Wiener v. Boca West Country Club, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-80039-RLR

BARRY WIENER,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOCA WEST COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,

JOHN W. JOYCE, JR., individually, and

MARIA TAITO, individually,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE arises out of Plaintiff Barry Wiener’s suspension from his country club and

his removal from the club tennis team. Plaintiff has sued Defendants Boca West Country Club,

Inc. (the “Club”), John W. Joyce, Jr. (“Joyce”), and Maria Taito (“Taito”) (collectively,

“Defendants”) for the following counts: (I) intentional interference with a contractual relationship;

(II) defamation of character; and (III) retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. DE 1.

Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). DE 16. The Court has reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response [DE 17], Defendant’s

Reply [DE 19], and the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons set

forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as more fully set forth in this Order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s background factual allegations are as follows. Plaintiff is a member of

Defendant Boca West Country Club, Inc. (the “Club”), where he played on the tennis team under

Defendant John W. Joyce, Jr. (“Joyce”), the Club’s tennis director. DE 1 ¶¶ 9–11. Plaintiff has

played in the Club tennis league for approximately seven years. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff is Ashkenazi

Jewish, id. ¶ 9, and the Club has a significant Jewish population, id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that

over the years, Joyce has engaged in “multiple incidents of adverse conduct in his treatment of

Plaintiff,” which “Plaintiff feels was based on an Anti-Sematic [sic] Bias against Plaintiff.” Id.

¶ 22.

On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a written complaint to the Club stating that “Based

on my interaction with Mr. Joyce I consider him an antisemite and would be willing to prove this

in a court of law.” Id. ¶ 15. After Plaintiff submitted his complaint, the Club “encourage[d

Plaintiff] to rethink” taking legal action. Id. ¶ 16. The Club privately conveyed the complaint of

antisemitism to Joyce. Id. ¶¶ 18, 23. Joyce’s assistant, Defendant Mario Taito (“Taito”), then

“proceeded to make a complaint at the direction of Mr. Joyce about a vague and undefined

unsportsmanlike conduct charge against Plaintiff Barry allegedly occurring on March 12, 2024,

that would eventually result in a retaliatory one year suspension from the club and permanent

removal from the club’s sports teams.” Id.¶ 18.

Plaintiff alleges that in response to his complaint of discrimination against Joyce, Joyce

retaliated and caused the Club to suspend Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to permanently lose his

position on the tennis team as well as his Club privileges, “while still maintaining the obligation

to pay all dues and fees forever (or at least as long as he removed [sic] owner of his home).” Id.

¶ 12.

On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this suit against Defendants for the following counts:

(I) intentional interference with a contractual relationship; (II) defamation of character; and

2

(III) retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. DE 1. Defendants have moved to dismiss for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). DE 16.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant a motion to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

should be granted only when the pleading fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must contain more than labels, conclusions, a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action, and naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement. Id. The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that the

plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully”).

A court ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint accepts the well-pled factual allegations

as true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d

843, 850 (11th Cir. 2017). The court need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. Diverse Power, Inc. v. City of LaGrange, 934 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2019).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the [plaintiff’s] allegations.” Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

3

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has pled insufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s claims. DE

16 at 4. The Court addresses in turn each of Plaintiff’s defamation (Count II), 42 U.S.C. § 1981

(Count III), and intentional interference (Count I) claims.

A. Count II – Defamation of Character

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Joyce and Taito should be

dismissed because (1) Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege the specific facts of the alleged

defamation, (2) the alleged statement was of pure opinion and therefore not actionable as a matter

of law, and (3) any statements were qualifiedly privileged. DE 16 at 10–12.

“Defamation under Florida law has these five elements: (1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) the

statement was made . . . at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual

damages; and (5) the statement must be defamatory.” Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2018). “A defamatory statement does not become actionable, however, until it is published

or communicated to a third person; statements made to the person alleging the defamation do not

qualify.” Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). “True

statements, statements that are not readily capable of being proven false, and statements of pure

opinion are protected from defamation actions by the First Amendment.” Turner, 879 F.3d at 1262.

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has not and cannot allege sufficient details to support

any false statement made by Joyce or Taito to support a claim for defamation. DE 16 at 10.

Plaintiff’s relevant factual allegations in support of his defamation claim are as follows:

14. Plaintiff [was] . . . barred from the team for life for an alleged and still after

two hearings at the club for its undescribed allegation of unsportsmanlike conduct

allegedly occurring in a five minute period during a match wherein he politely

requested a line call, well within the rules of the league.

4

18. . . . [Taito] proceeded to make a complaint at the direction of Mr. Joyce about

a vague and undefined unsportsmanlike conduct charge against Plaintiff Barry

allegedly occurring on March 12, 2024, that would eventually result in a retaliatory

one year suspension from the club and permanent removal from the club’s sport

teams.

37. Defendants Joyce and Taito intentional Defamed Plaintiff Barry by falsely

stating his conduct playing Tennis was being “unsportsmanlike”.

38. Within the context of League Tennis this refers to rule violations and

undignified conduct.

39. Defendants Joyce and Taito made additional allegations against Plaintiff Barry

to be found in discovery as the clubs hearings are conducted mostly behind closed

doors with no right to cross examine, or even hear the witness against Plaintiff

directly. In what can only be called a “star-chamber” proceeding Joyce and Taito

prevaricated against Plaintiff Barry sufficiently to have the club remove him. The

full extent of their false statements is currently unknown.

40. Defendant Joyce and Taito motivation was intentional and malicious . . . .

41. The statements were published to the world in a public club newsletter, were

published among the staff and membership of the Club, and among the board of

Governors.

42. Plaintiff has been damaged by Defamation, in that he has been banned for life

from the Tennis Team, the only reason he joined the club. . . .

DE 1.

As pled, Plaintiff has alleged the elements of (1) publication, id. ¶ 41; (2) falsity, id. ¶ 37;

(3) at least negligence on Joyce and Taito’s behalf, id. ¶ 40; and (4) actual damages, id. ¶ 42. The

fifth element—that the statements be defamatory—requires that Plaintiff adequately allege the

substance “with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether the publication

was defamatory.” See Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 413 So. 2d 51, 55

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).

Plaintiff has alleged only that Joyce and Taito referred to his tennis-playing conduct as

“unsportsmanlike.” Plaintiff otherwise alleges that the full extent of Joyce and Taito’s false

5

statements are unknown because they took place in the context of a closed-door meeting. DE 1

¶ 39. But Plaintiff has also alleged that defamatory statements “were published to the world in a

public club newsletter, were published among the staff and membership of the Club, and among

the board of Governors.” Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff has not detailed the substance of these publications—

an omission that is particularly glaring when, according to the allegations, the allegedly defamatory

statements are contained in a written, publicly accessible Club newsletter.

Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently described the defamatory statements, the Court is

unable to assess whether the statements are indeed pure opinions that are protected by the First

Amendment. See also Five for Ent. S.A. v. Rodriguez, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

(stating that in a defamation case, “a plaintiff must allege certain facts such as the identity of the

speaker, a description of the statement, and provide a time frame within which the publication

occurred”). Therefore, because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled all elements of his defamation

claim, the Court does not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments and Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I. Plaintiff’s defamation claim is dismissed with leave to

amend.

B. Count III – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Against Defendants Joyce, Taito, and the Club, Plaintiff asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim

for “racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.” DE 1 at 8. The Court

agrees with Defendants, however, that Plaintiff has failed to clearly state his § 1981 claim.

First, Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to conflate two distinct legal theories for racial

discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff refers to a “retaliation component” in § 1981 and refers

frequently to “intentional retaliat[ion]” and “willful retaliation.” Id. ¶¶ 50, 51, 53. But Plaintiff

6

then asserts that Defendants’ “actions constitute racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981.” Id. § 57. Indeed, Plaintiff states in his Response that the Complaint intends to allege both

discrimination and retaliation. DE 17 at 9. Plaintiff therefore fails to clearly state his § 1981 claims

because “a cause of action for retaliation under § 1981—which ‘includes retaliation for a plaintiff’s

opposition to race discrimination, whether or not he personally is the victim of that race

discrimination’—is ‘separate and distinct’ from a cause of action for race discrimination under

§ 1981.” Baker v. Kelly Smith, LLC, 977 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (quoting Tucker

v. Talladega City Schools, 171 F. App’x 289, 295 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint confusingly alleges the factual and legal bases for liability

as to each of the Defendants. Under the single count, Plaintiff asserts that “Joyce both directly and

through his proxy Taitio intentional retaliated against Plaintiff,” that the “Club is vicariously liable

for the actions of its employees while performing there duty,” and that the “Club is also liable for

its own actions in supporting the willful retaliation.” DE 1 ¶¶ 51–53 (errors in original).

As pled, Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint impermissibly combines different counts into a

single cause of action and asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without making clear

which defendant is responsible for which act. See Embree v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 779 F.

App’x 658, 662 (11th Cir. 2019) (describing shotgun pleadings). Defendants’ Motion is therefore

GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is dismissed with leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(b) (“If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or

occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must be stated in a separate count or

defense.”).

C. Count I – Intentional Interference with a Contractual Relationship

7

Plaintiff also brings an action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship

against Joyce and Taito. To establish an intentional interference claim under Florida law, a party

must show “(1) proof of the existence of a business relationship under which plaintiff has legal

rights; (2) the intentional and unjustified interference with that relationship by defendant; and

(3) damage to plaintiff as a result of the breach of the business relationship.” Midland

Management, LLC v. Burger King Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265–66 (S.D. Fla. 2001).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state an intentional interference claim because

(1) Joyce and Taito are not strangers to the contractual relationship and (2) regardless of whether

Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts to satisfy each of the claim’s elements, the claim is barred

by Florida’s single-action rule.

First, under Florida law, the general rule is that “[f]or the interference to be unjustified, the

interfering defendant must be a third party, a stranger to the business relationship.” Salit v. Ruden,

McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381, 385–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

“Florida courts have also clarified that the privilege to interference ‘enjoyed by a party that is

integral to the business relationship is not absolute. The privilege is divested when the defendant

acts solely with ulterior purposes and the advice is not in the principal’s best interest.’” Rudnick v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting O.E. Smith’s Sons,

Inc. v. George, 545 So.2d 298, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Joyce and Taito provided “willfully false information

falsifying Plaintiff’s unsportsmanlike behavior to the club for the express purpose of having him

thrown off the Tennis Team.” DE 1 ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that Joyce and Taito’s “motivation was

intentional and malicious, and . . . was designed to malicious [sic] hurt Plaintiff and prevent others

8

from coming forward against Joyce.” Id. ¶ 30. Based on these allegations, the Court is prepared

to infer that Joyce and Taito acted solely with ulterior purposes. Furthermore, it would not be

unreasonable to infer that the alleged behavior was not in the Club’s best interest, although it is a

closer call.

Second, “[i]n Florida, a single publication gives rise to a single cause of action.” Callaway

Land & Cattle Co. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp., 831 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). “The

rule is designed to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing a valid defense to defamation by recasting

essentially the same facts into several causes of action all meant to compensate for the same harm.”

Gannett Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). “When claims are

based on analogous underlying facts and the causes of action are intended to compensate for the

same alleged harm, a plaintiff may not proceed on multiple counts for what is essentially the same

defamatory publication or event.” Klayman v. Jud. Watch, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1256 (S.D.

Fla. 2014), aff’d (Feb. 17, 2015).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Joyce and Taito intentionally interfered with the contractual

relationship between Plaintiff and the Club “by providing willfully false information falsifying

Plaintiff’s unsportsmanlike behavior to the club for the express purpose of having him thrown off

the Tennis Team.” DE 1 ¶ 27. The basis for Plaintiff’s intentional interference arises from the

same publication and underlying facts as Plaintiff’s defamation claim. The Court is not persuaded

that Plaintiff’s further allegation—that Joyce and Taito “advocat[ed] for [Plaintiff’s] life time ban

from the team”—meaningfully provides an independent factual basis for an intentional

interference claim. Id. ¶ 28; see Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 70 (Fla. 1992) (stating that

recovery for separate causes of action is proper when they “are properly pled upon the existence

9

of independent facts”). The Court is particularly unpersuaded because Plaintiff alleges the same

underlying harm for his defamation and intentional interference counts—being “banned for life

from the Tennis Team, the only reason he joined the club”—as well as the same damages, paying

dues without receiving any corresponding benefit. DE 1 ¶¶ 32, 42; see also Callaway Land &

Cattle Co., 831 So. 2d at 208 (explaining that Florida’s single-action rule applies when “[t]he

various injuries resulting from [the same underlying publication] are merely items of damage

arising from the same wrong”).

Plaintiff’s intentional interference claim is based on the same core of facts and intends to

compensate for the same harm as does Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Because Plaintiff’s assertion

of the intentional interference claim runs afoul of Florida’s single-action rule,1 Defendant’s motion

to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s intentional interference claim is dismissed with leave to

amend. To the extent that Plaintiff re-pleads an intentional interference claim based on

independent facts, Plaintiff must also more clearly allege all elements of the claim, including

factual allegations to more clearly support why an intentional interference may lie against Joyce

and Taito as employees of the Club.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

1 The Court also questions how Florida’s single-action rule applies to federal claims. In other words, if Florida law

precludes Plaintiff from bringing a state interference claim together with a state defamation claim, would Florida law

also preclude Plaintiff from bringing a state defamation claim together with a federal discrimination claim, provided

the claims are based upon the same factual predicate? To clarify, the Court does not question whether Florida law

precludes the filing of a federal cause of action (discrimination), but instead whether Florida law precludes the filing

of a state cause of action (defamation) if it is filed in conjunction with a federal cause of action based upon the same

facts, seeking the same relief, and so forth. This issue was not briefed by the parties, but future argument on this

subject should address the Court’s concerns.

10

2. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend as more fully set forth

above.

3. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint no later than May 12, 2025.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 28th day of April,

2025.

>).

Feb A Derry,

ROBIN L. ROSENBERG C,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to Counsel of Record

1]