“AEDPA recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.”
How later courts described this case
- “AEDPA recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.”
- “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004))
- finding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-20077 Document: 76-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/01/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 24-20077
FILED
May 1, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Mukhtar Owais, Clerk
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Jennifer Goerig,
Respondent—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:22-CV-2056
______________________________
Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Davis and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Petitioner Mukhtar Owais, a native of Pakistan and lawful permanent
resident of the United States, challenges the district court’s denial of his
petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Owais claims he
was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment because his attorney failed to advise him that a conviction of the
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 24-20077 Document: 76-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/01/2025
No. 24-20077
charged offense—evading arrest with a motor vehicle, in violation of Texas
Penal Code § 38.04(b)(2)(A)—would result in his automatic deportation.
The state habeas court in a detailed opinion concluded that federal
immigration law in 2016 was not “truly clear” 1 as to whether the offense
qualified as a “crime of violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and
therefore as an automatically deportable offense under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing for the
removal of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony), 1101(a)(43)(F)
(incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 16 into “aggravated felony” definition). Based on
that conclusion, the state habeas court held that Owais’s counsel’s advice
during plea bargaining was adequate.
Owais then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition asserting
the same ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The district court denied
the petition.
We agree with the district court that, under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the state court’s decision did not
“involve[] an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1).
The district court gave a number of cogent reasons, with which we agree, to
support this conclusion. 2 The single argument Owais raises is that, in 2016,
the law was clear in the Fifth Circuit that the charged offense qualified as a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b); 3 hence, the state court’s failure to
_____________________
1
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). See generally Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2
See Owais v. Goerig, No. H-22-2056, 2024 WL 287696, at *6–8 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
25, 2024).
3
The Fifth Circuit decisions Owais primarily relies on are United States v. Sanchez-
Ledezma, 630 F.3d 447, 449–51 (5th Cir. 2011) (determining that the Texas crime of
2
Case: 24-20077 Document: 76-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/01/2025
No. 24-20077
follow that precedent was an unreasonable application of federal law. We
disagree. In the AEDPA context, “circuit precedent does not constitute
‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’ It
therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” 4 “A
federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view
different from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at best,
ambiguous.” 5 In the absence of clearly established law from the Supreme
Court, the state court must reasonably exercise its judgment based on all
relevant federal law. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s analysis
concluding that the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court in rejecting Owais’s claim for habeas
relief.
We see no reason to repeat the excellent reasoning of the district court
on the multiple issues in this case. For these reasons and those explained by
the district court in its careful and thorough opinion, we AFFIRM the
district court’s dismissal of Owais’s habeas petition.
_____________________
evading arrest with a motor vehicle qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 16(b)), and
United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (rejecting
argument that § 16(b)’s “crime of violence” definition is unconstitutionally vague),
abrogated by Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018). But see Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440,
451 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Vivas–Ceja,
808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (same); see also Dimaya, 584 U.S. at 174–75 (resolving the
circuit conflict and invalidating § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague). See generally
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that a claim
lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on
the correctness of the state court’s decision.” (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004))).
4
Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48–49 (2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see
also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013) (“AEDPA recognizes a foundational principle of
our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.”).
5
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (per curiam).
3