United States v. Edward Brown

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDWARD C. BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

Nos. 2:15-cr-20008 & 2:23-cr-20033 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2025 — DECIDED MAY 5, 2025

____________________

Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.

KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Edward C. Brown was convicted of

distribution and possession of child pornography. After his

prison sentence elapsed, Brown entered supervised release.

During an unannounced visit to Brown’s apartment, a proba-

tion officer discovered and seized an unreported cell phone.

A forensic search revealed that the phone contained 75

thumbnail images of child pornography in an inaccessible

2 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

cache folder. Brown was charged with possession of child

pornography, and a jury convicted him.

On appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evi-

dence. He highlights deficiencies in the forensic digital evi-

dence, including that the 75 thumbnail images lacked

metadata, and argues that there is insufficient basis for a jury

to find that he knowingly possessed child pornography. We

affirm Brown’s conviction.

I. Background

In 2015, Brown pleaded guilty to distribution and posses-

sion of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2).

In June 2022, Brown transferred out of prison to a halfway

house, and in December 2022, he began supervised release. As

part of his terms of supervised release, Brown agreed to let

probation make unannounced visits to his apartment. Proba-

tion also only allowed Brown to have one cell phone and re-

quired him to report that single device.

Probation officers visited Brown’s apartment unan-

nounced on April 13, 2023. They observed a Consumer Cellu-

lar Link II cell phone that Brown had not reported. They

seized the cell phone and sent it off for a forensic search.

The forensic data extraction revealed that the cell phone’s

cache contained 75 thumbnail images of child pornography.

The images were not accessible through the cell phone’s nor-

mal user interface. And the images contained no metadata in-

dicating when they were created, accessed, or modified.

Brown was arrested, and a federal grand jury returned an

indictment charging him with one count of possessing child

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 3

pornography on or about April 13, 2023, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). Brown pleaded not guilty.

In the run-up to trial, the district court granted the govern-

ment’s motion to admit Brown’s prior child pornography

convictions as propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Ev-

idence 414 and to prove knowledge under Federal Rule of Ev-

idence 404(b). It also held that Brown’s supervised release sta-

tus was admissible as evidence.

At the three-day trial, the jury heard testimony from three

government witnesses and two defense witnesses. The gov-

ernment’s first witness, probation officer Michael Bice, testi-

fied to his supervision of Brown and his discovery of the cell

phone. Bice explained that he informed Brown that he could

only use one cell phone, which must be registered with pro-

bation. Brown told Bice he used a Gabb-brand phone, an in-

ternet-restricted phone often “recommended for persons un-

der supervision that have a sex offense conviction.” Bice also

acknowledged that the one-phone restriction was set by pro-

bation and not contained in the court’s conditions of super-

vised release.

Bice recounted the April 2023 visit to Brown’s apartment,

where he seized the Consumer Cellular Link II cell phone that

Brown had not reported to probation. Bice noted that like the

Gabb phone that Brown reported, the Cellular Link II cell

phone could not connect to the internet. He also observed that

the cell phone was powered on when he first saw it because it

rang while it was in the evidence locker.

Next, the government called Jim Kerner, an Urbana, Illi-

nois police detective assigned to the Department of Home-

land Security. Kerner explained that he arrested Brown on

4 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

May 17, 2023, and conducted a search of Brown’s apartment

that failed to uncover anything of evidentiary value.

Kerner additionally testified that he interviewed Brown in

custody, and the government played clips from the interview.

In those videos, Brown recognized that although the unre-

ported phone was not internet accessible, it could receive im-

ages, audio, and video through a Bluetooth connection.

Brown said that he had paid someone to put music and music

videos on the phone but denied ever asking anyone to place

child pornography images on the phone. Brown stated that he

was “not a dummy” and “pretty computer savvy.” He pre-

dicted that any child pornography found on the phone must

be inaccessible to a regular user and stored in “shadow

memory.”

The government also played a portion of the interview

where upon prompting from Kerner, Brown agreed that he

had an interest in “petite women” and “younger, petite girls.”

Brown would not admit that he liked “young” individuals be-

cause he said he was concerned that “young” was not a “safe

word” for him to use. In response to Kerner’s questioning,

Brown insisted he had never touched any children and never

produced child pornography. Yet, he eventually answered

“yes” when Kerner asked Brown if the whole matter was

about the fact that Brown liked to “look at a few pictures

every now and then.”

The third and final government witness was Kurt Ben-

doraitis, an FBI special agent assigned to child exploitation

cases. Bendoraitis testified to his experience in digital extrac-

tion and forensic analysis of electronic devices. Based on the

extracted data, Bendoraitis concluded that Brown was the pri-

mary user of the unreported phone.

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 5

Bendoraitis further testified that he found approximately

75 thumbnail images of “clear and obvious minors engaged

in sex acts with adults or lascivious displays of their genitals”

located in the same cache file location on the phone. 1 Each

thumbnail meant the corresponding full image had been

viewed on the phone at some point. Five of the thumbnails

were briefly shown to the jury.

In addition to the cached thumbnails, Bendoraitis identi-

fied a separate database that contained artifacts of files once

associated with the device. Those artifacts included titles of

file images that were suggestive of child pornography, includ-

ing words like “tiny,” “little,” and “teen,” although the actual

images (including the thumbnails) were no longer accessible.

The data indicated that one such file was viewed or trans-

ferred to the phone on November 27, 2022 at 6:34 a.m. Who-

ever interacted with that file then scrolled through a series of

approximately ten images, pausing for as long as eight

minutes on an image. Bendoraitis conceded that he could not

link the file names to specific pictures and could not say with

certainty that the files were child pornography.

The defense’s first witness was Robert Benesiewicz, a spe-

cial agent with the Department of Homeland Security.

Benesiewicz reiterated the deficiencies in the data, including

the lack of evidence on when the 75 thumbnail images were

created, accessed, or deleted. He agreed it was “very unusual”

for there to be no data associated with the pictures.

1 The parties stipulated to the accuracy of the data extraction, that cell

phones are a means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate commerce,

and that the thumbnail images were child pornography involving minors

under the age of twelve.

6 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

The second and final defense witness was Scott Bokal, who

operated a digital forensics business. Bokal explained that he

had been provided with the data extraction from the phone,

and like Bendoraitis and Benesiewicz, did not find any

metadata associated with the images or any evidence that

Brown interacted with them.

Bokal observed that the data showed the phone was first

turned on in March 2020, with one other date of activity on

July 5, 2021, when a user account named “Me” was created.

Bokal confirmed an earlier statement from Bendoraitis that

several devices, including a Samsung TV and a Gabb phone,

were paired with the phone via Bluetooth on that same day.

The next activity was June 30, 2022, when the phone acquired

a cellular network connection and shortly thereafter “normal

cell phone usage” began.

Brown’s closing argument emphasized the missing

metadata and relied on Bendoraitis and Bokal’s testimony as

an alternative explanation for how the child pornography

thumbnails ended up on the phone: someone else viewed the

images in July 2021 when Brown was still incarcerated. The

government pointed to Brown’s previous child pornography

offenses, his recorded interview statements and his conceal-

ment of the phone from probation, calling on the jurors to use

their “common sense.”

The jury convicted Brown. Brown filed a motion for ac-

quittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 or, alter-

natively, a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-

dure 33. The district court denied the motion. It recognized a

lack of direct evidence that Brown interacted with child por-

nography images, but found there was sufficient circumstan-

tial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Specifically, it

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 7

highlighted Brown’s prior convictions, interview admissions,

and his decision not to report the phone.

The district court sentenced Brown to 78 months’ impris-

onment and a 15-year term of supervised release. At the same

hearing, the district court also revoked Brown’s supervised

release from his prior convictions, sentencing him to 6

months’ imprisonment consecutive to the 78 months, and a

10-year term of supervised release to run concurrently with

the 15 years.

Brown now appeals the denial of his motion for acquittal,

although not the denial of his alternative motion for a new

trial.

II. Analysis

Brown contends that the evidence was insufficient to sup-

port his conviction, focusing solely on whether he “know-

ingly possessed” child pornography images on his cell phone.

18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B). We disagree with Brown. No single

piece of evidence is a smoking gun, but the entire case pre-

sented to the jury was sufficient to support the verdict. De-

spite the flaws in the extracted data, the combination of the 75

thumbnail images and the November 2022 activity suggests

that Brown used the Cellular Link phone to look at child por-

nography. That interpretation of the evidence grows stronger

from other facts introduced at trial: Brown’s prior convictions,

his apparent admission of continued interest in child pornog-

raphy, his technological knowledge, and his failure to tell pro-

bation about the phone.

Our review here is deferential. “De novo review applies to

the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal; practically

speaking, however, the standard of review is that for

8 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d

1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016). “[W]e review the evidence pre-

sented at trial in the light most favorable to the government

and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States

v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 924 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting

United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2021)). We

do not reassess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence.

United States v. Farmer, 38 F.4th 591, 602 (7th Cir. 2022). Ulti-

mately, we overturn a conviction “only where no rational jury

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391, 397 (7th Cir.

2017).

A. Brown’s “Possession” of Images

Before we evaluate the evidence, we must confront a

threshold question: what, exactly, was Brown convicted of

possessing? The 75 cached thumbnail images only existed be-

cause the original full-size images were also at one point on

the phone, but at a basic technical level, the thumbnails are

not the same files.

Under 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B), an individual commits a

crime when he “knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses

with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, vid-

eotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an

image of child pornography....” The indictment charged

simply that Brown “knowingly possessed” images of child

pornography “[o]n or about April 13, 2023.” Portions of the

government’s argument at trial, as well as its briefing on ap-

peal, imply that Brown was prosecuted for knowing posses-

sion of the 75 thumbnail images.

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 9

If that is the theory of the case, we have concerns. Recall

that the images were found in the cache of a flip phone. Based

on the testimony elicited at trial, neither Brown nor any other

person interacting with the phone’s user interface would have

been able to access the thumbnail images or see that the

thumbnails were on the phone. Law enforcement only discov-

ered the thumbnails with forensic extraction software. There

is evidence that Brown was aware of the general principle that

deleted images can remain in a cache folder—which he re-

ferred to as “shadow memory”—but no evidence that Brown

was using the cache folder as a hiding place.

Without evidence that Brown could access the images, or

knew he could obtain the means of access, we cannot say he

was in “possession” of the images on April 13, 2023. That con-

clusion follows from our prior statements in this area. In

United States v. Seiver, we said that if a defendant who pos-

sessed child pornography “deleted the incriminating files”

such that the files were not accessible through a device’s user

interface, he no longer knowingly possessed those files if he

“could no longer access them because he lacked the software

that he would have needed to be able to recover them from

the hard drive’s slack space.” 692 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 2012).

To be sure, this language is dicta: Seiver was not a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for

possession of child pornography. Instead, it held that because

forensic evidence of child pornography tends to persist even

after a user has deleted the images, a warrant to search a com-

puter that was reasonably believed to contain child pornogra-

phy seven months beforehand was supported by probable

cause. Id. at 776–78. But we see no reason to question Sevier’s

logic.

10 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

Indeed, as Seiver observed, several of our sister circuits

have reached the same conclusion. The Tenth Circuit has ex-

plained that the “ordinary, everyday meaning” definition of

“possession” requires an individual to have “control” over a

“material or immaterial” item. United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d

1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Dobbs, 629

F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2011) (overturning conviction for re-

ceipt, not possession, of child pornography because the gov-

ernment presented no evidence that the defendant knew of or

could access images in his computer’s cache). The Fifth Cir-

cuit similarly held that a defendant cannot be convicted for

possessing digital images that were “not in plain view” on a

computer’s interface and “accessible only to a knowledgeable

person using special computer software, [when] there was no

circumstantial indicium that established that [the defendant]

knew of the images or had the ability to access them.” United

States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 152 (5th Cir. 2011). And the

Ninth Circuit has also agreed, overturning a conviction when

“[n]o evidence indicated that on or about April 13, 2004, [the

defendant] could recover or view any of the charged images

in unallocated space or that he even knew of their presence

there” and the government conceded “it presented no evi-

dence that [the defendant] had the forensic software required

to see or access the files.” United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911,

920 (9th Cir. 2011).

We think the prevailing approach to possession is sound,

but we emphasize that the existence of inaccessible child por-

nography images on a device can be strong evidence of previ-

ous possession of child pornography. See Seiver, 695 F.3d at

775 (“Even if he had deleted the child pornography, a success-

ful recovery of the images from his hard drive by an FBI com-

puter forensic expert would establish that he had possessed

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 11

them at one time, well within the five-year statute of limita-

tions.”); see also United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432, 443 (8th

Cir. 2017) (“[T]hough the ninety-five thumbnail images on the

Hitachi hard drive were not viewable without special soft-

ware, they nonetheless constituted evidence of prior posses-

sion of child pornography.”). In addition, we understand

technology is constantly progressing, and we advise that

nothing in this opinion should be taken to question the con-

viction of a defendant who used technical proficiency to hide

images of child pornography. The inquiry into whether a de-

fendant had possession over an image is fact-specific.

That brings us back to Brown. Although we cannot say

that there is sufficient evidence that Brown knowingly pos-

sessed child pornography on April 13, 2023, Brown conceded

that the thumbnails are derivative of identical full-size im-

ages, proving the Cellular Link phone contained accessible

child pornography at some point.

Importantly, the government did not need to show that

Brown knowingly possessed child pornography on the exact

date of April 13, 2023. “Where the indictment alleges that an

offense allegedly occurred ‘on or about’ a certain date, the de-

fendant is deemed to be on notice that the charge is not lim-

ited to a specific date.” United States v. Leibowitz, 857 F.2d 373,

379 (7th Cir. 1988). The jury instructions here accurately re-

flected that the “government must prove that the crime hap-

pened reasonably close to the date. The government is not re-

quired to prove that the crime happened on the exact date.”

Plus, the indictment and jury instructions did not refer specif-

ically to the thumbnail images, instead charging Brown more

generally with possession of “material, being photographs,

containing images of child pornography....” Brown’s “defense

12 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

counsel affirmatively approve[d]” the jury instructions in this

case, so he “waives his right to challenge them on appeal.”

United States v. Bell, 28 F.4th 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2022).

So, we are able to view the thumbnails as evidence of the

charged offense. The thumbnails were a way for the govern-

ment to talk about and establish Brown’s knowing possession

of the original child pornography images, even though those

images disappeared from the cell phone before April 13, 2023.

Having said that, we have delineated limits on the vari-

ance between the date charged in an indictment and the evi-

dence presented, depending on the offense and whether the

delay was prejudicial to the defendant. See United States v.

Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2005). For instance, with felon-

in-possession firearm charges, “a few weeks of variance is al-

lowable” but eight and nine month variances between the ev-

idence and the date alleged in the indictment are generally

impermissible. United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 466–

67 (7th Cir. 2016). In this case, while the maximum variance is

an admittedly long nine and a half months (starting from

Brown’s release and acquisition of the Cellular Link phone in

June 2022), we see no prejudice because the probative value

of the evidence had little to do with the timing of events

within that window. Even if the jury believed it was convict-

ing Brown for possessing the thumbnails on April 13, 2023, it

could have only reached that conclusion if it also believed

Brown possessed the original images at an earlier time. Brown

knew what he was accused of, and his theory of defense ac-

cordingly relied on the proposition that the thumbnails were

a vestige of activity from before he took possession of the

phone. The trial was about the government’s burden to prove

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 13

otherwise. Our job now is to assess whether the government

did enough to meet that burden.

B. The Evidence Supports Brown’s Conviction

We start by saying, once again, that the forensic evidence

of the 75 cached thumbnails is far from conclusive. Standing

alone, that data establishes only that Brown owned a phone

that was used to view child pornography at an unknown

point in time. Compare the facts here to United States v. Chap-

arro, where “[f]orensic analysis of the smartphone showed

that a user performed searches for terms related to child por-

nography on the morning of November 24, 2014” and uncov-

ered that “[t]he smartphone had saved to its memory thumb-

nail versions of child pornography images that a user viewed

that morning.” 956 F.3d 462, 471 (7th Cir. 2020). There was

powerful evidence that the defendant was the same user: of-

ficers seized the smartphone from him eight days later, and a

text sent on November 24, 2014 identified the defendant as the

sender. Id. at 471–72. The data-based case against Brown is

different—and weaker. With no timestamp information for

the creation of the 75 thumbnails, the government cannot

prove Brown’s knowing possession of child pornography by

reference to his close-in-time activity on the phone. 2

Still, the forensic data may not reveal when the 75 thumb-

nails (and therefore the original images) were created, but it

2 Brown argues a jury cannot infer a defendant’s knowledge solely

based on evidence that a device containing child pornography was in his

exclusive possession. We have not spoken on that issue and we have no

occasion to do so here. The government did not rely on an exclusive pos-

session theory and asked the jury to infer Brown’s knowledge from the

totality of the evidence.

14 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

does tell us that in November 2022, the user of the phone in-

teracted with about 10 images with file names indicative of

child pornography.3 Although we cannot know the content of

those files with certainty, our suspicion from the names is bol-

stered by the fact that the files were located on a device that

was indisputably used to store other images of child pornog-

raphy.

If the November 2022 files were likely child pornogra-

phy—which would have been a reasonable way for the jury

to view the evidence—the forensic data is much more incrim-

inating. There is no evidence that anyone other than Brown

was using the phone at the time. It would stretch the govern-

ment’s case too far to argue that the November 2022 files

could be “knowing possession” of child pornography that

sustains Brown’s conviction. But when it appears plausible

that Brown viewed child pornography on the phone at least

once, it becomes more probable that he was also responsible

for the 75 images captured as thumbnails.

That leads, naturally, to Brown’s prior convictions. Fed-

eral Rule of Evidence 414 “constitutes an exception to the rule

that evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show a de-

fendant’s propensity to commit the offense charged.” United

States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2011); see also

United States v. Foley, 740 F.3d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 2014) (stat-

ing that Rule 414 applies to possession of child pornography).

Said differently, “it is not improper to draw the inference

that the defendant committed this sexual offense because he

has a propensity to do so.” Loughry, 660 F.3d at 969 (quoting

United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009)).

3 For example, “little-teen-accidental-flash.jpg.”

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 15

Nevertheless, evidence admitted under Rule 414 is not a

shortcut to defeat a sufficiency challenge. Just as a jury may

not convict because “it is appalled by a prior crime the de-

fendant committed rather than persuaded that he committed

the crime charged,” Rogers, 587 F.3d at 822, our appellate re-

view must be a safeguard against that possibility. We must

consider exactly how a prior offense logically supports a de-

fendant’s guilt.

Here, Brown’s “criminal history is proof of his long-stand-

ing sexual interest in children, and a reasonable trier of fact

could find that it establishes motive beyond any reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Niggemann, 881 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir.

2018). It shows not only his desires but also that he prefers to

act upon them through viewing child pornography. Cf. United

States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The motive

to molest children does not completely overlap with the pro-

pensity to possess, transport, or advertise child pornogra-

phy.”). It would usually be a shock to find out that any given

person was charged with possessing child pornography. We

cannot say the same for Brown.

Beyond Rule 414, the jury saw evidence—portions of

Brown’s recorded interview with Kerner—that Brown’s pre-

dilection toward possessing child pornography persisted af-

ter his prior convictions and release from incarceration. De-

pending on how the listener interprets Brown’s responses to

Kerner, Brown may have outright admitted that he continued

to enjoy looking at child pornography. An alternative inter-

pretation is that Brown was merely acknowledging his past

offenses or got tripped up by Kerner’s questions. Either way,

Brown was focused on whether it was “safe” for him to admit

what he was attracted to. Brown also explained his familiarity

16 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

with technology, including an awareness that the Bluetooth

transfers that put music onto the phone could have been used

to transfer child pornography onto the phone, and he specu-

lated how the phone’s storage might have retained unviewa-

ble thumbnails from previously accessed child pornography.

Under our obligation to construe Brown’s statements in the

manner most favorable to the government, this evidence am-

plifies the other signals that Brown had both a motive and

means of committing the charged offense.

Finally, and especially considering the forensic data and

Brown’s sexual proclivities, it is difficult to devise an innocu-

ous explanation for why Brown did not disclose the Cellular

Link phone to probation. 4 The jury saw Brown’s statement

that he thought he was okay to have multiple phones if only

one was in service. Putting aside the evidence that the Cellu-

lar Link phone was in service, because it rang after it was

seized, Bice testified that probation is clear with supervisees

that the one phone rule applies regardless of service. Brown

only told probation about his Gabb phone, so despite Brown’s

contention that the Cellular Link phone was in open view in

his apartment, a reasonable jury could infer that he was trying

to hide it from probation. And why would Brown hide it? He

used the Cellular Link phone to listen to music and watch mu-

sic videos, but there is no evidence that he was unable to do

that on the Gabb phone too. The inference is both obvious and

incriminating.

4 Brown correctly says that the conditions of supervised release set by

the district court did not limit him to one phone, but he does not argue

probation lacked authority to impose that restriction.

Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 17

In response to the many signs of guilt, Brown put forward

a defense theory that the thumbnails were already on the Cel-

lular Link phone when he acquired it. Yes, the forensic data

showed Bluetooth activity on the Cellular Link phone on one

occasion while Brown was incarcerated, and yes, as Brown’s

closing noted, the Cellular Link phone was the type of non-

internet capable device that a sex offender might use. In iso-

lation, it is not impossible that Brown was unlucky enough to

take possession of a phone that someone else once used to

look at child pornography. 5 Yet when one remembers that

Brown owned the phone surreptitiously and very likely used

it to look at pornography that at the very least played to his

admitted ongoing sexual interest in young individuals, that

scenario becomes very unlikely. The government held the

burden of proof, but Brown’s attempt at offering his own ver-

sion of events was weak.

Taken as a whole, the evidence that Brown knowingly

possessed child pornography was significant. The shortfalls

in the forensic data were addressed by the circumstantial ev-

idence of Brown’s proclivities and behavior. 6 See Chaparro, 956

F.3d at 469 (looking at the “circumstantial evidence that

5 During his interview with Kerner, Brown wondered out loud

whether the person he paid to put music on the phone also put child por-

nography on it. Brown’s closing argument addressed this possibility only

in passing and primarily relied on the previous-user theory. In any event,

there is no evidence that such a mysterious transfer was responsible for

the existence of the thumbnails.

6 The district court allowed the government to introduce Brown’s su-

pervised release as evidence; Brown does not challenge that decision on

appeal. We note that although Brown’s release status provided context for

his restricted phone usage and the search of his apartment, it is not itself

evidence of guilt.

18 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582

[defendant] was the user” of a hard drive containing child

pornography); see also United States v. Memar, 906 F.3d 652, 656

(7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]here is nothing wrong with circumstantial

evidence of guilt.”). Thus, the jury had a sufficient basis to

find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

One last issue. Brown argued that if we reverse his convic-

tion, we should also overturn the revocation of his supervised

release because the district court relied on Brown’s conviction

as the sole basis for revocation. See, e.g., United States v. Flem-

ing, 9 F.3d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen the probationer

has been convicted of the offense, there is sufficient evidence

to meet the lower revocation standard.”). We uphold his con-

viction, so the argument is moot.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.