The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MATTHEW JONES, ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 767
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
vs. )
)
CLEVELAND HOPKINS AIRPORT, ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) AND ORDER
)
Defendant. )
Pro se Plaintiff Matthew Jones filed this action against Cleveland Hopkins Airport
alleging that the airport failed to protect him as an officer or employee of the United States
under the United States Criminal Code. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in
forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). That application is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that in 2001, while traveling with a United States senator and
representative as a “U.S.A. Constituent,” the group was “attacked with gunfire and anal rape as
[they] entered [the airport], exiting our plane, to wait for our next flight.” (Doc. 1 at 3-4.) He
claims that he “suffered gun shot wounds, stabbings, Police Brown race H diseases,
bludgeonings with batons and clubs, fist punches and feet kicks, wrenching and twisting,
grinding and squeezing, poisoning, anal rapes, burning, falling, and from the learned noises that
they memorized to use as fatal weapons.” (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1114, a provision of the
United States Criminal Code that governs the sentencing of persons who kill or attempt to kill
an officer or employee of the United States Government. (Id. at 4-5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (per
curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district court, however, is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the
allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the
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complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed
factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully- harmed- me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal
conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading
standard. Id. The court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.
1998).
DISCUSSION
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not
“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all the material elements
of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Although specific facts are not
required, in order to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l
Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of
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Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)). Additionally, this Court has discretion to refuse to
accept without question the truth of a plaintiff’s allegations when they are “clearly baseless,” a
term encompassing claims that may be fairly described as fanciful, fantastic, delusional, wholly
incredible, or irrational. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Rule 8
pleading standard. His complaint states only one claim under a provision of the United States
Criminal Code. Criminal statutes do not provide a private cause of action. See, e.g., United
States v. Oguaju, 76 Fed. Appx. 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003). The complaint fails to contain any
viable federal civil claims within the jurisdiction of this Court. Furthermore, his sparse factual
allegations are wholly incredible and irrational. Plaintiff’s complaint, therefore, must be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
No. 2), and dismisses this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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