Walton v. CORVI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TERRELL WALTON CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-1318

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH CORVI; NICOLE WILSON;

PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR THE

PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO

ANIMALS; and MARC SCHADE

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, J. April 30, 2025

I. INTRODUCTION

Terrell Walton (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Marc Schade prepared an affidavit of

probable cause containing false statements and/or omissions which led to Plaintiff’s arrest and

subsequent prosecution. Plaintiff brings two claims against Defendant Schade for state common

law malicious prosecution (Count IV) and for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count VII).

Defendants Joseph Corvi, Nicole Wilson, and Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of

Cruelty to Animals have each answered the Amended Complaint. Defendant Schade moved to

dismiss the two claims asserted against him. ECF 4. For the following reasons, Defendant

Schade’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant

Schade under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

common law malicious prosecution claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

III. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual background is drawn from the allegations in the Amended Complaint. The

Court takes the facts alleged by Plaintiff as true and construes them in his favor, as is required at

the motion to dismiss stage. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).

A. Plaintiff Removes Pitbull From Patrol Car

On August 4, 2021, Philadelphia police officers conducted a traffic stop and arrested Mr.

Bryan Landis from his car. Am. Compl. (ECF 1-2) at ¶ 13. Officers commanded Mr. Landis to

load his Pitbull dog into the rear seating area of the patrol car, and Defendant Joseph Corvi was

assigned to transport the Pitbull to the Philadelphia Animal Care and Control Team for

safekeeping. Id., ¶¶ 16, 19–21.

The Amended Complaint alleges that when Defendant Corvi arrived at the facility, the

Pitbull began barking and became aggressive. Id., ¶¶ 27–28. Defendant Corvi requested assistance

from an animal control professional to escort the Pitbull from the car and into the animal control

facility. Id., ¶ 30. The facility’s upper management assigned Plaintiff the responsibility of

removing the Pitbull from the patrol car. Id., ¶ 39.

The Amended Complaint alleges that as Plaintiff approached the driver’s side rear door of

the patrol car, the Pitbull displayed “dangerous, threatening, and aggressive tendencies towards

the plaintiff.” Id., ¶ 40. As a result, Plaintiff determined that he could only safely remove the

Pitbull from the patrol car from a distance by using a catch pole, which is a tool used primarily by

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animal control officers to safely capture and restrain potentially aggressive or dangerous animals

from a distance. Id., ¶¶ 38, 42. Plaintiff inserted the catch pole into the rear seating area of the

patrol car from a distance and laid the loop at the end of the catch pole around the Pitbull’s neck

using only his right hand. Id., ¶¶ 45, 50. In response, the Pitbull latched its teeth onto the pole

and clenched its jaws on the pole. Id., ¶ 51.

B. Pitbull is Examined at Animal Control

Plaintiff then led the Pitbull out of the patrol car using the catch pole and escorted the

Pitbull to the animal control emergency room. Id., ¶ 52. The Amended Complaint alleges that

while inside the building, the Pitbull demonstrated dangerous, threatening, and aggressive

tendencies. Id., ¶ 53. Dr. Roxanne Borrok, a doctor of veterinary medicine, examined the Pitbull

and allegedly determined that as a result of the Pitbull’s display of aggression, it was unsafe to

manage the Pitbull without sedation. Id., ¶ 59.

After the Pitbull was sedated, Dr. Borrok examined the Pitbull and diagnosed the Pitbull

as having suffered a bi-lateral distal mandibular fracture. Id., ¶¶ 60–62. Dr. Borrok allegedly

determined that the fracture could have arisen as a result of a mishandling of the catch pole or by

the sheer force of the Pitbull’s bite of the catch pole. Id., ¶ 63. The Amended Complaint further

alleges that Dr. Borrok reviewed video surveillance footage capturing images of Plaintiff’s

interaction with the Pitbull and Plaintiff’s handling of the catch pole, and allegedly determined

that Plaintiff did not mishandle the catch pole. Id., ¶ 64. The Pitball was euthanized at the animal

control center on August 4, 2021 due to the severity of the injury. Id., ¶¶ 65–66.

C. Defendant Schade Prepares Affidavit of Probable Cause

The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Marc Schade, a detective in the

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (id., ¶ 11), investigated the events of August 4, 2021 and

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prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause (the “Affidavit”) dated May 10, 2022. Id., ¶ 93.

Defendant Schade, according to the Amended Complaint, knowingly and deliberately, or with a

reckless disregard for the truth, included false statements and omitted facts in the Affidavit which

were inconsistent with the video surveillance footage of Plaintiff’s handling of the Pitbull with the

catch pole. Id., ¶¶ 94–95. The Amended Complaint alleges that as a “direct result” of the Affidavit

allegedly containing false and fabricated information, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office

criminally charged Plaintiff with violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5534 (relating to Aggravated Cruelty

to Animals Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533 (relating to Cruelty

to Animals). Id., ¶¶ 97–103.

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia

County on December 2, 2024, asserting state law malicious prosecution claims. ECF 1-1. On

February 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, bringing

seven claims against all Defendants:

1. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution, against Defendant Joseph Corvi;

2. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution, against Defendant Nicole Wilson;

3. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution – vicarious liability, against Defendant

Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“PSPCA”);

4. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution, against Defendant Marc Schade;

5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against

Defendant Joseph Corvi;

6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against

Defendant Nicole Wilson; and

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7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against

Defendant Marc Schade.

ECF 1-2. On March 12, 2025, Defendant Joseph Corvi removed the case to this Court pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1441, with the consent of all other Defendants. ECF 1 at ¶ 9.

Defendants Joseph Corvi (on March 19, 2025), Nicole Wilson (on March 21, 2025), and

the PSPCA (on March 25, 2025) each answered the Amended Complaint. See ECF 6–8. On

March 18, 2025, Defendant Marc Schade filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 4. Plaintiff responded to the Motion on

April 1, 2025. ECF 11.

V. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Defendant Schade argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for malicious

prosecution, either under Federal or State law, because Defendant Schade had probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff and there are no colorable allegations of malice in the Amended Complaint. ECF

4 at 8–13. Defendant Schade further contends that he is immune from liability. As to the § 1983

claim, Defendant Schade argues probable cause existed on the misdemeanor charge of animal

cruelty even if not for the felony charge, so he is entitled to qualified immunity because Third

Circuit law was not clearly established whether probable cause for one charge defeats a malicious

prosecution claim. Id. at 13–15. Defendant Schade also asserts that the State common law claim

is barred by Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). Id. at 15–17.

In response, Plaintiff counters that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that

Defendant Schade knew statements he made in the Affidavit to be false, he omitted other pertinent

facts, that no reasonable person could infer probable cause existed, and that the Amended

Complaint sufficiently pleads malice. ECF 11-1 at 6–13. As to qualified immunity, Plaintiff

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argues that Defendant Schade should have known that his conduct would violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.1 Id. at 13–15. Lastly, Plaintiff responds that the PSTCA does not bar a

malicious prosecution claim which is an intentional tort that constitutes willful misconduct, an

exemption to the PSTCA’s grant of immunity. Id. at 15–16.

VI. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must include

sufficient facts in the complaint that, accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is insufficient if it

suggests only the “mere possibility of misconduct” or is a “[t]hreadbare recital[ ] of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678–79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), and so it will not suffice if it is “devoid of

further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Thus, in considering a

motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual allegations as true and views them in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, Doe v. University of Sciences, 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020), but

may not “assume that [the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged[,]” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 563 n.8 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983)).

1 Plaintiff’s response to the qualified immunity argument misses the crux of Defendant Schade’s argument, as this

Court understands it – Plaintiff argues that Defendant Schade should have known that including false information in

an affidavit of probable cause is unlawful. However, Defendant Schade’s qualified immunity argument specifically

addresses the Third Circuit’s “any crime” rule and whether it was clearly established at the time that probable cause

for one charge does not defeat a malicious prosecution claim alleging absence of probable cause for another charge.

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VII. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against Defendant Marc Schade for malicious

prosecution; one count is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendant Schade violated

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and the second count arises under Pennsylvania State

common law.

A. Malicious Prosecution (Federal and State)

A claim for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires Plaintiff to

establish that “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended

in [Plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the

defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the

plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of

a legal proceeding.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296–297 (3d Cir. 2014). The legal standard

is the same for State common law malicious prosecution except Plaintiff does not need to show he

suffered a deprivation of liberty. Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Loc. Union

249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988). An officer can be liable for malicious prosecution “[i]f the

officer[] influenced or participated in the decision to institute criminal proceedings[.]” Halsey,

750 F.3d at 297.

Defendant Schade disputes factors three and four, arguing that the claims for malicious

prosecution fail because probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff, and the Amended Complaint

does not allege Defendant Schade acted maliciously. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

1. Probable Cause

In evaluating probable cause to initiate a legal proceeding, the Court considers whether

“the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves

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to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the

person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).

Because this inquiry requires evaluating the facts available to the officer, the Third Circuit has

stated that “[t]he question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury.”

Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998).

The thrust of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Schade are that Defendant Schade

prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause (the “Affidavit”) in which he knowingly, or with a

reckless disregard for the truth, included statements of fact or omitted facts that were inconsistent

with video footage capturing Plaintiff’s alleged handling of the Pitbull outside the animal control

facility. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 92–96. Where, as here, Plaintiff alleges “that an accurate affidavit would

not establish probable cause,” Plaintiff must show (1) “that the officer, with at least a reckless

disregard for the truth, ‘made statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a

warrant,’” and (2) “that those assertions or omissions were ‘material, or necessary, to the finding

of probable cause.’” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468–69 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting

Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2000)). While a factor to consider, “an arrest

warrant issued by a magistrate or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability[.]”2

Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786.

2 Defendant Schade argues that there is a rebuttable presumption probable cause exists to defeat a malicious

prosecution claim where the Philadelphia Municipal Court Judge determined at the preliminary hearing that there was

a prima facie criminal case against Plaintiff on all charges. ECF 4 at 9 n.3 (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 352

(3d Cir. 1989)). However, Rose addressed a prima facie case in the context of grand jury indictments or presentments,

not necessarily a state court preliminary hearing. Further, the Third Circuit in Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d

120, 125 (3d Cir. 1998) limited Rose’s application, holding that a presumption of probable cause does not apply to a

§ 1983 malicious prosecution action where the plaintiff’s conviction in municipal court was overturned.

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Defendant Schade attaches the Affidavit to his Motion and argues that the Affidavit shows

probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff.3 The Court declines to reach such a conclusion at this

stage.

a. False Statements or Omissions

The Amended Complaint alleges that the Affidavit contains both false statements and omits

certain pertinent facts. “[A]ssertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer

has obvious reasons to doubt the truth of what he or she is asserting” and “omissions are made

with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable person would

have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.’” Wilson, 212 F.3d at

783, 787–88 (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)). The Court

“look[s] only to the information available to the officer at the time of the swearing of the affidavit

of probable cause.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 471.

According to the Amended Complaint, the Affidavit allegedly contained the following

false statements:

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff jabbed at the Pitbull with a 6-

8-foot-long catch pole while the Pitbull was confined in the rear of a radio patrol car;

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff moved his hands up and all

around using the catch pole;

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff moved his hands up and all

around using the catch pole;

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff used two (2) hands when laying

the loop or snare mechanism at the end the catch pole around the Pitbull’s neck;

3 The Court considered the Affidavit attached to Defendant Schade’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF 4-1; Pension Ben.

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “a court may consider an

undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims

are based on the document.”). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Schade stem from the Affidavit and Plaintiff does

not dispute the Affidavit’s authenticity.

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• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff stuck the control stick inside

the police vehicle and violently moved the stick;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff used two (2) hands to shift and

twist the pole in an attempt to catch the dog;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation plaintiff improperly used the catch pole;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff struggled with the catch pole

for several minutes;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff forcefully removed the Pitbull

from the rear of the radio patrol car;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff forcefully dragged the Pitbull

into the Animal Care and Control Team of Philadelphia’s building;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff recklessly illtreated the

Pitbull;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff abused the Pitbull;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff recklessly caused the Pitbull

to suffer bodily injury; and

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff recklessly created a risk the

Pitbull would suffer serious bodily injury.

Am. Compl., ¶ 95(a)–(n). The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Schade had reasons to

doubt the truth of these statements because they were allegedly “patently inconsistent with video

surveillance footage.” Id. The Court reasonably infers from the Amended Complaint’s allegation

that Defendant Schade “undertook an investigation of the events occurring August 4, 2021” that

Defendant Schade would have considered that video surveillance footage at the time he signed the

Affidavit. Id., ¶ 92.

The Amended Complaint additionally alleges that Defendant Schade omitted several facts

in the Affidavit, including:

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• Veterinary Dr. Roxanne Borrok maintained the opinion plaintiff did not mishandle the

catch pole securing the Pitbull from the inside of the radio patrol car;

• Veterinary Dr. Roxanne Borrok maintained the opinion injury to the Pitbull’s mandible

arose from the sheer force of the dog’s bite upon the catch pole;

Id., ¶ 95(o)–(p). Such information—the opinion of the treating veterinarian—can plausibly be

considered information that a judge evaluating an affidavit of probable cause would wish to know.

See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787–88. Defendant Schade’s position that “it is not clear on the record

whether HSPO Wilson—much less Detective Schade—even knew of Dr. Borrok’s conflicting

opinion” when preparing the Affidavit is unavailing; the record is not yet developed, and all

inferences must be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. ECF 4 at 12. The Court reasonably infers from the

Amended Complaint’s allegations that Defendant Schade knew of Dr. Borrok’s conflicting

opinion and did not state it in the Affidavit.

b. Materiality

“To be constitutionally suspect, the misstatements and omissions must have been ‘material,

or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’” Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania, 95 F.4th

743, 748–49 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789)). In assessing materiality, the Court

reconstructs the affidavit of probable cause by “excis[ing] the offending inaccuracies and

insert[ing] the facts recklessly omitted,” and then determining whether the revised affidavit would

have “suffic[ed] in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe” that Plaintiff had

committed animal cruelty offenses. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789 (quoting Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483).

The Amended Complaint alleges facts contrary to many of the critical allegations

supporting probable cause in the Affidavit and alleges that video surveillance footage—which

Defendant Schade was allegedly aware of—discredits the Affidavit’s version. Whether or not

probable cause existed here thus relies, in part, on a credibility determination between Plaintiff

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and Defendants Wilson and Corvi as to what the video depicts. Cf. Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch.

Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that “where the probable cause determination rests

on credibility conflicts,” it is “particularly true” that it should be resolved by a jury). At this

juncture, the Court will not undertake a factual inquiry to resolve these disputes. Groman v. Twp.

Of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Generally, the existence of probable cause is a

factual issue.”). All that is relevant here is that without all of the alleged false statements and with

the alleged omissions inserted into the Affidavit, the Amended Complaint plausibly pleads the

absence of probable cause.

2. Malice

Defendant Schade next argues that the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that

Defendant Schade acted against Plaintiff with malice. “Actual malice in the context of malicious

prosecution is defined as either ill will in the sense of spite, lack of belief by the actor himself in

the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous improper purpose.” Lee v. Mihalich,

847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266

(1994). An officer’s decision to “omit crucial exculpatory information from [an] affidavit of

probable cause” can show malice. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020). The

Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant Schade omitted Dr. Borrok’s opinion that

the Pitbull’s injuries may not have been caused by Plaintiff’s handling of the catch pole. This is

sufficient at this stage to plausibly plead malice.

B. Immunity Defenses

The Court declines to rule at this stage whether Defendant Schade is entitled to qualified

immunity on the § 1983 claim or immunity under the PSTCA, as each of those defenses requires

a more complete record and additional factual development.

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Defendant Schade asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim because

probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with a misdemeanor even if not the felony.4 Under the

Third Circuit’s “any crime” jurisprudence as it existed at the time of arrest, “probable cause need[s]

only [to] exist as to ‘any offense that could be charged under the circumstances’ to defeat false

arrest and malicious prosecution claims.” ECF 4 at 14 (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d

595, 604 (3d Cir. 2005)). But Defendant Schade’s qualified immunity argument requires this

Court to make inferential leaps in Defendant’s favor that it cannot make on a motion to dismiss.

Defendant assumes probable cause existed on the misdemeanor charge because “[a]t the very least,

Detective Schade had reasonable grounds to believe that Plaintiff had recklessly ill-treated the dog,

sufficient to sustain a probable cause determination for the misdemeanor offense.”5 ECF 4 at 10.

However, the Amended Complaint, which the Court must accept as true, alleges that Dr. Borrok

“determined there was no mishandling of the catch pole.” Am. Compl., ¶¶ 63–64, 95(o). And

while Defendant Schade contends he reasonably based his Affidavit on the accounts of Defendants

Wilson and Corvi, the Amended Complaint alleges that their accounts are patently inconsistent

with video surveillance footage. Id. ¶¶ 92–95.

Defendant Schade also asserts he is immune from liability on the State claim under the

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), which limits recovery against an employee of

a local agency. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8545. However, the PSTCA’s limitations do not apply where it

4 Plaintiff was criminally charged with violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5534 (a felony) and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533 (a

misdemeanor). A person commits cruelty to animals (misdemeanor) “if the person intentionally, knowingly or

recklessly illtreats, overloads, beats, abandons or abuses an animal.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533.

5 Pennsylvania law provides that “[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he

consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his

conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct

and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a

reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 302(b)(3).

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is judicially determined that the act of the employee “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual

malice or willful misconduct.” Id. at § 8550. As the Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads

malicious prosecution, the Court cannot apply PSTCA immunity at this stage. See Russoli v.

Salisbury Twp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 870 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (Van Antwerpen, J.) (“Malicious

prosecution is an intentional tort that falls within 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8550.”).

Defendant Schade may raise these defenses at summary judgment after discovery and a

more developed factual record.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Schade’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. An

appropriate order follows.

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