BILLY BOY REAL ESTATE LLC v. UPPER MERION TOWNSHIP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BILLY BOY REAL ESTATE LLC, : CIVIL ACTION

BILLY BOY CONTRACTING LLC, :

EDDIE HENDRICK :

:

v. : No. 24-5559

:

UPPER MERION TOWNSHIP, UPPER :

MERION TOWNSHIP BOARD OF :

SUPERVISORS, TINA GARZILLO, :

WILLIAM JENAWAY, GREG WAKS, :

GREG PHILIPS, CAROLE KENNEY, :

ANTHONY HAMADAY :

MEMORANDUM

KEARNEY, J. May 1, 20251

We today address concerns arising when a local government takes real property for

recreational purposes which has the effect of depriving a minority-owned business from closing

on a purchase of the real property for its business. A largely commercial and mostly White

populated township has long looked to acquire over an acre of property adjacent to land it already

owned for public space. It attempted unsuccessfully to purchase this property several times. The

property owner—a White man—instead agreed to sell the property to a minority-owned business.

The owner of the minority-owned business, a Black man, seemingly did not know of the

township’s longstanding interest in this property when he first orally agreed and later signed a

contract to purchase the property. The township declared its intent to take the property by way of

condemnation and pay fair compensation under Pennsylvania law. Both the White property owner

and the minority businessowner hoping to close on the sale sued in state court objecting to the

condemnation. One of their objections accused the Township of racial animus. The state court

judge held an extensive evidentiary hearing and made specific findings, including finding no

evidence of racial animus. The minority businessowner nevertheless sued the township and its

supervisors for violating his equal protection and due process rights as well as Pennsylvania state

law claims for abuse of process and tortious interference with his agreement to purchase the land.

It seems the state court judge decided the same issue and we would be precluded from

revisiting the factual basis of this issue, but the township does not specifically argue this point

(although it pleaded issue preclusion as an affirmative defense months ago). So, we turn to

evaluating the evidence after discovery. We find the minority businessowner did not adduce

evidence the township’s decision to condemn this land was motivated by racial animus. We

understand he is disappointed in losing this business opportunity, but his disappointment cannot

be directed towards the township. We grant the township and its supervisors summary judgment

dismissing the federal claims with prejudice and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the two state law claims.

I. Undisputed Material Facts

Louis A. Damiani owns a 1.13-acre parcel containing a large garage facility and enough

open land to store large trucks in Upper Merion Township (the Property).2 Upper Merion is a

predominantly White township, and White-owned businesses occupied the Property from the early

1950s until January 2023.3

The Township’s interest in purchasing the Property.

The Township has owned three parcels of real estate adjacent to the Property for decades:

one parcel occupied by Walker Park, and two additional parcels of land which make up the Mullen

Tract.4 The Township purchased the Walker Park parcel almost seventy years ago; it purchased the

Mullen Tract parcels thirty years ago.5 A creek and wooded area separate the Township’s parcels

of real estate from the Property.6

The Township has long been interested in acquiring the Property because it is adjacent to

Walker Park and the Mullen Tract.7 The Township considered multiple possible uses for the

Property: to create a dog park, to expand the land adjacent to a path through the Mullen Tract

known as the Crow Creek Trail, to provide extra land next to the athletic fields, to move baseball

fields at risk of flooding, or simply to create more active open space.8

The Township tried to buy the Property and appraised its value multiple times over the

years. The Township, for example, offered to buy the Property from Mr. Damiani in 2008 but Mr.

Damiani rejected the offer as too low.9 The Township contracted with an appraisal company to

conduct an appraisal of the Property in 2009.10 Years passed. The Township learned in 2020 Mr.

Damiani might be interested in selling the Property.11 Mr. Damiani granted Township Manager

Anthony Hamaday leave to appraise the Property in August 2021.12 This 2021 appraisal placed the

Property’s value between $940,000 and $970,000.13 The Township’s Board of Supervisors

included the prospective purchase of the Property in its 2022 budget and bond issue, which also

involved the potential condemnation of other properties.14

Mr. Damiani makes other plans.

But Mr. Damiani had other plans for the Property. Eddie Hendrick, the African American

owner of a local trucking businesses, had been operating his business out of neighboring East

Norriton Township when someone told him he should speak to Mr. Damiani about a possible new

location for his business.15 Mr. Hendrick’s business, Billy Boy Contracting, LLC, provides contract

work, hauling, excavation, and utility services for the City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia

Airport.16 Mr. Hendrick contacted Mr. Damiani about buying the Property and the two men had a

series of conversations sometime before August 2022.17 The sale agreement between Mr. Hendrick

and Mr. Damiani began as an informal arrangement.18 They started with a “handshake agreement”

because they wanted to give Mr. Hendrick time to improve the Property to the point he could

operate his business from it comfortably before entering a formal agreement.19 Mr. Damiani did

not tell Mr. Hendrick about the Township’s earlier attempts to purchase the Property.20

The Township renews its efforts to acquire the Property.

Township Manager Hamaday visited the Property in August 2022 and again asked Mr.

Damiani if he would consider selling the Property.21 Mr. Damiani told Township Manager

Hamaday he had already sold the Property to Eddie Hendrick and/or a company called Billy Boy

for $2 million.22 Township Manager Hamaday asked Mr. Damiani to have Mr. Hendrick contact

him.23

Township Manager Hamaday then conducted an internet search and identified Billy Boy

as a minority-owned business.24 He told Tina Garzillo, the Chair of the Township’s Board of

Supervisors, Mr. Damiani had agreed to sell the Property to a minority-owned business.25 The

Township became unsure whether a sale actually occurred when the Township Solicitor checked

the Recorder of Deeds and found no deed transfer for the Property.26

Mr. Hendrick called Township Manager Hamaday at some point in 2022 or 2023 and told

him the Property “was under agreement;” Township Manager Hamaday asked Mr. Hendrick to call

the Township if the sale went through because the Township wanted to buy it.27

Mr. Hendrick improves the Property and formalizes his agreement to purchase it.

Mr. Hendrick moved his business to the Property in August or September of 2022 under

his informal arrangement with Mr. Damiani.28 He worked on the Property for three or four months

until he felt comfortable he could operate his business from there.29 He and Mr. Damiani decided

to finalize their agreement at the end of 2022.30 Their attorneys drafted an agreement of sale

confirming Mr. Hendrick would purchase the Property from Mr. Damiani for $1.5 million.31 Mr.

Hendrick would pay Mr. Damiani two sums of $300,000 each and would then have five years to

pay the remainder of the $1.5 Million purchase price.32 The parties signed the agreement in January

2023.33 Mr. Hendrick made payments to Mr. Damiani from January 2023 through September

2024.34

The Township waited to see if the Property would transfer to a new owner, but by the end

of December 2023, it still had not transferred.35

The Township’s interest in other properties at the same time.

The Township discussed acquiring other properties for open space including a parcel

adjacent to Hauser Park owned by Norfolk Southern Railroad, another portion of railroad property

partitioned and sold to contractors, and a third property along the Schuylkill River and the

Township’s boathouse owned by a landscaping company.36 The Township has had each of these

properties appraised.37 Its intended purpose for these properties would be to add open space to

adjoining properties already owned by the Township.38 The Township is also in the process of

purchasing a property on Henderson Road named the “Rossi Property” to complete a roadway for

access into a new development.39 The Township considered condemning the property but

ultimately entered an agreement with the property owner to instead purchase the property.40

The Township condemns the Property.

The Township decided to condemn the Property despite its muddled ownership status in

late 2023.41 The Township did not reach out to or try to negotiate with Mr. Hendrick.42 The

Township re-appraised the Property in early 2024.43 The 2024 appraisal placed the Property’s value

at $912,000.44 The Township Board of Supervisors held an executive session to discuss legal and

real estate matters on March 21, 2024, and adopted a resolution to condemn the Property at a public

meeting later the same day.45 The Property still had not been transferred to Mr. Hendrick at the

time the condemnation proceedings began in March 2024.46 Township Manager Hamaday

personally delivered the condemnation notice to Mr. Damiani.47 Mr. Damiani told Mr. Hendrick

of the condemnation on April 8, 2024.48

Mr. Hendricks unsuccessfully challenges the taking in state court.

The Township filed a declaration of taking in the Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas on March 22, 2024.49 The Township stated purpose for condemning the Property was for

recreational use and benefit of the public.50 Mr. Hendrick petitioned to intervene in the

condemnation proceedings on April 25, 2024.51 He alleged the Township condemned the Property

for an unlawful and improper purpose as racially motivated and intended to exclude a minority

business owner from the Township.52 Mr. Damiani, as record owner, filed preliminary objections

to the Declaration of taking a few days later.53 Mr. Damiani joined Mr. Hendrick in alleging racial

animus motivated the Township to condemn the Property.54

The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted Mr. Hendrick’s petition to

intervene, and Judge Tolliver held an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary objections.55 Judge

Tolliver then issued an Order and Memorandum overruling the preliminary objections.56 He found

no evidence adduced at the hearing allowing him to find fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion

as to the Township’s stated purpose for the taking.57 No evidence established racial motivations

for the taking as “the Township is expanding the land it already owns . . . .”58 Judge Tolliver

directed the Township pay to the court the estimated just compensation of $905,524.04 (derived

from the Property’s appraised value of $912,000 minus unpaid real estate taxes), to be held in

escrow.59 Judge Tolliver further directed Mr. Hendrick and Mr. Damiani to proceed in the pending

case to a final determination of the just compensation.60

Messrs. Hendrick and Damiani timely petitioned to appoint a board of viewers on

November 4, 2024.61 Judge Tolliver granted the petition three days later and appointed a board to

determine and report to the Court the total just compensation and damages to be awarded for the

condemnation.62 Messrs. Hendrick and Damiani petitioned to distribute estimated just

compensation to acquire alternative property on December 10, 2024.63 The Township filed a writ

of ejectment on January 3, 2025.64 The parties filed a stipulation in state court on February 5, 2025

providing, among other things: Mr. Damiani was the sole legal titled owner of the Property before

the taking; Messrs. Hendrick and Damiani agreed to a distribution of just compensation between

themselves; any additional damages awarded in the condemnation proceeds would be issued solely

to Mr. Damiani; Mr. Hendrick had an equitable interest in the ongoing use of the Property; Mr.

Hendrick could seek damages as a tenant through the board of viewers for relocation costs; and,

although Mr. Hendrick made improvements to the Property, he cannot seek damages from the

Township for those improvements.65 The parties further agreed the Township would withdraw its

writ of ejectment and Mr. Damiani and/or Mr. Hendrick would have ninety days to vacate the

Property after Judge Tolliver signed their stipulation.66 Judge Tolliver recognized the stipulation

as part of the record and ordered the Prothonotary to pay Mr. Damiani the $905,524 estimated just

compensation held in escrow.67 The Prothonotary disbursed the money on February 20, 2025.68

The condemnation proceeding is still pending as the board of viewers has not yet rendered

a decision concerning the total just compensation and damages to be awarded.69 Mr. Hendrick

recovered $600,000 from Mr. Damiani post-condemnation but did not receive compensation for

his improvements to the Property.70 He moved his equipment from the Property to a new location

in Phoenixville.71

Mr. Hendrick then sues here again claiming racial animus.

Mr. Hendrick and his minority-owned entities sued the Township and its Board of

Supervisors in this Court on October 20, 2024—approximately one month after Judge Tolliver

overruled Mr. Damiani’s preliminary objections and found no evidence of racial animus.72 He

alleged, notwithstanding Judge Tolliver’s detailed findings, the Township condemned the Property

based on its racial animus intended to exclude a Black-owned business from the predominantly

White Township in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause.73 He also

pleaded state law claims for abuse of process and tortious interference with contractual relations.74

II. Analysis

The Township now moves for summary judgment.75 Mr. Hendrick opposes.76 We grant

summary judgment in favor of the Township on all claims finding no genuine issue of material

fact on the federal claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the abuse of

process and tortious interference claims.

A. The state court already decided Mr. Hendrick’s racial animus claims which

may result in issue preclusion but the Township did not argue preclusion.

The fact Mr. Hendrick asks us to find the Township’s racial animus after Judge Tolliver

found no evidence of racial animus should trigger a federal lawyer’s scrutiny as to how a federal

court can now review the same issue. The Township apparently thought of issue preclusion as

evidenced in its affirmative defenses. But it today argues a different theory. The Township argues

we cannot overturn Judge Tolliver’s post-hearing decision finding no racial animus under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.77 Mr. Hendrick does not respond to this argument but we cannot ignore

the obvious concern.

The Township chose the wrong theory to argue on summary judgment although it plead the

correct affirmative defense. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Four requirements must

be met for Rooker-Feldman to apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff

‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered

before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and

reject the state judgments.”78 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction in

federal court where “the federal plaintiff [is] complaining of legal injury caused by a state court

judgment because of a legal error committed by the state court.”79 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not bar our jurisdiction where the plaintiff “is complaining of legal injury caused by the

adverse party.”80 “If a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies

a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . ., then there is

jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of

preclusion.’”81

The facts today do not preclude us from exercising our jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.

Mr. Hendrick alleges the Township caused his alleged injuries, not Judge Tolliver’s decision. We

do not read his Complaint as asking us to vacate or overrule Judge Tolliver’s decision despite the

fact we would have to disregard Judge Tolliver’s legal conclusions to find the Township acted out

of racial animus. The problem of denying a state judge’s legal conclusion is not a jurisdictional

issue under Rooker-Feldman; it is a preclusion issue.82

But we find the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, likely bars most or all

of Mr. Hendrick’s claims.83 “When a prior case has been adjudicated in a state court, federal courts

are required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to give full faith and credit to the state judgment and, in section

1983 cases, apply the same preclusion rules as would the courts of that state.”84 “Pennsylvania

courts require the party asserting issue preclusion to establish four elements: ‘(1) an issue decided

in a prior action is identical to the one presented in a later action; (2) the prior action resulted in a

final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party

to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) the party against whom

collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior

action.’”85 “[W]here a defendant’s alleged discrimination was resolved in a prior case and is raised

in a subsequent case based on the same facts, it is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion even

if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.”86

Mr. Damiani, with Mr. Hendrick as intervenor, filed preliminary objections to the taking,

one of which complained the taking of the Property was racially motivated.87 Judge Tolliver

concluded the evidence did not establish the Township knew a minority-owned business had

purchased the property as the deal was not made public; nor did the evidence establish the

Township knew Mr. Hendrick had acquired the property because it still legally belonged to Mr.

Damiani during the taking.88 The evidence confirmed the Township had a longstanding interest in

acquiring the Property and it was just expanding the land it already owned.89 Judge Tolliver found

“imputation of any racially motivated actions to the Board of Managers is hard-pressed under these

circumstances[,]” and overruled the preliminary objections.90

The first, third, and fourth elements of issue preclusion are easily met here. The first

element requires the issue be identical to an issue in an earlier case. Mr. Damiani, with Mr.

Hendrick as intervenor, challenged the Township’s taking of the Property as racially motivated in

the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.91 Both of Mr. Hendrick’s constitutional claims

and at least one of his state law claims in the present case require a finding of racial animus.92 The

third and fourth elements are also satisfied. Mr. Hendrick, as intervenor, is a party to the case in

state court. He had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of racial animus when Judge Tolliver

held an evidentiary hearing “to allow the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the factual

issues presented in [the] preliminary objections.”93

The second element—a final judgment on the merits—is slightly less straightforward but,

on balance, also weighs in favor of preclusion. We must determine whether Judge Tolliver’s order

overruling Mr. Damiani’s preliminary objections constitutes a final judgment on the merits.

“[W]hether an order is sufficiently final to be given collateral estoppel effect depends to a large

extent on the appealability of the order.”94 As relevant here, “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right

from an order overruling preliminary objections to a declaration of taking” in Pennsylvania.95 We

also “consider whether the ‘parties were fully heard [and whether] the court supported its decision

with a reasoned opinion.’”96 Judge Tolliver held a day-long evidentiary hearing to permit the

parties to present evidence and issued a well-reasoned memorandum with his order overruling the

preliminary objections. The order overruling the preliminary objections appears to be a final

decision on the merits.

Although all four elements of issue preclusion are seemingly satisfied in this case, we

decline to rest our decision on this doctrine. The Township raised issue preclusion as an affirmative

defense but did not argue it in its Motion for summary judgment, deciding instead to hang its hat

on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As a result, Mr. Hendrick is not on notice of issue preclusion as

a basis for summary judgment. We find issue preclusion would bar the re-litigation of the

Township’s racial animus and recognize we could dismiss based on the affirmative defense. But

because the doctrine has not been fully briefed, we find it more prudent to also address the merits

of Mr. Hendrick’s constitutional claims.

B. We grant the Township’s Motion for summary judgment on Mr. Hendrick’s

substantive due process claim.97

The Township moves for summary judgment on Mr. Hendrick’s substantive due process

claim, arguing its taking of the Property does not shock the conscience.98 Mr. Hendrick responds

genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to the Township’s conduct.99 We agree with the

Township: assuming Mr. Hendrick has an interest in the Property, he fails to establish the

Township’s actions shock the conscience.

“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular interest

at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and the government’s deprivation of that

protected interest shocks the conscience.”100 “The ‘shocks the conscience’ standard encompasses

‘only the most egregious official conduct.’”101 “[M]erely alleging an improper motive is

insufficient, even where the motive is unrelated to the merits of the underlying decision.”102 Our

Court of Appeals “has held that inconsistent application of zoning requirements, delaying permits

and approvals, improperly increasing tax assessments, and maligning and muzzling a property

owner, without more, is not the type of behavior that shocks the conscience.”103 “To shock the

conscience, the complained of behavior must be coupled with allegations of corruption, self-

dealing, unconstitutional ‘taking,’ ethnic bias, or interference with otherwise constitutionally

protected activity.”104

The Township argues the only evidence supporting racial bias is the unsubstantiated

opinion testimony of Mr. Hendrick.105 Mr. Hendrick testified he thought the Township’s actions

were racially motivated because a White company operated the Property for fifty years, doing the

same type of work as Mr. Hendrick, and the Township did not ask the White owner to sell the

Property; nor did it condemn the Property until Mr. Hendrick took over.106 He further testified:

“So, with saying that, I could only say that it’s one thing. It’s because I’m black. I mean, it’s rigged.

You can see it. There’s no reason.”107 The Township refutes this testimony by pointing out its

interest in the Property long predated Mr. Hendrick’s association with it, as evidenced by the

Township’s attempt to purchase the Property in 2008 and its appraisals of the Property in 2009 and

2021.108 We find the portions of the record establishing the Township tried to acquire the Property

years before Mr. Hendrick contracted to purchase it are compelling evidence the decision to

condemn was not racially motivated.

Mr. Hendrick argues the circumstances from August 2022 to March 2024 do not reflect a

legitimate reason for the Township to condemn the Property and “the decision to do so cannot be

characterized as mere coincidence.”109 He claims his equitable ownership of the Property is all that

changed from 2008 to 2024.110 He argues the decision to condemn might be defensible if there

some emergency or definitive plans necessitated the Township’s development of the Property, but

there was no emergency or definitive plans justifying condemnation of the Property in March

2024.111

We are not persuaded. Mr. Hendrick presents a false dichotomy by suggesting because the

Township did not condemn the property until Mr. Hendrick owned it or was about to own it, the

Township’s decision must have been motivated by race. In fact, there could be any number of

reasons the Township waited until March 2024 to condemn the Property. We are not asked to decide

whether the Township’s taking of the Property was proper; we are asked to decide whether it was

racially biased. The absence of an emergency or definitive plans at the time of condemnation does

not, without more, establish racial bias. “[T]o withstand a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that

contradict that which is offered by the moving party.”112 Mr. Hendrick does not meet his burden.

Mr. Hendrick cites one case involving bias against an ethnic group, Andrews v. Bureau of

Codes Administrative Office.113 He does not explain how this case helps his substantive due

process claim.114 We conclude it does not. The property owner in Andrews claimed she was treated

less favorably than other similarly situated property owners with respect to a condemnation order

against her property.115 She alleged, among other claims, violations of the equal protection clause

and the substantive due process clause.116 The property owner specifically identified other nearby,

non-minority property owners who lived in condemned properties for ten or more years without

prosecution and attached pictures and condemnation orders associated with the properties.117 She

identified eight other minority property owners who all sold or lost their property but were not

given the same time to comply as the non-minority property owners.118 She also “put forth

evidence . . . suggesting that at least one of the named Defendants made racially disparaging

remarks regarding African Americans.”119 With respect to the substantive due process clause,

Judge Rambo found “the nature of the alleged conduct satisfie[d] the ‘shocks the conscience’

standard” because the property owner adduced evidence suggesting the defendants exhibited

disparate treatment toward minority homeowners as compared to similarly-situated non-minority

property owners.120 Judge Rambo found the property owner adduced sufficient evidence of racial

bias to “narrowly survive[]” the local government’s motion for summary judgment.121

The present case is plainly distinguishable from Judge Rambo’s analysis. Unlike the

property owner in Andrews, Mr. Hendricks has no evidence suggesting the Township decided to

condemn the Property because he is Black. Without evidence of racial or ethnic bias, the

Township’s decision to wait until March 2024 to condemn the Property is no different than an

inconsistent application of zoning requirements, a delayed permit or approval, or any of the other

land-use decisions which do not rise to the level of “conscience-shocking” under our Court of

Appeals’s guidance.122

Mr. Hendrick does not adduce evidence from which a rational juror could find the

Township acted out of racial bias. We grant summary judgment in favor of the Township on Mr.

Hendrick’s substantive due process claim.

C. We grant the Township’s Motion for summary judgment on Mr. Hendrick’s

equal protection claim.

The Township also moves for summary judgment on Mr. Hendrick’s equal protection

claim. It argues the record does not establish the Township treated Mr. Hendrick differently

because of his race; instead, the record shows the Township wanted to expand its open space by

acquiring adjacent land.123 Mr. Hendrick responds genuine issues of material fact remain as to

whether the Township’s decision to condemn the Property violated his equal protection rights.124

We again agree with the Township.

The equal protection clause “prohibits states from intentionally discriminating between

individuals on the basis of race.”125 “The elements of an Equal Protection violation based on

selective treatment are the following: (1) that Plaintiffs were treated differently from other

similarly situated individuals, and (2) ‘that this selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable

standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor, . . . or to prevent the exercise of

a fundamental right.’”126 “Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when

they are alike in all relevant aspects.”127 “In cases involving zoning or land-use disputes, courts

consider ‘the similarity of the properties being compared, including their physical characteristics

and their “similarities in the eyes of a defendant.””128

The parties agree the Township identified several parcels of land as possible targets of

acquisition to purchase with the portion of the August 2022 $10 million bond issue earmarked for

open space purchases: a parcel owned by a railroad and a parcel worth $4 million dollars, both of

which it ultimately chose not to acquire.129 The Township claims the parcel owned by the railroad

and the $4 million parcel are not similar to the Property and the Township decided not to condemn

them for rational reasons.130 The Township also targeted a parcel named the “Rossi Property,”

possibly as early as 2019, which it is currently in the process of purchasing.131 The Township

claims the Rossi Property is not similar to the Property because it will be used for roadway access

and the owner of the Rossi Property did not receive more favorable treatment than Mr. Hendrick

because the Township reached an agreement of sale with the owner of the Rossi Property.132

Mr. Hendrick does not address whether the comparator properties are similarly situated to

the Property. He instead responds with a more detailed version of the argument he asserted with

regard to the substantive due process clause: White owners have used the Property for over fifty

years; the Township has been interested in the Property since 2008; the Township knew Mr.

Hendrick is Black as of August 2022; the Township knew Mr. Hendrick planned to buy the

Property since early 2023; and the Township had no emergency or specific plans for development

of the Property when it adopted the resolution to condemn it in March 2024.133 Mr. Hendrick argues

the Township’s earlier interest in the Property does not create a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason to condemn it, and “the only difference with respect to the Property from 2008 to 2024”

was Mr. Hendrick’s equitable ownership of it.134 He claims the fact the Township considered

several other non-minority-owned properties but did not condemn them supports the notion the

condemnation of the Property was racially motivated.135

We first briefly consider whether the record indicates the Township treated Mr. Hendrick

differently than other similarly situated individuals. We assume the other properties the Township

considered acquiring and/or condemning are similarly situated to the Property because neither the

Township nor Mr. Hendrick presents compelling argument on this point.136 We also assume the

Township treated the owners of at least some of these other properties (i.e., the properties targeted

for open space) more favorably than Mr. Hendrick because it did not condemn their properties but

it did condemn the Property.137 We are not convinced the Township treated the owner of the Rossi

Property more favorably than Mr. Hendrick, but we need not decide this question; either way, we

find Mr. Hendrick cannot establish the second prong of his equal protection claim.138

Even assuming the Township treated Mr. Hendrick worse than similarly situated property

owners, the second part of the equal protection claim requires Mr. Hendrick adduce evidence the

selective treatment was based on his race. He “must demonstrate ‘circumstantial evidence, beyond

evidence of the simple fact of differential treatment itself, from which a jury could reasonably infer

that [the defendant’s] actions were actually motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.’”139

Mr. Hendrick does not adduce such evidence. We are guided by our Court of Appeals’s

analysis in Thorpe v. Upper Makefield Township.140 Two property owners challenged the

township’s unfair zoning enforcement as motivated by racial animus toward Native Americans.141

Our Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Rufe’s grant of summary judgment for the township on the

property owners’ selective enforcement equal protection claim. The Court found “no evidence that

race was the impetus for the different treatment. That is, nothing in the record suggest[ed] any

nexus between Dale Thorpe’s Native American race and the Township’s zoning enforcement

actions.”142 It is the same in this case. There is simply no evidence of a nexus between Mr.

Hendrick’s race and the decision to condemn his Property.

Mr. Hendrick then begins to speculate: it could not have been a coincidence the Township

decided to condemn the Property around the time Mr. Hendrick was in the process of purchasing

it.143 But this argument is conclusory and speculative. It resembles the equal protection argument

the recipients of a public nuisance citation (an interracial couple) made in Homan v. City of

Reading: “what else could it be but racial animus?”144 Judge Joyner found this argument

insufficient and explained the couple “need[ed] to establish some other evidence, apart from the

mere different treatment,” to defeat summary judgment.145 We agree with Judge Joyner. The

Township adduced evidence of its longstanding interest in the Property and Mr. Hendrick identifies

no contradictory evidence showing the Township in fact acted out of racial bias. We again note the

absence of any emergency or definitive plans for the Property—even if it arguably provides a basis

for Mr. Hendrick to challenge the taking under Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code—does not,

without more, establish racial animus violating his constitutional rights. He does not meet his

burden to affirmatively show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. We grant summary

judgment in favor of the Township on Mr. Hendrick’s equal protection claim.

D. We decline to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Hendrick’s state

law claims.

We need not reach the merits of Mr. Hendrick’s related state law claims of abuse of process

and tortious interference. Following our dismissal of his constitutional claims we lack subject

matter jurisdiction over his state law claims unless we exercise our discretion to retain

supplemental jurisdiction.146 We decline to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over Mr.

Hendrick’s state law claims and dismiss without prejudice to timely pursue merited claims in state

court.

III. Conclusion

Mr. Hendrick cannot demonstrate a question of material fact suggesting the Township

violated his substantive due process or equal protection rights. The Township is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on its civil rights claims. We decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the state law claims.

1 We write today to further detail the basis for yesterday’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion for

summary judgment (ECF 30).

2 ECF 22 ¶¶ 20, 21.

3 Id. ¶¶ 12, 22.

4 Id. ¶ 25.

5 Id. ¶¶ 24–25.

6 Id. ¶ 23.

7 Id. ¶¶ 27–28.

8 Id. ¶¶ 30–33.

9 Id. ¶¶ 36–37.

10 Id. ¶ 38.

11 Id. ¶¶ 39–41.

12 Id. ¶ 42; see also Hamaday Individual Dep. 25:11–27:2 (Defs.’ Ex. 5). Defendants’ Appendix

and attached exhibits can be found at ECF 23. The entirety of ECF 23 is missing the ECF stamp

so we refer to each of the exhibits by the numbers designated in Defendants’ Appendix. Township

Manager Hamaday’s individual deposition is Exhibit 5.

13 ECF 22 ¶ 44.

14 Id. ¶ 45. The Township distributed a $10 million bond issue for open space, operating funds,

equipment, projects, etc. in 2022. It appraised several properties and earmarked a group of funds

for an “Open Space Plan.” It included the amount of money needed to buy the Property in the

funds sought by the bond issue. Hamaday Individual Dep. 23:22–25:10 (Defs.’ Ex. 5).

15 ECF 22 ¶¶ 2–3; Hendrick Dep. 14:15–15:7 (Defs.’ Ex. 2).

16 ECF 22 ¶ 4. Mr. Hendrick is also the owner of Billy Boy Real Estate, LLC. Id. ¶ 2.

17 Hendrick Dep. 14:15–15:7 (Defs.’ Ex. 2).

18 ECF 22 ¶¶ 58, 67.

19 Id. ¶¶ 67–71; see also Hendrick Dep. 15: 13–17, 18:21–19:1 (Defs.’ Ex. 2). Mr. Hendrick

estimates he spent about $250,000 on improvements to the Property. ECF 22 ¶ 68.

20 ECF 22 ¶¶ 92–94.

21 Id. ¶ 48–49.

22 Id. ¶¶ 50, 52.

23 Id. ¶ 52.

24 Id. ¶ 54. Township Manager Hamaday swore he conducted an Internet search of “Billy Boy

Trucking.” Id. (emphasis added). Billy Boy Trucking is not a party before us. We take judicial

notice Billy Boy Trucking is not a registered company with the Pennsylvania Secretary of State.

We assume, although it does not impact our analysis, Billy Boy Trucking is a fictitious name for

one or both of Mr. Hendrick’s companies.

25 Id. ¶¶ 57, 61, 64.

26 Id. ¶¶ 59, 87–88; see also Garzillo Dep. 52:11–23 (Defs.’ Ex. 3).

27 ECF 22 ¶¶ 53, 83. It is not entirely clear from the Township’s undisputed material facts when

Mr. Hendrick first spoke with Township Manager Hamaday; at paragraphs 49–53, the Township,

citing Township Manager Hamaday’s deposition, avers Township Manager Hamaday asked Mr.

Damiani to have Mr. Hendrick call him in August 2022. But at paragraph 83 the Township states

Mr. Hendrick spoke with Township Manager Hamaday in 2023. Mr. Hendrick likewise swore it

was 2023 when Mr. Damini told him to call Township Manager Hamaday. Hendrick Dep. 29:2–6

(Defs.’ Ex. 2).

28 Hendrick Dep. 18:12–16 (Defs.’ Ex. 2) (swearing he occupied the Property for “about three to

four months” at the end of 2022).

29 Id. 18:12–19:1.

30 ECF 22 ¶ 72.

31 Id. ¶¶ 73–74.

32 Id. ¶ 76.

33 Id. ¶ 75.

34 Id. ¶¶ 78–81.

35 Id. ¶ 98; see also Hamaday Individual Dep. 36:19–24 (Defs.’ Ex. 5).

36 ECF 22 ¶ 158.

37 Id. ¶ 159.

38 Id. ¶ 162.

39 Id. ¶¶ 163, 166.

40 Id. ¶ 165.

41 Id. ¶ 105.

42 Id. ¶¶ 100–02; ECF 27-2 ¶¶ 100–02.

43 Id. ¶ 103.

44 Id. ¶ 104.

45 Id. ¶¶ 112–13.

46 Id. ¶¶ 106–07.

47 Id. ¶ 114.

48 Id. ¶ 90; ECF 27-2 ¶ 188.

49 ECF 22 ¶ 119.

50 Id. ¶ 120.

51 Id. ¶ 121.

52 Id. ¶ 122.

53 Id. ¶ 123.

54 See Prelim. Objs. ¶ 3(g) (Defs.’ Ex. 18).

55 ECF 22 ¶¶ 124–25.

56 Id. ¶ 126.

57 Id.

58 Id. ¶ 127.

59 Id. ¶¶ 128, 130.

60 Id. ¶ 129.

61 Id. ¶ 132.

62 Id. ¶ 133. Judge Tolliver appointed a new board of viewers later the same month upon recusal

of the first board. Id. ¶ 134; see also November 26, 2024 Order (Defs.’ Ex. 23).

63 ECF 22 ¶ 135.

64 Id. ¶ 136.

65 Id. ¶¶ 137–38.

66 See February 4, 2025 Stipulation (Defs.’ Ex. 25).

67 ECF 22 ¶¶ 141–42.

68 Id. ¶ 143.

69 Id. ¶ 144.

70 Id. ¶ 146–47.

71 Id. ¶¶ 14–50.

72 ECF 1. Mr. Hendrick filed an amended Complaint on October 23, 2024. ECF 3.

73 ECF 3.

74 See id.

75 ECF 24. Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “Material facts are those ‘that could affect the outcome’ of the proceeding, and ‘a

dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Servs., 850 F.3d 526, 534

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)). On a motion for

summary judgment, “we view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 533–34 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

378 (2007)). “The party seeking summary judgment ‘has the burden of demonstrating that the

evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.’” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,

323 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d

Cir. 2015)). If the movant carries its burden, “the nonmoving party must identify facts in the record

that would enable them to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of their case for which

they have the burden of proof.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 643 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986)). Where “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial . . . there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. “The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 323.

76 ECF 27.

77 ECF 24 at 11–12. The Township only argues Rooker-Feldman with respect to Mr. Hendrick’s

substantive due process claim.

78 Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)

(alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005)).

79 Id. at 169 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)).

80 Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164).

81 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (alterations in original) (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of

Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).

82 See Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 170 (alteration in original) (“As a final step, should the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine not apply such that the district court has jurisdiction, ‘[d]isposition of the federal

action, once the state-court adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law.’”

(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293)).

We acknowledge the Township’s reliance on our analysis of Rooker-Feldman in a land use dispute

in Brandywine Vill. Assocs. v. E. Brandywine Twp., No. 20-2225, 2020 WL 5517353 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 14, 2020). But we are also mindful the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies in “limited

circumstances.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. We have not seen, and the Township has not shown,

authority disposing of this type of a challenge to a local government decision based on Rooker-

Feldman. We remind the Township our Rooker-Feldman analysis in Brandywine was largely dicta

as we based our decision on finding the landowner did not state a claim. We also today clarify, to

the extent we created confusion by the unfortunate overbroad references in our Brandywine

analysis, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not generally apply to challenge the local

government’s zoning decision; it instead applies when the landowner asks a federal judge to review

and reject a state court judgment which caused the claimed harm. See, e.g., King v. Burr, 728 F.

App’x 83, 85–86 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiff’s claims where pleaded

injury was caused by allegedly void state court orders). We note the dearth of authority barring a

claim under Rooker-Feldman in this context since the landowner is generally challenging the local

government’s zoning or condemnation decision and not the state court’s later judgment evaluating

the underlying decision.

83 The Township does not raise issue preclusion in its Motion for summary judgment but it did

plead it as an affirmative defense. ECF 8 at 5 ¶ 2.

84 Kelly-Pimentel v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 15-1463, 2017 WL 1355175, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13,

2017) (first quoting Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993); then

citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)).

85 Adelphia Gateway, LLC v. Pa. Env’t Hearing Bd., 62 F.4th 819, 826 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Rue

v. K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82, 84 (Pa. 1998)).

86 Hoover v. Parekh, No. 18-02305, 2019 WL 7597205, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2019) (citing King

v. Mansfield Univ. of Pa., No. 15-00159, 2016 WL 6525177, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2016)), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 18-2305, 2020 WL 247174 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2020).

87 See Prelim. Objs. ¶ 3(g) (Defs.’ Ex. 18).

88 September 17, 2024 Memorandum (Defs.’ Ex. 21) at 678a–679a (using the pagination assigned

by Defendants).

89 Id. at 679a. In his response to the Defendants’ assertion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Mr.

Hendrick argues we have evidence that Judge Tolliver did not have at the time of the hearing. ECF

27-3 at 5 n.2. He does not explain why he did not adduce this evidence in state court.

90 September 17, 2024 Memorandum (Defs.’ Ex. 21) at 678a.

91 See Prelim. Objs. ¶ 3(g) (Defs.’ Ex. 18).

92 ECF 3. Mr. Hendrick’s tortious interference claim does not explicitly mention race. Id. ¶¶ 56–

58. But he can only succeed on this claim if the Township had no factual or legal justification to

interfere with Mr. Hendrick’s contractual relationship with Mr. Damiani, which, based on the

pleadings, implicitly requires a finding of racial animus.

93 See September 17, 2024 Memorandum (Defs.’ Ex. 21) at 673a.

94 Lean v. A. City Showboat Inc., No. 07-0407, 2007 WL 1545288, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2007)

(alteration in original) (quoting Karibjanian v. Chromalloy Pharm., Inc., No. 90–4641, 1991 WL

125176, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1991)).

95 Pa. R.A.P. 311(e). In this regard, Judge Tolliver’s order and memorandum are different from

orders overruling preliminary objections in other cases, which are generally “interlocutory and

unappealable.” Lean, 2007 WL 1545288, at *2 (quoting Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Hodes,

784 A.2d 144, 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).

96 Lean, 2007 WL 1545288, at *2 (alterations in original) (quoting Karibjanian, 1991 WL 125176,

at *1).

97 The Township also moved for summary judgment on an unpleaded procedural due process claim,

see ECF 24-1 at 3 n.1, but Mr. Hendrick clarified he is not suing the Township under a procedural

due process theory. ECF 27-3 at 2 n.1.

98 ECF 24-1 at 8–11.

99 ECF 27-3 at 8–9.

100 Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.

v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400–02 (3d Cir. 2003)).

101 United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846

(1998)).

102 Chainey, 523 F.3d at 220 (citing United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400).

103 Toll Bros. v. Twp. of Moorestown, No. 10-4843, 2011 WL 2559507, at *8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2011)

(citing United Artists, 316 F.3d at 402).

104 Id. (citing Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004)).

105 ECF 24 at 9.

106 Hendrick Dep. 46:12–47:1 (Defs.’ Ex. 2).

107 Id. 47:10–13.

108 ECF 24-1 at 9–10. The Township also points to its continued monitoring of land transfer reports

to determine if the sale went through as evidence that refutes any notion of racial bias. Id. at 10–

11. We find this evidence carries less weight as this monitoring took place after the Township

learned Mr. Damiani had agreed to sell the Property to a minority-owned business and because it

is not entirely clear when the Board learned Mr. Hendrick is Black.

109 ECF 27-3 at 9.

110 Id.

111 Id.

112 Surgick v. Cirella, 509 F. App’x 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)).

113 2012 WL 610333 *10–*11 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012). He also cites Assocs. in Obstetrics &

Gynecology v. Upper Merion Twp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Pa. 2003), see ECF 27-3 at 8. Judge

Baylson in Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology found the plaintiffs pleaded the Township

selectively enforced zoning regulations against an abortion provider with the intent of eliminating

abortion services. Id. at 658. We find this case inapplicable.

114 ECF 27-3 at 8.

115 Andrews, 2012 WL 610333, at *1.

116 Id. at *3.

117 Id. at *8.

118 Id.

119 Id. at *9.

120 Id. at *11.

121 Id.

122 See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286.

123 ECF 24-1 at 13–14.

124 ECF 27-3 at 5.

125 Antonelli v. New Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,

642 (1993)).

126 RP Wynstone, LP v. New Hanover Twp., No. 24-959, 2025 WL 418513, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Feb.

5, 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir.

2010)).

The Township also cites the standard for a class of one equal protection claim, but we find its

reliance inapposite, as Mr. Hendrick, a Black man, is a member of a protected class—a fact the

Township does not dispute. ECF 24-1 at 13 (“Here, undeniably, Plaintiffs are a protected class.”).

The class of one theory applies when “the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group.”

Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 (2000) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Perez v.

Lebron, No. 20-04331, 2021 WL 2255852, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2021) (“Perez, a Hispanic

male, is a member of a protected class, so we need not examine his claims under the ‘class of one’

rubric.”).

127 RP Wynstone, 2025 WL 418513, at *18 (quoting Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203

(3d Cir. 2008)), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2018).

128 Giuliani v. Springfield Twp., 238 F. Supp. 3d 670 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Jeffers v. City of

Washington, No. 14-1361, 2015 WL 4232662, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015)), aff’d, 726 F. App’x

118 (3d Cir. 2018). The plaintiff in Giuliani proceeded under a class of one equal protection theory,

which requires “an extremely high degree of similarity . . . .” Jeffers, 2015 WL 4232662, at *3

(quoting Curbside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)). Still, we find this standard

instructive in comparing the relevant properties in this case.

129 ECF 24-1 at 14; Hamaday Individual Dep. 75:23–77:19 (Ex. 5).

130 ECF 24-1 at 14.

131 Id.; ECF 27-2 ¶ 165.

132 ECF 24-1 at 14. The Township further argues Mr. Damiani is not in a protected class and the

taking was against Mr. Damiani, not Mr. Hendrick. Id. at 15. We need not address this argument.

We assume for the sake of deciding this claim the taking also impacted Mr. Hendrick, the equitable

owner of the property.

133 ECF 27-3 at 5–6.

134 Id. at 5.

135 Id. at 6.

136 For instance, the Township claims the other three properties it considered acquiring for open

space “are not similar to the Property for a variety of reasons[,]” but does not really express why

this is so apart from indicating one is owned by a railroad and one is valued at $4 million. ECF 24-

1 at 14. The Township does not cite authority to support that identity of ownership and price can

indicate dissimilarities between properties. The Township claims the property it is in the process

of acquiring, the Rossi Property, is “not alike in all relevant aspects[]” because it is being acquired

for roadway access versus open space. This is slightly more persuasive than the conclusory

arguments with respect to the other three properties, but still, the Township does not provide

authority to support the intended uses for properties can indicate dissimilarities.

137 Cf. Andrews, 2012 WL 610333, at *8 (denying summary judgment on equal protection claim

where Harrisburg government agencies issued condemnation orders against the properties of

plaintiff and other minority property owners but did not prosecute properties of non-minority

property owners for ten or more years).

138 We do not necessarily think the treatment of the Rossi Property was more favorable because

the Township considered condemning the Rossi Property but instead the parties were able to reach

an agreement of sale, which may have been the case for Mr. Hendrick, too, if he had expressed his

interest in selling the Property. Mr. Hendrick instead swore when Mr. Hamaday asked if he wanted

to sell the Property, he responded, “no but, you know, maybe when I’m done with it we could talk

about it then.” Hendrick Dep. 29:20–30:1 (Ex. 2).

139 Homan v. City of Reading, 15 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (alteration in original) (first

quoting Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 982 F. Supp. 970, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1997); then citing

Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir. 1995); and then citing LaTrieste Restaurant

and Cabaret Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)). In Homan, Judge Joyner

granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, which arose when the City

declared their warehouse a public nuisance. 15 F. Supp. 2d at 697, 702–04. The plaintiffs’ argument

hinged on the fact they were an interracial couple and the City gave Caucasian property owners

more time to clear their properties and/or did not act to demolish them. Id. at 703. Judge Joyner

found “there [was] no evidence from which a rational juror could find that the Defendant had an

improper racial motivation to selectively enforce the law concerning abatement of public

nuisances.” Id. at 704.

140 758 F. App’x 258 (3d Cir. 2018).

141 Id. at 262–63.

142 Id. at 263.

143 ECF 27-4 at 5–6.

144 Homan, 15 F.Supp.2d at 703 (cleaned up).

145 Id. at 704 (emphasis added).

146 We may consider our supplemental jurisdiction sua sponte. See Patel v. Meridian Health Sys.,

Inc., 666 F. App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2016). Congress allows us to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims where the state law claims “form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Congress also empowers us to decline

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if we dismissed “all claims over which

[we] ha[ve] original jurisdiction[.]” Id. § 1367(c)(3); cf. Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22, 43–44 (2025) (we must remand state law claims before us under section 1367

supplemental jurisdiction based on federal question where all federal claims are dismissed from

the case). See also Moore v. Atlantic County, No. 07-5444, 2015 WL 1268184, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar.

18, 2015) (“It is generally established in the Third Circuit that a court may decline supplemental

jurisdiction when federal claims are dismissed by way of summary judgment.” (first citing Tully

v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir.1976); then citing Simmerman v. Corino,

804 F. Supp. 644, 658 (D.N.J.1992))).