Opinion

Raulerson v. State of Florida

Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
Apr 30, 2025
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.0%

requiring “explicit and clear” statutory abrogation of common-law rules relating to rights of action, such abrogation not being inferred or implied

How later courts described this case

  • requiring “explicit and clear” statutory abrogation of common-law rules relating to rights of action, such abrogation not being inferred or implied
  • “At common law, a private citizen may arrest a person who in the citizen’s presence commits a felony or breach of the peace.”
  • noting well-settled rule of Florida jurisprudence that “the common law may be modified indirectly as well as directly, by a statute which is ‘inconsistent’ with the common law in a particular instance”
  • explaining how “a statute may expressly or by implication supersede the common law,” in turn becoming “the controlling law within its proper sphere of operation” (emphasis supplied)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2022-2798

_____________________________

ROGER DALE RAULERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction.

Phillip A. Pena, Judge.

April 30, 2025

ROWE, J.

Roger Dale Raulerson petitions for a writ of prohibition,

following the circuit court’s order denying his motion to dismiss.

Raulerson claimed immunity from criminal prosecution under

section 776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2019), asserting that he was

acting in self-defense and also seeking to prevent escape while

making a citizen’s arrest when he twice shot into the victims’ car.

We deny the petition.

Facts

Based on events that occurred on May 3, 2020, the State

charged Raulerson with (1) aggravated battery with a deadly

weapon, (2) shooting or throwing a deadly missile into an occupied

1

vehicle, (3) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and

(4) criminal mischief. Raulerson moved to dismiss counts one, two,

and four, asserting self-defense immunity under section

776.032(1). He claimed that he was immune from prosecution

because he was making a citizen’s arrest, the victims resisted him,

and were trying to prevent escape, and, in the alternative, because

he reasonably believed that using deadly force was necessary to

prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself under

section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes.

At the evidentiary hearing, the State and defense counsel

presented testimony from the victims, the defendant,

eyewitnesses, police officers, and experts. The facts below were

developed from this testimony.

In April 2020, the victims (Husband and Wife), who had been

married for over twenty-seven years, had recently moved in with

Husband’s half-brother, Richard Hunt. Hunt inherited a portion of

the home and land located on North Raulerson Road when his

mother died. Husband also inherited a portion of the home now

jointly owned with his stepfather and siblings. Raulerson lived in

a home about one hundred yards down from and across the road

from Hunt.

On the morning of the shooting, Husband and Wife drove to

Dollar General to buy groceries to make breakfast. When they

arrived back at Hunt’s house, the couple realized they had

forgotten a few items, and they began to argue. They drove back to

the store, arguing on the way there and back.

Raulerson claimed that from his home down the road, he saw

the couple driving to and from the store. He asserted that Husband

and Wife drove separate cars. Raulerson maintained that the two

raced up and down the road and tried to run each other off the

road. Raulerson reported what he saw to the Baker County Sheriff.

The Sheriff directed Lt. James Marker to contact Raulerson about

the complaint.

Husband and Wife refuted Raulerson’s version of the story

about their driving. Wife explained that after she and Husband

discovered they needed to return to the store for the items they

2

forgot to buy, they were arguing and decided to drive back to the

store in separate cars. Wife said that during the drive, she and

Husband pulled up next to each other so they could talk to each

other through the car windows—Wife did not have a cell phone.

Wife denied that she and Husband tried to run each other off the

road. She owned both cars and would not try to hit her own car.

There was also a factual dispute about what happened when

Husband and Wife returned to Hunt’s home after the second trip

to the store. By the time Lt. Marker returned Raulerson’s call

about his complaint, Husband and Wife were back at Hunt’s house.

Raulerson reported to Marker his claims about Husband and Wife

trying to run each other off the road. And then, while he was on

the phone with Marker, Raulerson reported that he saw Husband

strike Wife in the face. Raulerson told Marker that it looked like

Husband was killing Wife and that Raulerson “was going to have

to go over there and shoot the guy.” Marker responded

immediately, making it clear that Marker was on the way to deal

with the situation and that Raulerson should not leave his

residence. Raulerson later admitted that he heard Marker say that

he was twelve minutes away, but Raulerson denied hearing the

instruction to remain at his residence. Instead, Raulerson drove

over to Hunt’s property.

Meanwhile, Raulerson’s live-in girlfriend called 911. She told

the 911 operator that Husband and Wife were engaged in a fight

and that the police needed to be dispatched.

Husband and Wife testified that after they put the groceries

away, they returned to Wife’s car to avoid arguing in front of Hunt.

Husband admitted that he shoved Wife as they were walking back

to the car and that she fell to the ground.

When Raulerson arrived at Hunt’s house, he stated that he

saw Husband and Wife sitting inside the car. The car was parked

facing the house. The driveway to leave the property was located

to the right of the car. Wife was seated in the driver’s seat, and

Husband was seated in the passenger’s seat. Raulerson claimed

that he saw Husband with his hands around Wife’s neck.

Raulerson armed himself with an AR-15 platform pistol that he

kept in his truck.

3

After arming himself, Raulerson walked to the driver’s side of

the car, where Wife was sitting. Raulerson was about four steps

away from the car when he aimed his gun through the driver’s side

window and said, “get out of the car,” and “get on the ground”

several times. Raulerson did not specify whether he was referring

to Husband or Wife when he gave those instructions.

Husband and Wife testified that with Raulerson yelling and

pointing a gun at them, they exited the car. Raulerson pointed his

gun at Wife when she tried to talk to him. Raulerson then pointed

his gun at Husband when he tried to talk. Raulerson ordered

Husband to lie on his stomach on the ground. Husband instead

walked around the back of the car and toward Raulerson. Husband

told Raulerson to fight him like a man. Raulerson then took a step

back. But as Raulerson pointed the gun at Wife, Husband got back

into the car to drive away. At that point, Raulerson stood about

five feet from the front of Hunt’s front porch. Wife was standing

close to Raulerson on the driver’s side of the car. Hunt was

standing a few feet behind Raulerson. Husband explained that if

he turned the car to the left, he would have hit Raulerson, Wife,

and Hunt’s home.

Instead, Husband turned the car all the way to the right to

exit the property. Raulerson then yelled that Husband was under

citizen’s arrest. As he was driving away, Husband heard two

gunshots. Raulerson fired at Husband about two or three seconds

after the car started to move. It took Husband a few moments to

realize that he had been shot twice in his left upper thigh. The

forensic evidence showed that two bullets pierced the driver’s side

door, with the first bullet entering the middle of the door and the

second bullet entering near the door handle.

Raulerson disputed that Husband was trying to leave the

property. Raulerson claimed that Husband drove straight at him

and that he was “dead square center” with the front bumper of the

car. Raulerson maintained that he heard the thump of the

accelerator hitting the floor. He then screamed for Husband to stop

and jumped to the side. He claimed that Husband compensated for

his movement, which caused him to fear for his life. When he

4

jumped a second time, Raulerson claimed that he fired two bullets

in mid-air. He stated that he saw both bullets strike Husband.

But forensic evidence contradicted Raulerson’s claims about

his position and the movement of the vehicle when he fired the AR-

15 into the car. The tire track evidence showed that the car

immediately began turning as it began to move. The State’s expert

determined that Raulerson was standing to the side of the car

when he fired the first shot and that the second shot was fired as

the car was moving away from Raulerson. Even Raulerson’s own

expert concluded that Raulerson was seven to nine feet away from

the car when Raulerson fired his gun at the car. Raulerson’s expert

also concluded that Raulerson was near the left-front wheel well,

left-front fender area—not standing directly in front of the car—

when he discharged his weapon and that the car was turning right

when the shots were fired.

After Husband was shot, Raulerson would not let Wife leave

the area. When Lt. Marker arrived, Raulerson told him that he

fired two shots in the car. But Raulerson never reported to the

officer that Husband was trying to run him over.

After weighing the testimony and making credibility

determinations, the trial court denied Raulerson’s motion to

dismiss. The court found that even if Raulerson had the authority

to make a citizen’s arrest, he was not entitled to self-defense

immunity because Raulerson did not have an objectively

reasonable belief that use of deadly force was necessary to defend

himself from Husband and also that force was not reasonably

necessary to prevent Husband’s escape.

Analysis

Raulerson argues that this Court should grant his petition for

a writ of prohibition because he is entitled to self-defense

immunity. He claims that he was making a citizen’s arrest when,

while armed with an AR-15 platform pistol, he detained Husband

and Wife in their car. Raulerson contends that he had the

authority to make the arrest and detain Husband because

Husband was committing an aggravated battery, and he was

justified in using force to prevent Husband’s escape. Then when

5

Husband tried to run him over with his car and Raulerson shot at

the car, Raulerson claims that he had an objectively reasonable

fear that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm.

To begin with, this is not an appeal from a nonfinal order in

which this Court reviews the circuit court’s ruling for an abuse of

discretion or for legal error. Rather, Raulerson seeks to invoke the

writ authority of this Court, asking for the issuance of the

extraordinary writ of prohibition. 1 Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Int’l Bonded

1 Several district courts questioned whether prohibition is an

appropriate vehicle for an appellate court to address a trial court’s

ruling on a self-defense immunity motion. See Nadell v. Hursey,

363 So. 3d 1135, 1138–39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); Snow v. State, 352

So. 3d 529, 532–34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); Edwards, 351 So. 3d 1142,

1146 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). The Third District certified this

question to the Florida Supreme Court: “Is prohibition the

appropriate remedy for a civil defendant to challenge a nonfinal

order denying the defendant’s motion for statutory immunity

under Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law?” Nadell, 363 So. 3d at

1140. But the supreme court declined review. Nadell v. Hursey, No.

SC2023-1079, 2023 WL 8948388 (Fla. Dec. 28, 2023). The Third

District also referred to the Florida Bar’s Appellate Rules

Committee “the issue of whether rule 9.130’s list of appealable

nonfinal orders should be amended to include appeals from

nonfinal orders denying a civil defendant’s motion for statutory

immunity under SYG.” Nadell, 363 So. 3d at 1138–39. The

supreme court ultimately amended Florida Rule of Appellate

Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to allow “civil defendants to appeal nonfinal

orders that deny claims of immunity brought under section

776.032, Florida Statutes (2024).” See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules

of App. Proc., No. SC2024-0317, 2025 WL 715788 at *1 (Fla. Mar.

6, 2025). Even so, the Court declined the invitation to amend the

rule to allow criminal defendants to appeal nonfinal orders

denying immunity motions. Id. at *2. The Court explained that the

writ of prohibition provides an adequate means to challenge such

an order:

We do not suggest that a criminal defendant who hopes

to challenge a nonfinal order denying a claim of Stand

6

Couriers, Inc., 356 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“[T]he writ

of prohibition will not be invoked for slight reasons, but only in

emergency cases to forestall an impending, present injury.”

(quoting Joughin v. Parks, 147 So. 273, 274 (1933))).

On the facts before us, we decline to exercise our prerogative

to grant Raulerson’s petition. See English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d

293, 297 (Fla. 1977) (“[O]nly when damage is likely to follow the

inferior court’s acting without authority of law or in excess of

jurisdiction will the writ issue.”); Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Miami-

Dade Cnty. Expressway Auth., 298 So. 3d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA

2020) (“The ‘writ is very narrow in scope and operation and must

be employed with caution and utilized only in emergency cases to

prevent impending injury where there is no other appropriate and

adequate legal remedy.’” (quoting Mandico v. Taos Constr. Inc.,

605 So. 2d 840, 854 (Fla. 1992))).

Raulerson claimed that he was making a citizen’s arrest when

he detained Husband and Wife and held them at gunpoint. No

doubt citizen’s arrests were permissible under the common law.

Edwards v. State, 462 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (“At

common law, a private citizen may arrest a person who in the

citizen’s presence commits a felony or breach of the peace.”).

Florida adopted the common law of England as of July 4, 1776. See

§ 2.01, Fla. Stat. Even so, as explained in the concurring opinion,

Your Ground immunity will have no avenue for relief. We

have stated previously that the constitutional writ of

prohibition may be invoked in such circumstances. See

Boston v. State, 326 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2021) (declaring

that “a defendant who avails him or herself to a pretrial

immunity hearing and who believes legal error was

committed at the pretrial immunity hearing may still

seek relief by filing a petition for a writ of prohibition

before invoking his or her right to a trial”) (emphasis

omitted) (footnote omitted). We reiterate the availability

of that remedy now.

Id.

7

Raulerson’s claim of authority to effect a citizen’s arrest is dubious

on the law and on the facts.

But this case need not turn on Raulerson’s assertion of

authority to make a citizen’s arrest. Raulerson has failed to show

clearly and conclusively, without a good faith dispute, that when

Husband was driving away from the scene and Raulerson twice

fired his weapon into Husband’s car, Raulerson had an objectively

reasonable belief that he faced an imminent threat of great bodily

harm or death.

To raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity under

section 776.032(1), Raulerson had to show that the elements of

justifiable force were met. See Edwards v. State, 351 So. 3d 1142,

1148–49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). Section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes

(2019), provides:

A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly

force if he or she reasonably believes that using or

threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent

imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself

or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a

forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use

deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not

have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or

her ground if the person using or threatening to use the

deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is

in a place where he or she has a right to be.

To demonstrate that his use of deadly force was justifiable,

Raulerson had to allege specific facts that show or tended to show

that he (1) used deadly force, (2) reasonably believed deadly force

was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to

himself or another, (3) used such deadly force while resisting the

victim’s attempt to murder him or to commit a forcible felony on

him, and (4) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and

was in place he had a right to be. 2

2 As stated above, the majority’s

decision does not address

whether Raulerson had the authority to make a citizen’s arrest

8

In reviewing Raulerson’s claim of using deadly force in self-

defense, the trial court had to determine whether a reasonable

person in Raulerson’s position would have used the same force as

Raulerson. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Craven v. State, 285 So. 3d

992, 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “[T]he appearance of danger must

have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person

under the same circumstances would have believed that the

danger could be avoided only through the use of force.” Garrett v.

State, 148 So. 3d 466, 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The trial court

concluded that Raulerson did not have an objectively reasonable

belief that he needed to use deadly force to prevent imminent death

or great bodily harm.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court made these factual

findings. On the morning of the shooting, Husband and Wife were

arguing in Hunt’s front yard. Husband struck Wife, knocking her

to the ground. The two entered Wife’s car, where Husband choked

Wife. When Raulerson observed these actions, his immediate

reaction was to report to a law enforcement officer that he might

have to go to over there to shoot Husband. He had this reaction

even though he had no reason to believe that Husband or Wife

were armed. Even after Lt. Marker said he was minutes away,

Raulerson decided to drive over to Hunt’s house to confront

Husband and Wife, armed with an AR-15 pistol. The trial court

found credible the testimony of Lt. Marker—that Raulerson

approached Husband “ready to shoot him.”

when he detained Husband and Wife at gunpoint and against their

will. But if Raulerson lacked authority to make a citizen’s arrest,

the unlawful detention of Husband and Wife by force and against

their will would amount to the commission of the felony offense of

false imprisonment. See § 787.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The term

‘false imprisonment’ means forcibly, by threat, or secretly

confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person

without lawful authority and against her or his will.”). And if

Raulerson were committing the crime of false imprisonment, his

use of deadly force would not have been justified under section

776.012(2).

9

The trial court found that Raulerson then confronted the two

unarmed individuals, pointed the AR-15 pistol at them, ordered

them out of their own car, and instructed them to lie on the ground.

When they would not obey his orders after exiting the car,

Raulerson continued to aim his loaded gun at them.

The trial court found incredible Raulerson’s claim that, while

in mid-air and jumping out of the way of an oncoming car, he fired

two rounds at Husband who was driving directly toward him and

accelerating. Rather, the trial court found that there was clear and

convincing evidence to show that Raulerson was standing to the

left of the car and that Husband was attempting to leave the

property. It also concluded that Raulerson could have shot at the

car’s tires or engine compartment instead of directly at Husband.

Raulerson has failed to show that there is no dispute that he

is entitled to immunity. As the trial court found, the testimonial

and physical evidence conflict with Raulerson’s version of events.

Wife and Hunt were standing a few feet from Raulerson when

Husband allegedly accelerated toward Raulerson. But neither

reported jumping out of the way to avoid being hit. And Wife

testified that Raulerson was standing to the left of the car when he

fired his gun.

The physical evidence also conflicted with Raulerson’s version

of events. The tire tracks showed that Husband immediately

turned right as the car moved forward—not left where Raulerson

was standing. Raulerson fired two shots; both rounds pierced the

driver’s side door. The first hole was in the middle of the driver’s

side door, and the second hole was near the door handle. Both

forensic experts examined the entry paths of the bullets and

concluded that Raulerson could not have been standing directly in

front of the car when he fired his AR-15.

On these facts, Raulerson has failed to show clearly and

conclusively that he is immune from prosecution and that the trial

court is acting beyond its jurisdiction. For these reasons, we deny

Raulerson’s petition for a writ of prohibition.

DENIED.

10

KELSEY, J., concurs in result only; TANENBAUM, J., concurs with

opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

The record fails to demonstrate clearly and conclusively that

the petitioner is immune from prosecution, so I agree that he is not

entitled to the extraordinary relief being sought. There is no need,

however, to assess the trial court’s fact determinations for evidence

sufficiency. Even though our court and other district courts

repeatedly have treated petitions like this one like appeals, the

Florida Constitution does not provide that type of review

authority. Moreover, the supreme court has expressly foreclosed

such use of the writ of prohibition for over 120 years. We should

hew to the supreme court’s consistent directive over the years that

the writ’s scope remain narrow—reserved for emergencies when a

trial court proposes to act beyond its jurisdiction; never to be used

for direct appellate review. Under this mandated approach, I am

not convinced by the petition and the record that the trial court

indisputably will exceed its jurisdiction if prosecution of the

petitioner is allowed to continue.

I

A

The supreme court continues to follow the ancient English

view on the writ of prohibition:

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ, a prerogative writ,

extremely narrow in scope and operation, by which a

superior court, having appellate and supervisory

jurisdiction over an inferior court or tribunal possessing

judicial or quasi-judicial power, may prevent such inferior

11

court or tribunal from exceeding jurisdiction or usurping

jurisdiction over matters not within its jurisdiction.

English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977). It is “employed

with great caution and utilized only in emergencies.” Id.; see also

id. at 297 (“Prohibition will be invoked only in emergency cases to

forestall an impending present injury where person seeking writ

has no other appropriate and adequate legal remedy.”). The

supreme court determined that one such emergency is the need to

enforce a defendant’s statutory immunity against continued

criminal prosecution based on evidence he was compelled to give.

See State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 164 So. 872, 874 (Fla. 1935);

State ex rel. Byer v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 179, 182–83 (Fla. 1951).

The district courts of appeal later extended this scope to also

include enforcing a criminal defendant’s claimed justified-use-of-

force immunity against continued prosecution; an extension to

which the supreme court has given its implicit imprimatur. See

Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 778 (Fla. 2015); Boston v. State,

326 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2021); see also In re Amends. to Fla. Rules

of App. Proc., No. SC2024-0317, 2025 WL 715788, at *2 (Fla. Mar.

6, 2025). Oddly, though, this court stated that review of a trial

court’s denial of immunity in prohibition “is governed by the same

standard which applies in an appeal from an order denying a

motion to suppress”; it cited no authority and provided no analysis

to support such an imprecise observation. Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d

804, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (emphasis supplied). Other district

courts nevertheless followed suit. So instead of properly treating

these petitions as invoking their limited writ authority under

Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, the district

courts have been handling prohibition in this context as if their

appellate jurisdiction under Article V, section 4(b)(1)—specifically,

jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order as authorized by

supreme court rule—had been invoked. 1 In doing so, the courts

1 A district court of appeal has only appellate jurisdiction. See

Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (recognizing that the district court has

“jurisdiction to hear appeals” (emphasis supplied)). While the

district court has authority to issue enumerated extraordinary

writs and other writs, that authority does not equate with original

12

have failed to understand a threshold proposition: that a district

court cannot both apply an appellate standard of review in an

extraordinary writ proceeding and not obliterate the constitutional

distinction between the court’s appellate jurisdiction and its writ

authority as a supervisory court.

There ought to be no “struggling” with this point. Cf. Nadell

v. Hursey, 363 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (noting how

district courts are “struggling” with how prohibition should be

utilized in these immunity matters). The district courts’ approach

to prohibition regarding self-defense immunity (i.e., engaging

essentially in direct review)—never used or approved by the

supreme court—runs afoul of both the Florida Constitution and

the categorical limitations expressly imposed on the writ by the

supreme court as far back as 1898.

The constitution provides a district court of appeal jurisdiction

to review final judgments and orders of the trial courts, and that

review may be sought as a matter of right. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1),

Fla. Const. The district court, however, does not have jurisdiction

to consider a non-final order appeal unless authorized by supreme

court rule. See id. (authorizing district court review of

“interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules

adopted by the supreme court”); Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen

O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577, 580 (Fla. 2022) (“Florida’s district

courts may review only those interlocutory orders allowed by the

rules of this Court.”); cf. Vericker v. Powell, No. SC2022-1042, 2025

WL 922413, at *2 (Fla. Mar. 27, 2025) (“It is well established that

district courts of appeal generally lack authority to review nonfinal

orders until after the trial court issues a final judgment.”). Only

the supreme court—not the district courts and not the

Legislature—has the “power to define the scope of interlocutory

appeals.” State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. 2000); cf.

jurisdiction—except, perhaps, for habeas authority. Rather, the

district court may issue those writs to aid the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction. Cf. Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. The

constitution expressly gives “original jurisdiction” only to the

circuit court, which also is the only court to possess both original

and appellate jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.

13

State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1972) (explaining that the

constitution “does not authorize the legislature to provide for

interlocutory review,” so “any statute purporting to grant

interlocutory appeals is clearly a declaration of legislative policy

and no more” and is void “unless the Supreme Court of Florida

adopts such statute as its own”).

Whether a non-final order is subject to direct appellate review

(instead of indirectly, through an assessment of the record to

determine entitlement to extraordinary-writ relief against a trial

judge) is purely a policy call the supreme court gets to make for the

courts. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla.

1984) (explaining that “[t]he thrust of rule 9.130 is to restrict the

number of appealable nonfinal orders,” the theory being “that

appellate review of nonfinal judgments serves to waste court

resources and needlessly delays final judgment”); Jaye v. Royal

Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998) (“The judicial policy in

favor of limited certiorari review is based on the notion that

piecemeal review of nonfinal trial court orders will impede the

orderly administration of justice and serve only to delay and

harass.”); cf. Mandico v. Taos Const., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla.

1992) (adding a non-final order to Florida Rule of Appellate

Procedure 9.130 “[b]ecause we are sensitive to the concern for an

early resolution of controlling issues”); Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v.

Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 255 (Fla. 2023) (“And it is within our

constitutional authority to ensure that Florida’s procedural rules

of court manifest the substantive legal enactments of the

Legislature.”); Vericker, No. SC2022-1042, 2025 WL 922413, at *5

(agreeing that adoption of new rule allowing for “immediate review

of nonfinal orders denying qualifying Anti-SLAPP motions” is

warranted “to conform[] to” legislative policy).

Indeed, the supreme court recently considered a rule-

amendment proposal to authorize direct appellate review of self-

defense immunity interlocutory orders in criminal cases. The court

made a policy assessment leading to its rejecting the proposal in

favor of prohibition as the avenue for any immediate relief. See In

re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., No. SC2024-0317, 2025 WL

715788, at *1–2 (noting “there are very few circumstances where

interlocutory appeals are authorized in criminal proceedings,”

which “do not include challenges against nonfinal orders denying

14

statutory immunity”; so declining to adopt the rule change out of

concern for “unique problems” that might arise in the context of

those proceedings). 2 The district courts of appeal, then, still lack

the constitutional authority to directly review a denial of self-

defense immunity as if the order is on appeal—by writ or

otherwise. While the writ of prohibition obviously is available as a

remedy in this context, considerations on whether to grant it must

be commensurate with the extraordinary remedy that the writ is.

A petition for the writ is not the same as an appeal, and it cannot

be handled as if it is—which the supreme court has been saying for

most of the State’s jurisprudential history.

B

The writ of prohibition being extraordinary and lying outside

the established constitutional pathways for appellate review; the

supreme court has “strictly enforced” the “fundamental principle”

that prohibition “is never allowed to usurp the functions of a writ

of error or certiorari, and can never be employed as a process for

the correction of errors of inferior tribunals.” State v. Malone, 23

So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1898) (emphases supplied); 3 id. (noting that the

writ “is never allowed to usurp the office of a writ of error, or an

appeal” (emphasis supplied)); see State ex rel. B. F. Goodrich Co. v.

Trammell, 192 So. 175, 176–77 (Fla. 1939) (“The writ of prohibition

is never allowed to usurp the functions of an appeal, writ of error

or certiorari.”); Mintz Truppman, 346 So. 3d at 580 (warning

2 Even though the proposed rule change would have given a

criminal defendant the more favorable review parameters that

accompany direct appellate review—instead of an extraordinary,

prerogative writ’s more stringent parameters—the Florida Public

Defender Association vigorously opposed it.

3 This decision may be old—found primarily in those “dusty

books”—but it is still good law. See Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d

901, 905 (Fla. 2002) (expressly stating that the supreme court

“does not intentionally overrule itself sub silentio,” so when faced

with “an express holding . . . on a specific issue and a subsequent

contrary dicta statement on the same specific issue,” a lower court

must “apply [the] express holding in the former decision until such

time as [the supreme court] recedes from the express holding”).

15

against use of the writ of prohibition “to end-run our rules on

appeals generally and interlocutory appeals in particular”).

So when the supreme court says a writ of prohibition is “an

appropriate remedy,” it does not mean the writ can be “deployed to

reverse a trial court’s order on the merits of a case.” Mintz

Truppman, 346 So. 3d at 581 (emphasis supplied); see English, 348

So. 2d at 296–97 (explaining that prohibition is “preventive and

not corrective,” its purpose being “to prevent the doing of

something, not to compel the undoing of something already done,”

not “to revoke an order already entered” (emphases supplied)). To

this day, the office of prohibition is reserved for when “a [lower]

court has proposed to act in excess of its subject matter

jurisdiction.” Mintz Truppman, 346 So. 3d at 581. It should be clear

from all this that prohibition is not a review writ.

In turn, the trial court’s order on self-defense immunity is not

what is being reviewed in a prohibition proceeding. The supreme

court—once again, for over 120 years—has distinguished “between

the assumption of a jurisdiction to which the court has no legal

claim, and the mere erroneous exercise of a jurisdiction with which

the court is invested.” Malone, 23 So. at 576; see State ex rel.

Schwarz v. Heffernan, 194 So. 313, 314 (Fla. 1940) (“It is

fundamental that prohibition does not lie to correct errors of a

court which is acting within its jurisdiction, although proceeding

improperly in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”); Mintz Truppman,

346 So. 3d at 580 (“We have consistently said that the purpose of

the writ is to prevent a court’s action beyond the scope of its

jurisdiction, not to correct an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.”).

Naturally, “[e]very court has judicial power to hear and

determine the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties

and as to subject matter, and necessarily does so by proceeding in

the cause.” B.F. Goodrich Co., 192 So. at 177 (quotation and

citation omitted). When there is a good-faith representation to the

court that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court “will examine the

grounds of its jurisdiction before proceeding further,” and it “may

receive testimony on a preliminary question to” make that

16

determination. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 4 The trial

court “having jurisdiction to decide as to its own jurisdiction in any

particular case, it follows that its decision will have the same effect

and conclusiveness as would its decision on any other matter

within its jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The

court’s adjudication of a jurisdictional fact that “it is required to

ascertain . . . is conclusive on the question of jurisdiction, until set

aside or reversed by direct proceedings.” Id. (emphasis supplied)

(quotation and citation omitted). “If the existence of jurisdiction

depends on controverted facts which the inferior court has the

jurisdiction to determine, and the court errs in the exercise thereof,

prohibition is not available.” English, 348 So. 2d at 298 (emphasis

supplied).

In prohibition, then, how the trial court weighed the evidence

or whether there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s

determination of self-defense immunity is not for our

consideration. See Schwarz, 194 So. at 314 (precluding use of

prohibition to consider whether a lower court erred in determining

“controverted facts which the [] court has the jurisdiction to

determine”); State ex rel. Hendricks v. Hunt, 70 So. 2d 301, 306

(Fla. 1954) (noting that it is “settled that the sufficiency of the

evidence to support any particular order made by the respondent

judge in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute is

not a matter that may be determined in a prohibition proceeding

but can be decided only by an appeal from the order” (emphasis

supplied)); Mandico, 605 So. 2d at 854 (noting that prohibition may

not “be used to test the correctness of a lower tribunal’s ruling on

jurisdiction where the existence of jurisdiction depends on

controverted facts that the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction to

determine” (citing English, 348 So. 2d at 298) (emphasis

supplied)); cf. Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 752 (Fla. 1977)

(noting in seminal immunity-from-prosecution case that review of

4 Section 776.032(4), Florida Statutes, in fact expressly gives

the trial court this jurisdiction, requiring it to hold a “pretrial

immunity hearing,” where the defendant must raise a “prima facie

claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution”; after

which the state must present “clear and convincing evidence” that

“overcome[s]” the claimed immunity.

17

an order on a motion to suppress, had one been filed, “would not be

appropriate” in prohibition).

The only question that could be before us in prohibition is

whether, as a matter of law and on the face of the record, the lower

court clearly and indisputably is acting or proposing to act beyond

its jurisdiction. See B.F. Goodrich, 192 So. at 176 (denying

prohibition because the “questions presented here are to such a

large extent questions of fact (alleged but not yet proven), as well

as of law, that lack of jurisdiction is not made conclusively to

appear” (emphasis supplied)); id. at 177 (explaining that “where

the question of jurisdiction is one of law, a court cannot by an

erroneous decision acquire jurisdiction which it has not, or divest

itself of jurisdiction which it has” (quotation and citation omitted));

id. (determining there were “not sufficient grounds shown upon

the face of the record” to warrant relief through prohibition);

English, 348 So. at 298 (requiring that request for prohibition

“affirmatively show lack of jurisdiction in the lower court”); cf.

State v. White, 24 So. 160, 167 (Fla. 1898) (looking to whether

court’s acting in excess of jurisdiction “is apparent upon the face of

the proceedings” to determine whether “prohibition will lie”); State

ex rel. Jacksonville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Gray, 177 So. 849,

850 (Fla. 1937) (suggesting that prohibition lies only where there

“is a question of law and no discretion involved, and the ruling was

one affecting the exercise of jurisdiction”); State ex rel. Byer v.

Willard, 54 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 1951) (looking to “material facts

shown by the record” to determine whether to grant writ). The

supreme court’s unmistakably consistent position on prohibition

over more than a century controls how we handle these prohibition

petitions regarding self-defense immunity, notwithstanding what

the practice has been among the district courts of appeal—

seemingly based on a single unsupported and unelucidated

sentence in one decision of this court.

C

Thus, there is only one question for me in this case: whether

the record before us demonstrates clearly and conclusively, without

a bona-fide factual dispute, that the petitioner is immune from

prosecution and the trial court is proposing to proceed without the

18

constitutional or statutory power to do so. My answer is a firm no,

as I explain next.

II

A

A person has immunity when his use of force is legally

justified. See § 776.032(1), Fla. Stat. (providing immunity “from

criminal prosecution” to a person “who uses force as permitted in

s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031,” except when force is used

against a law enforcement officer). Under section 776.012(2),

Florida Statutes,

[a] person is justified in using or threatening to use

deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or

threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent

imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself

or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a

forcible felony.

This immunity, however, is not available if the person “[i]s

attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the

commission of, a forcible felony.” § 776.041(1), Fla. Stat. Moreover,

a person “engaged in a criminal activity” or located “in a place

where he [] [does not have] a right to be” has “a duty to retreat”

rather than an entitlement to stand his ground and face the threat

with force. § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat. 5

As already discussed, this immunity’s availability bears on a

trial court’s jurisdiction to allow a criminal prosecution to proceed,

and the court has statutory jurisdiction to resolve a factual dispute

bearing on that availability. See § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. (providing

for a “pretrial immunity hearing” at which the State must

overcome a defendant’s prima facie case of immunity with “clear

and convincing evidence”). In this case, the State called several

5 Ancillary to my analysis is the separate observation that the

petitioner did not have the right to be on the property, only a

license or privilege to be there—at the property owner’s invitation.

This is another reason the petitioner is not entitled to immunity.

19

witnesses at the pre-trial hearing on the petitioner’s claim under

this provision, and those witnesses’ testimony, according to the

trial court, constituted clear and convincing evidence that

overcame the petitioner’s immunity claim. See id. The petitioner

having testified as well, there necessarily was a conflict in the

evidence, a conflict the trial court resolved with credibility

determinations—including a conclusion that the petitioner’s

testimony was not credible. In the context of this prohibition

petition, the trial court’s resolution of the evidentiary conflict is

conclusive and not reviewable. See B.F. Goodrich Co., 192 So. at

177. 6 The question for us is whether, when applying the law to

those facts, the petitioner is clearly immune. Cf. Smith v. State,

387 So. 3d 495, 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (granting writ of

prohibition after applying law to undisputed facts found by the

trial court and concluding the petitioner was entitled to

immunity). 7

There does not appear to be a dispute basically about one

threshold fact leading to the events for which the petitioner was

charged: He approached the two victims (a husband and wife) in

their car while they were fighting and ordered them, at gunpoint,

to exit and lie face-down on the ground. This means the petitioner

arguably was committing at least two forcible felonies by the time

the husband hopped into a car and supposedly took off in the

petitioner’s direction: aggravated assault and false imprisonment.

See § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (defining “forcible felony” to include

“aggravated assault” and “any other felony which involves the use

or threat of physical force or violence against any individual”);

§ 787.02(1)(a), (2), Fla. Stat. (making it a third-degree felony to

“forcibly, by threat . . . restrain[] another person without lawful

authority and against her or his will” (emphasis supplied));

6 The petitioner does not contend that the trial court failed to

properly afford him the evidentiary hearing to which he is

statutorily entitled. If he had, it would have been a claim to be

addressed in certiorari, not prohibition. See Edwards v. State, 351

So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

7 In appellate standard-of-review parlance, this would be akin

to de novo consideration.

20

§§ 784.011(1), 784.021(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (establishing a third-

degree felony for the “intentional, unlawful threat by word or act

to do violence to the person of another,” while using a deadly

weapon, coupled with the “doing some act which creates a well-

founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent”

(emphasis supplied)).

The petitioner contends he was acting lawfully because he was

making a common-law “citizen’s arrest,” rendering the highlighted

text above inapplicable. The trial court accepted that there was

such a thing and considered only whether the petitioner acted

reasonably in shooting to prevent an escape. See § 776.07(1), Fla.

Stat. (providing for justified use of force when a “law enforcement

officer or other person who has an arrested person in his or her

custody” and he “reasonably believes” the force “to be necessary to

prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody”). Though

the citizen’s arrest was an ancient common-law concept—one

initially imported into Florida’s substantive law—extensive

statutory law enacted since then is not consistent with its

continued operation with respect to private persons acting alone.

If there no longer is a common-law “citizen’s arrest” in Florida for

private persons, then the petitioner was not acting with lawful

authority when he held the victims under threat of a deadly

weapon, and immunity is not available to him under chapter 776,

Florida Statutes.

B

At English common law, the citizen’s arrest was required of

any person present when a felony was committed. See WILLIAM

HAWKINS, 2 A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN Bk. 2, ch. 2,

114–16, §§ 1–7 (8th ed. 1824); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4

COMMENTARIES *191–92 (Oxford Press 2016). Citizens also were

required to heed a summons by a sheriff or constable to pursue and

arrest a person suspected of having committed a felony—known as

hue and cry—and all citizens present at the commission of a felony

were required to organize pursuit of the suspect. See 3 Edw. 1, ch.

9 (First Statute of Westminster (1275)); 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, ch. 1

(Second Statute of Winchester (1285)); EDWARD COKE, 3

INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 116–17 (1644). These

concepts came into Florida’s substantive law when the Legislature

21

adopted “[t]he common and statute laws of England . . . down to

the 4th day of July, 1776.” § 2.01, Fla. Stat.

Preservation of the ancient English law as Florida’s

substantive law goes only so far: as long that it is “not inconsistent

with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of

the Legislature of this state.” Id. (emphasis supplied); see also

§ 775.01, Fla. Stat. (putting into effect English common law “in

relation to crimes . . . where there is no existing provision by

statute on the subject”). Relevant here, the Legislature

undoubtedly has adopted “general and comprehensive statutes

that are designed to regulate” the “entire subject” regarding law

enforcement officers, peace officers, arrests, and detention

(including by private persons), so those statutes “supersede all

common-law rules in the premises, and the valid provisions of the

statutes are the controlling law.” See Broward v. Broward, 117 So.

691, 693 (Fla. 1928); see also id. (explaining how “a statute may

expressly or by implication supersede the common law,” in turn

becoming “the controlling law within its proper sphere of operation”

(emphasis supplied)); Banfield v. Addington, 140 So. 893, 899 (Fla.

1932) (noting well-settled rule of Florida jurisprudence that “the

common law may be modified indirectly as well as directly, by a

statute which is ‘inconsistent’ with the common law in a particular

instance”); Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1952), overruled

on other grounds by Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971)

(explaining that section 2.01, Florida Statutes, “preserves the

common law only in those cases where it is ‘not inconsistent’ with

the acts of the Legislature,” so “[i]t is not necessary that a statute

be in direct conflict with the common law before the latter may be

superseded, inconsistency being sufficient” (second emphasis

supplied)). 8

8 But cf. Cullen v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 58 So. 182, 183

(Fla. 1912) (requiring a clear legislative intent to statutorily

abrogate a common-law right of action); City of Hialeah v. State ex

rel. Morris, 183 So. 745, 747–48 (Fla. 1938) (requiring “explicit and

clear” statutory abrogation of common-law rules relating to rights

of action, such abrogation not being inferred or implied); Thornber

v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990) (stating

22

The abrogation in this space started early in Florida’s history.

Indeed, the Legislature in 1845 directed a compilation of English

statute law still in effect in Florida, which was prepared by Leslie

Thompson in 1853 but officially published years later, upon being

revised and summarized, as a supplementary third volume of the

1941 Florida Statutes (titled “Helpful and Useful Matter”) under a

subsequent legislative directive. See § 16.44(2), (11), Fla Stat.

(1941) (Supp. 1945). The compilation determined, even then, at

least one aspect of the common-law’s “method of apprehending

criminals [by citizens]”—hue and cry—“[was] not consistent with

our police and law enforcement procedures.” Florida Statutes vol.

3 at 34 (1941). It also observed that, by statute, a Florida sheriff

already had authority to “raise the power of the county and

command any person to assist him, when necessary, in the

execution of the duties of his office.” § 144.02, Fla. Stat. (1941); see

§ 30.15(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (setting out the same authority in

successor statute, and providing for punishment of someone who

“refuses or neglects to render such assistance”); cf. South v. State

of Maryland for use of Pottle, 59 U.S. 396, 402 (1855) (describing

how, as a “conservator of the peace,” the English sheriff “may

command the posse comitatus or power of the country” to pursue

and arrest felons on the run).

A close look at the Florida Statutes reveals further evidence

the Legislature has opted to give law-enforcement officers and

other peace officers 9 the authority to arrest without a warrant,

that when it comes to common-law rights of action, the

“presumption is that no change . . . is intended unless the statute

is explicit and clear in that regard”); State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d

338, 341 (Fla. 1997) (requiring unequivocal statutory statement for

abrogation of common-law immunity from prosecution).

9 A peace officer is synonymous with a “conservator of the

peace,” which is an officer of the government vested by the

sovereign with authority to stop breaches of the peace (including

riots and mayhem) as they are happening, rather than pursuing

arrest after the breach as part of the law’s enforcement. See State

of Maryland for use of Pottle, 59 U.S. at 402–03 (explaining how

historically, the “conservator of the peace in his county or bailiwick

23

rather than persist in leaving to every citizen the duty and

authority to keep the public peace. First, there are the demanding

requirements for someone to be certified as a law enforcement

officer, an officer having the power to both bear arms and arrest.

See § 943.09, Fla. Stat. (establishing Criminal Justice

Professionalism Program); § 943.13, Fla. Stat. (setting out

minimum qualifications, including a certified training

requirement, for any person to be employed as a law enforcement

officer by an “employing agency,” defined by section 943.10(4),

Florida Statutes, to be a governmental entity with constitutional

. . . is the representative of the king, or sovereign power of the

State” who may “upon view, without writ or process, commit to

prison all persons who break the peace or attempt to break it” and

“command the posse comitatus or power of the country” to pursue

felons and traitors; ultimately “wielding the executive power for

the preservation of the public peace”); City of Chicago v. Morales,

527 U.S. 41, 106–08 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referencing

how the “criminal law deals with offenses after they have been

committed,” while “the police power aims to prevent them,” so “the

idea that the police are also peace officers [is not] simply a quaint

anachronism”); see also Art. V, § 19, Fla. Const. (providing that “all

judicial officers in this state shall be conservators of the peace”);

compare § 35.26, Fla. Stat. (making the marshal and deputy

marshals for the district court of appeal “conservators of the peace”

where the court “is sitting”; authorizing apprehension of, “without

warrant, any person disturbing the peace”; and requiring delivery

of that person “to the appropriate law enforcement officer”), with

§ 25.251(3), Fla. Stat. (making the supreme court marshal and

deputy marshals “law enforcement officers . . . with full powers to

bear arms and make arrests”); § 379.3311(1), Fla. Stat.

(constituting members of the Florida Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Commission (“FWC”), its executive director, and its

officers as “peace officers with the power to make arrests for

violations of the law . . . committed in the presence of the officer”);

§ 870.04, Fla. Stat. (listing various law enforcement officers

together with a mayor, city commissioner, city council member,

alderman, and city police officer, as “peace officers”). Law

enforcement officers typically are also peace officers, but not every

peace officer is a law enforcement officer.

24

or statutory authority to employ or appoint such an officer);

§ 943.10(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (defining “law enforcement officer” as

someone “elected, appointed, or employed full time by any

municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof; who

is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests” and has

as his primary responsibility “the prevention and detection of

crime” or enforcement of the state’s “penal, criminal, traffic, or

highway laws”); § 943.133, Fla. Stat. (setting out employing agency

responsibilities regarding management of its law enforcement

officers); § 943.135, Fla. Stat. (setting out continuing education

requirements as a condition for a law enforcement officer’s

“continued employment or appointment” as an officer); § 943.139,

Fla. Stat. (requiring an employing agency to “immediately notify”

the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission “of the

employment or appointment, or separation . . . of any” law

enforcement officer); § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. (setting out

certification requirements for employment or appointment of

someone as a law enforcement officer); § 943.1397(1), Fla. Stat.

(precluding certification of anyone as a law enforcement officer

“until the person has achieved an acceptable score on the officer

certification examination for the applicable criminal justice

discipline”).

Next, having established certification standards for law-

enforcement officers, the Legislature enumerates a variety of

circumstances when a “law enforcement officer may arrest a

person without a warrant.” § 901.15, Fla. Stat.; see also § 901.1505,

Fla. Stat. (giving a “federal law enforcement officer” the authority

to make warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, to use

force when reasonably necessary, and to conduct a warrantless

search incident to arrest); cf. § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (specifying when

a law enforcement officer may “temporarily detain” someone

suspected of committing or being about to commit a law violation).

A law enforcement officer, together with any other peace officer,

must “inform the person to be arrested of the officer’s authority

and the cause for arrest” when arresting without a warrant.

§ 901.17, Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). There is no similar

25

authorization or regulation for a private person to make a

warrantless arrest. 10

The Legislature also meticulously specifies who is a law

enforcement or peace officer and who else has the authority to

detain or arrest. See, e.g., § 27.255, Fla. Stat. (declaring

investigators with a state attorney’s office to be both law

enforcement officers and conservators of the peace, with “full

powers to arrest” and to bear arms, and providing them “the same

rights, protections, and immunities afforded other peace or law

enforcement officers”); § 321.05, Fla. Stat. (declaring Florida

Highway Patrol members as “conservators of the peace and law

enforcement officers of the state, with the common-law right to

arrest a person who, in the presence of the arresting officer,

commits a felony” or breach of the peace; and giving them “full

power to bear arms”); § 379.3311(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (giving peace

officers of FWC the power to arrest without a warrant); § 493.631,

Fla. Stat. (authorizing a security officer to temporarily detain a

person, until arrival of a law enforcement officer, if there is

probable cause to believe the person is committing a crime against

a “critical infrastructure facility,” authority that terminates upon

arrival of a law enforcement officer); § 648.30(3), Fla. Stat.

(prohibiting anyone, “other than a certified law enforcement

officer” from “apprehend[ing], detain[ing], or arrest[ing] a

principal on a bond, wherever issued, unless that person is

qualified, licensed, and appointed as provided in this chapter or

licensed as a bail bond agent or bail bond enforcement agent”);

§ 810.08(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a property owner or his

designee to detain a person, until a law enforcement officer arrives,

if he “reasonably believes” the person is engaged in felonious

armed trespass in one of his structures or conveyances);

10 Warrantless arrests are highlighted here because the

Legislature appears to contemplate at least one situation in which

an arrest warrant may issue to someone beside a peace officer to

execute. See § 941.07, Fla. Stat. (authorizing the Governor, under

the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, to “sign a warrant of

arrest” for an out-of-state fugitive that may “be directed to any

peace officer or other person whom the Governor may think fit to

entrust with the execution thereof” (emphasis supplied)).

26

§ 810.09(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a property owner or his

designee to detain a person he believes is engaged in felonious

armed trespass until a law enforcement officer arrives); § 810.097,

Fla. Stat. (authorizing the chief administrative officer of a school,

or his designee, to temporarily detain a person until a law

enforcement officer arrives, if there is probable cause to believe the

person is trespassing on school property); § 812.015(3)(a), Fla.

Stat. (authorizing “a merchant, a farmer, or a transit agency’s

employee or agent” to detain someone temporarily—and

immediately contact a law enforcement officer—if there is probable

cause to believe the person engaged in “retail theft, farm theft, a

transit fare evasion, or trespass”); § 870.04, Fla. Stat. (authorizing

peace officers to order dispersal of riotous crowd and “to command

the assistance” from others in seizing and arresting anyone who

fails to comply); § 876.44, Fla. Stat. (authorizing “any peace officer

or any other person employed” as a watchman or guard on a

specified premises to detain for questioning and to arrest without

a warrant under specified conditions); § 901.252, Fla. Stat.

(allowing a municipal law enforcement officer to patrol municipal

property outside city limits and to detain a person if there is

probable cause to believe the person violated the law on that

property); § 947.22, Fla. Stat. (providing for the authority of a

parole or probation officer to arrest a parolee without a warrant);

§ 1012.97(2), Fla. Stat. (declaring that state university police

officers are “law enforcement officers of the state and conservators

of the peace” with “the right to arrest” and “full authority to bear

arms in the performance of their duties”).

Note that the only private persons the Legislature authorizes

to detain someone without a warrant—in addition to government

officers—are either those for whom the detaining would be part of

their employment, or property owners where there is armed

trespass. And when the Legislature does authorize a private

person to temporarily detain someone as part of his employment

or to stop a trespass on his property, it also typically gives

immunity from criminal and civil liability for “false arrest, false

imprisonment, or unlawful detention,” provided the citizen

complies with the statutory requirements for detention. See, e.g.,

§§ 493.631(9), 810.08, 810.09, 810.097(3), 812.015(3)(c), Fla. Stat.

27

Missing from the catalog of statutes authorizing warrantless

detentions and arrests, under specified procedures, is

authorization for simply any private person to detain—without a

warrant, without any procedures or restrictions, without any

connection with employment or one’s own property—anyone who

commits a felony in his presence. It frankly is silly to assume the

Legislature would go through all this trouble enacting statutes

regulating detentions and arrests if just anyone—off his own

property, off the clock, on the street—still could make his own

arrest without any regulation or supervision at all. In fact, the

Legislature specifies—by my count—only three other situations

(beside the property owner’s preventing armed trespass) in which

a private person can detain or arrest independent of his

employment: warrantless arrest by a “private person” upon

“reasonable information” that the accused has been charged with

a felony in another State (section 941.14, Florida Statutes); when

directed by a peace officer to render assistance with an arrest

(sections 843.06, 901.18, and 941.09, Florida Statutes); and when

directed by a peace officer to assist with dispersing a riotous

assembly (section 870.04, Florida Statutes). The “general and

comprehensive” statutory scheme providing detailed regulations

in this subject area—together with specific statutory references to

warrantless arrests by private persons—highlights clear

legislative intent to abrogate the common-law citizen’s arrest. 11

11 The supreme court has not directly held to the contrary. The

one time it did mention citizen’s arrest in the last forty years, it

came in the context of determining whether a search incident to

an arrest by law enforcement officers—following surveillance of a

possible drug offense, pursuit, and arrest outside their

jurisdiction—could still be valid for evidentiary suppression

purposes, even though they improperly made the arrest, ostensibly

“under color of office.” See Phoenix v. State, 455 So. 2d 1024, 1025

(Fla. 1984). The question that the court answered in the

affirmative is whether the arrest by the uniformed officers could

“be validated as a ‘citizen’s arrest’” when the arrest followed

surveillance outside the officers’ jurisdiction and occurred while

the officers were using a “marked police car and asserted their

official position in stopping the arrestees.” Id. The court’s analysis

28

This said, we also should not lose sight of the fact that the

petitioner did not just try to arrest the victims but instead seized

and held them while pointing a firearm at them. Only law

enforcement and peace officers are exempt from Florida’s firearm-

use controls, and then only while acting “within the scope or course

of their official duties or when acting at any time in the line of or

performance of a duty.” § 790.051, Fla. Stat.; see also § 790.25(2),

and holding appear limited to the contours of the special status

that a law enforcement officer holds—the officer seemingly being

always on duty. See § 790.052(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (giving a law

enforcement officer “the right to carry . . . concealed firearms,

during off-duty hours, at the discretion of their superior officers”

and allowing off-duty officers to “perform those law enforcement

functions that they normally perform during duty hours, utilizing

their weapons in a manner which is reasonably expected of on-duty

officers in similar situations”).

A law enforcement officer has extensive statutory powers of

arrest, including outside his jurisdiction in certain instances. See

§ 901.15, Fla. Stat (detailing when a warrantless arrest by a law

enforcement officer is lawful, but not mentioning an out-of-

jurisdiction arrest as being unlawful); § 901.25(2), Fla. Stat.

(authorizing arrests “outside the officer’s jurisdiction when”

pursuing someone he suspects to have committed a felony); cf.

§ 893.09(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring “all peace officers of the state” to

enforce the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and

Control Act). A law enforcement officer, then, is not like a private

person in this respect. The court applied the common-law, citizen’s

arrest principle in Phoenix to guard against a government officer’s

abusing the arrest power to conduct unreasonable searches and

seizures outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Allowing a law

enforcement officer the common-law arrest power under certain

circumstances is still consistent with the Legislature’s overall

statutory scheme in a way that allowing the same power to an

untrained, unregulated private person is not. Simply put, the

continued availability of the common-law citizen’s arrest for

private persons like the petitioner—in the face of the “general and

comprehensive scheme” discussed above—was not a necessary

component of the Phoenix decision.

29

Fla. Stat. (authorizing law enforcement and peace officers to

“lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and

supplies for lawful purposes” while “carrying out official duties,”

notwithstanding general statutory restrictions on the display or

use of a firearm to threaten others). Private persons, like the

petitioner, are prohibited from “openly carry[ing]” a firearm,

including intentionally displaying it in a “threatening manner, not

in necessary self-defense.” § 790.053(1), Fla. Stat.; see also

§ 790.10, Fla. Stat. (prohibiting a person with a firearm from

exhibiting it in a “threatening manner” while others are present).

Reinforcing the distinction between use of force in connection with

arrest by a law enforcement officer and that of a private person is

section 776.05, Florida Statutes. Under that provision, a “law

enforcement officer . . . need not retreat or desist from efforts to

make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened

resistance.” § 776.05(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). The officer

in turn “is justified in the use of any force” that he “reasonably

believes to be necessary to defend himself . . . from bodily harm

while making the arrest.” Id.

Recall there are very limited circumstances where a private

person—like the petitioner—has express statutory authority to

make a warrantless arrest: when faced with an out-of-state

fugitive and when under the direction of a peace officer. See

§§ 901.18, 941.14, Fla. Stat. Section 776.05(1) reflects this

statutory carve-out for authorized, warrantless arrests by private

persons, allowing for the use of force only when the person has

been “summoned or directed” by a law enforcement officer “to

assist him” with the arrest. It must be, then, that a private person

similarly can use deadly force to prevent an escape only if he is

holding someone in custody at the direction of law enforcement,

not to prevent someone from escaping from the private person’s

own unlawful detention. See § 776.07(1), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a

“law enforcement officer or other person who has an arrested

person in his or her custody” use any force reasonably believed to

be necessary to prevent escape).

Here, the petitioner did not just act without direction from a law

enforcement officer—but instead acted directly contrary to an

officer’s clear instruction: to wait and do nothing until law

enforcement was on the scene. The petitioner chose to go at it

30

alone, recklessly and unlawfully, creating a highly dangerous

situation that easily could have ended with a tragic outcome for

one of the victims or the petitioner. The petitioner cannot conduct

an unauthorized arrest, while using the threat of deadly force, and

claim immunity from prosecution for the unfortunate

consequences that ensue. There being no clear case of immunity

here, no basis exists to grant the extraordinary relief requested. I

join the denial of the petition.

_____________________________

Elizabeth L. White, Matthew R. Kachergus, Bryan E. DeMaggio,

and Camille E. Sheppard of Sheppard, White, Kachergus &

DeMaggio, P.A., Jacksonville, for Petitioner.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Michael Schaub,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

31

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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