Martin v. Hughes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BRITTANY MARTIN, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-3094-SEM-EIL

)

LATOYA HUGHES, et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff pro se Brittany Martin has filed a Complaint (Doc. 1)

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that is before the Court for screening. For

the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice.

I. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. Facts Alleged

The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) because the proposed Amended

Complaint included only piecemeal allegations against eight

additional Defendants, rather than consisting of a standalone

amended complaint that would replace the original Complaint in its

entirety. See Flanner v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d

632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the facts summarized and

screened in this Order relate only to those included in the initial

Complaint (Doc. 1).

At all times relevant to her Complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate

within the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) at Logan

Correctional Center (“Logan”).

Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies the following Defendants at

Logan: Warden Melinda Eddy, Assistant Warden Michael Long,

Major Batton, Major Thomas, PREA1 Coordinator/Supervisor

Tapkins, Internal Affairs Lieutenant McGinnis, Adjustment

Committee Lieutenant Rachelle Tillquist, Lieutenant Jake Dietrich,

Lieutenant Evan Brunner, Lieutenant Ajagbe, Sergeant Dennis

Uhrig, Officer Murray, Officer Andrea Silas, and Counselor O’Bryan.

Plaintiff also names IDOC Director LaToya Hughes and John Loftus

of the IDOC’s Administrative Review Board as Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dietrich harassed her on

numerous occasions, beginning in March 2023 and culminating

with a physical assault on April 7, 2024. There is a pending

Internal Affairs investigation into Defendant Dietrich’s harassment

of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that on June 26, 2023, she was physically

assaulted by Defendant Ajagbe.

On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff alleges she was twice “violated”

during a strip search by Defendant Silas. She reported the act to

the PREA department, but a PREA investigation was not initiated by

the Internal Affairs department.

1 Prison Rape Elimination Act

On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff alleges she was sexually and

physically assaulted by Defendants Murray and Uhrig. She

reported this incident to the PREA department.

On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff was allegedly sexually and

physically assaulted by Defendant Brunner. She again reported

this abuse to the PREA department.

Plaintiff was housed in Housing Unit 10 beginning on

February 3, 2024. Plaintiff alleges the unit had mold, dirty water,

and lead and caused her to suffer from dizziness, migraines, eye

redness, and skin sores. The unit was shut down in March 2024.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 21, 2024, Defendant O’Bryan

denied Plaintiff’s request to attend her father’s funeral.

Plaintiff alleges that she and other female inmates at Logan

are housed with “men who identify themselves as women.” Plaintiff

wrote a grievance because she was uncomfortable with this and

wanted a record if she were to be hurt by a transgender inmate in

the future. Plaintiff alleges she was sexually harassed by inmate

Deon Hampton from March 31 to April 7, 2024, when she reported

Hampton to PREA.

Plaintiff alleges that she is regularly falsely accused and

“written up” with disciplinary tickets at Logan. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Tillquist is biased against her and does not give her fair

hearings on these tickets.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she has been “continuously

notifying” Defendants McGinnis, Tapkins, Thomas, Batton, Long,

Eddy, Loftus, and Hughes about the foregoing allegations.

III. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains allegations against sixteen

Defendants. As written, most of the allegations are apparently

factually unrelated, consisting of distinct instances of assault by

different Defendants on different dates, complaints about other

forms of harassment by still other individuals, the impact of

housing conditions on Plaintiff’s physical health, and allegations of

due process violations in the context of discipline, inter alia.

But “a litigant cannot throw all his [or her] grievances, against

dozens of different parties, into one stewpot.” Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012).

“Although it is acceptable for a plaintiff to bring multiple

claims against a single party in the same case, a plaintiff cannot

bring unrelated claims against different defendants in the same

case.” Coombe v. Green Bay Corr. Inst., 2024 WL 1051084, at *2

(E.D. Wis. Mar. 11, 2024), citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607

(7th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) and 20(a)(2)). More specifically:

[A] plaintiff may put in one complaint every claim of any kind

against a single defendant, per Rule 18(a), but a complaint

may present claim # 1 against Defendant A, and claim # 2

against Defendant B, only if both claims arise “out of the same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences.”

Wheeler, 689 F.3d at 683, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A).

Based upon the Complaint in its current form, the Court

cannot discern which Defendant constitutes Plaintiff’s “Defendant

A,” against whom Plaintiff may bring multiple unrelated claims—or

whose actions give rise to a series of transactions or occurrences

from which claims against other Defendants may also arise.

The Seventh Circuit has outlined several options available to

the district court if one or more parties are misjoined. However,

Plaintiff must be warned about the consequences of those options

and must be given an opportunity to decide which option she

prefers. Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 2002).

The court may strike the complaint and grant leave to

replead. See Perez [v. Fenoglio], 792 F.3d [768,] 783 [(7th Cir.

2015)]. The court may dismiss improperly joined defendants if

doing so will not prevent the plaintiff from timely refiling those

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“[T]he court may ..., on just

terms, ... drop a party.”); Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009,

1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that a district court must not

dismiss misjoined claims when there is a risk of “statute of

limitations consequences”). Or the court may sever the case

into two or more actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Because paying a

second filing fee may impose a substantial financial burden on

a prisoner, see Taylor [v. Brown], 787 F.3d [851,] 853–84 [(7th

Cir. 2015)], the court should not sever claims without a

plaintiff’s consent or acquiescence. Instead, it should allow

him to opt for partial dismissal rather than severance.

Id. at 1107.

Here, the Court will follow the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion

that “a district court faced with misjoined claims begin…by striking

the complaint, explaining the misjoinder, and giving the plaintiff at

least one chance to fix the problem.” Id. For the reasons outlined

above, Plaintiff’s Complaint, as currently pled, consists of misjoined

claims and is therefore dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will

be granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint. If

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not resolve the identified issues,

the Court may set a deadline for Plaintiff to either dismiss certain

Defendants or sever certain claims. See Id.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2) Plaintiff’s deadline to file an amended complaint is 21

days from entry of this Order. If Plaintiff does not file an

amended complaint by that deadline, this case will be

dismissed.

ENTERED April 30, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE