ¶ 67.)

The officers possessed an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s

son, Larry Blakley, Jr., although the warrant specified that

Blakley, Jr. lived at a different residence, (id. ¶ 68), almost

three miles away, (id. ¶ 73). Further, Blakley, Jr. is more than

twenty years younger than his father, has “vastly different

physical attributes,” and does not share his father’s birthdate.

(Id. ¶¶ 70–72, 79.) At the time of these events, Plaintiff “had

not been in contact with [Blakley, Jr.] since October of 2020.”

(Id. ¶ 79.)

When Plaintiff opened his door, one of the officers

“indicated he was looking for a suspect and asked to come

inside. [Plaintiff] said no.” (Id. ¶ 82.) Nonetheless, the

officers “proceeded to enter [Plaintiff’s] home.” (Id. ¶ 83.)

Plaintiff “produced identification to the deputies,

demonstrating that he was not the individual listed on the

warrant despite the similar name.” (Id. ¶ 84.) Even so, the

officers “began to search [Plaintiff’s] home” without consent.

(Id. ¶ 89.) Then, “without warning, [Officers Mabe, Smith, and

Wolfe], or some combination thereof, violently threw [Plaintiff]

to the floor.” (Id.)

“After throwing [Plaintiff] to the floor, Defendants Mabe,

Smith, and Wolfe placed [Plaintiff] in handcuffs. They continued

their assault on [Plaintiff], violently stomping on his hand and

kicking and punching him along his trunk, in the shins, abdomen,

hip, back, and even his forehead.” (Id. ¶ 90.) Plaintiff begged

them to stop. (Id. ¶ 109.)

The officers then “transported [Plaintiff], still

restrained in handcuffs, to the Stokes County Jail.” (Id. ¶ 93.)

However, they “failed to restrain [Plaintiff] in the police car,

leaving him to be thrown around in the back seat of the

vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 94.) Plaintiff was in pain but received no

medical attention. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 96.)

Later that evening, Plaintiff returned home, and “called

his daughter, Shannon Goins, to tell her about the incident” and

that “he was having trouble breathing.” (Id. ¶ 99.) Ms. Goins

“called for EMS and they arrived to transport [Plaintiff] to the

hospital.” (Id. ¶ 100.) At the hospital, Plaintiff “was

tachycardic and was provided IV medications for his obvious

pain.” (Id. ¶ 101.) Additionally, he was diagnosed with “one

broken rib and left-sided transverse process factures of the

vertebral bodies at L1 and L2 on his spine.” (Id. ¶ 102.) The

next day, Plaintiff’s granddaughter, Amanda Blakley, took

photographs of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 103.) Those photographs reveal

extensive purple bruising on the side of his body and marks on

his shins. (See id.)

Since the events of March 4, 2021, Plaintiff has suffered

chronic pain and “permanent[] injur[y] both physically and

mentally.” (Id. ¶¶ 113, 115.) He has been “unable to participate

in personal, social, or work activities,” no longer lives alone,

has felt “frustrated and depressed,” and has incurred medical

expenses totaling $96,198.70. (Id. ¶¶ 114, 116–17.)

B. Sheriff Lemons’ Training of Officers

Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Lemons “holds final

policymaking authority with respect to the use of force by

deputies employed with by SCSO.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff further

alleges:

Defendant Lemons implemented, maintained, and enforced

the customs, practices, policies, or procedures that

directed, encouraged, or permitted Defendants Mabe,

Smith, and Wolfe to conduct unlawful searches and use

excessive force against individuals. Defendant Lemons

has a duty to ensure that the deputies working for SCSO

are qualified, credentialed, and trained.

SCSO does not provide deputies with training on

execution of warrants, use of force, written policies on

use of force, or guidance on what degree of force should

be used in different situations.

Defendant Lemons failed to train deputies on proper

procedures for lawful searches/obtaining consent to

enter private property, and proper use of force.

Defendant Lemons further failed to supervise and/or

failed to discipline deputies whose previous unlawful

searches/entry onto private property and uses of

excessive force implied tacit authorization for such

behaviors and created a widespread custom and practice

of unlawful entry onto property and use of excessive

force within the SCSO.

(Id. ¶¶ 147-149.) This court understands these allegations to

allege that (1) the Sheriff of Stokes County has a duty and

responsibility to ensure that his deputies are qualified,

credentialed, and trained, and (2) the Sheriff of Stokes County

does not provide any training or written policies on the use of

force. Plaintiff does not explain what “qualified” or

“credentialed” mean nor does he allege that the deputies lacked

qualifications or credentials.

In North Carolina, the State has undertaken a level of

responsibility for the training of sheriffs and deputy sheriffs.

The offices of sheriff and deputy sheriff are [] of

special concern to the public health, safety, welfare

and morals of the people of the State. The training and

educational needs of such officers therefore require

particularized and differential treatment from those of

the criminal justice officers certified under Article 1

of Chapter 17C of the General Statutes.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17E-1. In furtherance of that policy, the

State created the North Carolina Sheriff’s Education and

Training Standards Commission, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17E-3,

which has the “power[], dut[y], and responsibilit[y]” to

establish, for example, minimum training standards to qualify

for entry level employment in temporary status or in a permanent

position, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17E-4. The North Carolina

Sheriff’s Education and Training Standards Commission has

established regulations which address “Minimum Standards for

Justice Officers,” see 12 N.C. Admin. Code 10B.0301,

“Certification of Personnel,” see 12 N.C. Admin. Code 10B.0401,

and “Minimum Standards of Training for Deputy Sheriffs,” see 12

N.C. Admin. Code 10B.0500.

In light of the state’s statutory and regulatory scheme,

Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to plausibly allege a

separate duty or responsibility onto Sheriff Lemons, a publicly

elected official, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-1, to train his

deputies. As explained hereafter, this court will allow

Plaintiff’s “condonation” theory of Monell liability to proceed

against Sheriff Lemons. See infra Section III.A.i. However, this

theory of liability implicates whether the Sheriff failed to

“put a stop to or correct” an ongoing pattern of

unconstitutional conduct, see Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys

Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014), which is an issue

separate and apart from Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusion that

Sheriff Lemons had an underlying duty to train his deputies and

failed to provide them with any training. (See Compl. (Doc. 1)

¶¶ 147-149.)

C. Sheriff Lemons’ and Captain Dalton’s Supervision of

Officers

Plaintiff’s Monell claim, and several other claims, rely on

the conclusory allegation that Sheriff Lemons and Captain Dalton

“knew of prior excessive force complaints against Defendants

Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe . . . but failed to take any corrective

action to ensure the safety of the people of Stokes County,

North Carolina.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 18.) Determining whether

this conclusion is plausibly supported requires drawing

reasonable inferences from the well-pleaded facts in the

complaint.

Namely, Plaintiff alleges that after the incident on March

4, 2021, Ms. Goins and Ms. Blakley contacted Captain Dalton

“about filing a complaint against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and

Wolfe.” (Id. ¶ 104.) Captain Dalton “told them that he had

‘already seen the videos’ [and] that there was no need to file a

complaint,” (id.), which Plaintiff interpreted as “attempts to

dissuade [them] from filing a complaint,” (id. ¶ 105).

Plaintiff, Ms. Goins, and Ms. Blakley then traveled together to

the Stokes County Sheriff’s Office to speak with Captain Dalton

in person about the incident. (Id.)

After arriving at the Stokes County Sheriff’s Office,

Plaintiff, Ms. Goins, and Ms. Blakley showed Captain Dalton the

photographs of Plaintiff’s bruises. (Id. ¶ 106.) When Captain

Dalton saw the photographs, his “demeanor changed.” (Pl.’s Ex.

2, Pl.’s Decl. (Doc. 1-2) ¶ 19.)1 He requested email copies of

the photos, and he informed Plaintiff “that the Sheriff’s Office

had complaints about Defendants Mabe, Smith and Wolfe for

excessive force and that the offices [sic] would feed off one

1 Plaintiff has attached his own affidavit and the

affidavits of Shannon Goins and Amanda Blakley to the complaint.

It appears to this court that the allegations of the complaint

are similar or identical to the matters described in the

affidavits with one exception. Amanda Blakley attests that her

brother, who “has had interactions with law enforcement,

specifically Deputy Mabe,” has “complained about Mabe using

excessive force” in the past. (Pl.’s Ex. 4, Amanda Blakley

Decl.) (Doc. 1-4) ¶ 21.) That fact has been considered by this

court.

another when they worked together.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 106,

110.)

These factual allegations present a difficult question as

to what may be reasonably inferred about the past actions of

Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe as well as the knowledge that

Captain Dalton (and relatedly, Sheriff Lemons) possessed of

those actions. However, this court finds Plaintiff’s allegations

sufficient to support the following inferences: (1) there were

two or more prior complaints of excessive force lodged against

Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe; (2) Captain Dalton, and by

extension Sheriff Lemons, were aware of the prior complaints;

and (3) there was at least some merit to those prior complaints.2

In light of these inferences, Plaintiff’s allegation that

“Defendants Dalton and Lemons knew of prior excessive force

complaints against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe . . . but

failed to take any corrective action to ensure the safety of the

people of Stokes County, North Carolina,” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶

2 Defendant Dalton argues that Plaintiff has not alleged

“any facts indicating that any prior complaints had merit.”

(Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 4.) However, one reasonable

inference to draw from Captain Dalton’s statement that the

officers would “feed off one another when they worked together,”

(Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 110), is that this statement was an admission

that the officers were known to be more aggressive when they

work together. Discovery will afford Captain Dalton an

opportunity to refute or clarify this statement.

18), is plausibly supported by facts alleged. While there may be

other reasonable inferences to draw from the allegations

regarding Captain Dalton’s statements, at this stage, all

reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of Plaintiff. See

Ray, 948 F.3d at 226.

Additional facts will be raised and addressed as necessary

in the analysis to follow.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint on March 4, 2024,

(Compl. (Doc. 1)), asserting the following claims for relief.

First, he asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim

against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe in their individual

capacities alleging that these officers conducted an

unreasonable search and seizure, and used excessive force, when

they arrested Plaintiff at his home on the evening of March 4,

2021. (Id. ¶¶ 124–34.)

Second, he asserts a § 1983 supervisory liability claim

against Defendant Dalton in his individual capacity, (id. ¶

143), alleging that Captain Dalton failed to properly train,

discipline, and supervise Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe

despite knowing that the officers had incurred past complaints

of excessive force. (Id. ¶¶ 135–44.)

Third, he asserts a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim against

Defendant Lemons in his official capacity as Sheriff of the

Stokes County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”), (id. ¶ 152), which this

court construes as a Monell claim against the SCSO. (Id. ¶¶ 145–

52.)

Fourth, he asserts a § 1983 “failure to intervene” claim

against Defendant Wolfe in his individual capacity, (id. ¶ 158),

alleging that Deputy Wolfe “possessed the power to intervene and

stop the unlawful and brutal actions of Defendants Mabe and

Smith.” (Id. ¶¶ 153–59.)

Fifth, he asserts a state law claim for assault and battery

against Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe in their individual

and official capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 160–68.)

Sixth, he asserts a state law claim for gross negligence

against Defendants Mabe, Smith, Wolfe, and Dalton in their

individual and official capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 169–73.)

Seventh, he asserts a state law claim for intentional

infliction of emotional harm (“IIED”) against Defendants Mabe,

Smith, Wolfe, and Dalton in their individual and official

capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 174–78).

Eighth, he asserts a claim against Western Surety Company,

the surety of the SCSO’s bond, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§

162-8, 58-76-5. (Id. ¶¶ 179–87.)

All Defendants, other than Western Surety Company, filed

motions to dismiss. Defendants Wolfe, Mabe, and Smith filed

identical motions, requesting dismissal of the official capacity

claims asserted against them. (Docs. 22, 27, and 31.) This court

issued an order on March 31, 2025, denying Defendants Wolfe,

Mabe, and Smith’s motions without prejudice as moot, after

reconstruing Plaintiff’s complaint to make it clear that his

claims against Defendants Wolfe, Mabe, and Smith in their

official capacities are claims against the Sheriff of Stokes

County and, thus, only the Sheriff has standing to respond to

those claims. (See Doc. 45 at 5.)

This memorandum opinion and order addresses the motions to

dismiss filed by Defendant Sheriff Lemons, (Doc. 17), and

Defendant Captain Dalton, (Doc. 20). Sheriff Lemons argues that

Plaintiff’s Monell claim (Claim III) should be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18) at 6–

12.)3 Lemons also argues that Plaintiff’s state law tort claims

against the SCSO officers in their official capacities (Claims

V-VII) are barred by governmental immunity. (See id. at 13–21.)

Captain Dalton argues that all three claims asserted against him

3 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed within the court refer to the page numbers

located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they

appear on CM/ECF.

in his individual capacity (Claims II, VI, and VII) should be

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See Def. Dalton’s Br.

(Doc. 21) at 7–15, 17–20.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Sheriff Lemons’ and Captain Dalton’s Arguments for

Dismissal of Claims Under Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

plausible on its face if the plaintiff pleads “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable” and demonstrates “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court accepts the

complaint’s factual allegations as true. See id. Further, this

court liberally construes the complaint and “draw[s] all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ray, 948 F.3d

at 226. This court does not, however, accept legal conclusions

as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

i. Plaintiff has stated a plausible § 1983 Monell

claim against Sheriff Lemons (Claim III)

Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Lemons, in his official

capacity, “implemented, maintained, and enforced the customs,

practices, policies, or procedures that directed, encouraged, or

permitted Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe to conduct unlawful

searches and use excessive force against individuals.” (Compl.

(Doc. 1) ¶ 147.) A claim against Sheriff Lemons in his official

capacity constitutes a claim against the Stokes County Sheriff’s

Office (“SCSO”). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66

(1985); see also Butterfield v. Gray, 279 N.C. App. 549, 554

n.4, 866 S.E.2d 296, 301 n.4 (2021) (citations omitted)

(explaining that, under the North Carolina Constitution, a

sheriff’s office is a local governmental entity distinct from

the county government).

Under Monell v. New York City Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a local governmental entity, such

as the SCSO, is “liable for its own illegal acts.” See Owens,

767 F.3d at 402. Specifically, the local entity is “liable under

§ 1983 if it follows a custom, policy, or practice by which

local officials violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

Id.

To state a § 1983 Monell claim against the SCSO, Plaintiff

must “plausibly allege a constitutional harm that stems from the

acts of an [SCSO] employee taken in furtherance of some [SCSO]

policy or custom.” See Washington v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 457 F.

Supp. 3d 520, 532 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Milligan v. City of

Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Sheriff Lemons does not contest that

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a constitutional harm stemming

from acts committed by the SCSO officers on March 4, 2021. (See

generally Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18).) However, Sheriff Lemons

argues that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to

attribute these constitutional violations to a “policy or

custom” of the SCSO. (Id. at 6–12.)

“A policy or custom for which [the SCSO] may be held liable

can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a

written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a

person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an

omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that

‘manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens’;

or (4) through a practice that is so ‘persistent and widespread’

as to constitute a ‘custom or usage with the force of law.’”

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted); see also Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty.

Sch. Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2022). Regarding the

fourth theory of liability, an entity’s failure “to put a stop

to or correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct”

can constitute a “custom by condonation.” See Owens, 767 F.3d at

402 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir.

1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Monell liability under

any of the first three theories articulated in Lytle. As to the

first and second theories, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts

related to an express policy or to the decisions of a

policymaker. As to the third theory, Plaintiff alleges that the

“SCSO does not provide deputies with training on . . . use of

force,” (see Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 148), but as discussed supra

Section I.B., he has not plausibly alleged a duty or

responsibility on the part of Sheriff Lemons to train his

officers in light of North Carolina’s statutory scheme, nor has

he plausibly alleged “an affirmative causal link” between

Lemons’ alleged training omissions and Plaintiff’s injuries in

light of that scheme. See Washington, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 532.

However, Plaintiff contends that his complaint establishes

a plausible Monell claim under the fourth theory of liability:

custom by condonation. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Lemons’ Mot.

(Doc. 29) at 7–9 (“Plaintiff alleges that prior complaints of

excessive force against these deputies were ignored . . . .”).)

1. SCSO “Custom By Condonation”

“Under this theory of liability, [a sheriff’s office]

violates § 1983 if [the sheriff] fail[s] to put a stop to or

correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct.” See

Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). To prevail on this theory, a “plaintiff must point to

a persistent and widespread practice of municipal officials, the

duration and frequency of which indicate that policymakers (1)

had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2)

failed to correct it due to their deliberate indifference.” Id.

(cleaned up). “Both knowledge and indifference can be inferred

from the ‘extent’ of employees’ misconduct. Sporadic or isolated

violations of rights will not give rise to Monell liability;

only ‘widespread or flagrant’ violations will.” Id. at 402-03

(internal citations omitted).

Given the above standard, “prevailing on the merits of a

Monell claim is difficult.” Id. at 403. However, “simply

alleging such a claim is, by definition, easier.” Id. In Owens,

the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff had plausibly alleged a

Monell claim against a state’s attorney’s office when he

alleged: (1) “[r]eported and unreported cases from the period of

time before and during the events complained of” show that the

office had a practice of “knowingly and repeatedly suppressing

exculpatory evidence in criminal prosecutions”; and (2) “a

number of motions were filed and granted during this time

period,” which demonstrates that the office “condon[ed] [this

behavior], and/or knowingly turn[ed] a blind eye to it.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court

reasoned that “[t]he assertions as to ‘reported and unreported

cases’ and numerous ‘successful motions’ are factual

allegations, the veracity of which could plausibly support a

Monell claim.” Id. These “brief, but non-conclusory” factual

allegations, “if true, would buttress [the plaintiff’s] legal

conclusion.” Id.

Similarly, here, Plaintiff has alleged that (1) “the [SCSO]

had complaints about Defendants Mabe, Smith and Wolfe for

excessive force” and was aware that the officers “would feed off

one another when they worked together,” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 110),

and yet, the SCSO (2) “failed to supervise and . . . discipline

[these] deputies” and allowed them to work together on the

evening of March 4, 2021, thereby “impl[ying] tacit

authorization for such behaviors and creat[ing] a widespread

custom and practice,” (id. ¶ 149; see also id. ¶ 139). As was

the case in Owens, Plaintiff will be required to prove the

veracity of these allegations and show, among other things, that

“the duration and frequency of [the SCSO officers’] conduct was

widespread and recurrent.” See Owens, 767 F.3d at 403. But to

survive Defendant Lemons’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff’s

“recitation of facts need not be particularly detailed, and the

chance of success need not be particularly high.” Id. Plaintiff

has therefore stated a plausible Monell claim against the SCSO

under a “custom by condonation” theory of liability. See id. at

402-03.

Defendant Lemons’ motion to dismiss will be denied as to

the Monell claim against him in his official capacity (Claim

III).

ii. Plaintiff has stated a plausible § 1983

supervisory liability claim against Defendant

Dalton in his individual capacity (Claim II)

Plaintiff contends that the alleged constitutional

violations committed by Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe on

March 4, 2021, are also imputable to the officers’ supervisor,

Captain Dalton. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 138–39.) Captain Dalton,

like Sheriff Lemons, does not contest that Plaintiff’s complaint

states a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendants Mabe, Smith,

and Wolfe in their individual capacities. (See generally Def.

Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21).) Captain Dalton argues that Plaintiff

has not plausibly alleged that the alleged constitutional

violations by Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe are imputable to

him. (See id. at 7–15.)

“[S]upervisory officials may be held liable in certain

circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their

subordinates.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994)

Specifically, a supervisor is liable when “(1) he knew that his

subordinate ‘was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and

unreasonable risk of constitutional injury’; (2) his response

showed ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the

alleged offensive practices’; and (3) that there was an

‘affirmative causal link’ between his inaction and the

constitutional injury.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 224

(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). A subordinate

poses a “‘pervasive’ and ‘unreasonable’ risk of harm” when his

“conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several

different occasions and . . . poses an unreasonable risk of harm

of constitutional injury.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. A supervisor’s

response demonstrates “deliberate indifference” when it involves

“continued inaction in the face of documented widespread

abuses.” Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that after the events of March 4, 2021,

he visited the Stokes County Sherrif’s Office to “fil[e] a

complaint” with Captain Dalton - “the supervisor of Defendants

Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe.” (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 104–06, 136.)

During their conversation, Captain Dalton “informed [Plaintiff]

that the Sheriff’s Office had complaints about Defendants Mabe,

Smith and Wolfe for excessive force and that the offices [sic]

would feed off one another when they worked together.” (Id. ¶

110.) Citing these remarks by Captain Dalton, Plaintiff alleges

that Dalton “possessed actual and/or constructive knowledge that

Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe were the subjects of prior use

of force/excessive force complaints and posed a harm to

citizens.” (Id. ¶ 138.) Plaintiff further alleges that Captain

Dalton “consciously and intentionally failed to act or intervene

to prevent them from working together on March 4, 2021,” and

“was deliberately indifferent to his responsibility to train and

supervise these Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 139.) Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that Captain Dalton’s “failures” were “a direct and

proximate” cause of Plaintiff’s constitutional injuries. (See

id. ¶¶ 142–143.)

While this court need not accept Plaintiff’s legal

conclusions as true, it nonetheless finds that he has pleaded

facts sufficient to state a plausible § 1983 supervisory

liability claim for relief. Drawing all reasonable inferences in

Plaintiff’s favor, see Ray, 948 F.3d at 226, he has plausibly

alleged that Defendant Dalton knew of the risk of harm posed by

Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe (especially when they worked

together), as evidenced by the prior complaints about the

officers and Dalton’s admission that the officers would “feed

off” one another. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 110.) These allegations

support the first supervisory liability element. See King, 825

F.3d at 224. He has also alleged that Captain Dalton failed to

correct the officers’ behavior or otherwise intervene to prevent

them from working together, (see id. ¶ 139), which plausibly

supports the second element. Regarding the third element, it is

reasonable to infer from the facts alleged that Defendant

Dalton’s supervisory omissions allowed his subordinates’ conduct

to continue unabated, ultimately causing Plaintiff’s

constitutional injuries on the evening of March 4, 2021.

Defendant Dalton’s motion to dismiss will be denied as to

the § 1983 supervisory liability claim (Claim II) brought

against him in his individual capacity.4

4 Defendant Dalton also states that he is entitled to

qualified immunity as to this § 1983 supervisory liability claim

on account of his not having violated any “clearly established”

constitutional right but he does not flesh out this argument.

(See Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 15.) Supervisory liability

is a well-established means of attaching § 1983 liability, see

generally King, 825 F.3d 206, and based on the facts Plaintiff

has alleged, it is plausible that Dalton fell short of the

standard for supervision placed on him by Fourth Circuit

precedent, see id. at 224. Further factual development is needed

to determine whether Defendant Dalton is entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim. Thus, it is premature to award qualified

immunity at this stage.

iii. Plaintiff’s claim for gross negligence against

Defendant Dalton in his individual capacity is

barred by public official immunity (Claim VI)

The factual allegations underlying Plaintiff’s gross

negligence claim against Captain Dalton overlap significantly

with those underlying his § 1983 supervisory liability claim.

(See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 171.)

“[A] claim for gross negligence requires that plaintiff

plead facts on each of the elements of negligence, including

duty, causation, proximate cause, and damages.” Land v. Whitley,

292 N.C. App. 244, 255, 898 S.E.2d 17, 26, review allowed, 900

S.E.2d 662 (2024) (citation omitted). Negligence becomes “gross

negligence” when it involves “wanton conduct done with conscious

or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.” Id.

at 255, 898 S.E.2d at 26 (citation omitted). “An act is wanton

when it is done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly,

manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.”

Cullen v. Logan Devs., Inc., 386 N.C. 373, 382, 904 S.E.2d 730,

737 (2024) (citation omitted).

Defendant Dalton argues that Plaintiff has not plausibly

alleged any “grossly negligent” conduct by Captain Dalton, and

that even if he has, Captain Dalton is protected by public

official immunity. (See Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 17.)

Public official immunity is a derivative form of

governmental immunity, which precludes suits against

public officials in their individual capacities as

follows: As long as a public officer lawfully exercises

the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by

virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his

official authority, and acts without malice or

corruption, he is protected from liability.

Wilcox v. City of Asheville, 222 N.C. App. 285, 288, 730 S.E.2d

226, 230 (2012) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). “Thus, a

public official is immune from suit unless the challenged action

was (1) outside the scope of official authority, (2) done with

malice, or (3) corrupt.” Id.; accord Bartley v. City of High

Point, 381 N.C. 287, 294, 873 S.E.2d 525, 533 (2022). “Sheriffs,

sheriff’s deputies, and jailers have all been recognized as

public officials . . . .” Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 554, 866

S.E.2d at 301.

Plaintiff alleges that “the actions of each Defendant”

named in this suit “constitute . . . malicious . . . and

improper police conduct.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 19.) “[A] malicious

act is one which is (1) done wantonly, (2) contrary to the

actor’s duty, and (3) intended to be injurious to another.”

Bartley, 381 N.C. at 296, 873 S.E.2d at 534 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Regardless of the sufficiency of

Plaintiff’s pleadings as to the first two elements of malice,

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant Dalton’s

actions were taken with the “inten[t] to be injurious” to

Plaintiff, and thus he has not supported his conclusory

allegation that Dalton engaged in malicious police conduct. See

id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions.” (cleaned up)); Meyer

v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 114, 489 S.E.2d 880, 890 (1997) (“[W]e

note that a conclusory allegation that a public official acted

willfully or wantonly should not be sufficient, by itself, to

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The facts alleged

in the complaint must support such a conclusion.”).

For one, Plaintiff does not allege that Captain Dalton’s

discretionary decisions about how to supervise Officers Mabe,

Smith, and Wolfe were made with any actual intent to injure

Plaintiff. (See generally Compl. (Doc. 1).) Granted, in the

context of public official immunity, the Supreme Court of North

Carolina instructs:

We have held that “the intention to inflict injury may

be constructive” intent where an individual’s conduct

“is so reckless or so manifestly indifferent to the

consequences, where the safety of life or limb is

involved, as to justify a finding of willfulness and

wantonness equivalent in spirit to an actual intent.”

Bartley, 381 N.C. at 296, 873 S.E.2d at 534 (emphasis added)

(internal citations omitted). Although this court found that

Plaintiff plausibly alleged Captain Dalton, through supervisory

omissions, was deliberately indifferent to the general risk of

harm that Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe posed to the citizens

of Stokes County, (see supra Section III.A.ii.), the same

allegations do not plausibly support a conclusion that Dalton

was “so reckless or so manifestly indifferent to the

consequences,” that he possessed a “spirit” that was “equivalent

. . . to an actual intent” to injure Plaintiff. See Bartley, 381

N.C. at 296, 873 S.E.2d at 534.

Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Captain

Dalton acted with malice, nor that he acted “outside the scope

of official authority” or “corrupt[ly],” see Wilcox, 222 N.C.

App. at 288, 730 S.E.2d at 230, his claim for gross negligence

is barred by public official immunity.5 Cf. Mitchell v. Pruden,

251 N.C. App. 554, 561–62, 796 S.E.2d 77, 83 (2017) (granting

public official immunity and dismissing claim at 12(b)(6) stage

for failing to plausibly allege defendant’s malice); Petrillo v.

5 Defendant Dalton appears to argue that public official

immunity categorically bars claims of gross negligence. (See

Def. Dalton’s Br. (Doc. 21) at 17.) He cites to a Fourth Circuit

opinion, published in 1994, which states: “[T]he North Carolina

Supreme Court has never allowed a showing of gross negligence to

suffice to pierce an officer’s immunity, absent a statute

specifically abolishing the common law immunity.” Shaw, 13 F.3d

at 803. It is not certain how the Fourth Circuit might resolve

that issue today in light of recent North Carolina cases. See,

e.g., Wilcox, 222 N.C. App. at 301, 730 S.E.2d at 238 (“[S]o

long as [plaintiff] can also satisfy [his] burden of showing

that the Individual Defendants acted maliciously, [plaintiff]

can assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their

individual capacities for negligen[ce].”). Nonetheless, that

issue need not be resolved here.

Barnes-Jones, 291 N.C. App. 62, 68, 894 S.E.2d 772, 778 (2023)

(same).

For these reasons, Defendant Dalton’s motion to dismiss the

gross negligence claim brought against him in his individual

capacity (Claim VI) will be granted.

iv. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible IIED claim

against Defendant Dalton in his individual

capacity (Claim VII)

To state an IIED claim under North Carolina law, a

plaintiff must allege: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct [by

the defendant], (2) which is intended to cause and does cause

(3) severe emotional distress to another.” Turner v. Thomas, 369

N.C. 419, 427, 794 S.E.2d 439, 446 (2016) (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). “The tort also may be established

when a ‘defendant’s actions indicate a reckless indifference to

the likelihood that they will cause severe emotional distress.’”

Id. “Conduct constituting this cause of action may be found in

an abuse by the actor of a position which gives him power to

affect the interests of another,” when that conduct “exceeds all

bounds of decency tolerated by society” and is “regarded as

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”

Id. (cleaned up) (citations omitted).

Following the events of March 4, 2021, Plaintiff sought to

file a “complaint” with the Stokes County Sheriff’s Office

against Officers Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶

104-06, 111.) When Plaintiff arrived at the Sheriff’s Office,

Captain Dalton “assured [Plaintiff] that the matter would be

handled and heard [Plaintiff] and his family’s complaints.” (Id.

¶ 111.) However, “Defendant Dalton did not provide [Plaintiff]

with any forms, paperwork, of [sic] file number concerning his

complaint.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s IIED claim is founded upon the allegations,

“upon information and belief,” that Dalton “did [sic] open any

file or investigation of this matter despite receiving the

verbal complaints,” “lied” to Plaintiff to “discourage” him from

filing a complaint, “ignor[ed] [Plaintiff’s] complaints of

excessive force,” “destroy[ed] video evidence of [Plaintiff’s]

encounter[] with officers,” and “took active steps to conceal

[Plaintiff’s] report of excessive force.” (See Compl. (Doc. 1)

¶¶ 176, 111–12; see also Pl.’s Ex. 2, Pl.’s Decl. (Doc. 1-2) ¶¶

18–19.)6 In his response memorandum, Plaintiff argues that these

6 Plaintiff also incorporates his allegations about Captain

Dalton’s supervision of Defendants Mabe, Smith, and Wolfe into

the IIED subsection of his complaint. (See Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶

174, 176(i).) However, those alleged supervisory failures by

Captain Dalton are not plausibly linked to any intent on behalf

of Dalton to cause emotional harm to Plaintiff. This court

focuses its analysis of Plaintiff’s IIED claim on the actions he

alleges Dalton took, directed at Plaintiff, after the events of

March 4, 2021.

allegations show that Captain Dalton “participated in a cover-

up.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Dalton’s Mot. (Doc. 33) at 14.)

Plaintiff’s allegations that Captain Dalton “lied,”

“discouraged,” “ignored,” and “destroyed” evidence are

conclusions not plausibly supported by the facts alleged.7

Plaintiff alleges as well-pleaded fact that Captain Dalton (1)

“heard [Plaintiff’s] and his family’s complaints,” (2) “assured

[Plaintiff] that the matter would be handled,” and (3) “did not

provide [Plaintiff] with any forms, paperwork, of [sic] file

number concerning his complaint.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 111.)

However, Plaintiff does not allege that the SCSO typically

adheres to a formal, written process for responding to citizen

complaints lodged against their deputies, nor that Plaintiff had

7 “Generally, conclusory allegations based solely ‘upon

information and belief’ are ‘insufficient to defeat a motion to

dismiss.’” Mystic Retreat Med Spa & Weight Loss Ctr. v.

Ascentium Cap. LLC, 615 F. Supp. 3d 379, 384 (M.D.N.C. 2022)

(citation omitted). The words “upon information and belief”

“will only make otherwise unsupported claims plausible when the

facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the

defendant or where the belief is based on factual information

that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” Id. at 385

(quoting Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 384–85

(2d Cir. 2018)). Here, even if some of the facts are within the

control of the Sheriff, Plaintiff does not allege any facts

which support his belief that a cover up occurred. Assuming

Plaintiff’s allegations can be construed to support an inference

that no internal, disciplinary action was taken against the

officers, that absence of disciplinary action does not plausibly

support an inference of any intent by Dalton to inflict

emotional distress upon Plaintiff.

a right to any follow up communication or other recourse after

lodging a verbal complaint. At bottom, this court is unable to

infer from the facts alleged that Defendant Dalton failed to

“handle[]” the matter, as he allegedly assured Plaintiff he

would, (id.), nor infer that he participated in the more

sinister conduct of “a cover-up,” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Dalton’s

Mot. (Doc. 33) at 14), the latter of which might give rise to an

IIED claim if plausibly supported by the facts alleged.

Defendant Dalton’s motion to dismiss will be granted as to

Plaintiff’s IIED claim (Claim VII) brought against him in his

individual capacity. However, in acknowledgement that the

internal actions Defendant Dalton took after receiving

Plaintiff’s verbal complaint are facts largely “within the

possession and control of the defendant,” see Mystic Retreat Med

Spa & Weight Loss Ctr., 615 F. Supp. 3d at 385, Plaintiff’s

claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

B. Sheriff Lemons’ Argument for Governmental Immunity

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts the following state law

claims against various officers of the SCSO in both their

individual and official capacities: assault and battery (Claim

V), (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 160–68); gross negligence (Claim VI),

(id. ¶¶ 169–73), and intentional infliction of emotional

distress (“IIED”) (Claim VII), (id. ¶¶ 174–78).

As opposed to an individual capacity suit where the

plaintiff “seeks recovery from the defendant directly[,] a suit

against a defendant in his official capacity means that the

plaintiff seeks recovery from the entity of which the public

servant defendant is an agent.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489

S.E.2d at 887 (citation omitted). Under North Carolina law,

“official-capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an

action against the governmental entity.” Mullis v. Sechrest, 347

N.C. 548, 554, 495 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1998). Sheriff Lemons argues

that Plaintiff’s state law claims, insofar as they are brought

against SCSO officers in their official capacities, are barred

by governmental immunity. (See Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18) at

13.)

A public official sued in his official capacity – including

a sheriff or sheriff’s deputy - “may raise the defense of

governmental immunity.” See Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 554,

866 S.E.2d at 301. “Under the doctrine of governmental immunity,

. . . public officials are immune from suits alleging negligence8

in the exercise of a governmental function, unless the plaintiff

shows that the . . . public officials waived immunity.” Id. A

8 “A county is also generally immune from suit for

intentional torts of its employees in the exercise of

governmental functions.” See Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 554,

866 S.E.2d at 301 (citation omitted).

county’s “purchase of liability insurance pursuant to N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 153A-435 may waive governmental immunity for both a

county and a sheriff,” except to the extent “the applicable

liability insurance policy excludes a plaintiff’s claim from

coverage.” Id. at 556, 866 S.E.2d at 302. Additionally, a

sheriff’s purchase of a surety bond, as required by N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 162-8, waives governmental immunity, but only “to the

extent of the coverage provided.” See id. at 559–60, 866 S.E.2d

at 304 (citations omitted).

Here, Defendant Sheriff Lemons has produced a copy of

Stokes County’s liability insurance policy for the 2020-2021

fiscal year. (See Def. Lemons’ Ex. 1, Insurance Policy (Doc. 18-

1).)9 The policy includes the same express language, (see id. at

82, 84), that North Carolina courts have repeatedly held does

not waive governmental immunity. See, e.g., Est. of Earley ex

rel. Earley v. Haywood Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 204 N.C. App.

338, 342–43, 694 S.E.2d 405, 409 (2010); Butterfield, 279 N.C.

App. at 556–57, 866 S.E.2d at 302–03. Plaintiff does not

challenge this point. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Lemons’ Mot.

9 Defendant’s liability insurance policy is “integral to the

complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s

authenticity” - thus, this court can consider the policy in

deciding Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Doriety for Est. of

Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670, 679 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir.

2016)).

(Doc. 29) at 12–13.) In accordance with the precedent

established by North Carolina state courts, this court finds

that Stokes County’s purchase of liability insurance did not

waive the SCSO’s governmental immunity.

“Though [this court] conclude[s] that Defendants did not

waive immunity by purchasing liability insurance, [it] must also

consider whether Sheriff [Lemons] waived immunity by purchasing

a sheriff’s bond.” See Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 559, 866

S.E.2d at 304. As stated above, purchase of a sheriff’s bond

“waives the sheriff’s governmental immunity, but only to the

extent of the coverage provided.” Id. at 559, 866 S.E.2d at 304

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).10 The North

Carolina legislature prescribes an avenue for citizens to

recover on these bonds: “Every person injured by the neglect,

misconduct, or misbehavior in office of any . . . sheriff . . .

may institute a suit or suits against said officer or any of

them and their sureties upon their respective bonds for the due

performance of their duties in office . . . .” See N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 58-76-5.

10 This waiver also “extends to the acts of a sheriff’s

deputy, for ‘[t]he acts of the deputy are acts of the sheriff.’”

Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 230 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N.C. 558, 194 S.E. 305, 308

(1937)).

In the present case, “Sheriff Lemons concedes that [SCSO’s]

purchase of the sheriff’s official bond waives governmental

immunity, but . . . only for the $25,000 face amount of the

bond.” (Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 6 (cleaned up); see also

Def. Lemons’ Ex. A, Surety Bond (Doc. 37-1).) This court agrees

that the SCSO’s bond waives governmental immunity, and that it

does so only to the extent of its face value. See Butterfield,

279 N.C. App. at 560–61, 866 S.E.2d at 304–05; White v. Cochran,

229 N.C. App. 183, 190, 748 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2013); Pickens v.

Hendricks, No. 1:21-cv-30, 2024 WL 4181050, at *10 (W.D.N.C.

Sept. 12, 2024) (slip copy).

Defendant Lemons also argues that this waiver of

governmental immunity applies “only as to Plaintiff’s statutory

claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-76-5,” that is, Plaintiff’s

claim for relief asserted against Defendant Western Surety

(Claim VIII). (See Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 6; see also

Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 179–87.) Lemons argues that governmental

immunity has not been waived for the state law tort claims

(Claims V, VI, and VII), and that these claims should be

dismissed insofar as they are asserted against SCSO officers in

their official capacities. (See Def. Lemons’ Br. (Doc. 18) at

21, see also id. at 21 n.3.)

The procedure “to recover on a sheriff’s bond” is well

established under North Carolina precedent: “[A] plaintiff must

join the bond surety as a party to any action against the

sheriff.” Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (M.D.N.C.

2004) (citation omitted); see also Summey v. Barker, 142 N.C.

App. 688, 691, 544 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2001). However, in the

present case, where Plaintiff has joined the bond surety

(Western Surety Company) as a party to the litigation, has

asserted a standalone claim against the surety (Claim VIII), and

has asserted official capacity state law claims against officers

of the SCSO (Claims V, VI, and VII), it is not immediately clear

whether Plaintiff’s claim against the surety, Plaintiff’s claims

against the officers in their official capacities, or both,

should represent his right to recover against the bond should he

prevail on the merits of those claims.

Defendant Lemons cites to authorities which emphasize that

a statutory claim against a bond is a distinct cause of action

from common law tort claims brought against officers in their

official capacities. See Stafford v. Barker, 129 N.C. App. 576,

584–85, 502 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1998); Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App.

29, 40, 407 S.E.2d 611, 617 (1991). Lemons argues that his

purchase of a surety bond waives immunity only for the statutory

claim. (See Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 6–8; Def. Lemons’

Br. (Doc. 18) at 21 n.3.) However, this court notes examples

where state courts appear to permit a plaintiff to rely on

official capacity claims as the vehicle for securing relief

against a surety bond. See, e.g., Summey, 142 N.C. App. at 690–

691, 544 S.E.2d at 265 (denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s negligence claim and citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58–76–

5 for the proposition that “public officers may be sued in their

official capacities”); Smith v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ, 168

N.C. App. 452, 468–69, 608 S.E.2d 399, 411–12 (2005) (affirming

denial of a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent supervision

and retention claim and permitting plaintiff to amend complaint

to add surety as defendant).11

Given this ambiguity, this court chooses to defer

determination – pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(i) – of whether Plaintiff’s eighth claim for relief asserted

against Western Surety, or his fifth, sixth, and seventh claims

for relief asserted against officers of the SCSO in their

official capacities, or both categories of claims, ought to

represent Plaintiff’s right to recover against the bond should

11 The North Carolina Supreme Court has examined the

operative statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58–76–5, in its current

form only once, in Wynn v. Frederick, 385 N.C. 576, 580, 895

S.E.2d 371, 376 (2023). In Wynn, however, the issue before the

court was whether the statute waives immunity for state

magistrates. Id. at 580–81, 895 S.E.2d at 376.

he succeed on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(i) (“[A]ny

defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)-(7) . . . must be heard and

decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until

trial.”).

At this stage, it is enough for this court to reaffirm well

established principles: “To the extent that the Plaintiff may

recover damages against [the SCSO pursuant to state law claims]

his recovery will be limited to the amount of the bond

[($25,000)].” See Pickens, 2024 WL 4181050, at *10; see also

White, 229 N.C. App. at 190, 748 S.E.2d at 339 (“[T]he purchase

of a bond precludes a sheriff from relying upon the protective

embrace of governmental immunity . . . only where the surety is

joined as a party to the action . . . and only to the extent of

the amount of the bond.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)); Butterfield, 279 N.C. App. at 561, 866 S.E.2d at 305

(holding that “governmental immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims in

excess of Sheriff[’s] statutory bond”).

Defendant Lemons’ motion seeking dismissal of the official

capacity tort claims brought against officers of the SCSO

(Claims V, VI, and VII) will be denied.

C. Plaintiff May Not Assert a Direct Cause of Action

Under the North Carolina Constitution

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts

[i]n the alternative, if it is determined that

Defendants [sic] Sheriff Lemons has not waived sovereign

or governmental immunity or that any such waiver does

not allow Plaintiff an adequate remedy at state law,

then Plaintiff asserts a direct cause of action for

violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the North

Carolina Constitution.

(Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 45; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Lemons’ Mot.

(Doc. 29) at 15–17; Def. Lemons’ Reply (Doc. 37) at 8–12.)

This court found that Defendant Lemons has waived

governmental immunity via the purchase of a sheriff’s bond, at

least to the extent of the face value of the bond. Nonetheless,

it will briefly discuss below whether Plaintiff possesses “an

adequate remedy at state law,” and conclude that he does.

In Corum v. University of North Carolina Through Board of

Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992), the Supreme

Court of North Carolina instructed: “[I]n the absence of an

adequate state remedy, one whose state constitutional rights

have been abridged has a direct claim against the State under

our Constitution.” 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d, 276, 289

(1992). The court emphasized that the North Carolina

constitution allows for a direct claim only where “no other

remedy” exists. Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290. More recently,

the North Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed the North Carolina

Supreme Court’s precedent and explained that a Plaintiff has an

“adequate remedy” where: (1) “the remedy addresses the alleged

constitutional injury,” and (2) “the remedy provides the

plaintiff an opportunity to enter the courthouse doors.” Taylor

v. Wake Cnty., 258 N.C. App. 178, 185, 811 S.E.2d 648, 654

(2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, because Plaintiff has a remedy against the SCSO’s

surety and against the SCSO officers in their individual

capacities, Plaintiff has an “adequate remedy” available to him

that both (1) addresses his alleged constitutional injury and

(2) allows him to “enter the courthouse doors.” See id.

Accordingly, Plaintiff may not assert a direct cause of action

under the North Carolina Constitution.

IV. CONCLUSION

Regarding Plaintiff’s four claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, this court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a

§ 1983 Monell claim against the Sheriff of Stokes County (Claim

III), as well as individual capacity § 1983 claims against

Defendant Dalton for supervisory liability (Claim II), against

Defendants Mabe, Wolfe, and Smith for an unreasonable search and

seizure (Claim I), and against Defendant Wolfe for failure to

intervene (Claim IV). Defendants Lemons and Dalton moved to

dismiss Claim III and Claim II, respectively, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). This court found that Plaintiff stated a plausible

Monell claim against Sheriff Lemons under a “condonation” theory

of liability, as well as a plausible § 1983 supervisory liability

claim against Dalton. The individual Defendants named in Claims I

and IV did not seek dismissal of those claims at this stage.

Thus, all four of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims will proceed to

discovery.

Plaintiff’s complaint additionally asserts state law claims

for assault and battery (Claim V), gross negligence (Claim VI),

and IIED (Claim VII), against officers of the SCSO in both their

individual and official capacities. Defendant Dalton, a named

defendant in Claim VI and Claim VII, moved to dismiss the claims

insofar as they are asserted against him in his individual

capacity. This court found that Claim VI is barred against

Defendant Dalton by public official immunity and Claim VII fails

on 12(b)(6) grounds. Both claims will be dismissed against

Defendant Dalton, although the dismissal of Claim VII will be

without prejudice. The other individual Defendants did not seek

dismissal of the state law claims brought against them in their

individual capacities. Thus, Claim V will proceed against all the

named Defendants in their individual capacities, and Claims VI

and VII will proceed against all the named Defendants in their

individual capacities except for Defendant Dalton.

Finally, Defendant Lemons moved to dismiss the state law

claims insofar as they were brought against the named Defendants

in their official capacities, arguing that these claims are

barred by governmental immunity. This court found that the Stokes

County Sheriff’s Office has waived governmental immunity up to

the amount of the face value of the bond and has deferred ruling,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(i), as to whether

that waiver applies to Plaintiff’s official capacity tort claims

(Claims V, VI, and VII) in addition to Plaintiff’s statutory

cause of action asserted against Western Surety (Claim VIII).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Joey Lemons’ Motion

to Dismiss, (Doc. 17), is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Terry Dalton’s Motion

to Dismiss, (Doc. 20), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It

is DENIED as to the claim for § 1983 supervisory liability. It is

GRANTED as to the claim for gross negligence, and this claim is

DISMISSED against Defendant Dalton. It is also GRANTED as to the

claim for IIED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

against Defendant Dalton.

This the 5th day of May, 2025.

Le Minin □□□ Webi

United States District Jud¢ge

=- 4? =-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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