RIYAZ v. INTEGRA LIFE SCIENCES

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ZAFAR RIYAZ,

Plaintiff,

Vv. Civil Action No. 24-9861 (MAS) (JTQ)

INTEGRA LIFE SCIENCES, MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Zafar Riyaz’s (“Plaintiff’)

Complaint (ECF No. 1), and application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP’”) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 1-2). Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established

indigence and grants the IFP Application. Having granted Plaintiff IFP status, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must screen his Complaint. For the reasons set forth below,

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

1. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a discharged employee, alleges that Integra Life Sciences (“Defendant”),

particularly his supervisor, Iris Rodriguez, terminated his employment and failed to accommodate

his disability on November 3, 2023.! (See Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that he

' Although the Complaint names Iris Rodriguez as the defendant on page three, the caption names

Integra Life Sciences as the defendant on page two; accordingly, the Court evaluates the Complaint

with Integra Life Sciences as Defendant. (Compl. 3.) If Plaintiff wishes to bring claims against Iris

Rodriguez instead of, or in addition to Integra Life Sciences, he may indicate such by amending

the caption of the Complaint.

injured his neck and shoulder while lifting boxes and that Defendant discriminated against him

based on said disability. Ud.) Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (the “EEOC”) on April 29, 2024. (/d. at 7.) Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to

Sue from the EEOC on July 20, 2024. (/d.) Plaintiff filed the instant suit on October 15, 2024,

alleging discrimination in employment pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991

(the “ADA”) and seeking reinstatement of his job. (/d. at 5, 8.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

An IFP application “is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to

the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The Court, accordingly, must

carefully review an application and “if convinced that [the applicant] is unable to pay the court

costs and filing fees, the [Court will grant leave to proceed [IFP].” Douris v. Middletown

Township, 293 F. App’x 130, 132 (Gd Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss a case at any time if the court determines that “the

action ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)G)-(iii).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)[ ] is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to [Rule]

12(b)(6).” Conner v. Reed, No. 21-14193, 2020 WL 138100, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2022) (quoting

Schreane vy. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint

and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Phillips v. County

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A

complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss but must

contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it

provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” /d. (quoting Beil □□□□

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court construes

pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than those

filed by attorneys, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but “pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2019).

Il. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application.

The Court must carefully review Plaintiff's IFP Application, and “if convinced that [the

applicant] is unable to pay the courts cost and filing fees, the [C]Jourt will grant leave to proceed

in forma pauperis.” Douris, 293 F. App’x at 132 (citing Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,

1084 n.5 (Gd Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff's IFP Application is complete and indicates that he is

unemployed and possesses no savings or assets aside from $800 in cash. (See IFP Appl., ECF No.

1-2.) Plaintiff states neither he nor his spouse had an income source during the past twelve months,

that his son is supporting them financially, and that he does not expect changes in the near future.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has established indigence and grants the IFP Application. See

Hickson vy. Mauro, No. 11-6304, 2011 WL 6001088, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (“The decision

to grant or deny an IFP application is based solely on the economic eligibility of the [plaintiff].”

(citing Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 Gd Cir. 1976)).

B. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Plaintiff's Complaint in the instant litigation asserts claims solely based on the ADA.

(Compl. 5-6.) The District Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’ s

ADA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The ADA “prohibits a range of discriminatory employment

practices, including termination of a qualified individual on the basis of disability and failure to

provide reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee.” Meggiolaro vy. Lagniappe

Pharmacy Servs., Transaction Data Sys., Inc., No. 16-3407, 2016 WL 5660432, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept.

29, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)).

L. Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff must adequately

allege that: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise

qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations

by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of

discrimination.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gaul

v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)). Here, Plaintiff does not allege—and a liberal

reading of his Complaint does not suggest—that Defendant violated the ADA. (See Compl.)

The first prong of a discrimination claim requires Plaintiff to establish himself as a disabled

person within the meaning of the ADA. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306. A person is “disabled” under the

ADA if he has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities,” has “a record of such impairment,” or was “regarded as having such an impairment.”

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” if “the individual

establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited . . . because of an actual or

perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to

limit a major life activity.” /d. § 12102(3)(A). Here, the Complaint contains only a bald assertion

that Plaintiff has a “disability,” presumably as a result of the unspecified injury Plaintiff suffered

“TwIhile lifting boxes.” (Compl. 6-7.) Without more, the factual allegations in the Complaint are

insufficient to meet the first prong of the ADA analysis because Plaintiff has failed to provide

sufficient facts that would allow the Court to determine whether Plaintiff is a disabled person

within the meaning of the ADA, as described above. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Quick Check Store No.

129, No. 12-3300, 2013 WL 6623923, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2013) (finding general allegations of

pain in hands and back and “permanent injuries,” without more, insufficient to support the first

prong of an ADA claim).

The second element of a discrimination claim requires Plaintiff to adequately allege that

“he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable

accommodations by the employer.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306 (quoting Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580); see

also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Complaint, however, does not contain any factual allegations

regarding the essential functions of Plaintiffs former position, let alone whether he could perform

those functions with or without accommodation. (See generally Compl.) As such, the Complaint

does not satisfy the second prong of an ADA claim.

Lastly, the third requirement to state a discrimination claim requires Plaintiff to adequately

allege that he “suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.”

Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306 (citing Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580). The Complaint does not include any factual

allegations that link Plaintiff's termination with his alleged disability. (See generally Compl.)

Indeed, the Complaint does not include any factual allegations about the circumstances or timing

of Plaintiffs termination. (See generally Compl.) At this juncture, the Court, without more, cannot

infer a plausible, causal connection between Plaintiff's alleged disability and the termination of

his employment. See Gist v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 14-6449, 2015 WL 4619518, at *3

(D.N.J. July 31, 2105) (finding the facts in the complaint so sparse that the Court “cannot even

determine what temporal relationship existed between Plaintiffs request for accommodations and

his termination in order to possibly infer a causal connection’’).

Since Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to adequately allege any prong of his ADA

discrimination claim, it is accordingly dismissed.

2. Failure to Accommodate

To adequately plead a prima facie failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, Plaintiff

must allege that: “(1) he was disabled and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an

accommodation or assistance; (3) his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he

could have been reasonably accommodated.” Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir.

2006).

Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the first requirement—that he was disabled and his

employer knew it—and the second requirement—that he requested an accommodation or

assistance. (See generally Compl.) The employee, to trigger the employer’s obligations, must “give

notice that ‘make[s] clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.”” Honauer

v. N. Jersey Truck Ctr., No 19-8947, 2020 WL 5422824, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2020) (alteration

in original) (quoting Taylor, 185 F.3d at 311). The key to the request is “whether the employee

‘provides the employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can

&

be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.’” Jd. (quoting

Taylor, 185 F.3d at 313). There are no facts in the Complaint to indicate that Plaintiff made such

an accommodation request. See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 Gd Cir.

2003) (“[E]ither by direct communication or other appropriate means, the employee ‘must make

clear that [he] wants assistance for [his] disability.’””) (quoting Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214

F.3d 402, 408 Gd Cir. 2000)).

The third requirement—his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist—and fourth

requirement—he could have been reasonably accommodated—are also not satisfied for the same

reasons stated above. There is neither an indication that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's

disability nor any request from Plaintiff for an accommodation. It follows that the Court cannot

infer whether Defendant failed to make good faith efforts to assist. By extension, the Court cannot

determine whether Plaintiff could have reasonably been accommodated because the Complaint

lacks any facts concerning what accommodation Plaintiff allegedly requested, let alone what could

be reasonably accommodated. See Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir.

2000) (explaining that a plaintiff may not recover in a failure to accommodate claim “without

showing that a reasonable accommodation was possible”).

While the Court remains sympathetic to Plaintiffs circumstances, Plaintiff fails to state a

failure to accommodate claim under the ADA. The Court, therefore, dismisses the Complaint.

Plaintiff will have an opportunity to file an amended complaint to fix the deficiencies that the Court

has identified in this Memorandum Opinion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the Complaint. The Court will issue an order

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MICHAEL A. Gripe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE