PEARCE v. FOREST HILLS BOROUGH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL PEARCE,

2:24-CV-01271-CCW

Plaintiff,

v.

FOREST HILLS BOROUGH, FOREST

HILLS POLICE DEPARTMENT, FOREST

HILLS MAYOR FRANK PORCO, POLICE

CHIEF CHARLES WILLIAMS, BOROUGH

OF CHALFONT, CHALFONT MAYOR

JAMES PERRY, DAKOTA WAGNER,

Defendants.

OPINION

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants. ECF No. 22. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. Factual Background

This case arises from interactions between pro se Plaintiff Michael Pearce and Defendants

Forest Hills Police Department, Police Chief Charles Williams, and Officer Dakota Wagner.1 The

relevant factual allegations, taken as true, are as follows.

On July 1, 2024, Mr. Pearce made two separate 911 calls. ECF No. 19 at 1. The first call

was to report that a dumpster was blocking a designated handicap parking space, and the second

was to report a Ford Escort that was parked on the sidewalk of Highland Avenue. Id. When no

police officers responded, Mr. Pearce again called 911 to ask when they would respond. Id. The

1 Mr. Pearce originally included as Defendants the Borough of Forest Hills, the Borough of Chalfant, Forest Hills

Mayor Frank Porco, and Chalfont Mayor James Perry. ECF No. 19. The parties, however, have agreed to dismiss

these defendants. ECF No. 30 at 2. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis will be limited to the remaining defendants and

claims.

911 dispatcher informed Mr. Pearce that officers from the Forest Hills Police Department had

already handled the call. Id. A few minutes later, Mr. Pearce observed a Forest Hills patrol vehicle

arrive. Id.

Mr. Pearce then went to the police station to speak with a supervisor about why dispatch

told him that officers had already responded to his call when, in fact, they had not. Id. While at

the station, Mr. Pearce spoke with Officer Wagner and a second officer. Id. The officers explained

that they were busy on an arrest when Mr. Pearce called. Id. Mr. Pearce, however, responded that

he called 911 after the officers had left the scene of arrest. Id. When the officers ended the

conversation, Mr. Pearce stated, “Fuck this” and called Officer Wagner “a pig.” Id. The following

day, Mr. Pearce spoke with Chief Williams about the officers’ response to his 911 calls, and

informed Chief Williams that he would be “photographing the police in the performance of their

duties, so as to gather evidence of failure to perform their duties.” Id. at 1–2.

On July 5, 2024, when Mr. Pearce was leaving a Dunkin Donuts, he drove past a marked

Forest Hills patrol vehicle that was parked by the exit. Id. at 2. On July 10, 2024, Forest Hills

Police arrested Mr. Pearce for stalking, harassment, conspiracy to commit stalking, false reports

to law enforcement, and disorderly conduct. Id. Officer Wagner’s sworn arrest affidavit stated

that Mr. Pearce’s two 911 calls on July 1 were false reporting. Id. It further stated that the

dumpster was next to—and not blocking—the handicap spot, and that the Ford Escort was not

parked on Highland Avenue. Id. It also explained that Mr. Pearce was being charged with

harassment because he called 911 while knowing that the officers were on priority calls, and that

Mr. Pearce was charged with disorderly conduct for causing a scene and yelling “Fucking Pigs”

and “Suck Our Dicks.” Id. Mr. Pearce then alleges that during a preliminary hearing, Officer

Wagner testified that the dumpster was, in fact, blocking the handicap spot and that the Ford

Escape was parked on Highland Avenue. Id. Both statements contradicted those in his arrest

affidavit. Id. Mr. Pearce was subsequently found guilty of harassment and disorderly conduct in

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. ECF No. 30, Ex. 2. Mr. Pearce’s convictions,

however, were overturned on appeal. Id.

On August 6, 2024, Mr. Pearce filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County against Defendants. ECF No. 1, Ex. 2. On September 6, 2024, Defendants

removed the action to federal court.2 ECF No. 1. Mr. Pearce then filed an Amended Complaint

against Defendants. ECF No. 19. On November 25, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss Mr.

Pearce’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.3 ECF No. 22. In response, Mr. Pearce

filed two documents which opposed the Motion to Dismiss and requested leave to amend his

Amended Complaint to add in the type of relief he is seeking. ECF Nos. 30, 33. The Motion is

now fully briefed and ripe for resolution. ECF Nos. 22, 23, 30–33.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a complaint’s

factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty.

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain detailed

factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot rest on mere labels and conclusions.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, “a formulaic recitation of the

2 Defendants’ removal was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) because Mr. Pearce’s original complaint

raised federal questions.

3 In their Motion, Defendants also ask the Court to convert their Motion to Dismiss into a summary judgment motion

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Per Rule 12(d), if the Court converts the Motion into a summary judgment motion,

it must give all parties “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Here, the

Court declines to convert the Motion into a summary judgment motion.

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Accordingly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and be “sufficient . . . to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a three-step

process for district courts to follow in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations

that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to

the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster

Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). That said, under Rule 8’s notice pleading standard, even

after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only “allege sufficient

facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connolly

v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that “at least for purposes of

pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion

to dismiss”). And when resolving a pro se plaintiff’s motion, courts “liberally construe pro se filings

with an eye toward their substance rather than their form.” See United States v. Delgado, 363 F.

App’x 853, 855 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. Legal Analysis

In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Pearce does not cite any statutory authority for his claims

but contends that Officer Wagner’s “FALSE SWEARING on an Arrest Affidavit and his

PERJUROUS [sic] testimony violated the Plaintiff’s 1st Amendment right to record the police and

his 4th Amendment right to false imprisonment.” ECF No. 19 at 2. He then reiterates that Officer

Wagner committed “False SWEARING and Felonious PERJURY.” Id. Mr. Pearce’s basis for

including other defendants is that “Forest Hills Police are the officer’s employer” and “Police

Chief Charles Williams is the Officer’s immediate supervisor. Id. The Court liberally construes

his Amended Complaint as bringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Mr.

Pearce’s First Amendment right to record police activity and his Fourth Amendment right to be

free from false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.4 See generally ECF No. 19.

Section 1983 establishes a statutory cause of action to vindicate constitutional violations.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must plead that they were “deprived

of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Coulter v. Coulter, No. 23-2222,

2024 WL 163081, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 2024); see Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d

606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Thus, courts consider whether a plaintiff has

“identif[ied] the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated” and “whether

the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d

798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5

(1998)). Further, courts must also address the state actor element, which requires an individual to

“have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Harvey, 635 F.3d at 609 (quoting Abbott v.

4 The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Pearce’s constitutional claims, which raise federal questions, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998)). The Court will address each of Mr. Pearce’s § 1983

claims below.

A. Mr. Pearce Has Failed to Allege Chief Williams’ Personal Involvement.

As a threshold matter, Defendants seek to dismiss Chief Williams as a defendant, asserting

that Mr. Pearce has failed to allege that Chief Williams was personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violations. ECF No. 23 at 10–11. Mr. Pearce responds that he informed Chief

Williams that he planned to record police, and because Chief Williams failed “to advise his

subordinates of the Plaintiff’s 1st Amendment protected activity [it] proves that he conspired with

Defendant Wagner and is liable for the violation against the Plaintiff.” ECF No. 33 at 2.

“Section 1983 liability cannot be based solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.”

Gagliardi v. Fisher, 513 F. Supp. 2d 457, 473 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (Conti, J.) (citing Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Rather, an individual defendant in a § 1983

case “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held

responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.”

Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).

Additionally, a supervisor’s conduct may be actionable where they “with deliberate indifference

to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused

[the] constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586

(3d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). See also Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)

(“[A § 1983] complaint is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons

responsible.”).

Here, the Court agrees that Mr. Pearce has failed to allege that Chief Williams was

personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. First, the only allegations in the

Amended Complaint regarding Chief Williams appear to relate to Mr. Pearce’s First Amendment

claim. See ECF No. 19 at 1 (alleging that Mr. Pearce spoke to Chief Williams about his officers’

lack of performance, after which Mr. Pearce informed Chief Williams that he would be recording

the officers’ activities). Mr. Pearce, however, has not alleged that Chief Williams personally

prevented him from recording police activity, that Chief Williams had a policy or custom of

interfering with such activity, or that Chief Williams knew his officers were interfering with Mr.

Pearce’s recording activity and allowed it to happen. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (explaining that

personal involvement can be shown through particularized allegations of “actual knowledge and

acquiescence” in the alleged violation). Accordingly, Mr. Pearce has failed to state a claim against

Chief Williams for First Amendment interference.

Mr. Pearce’s only other reference to Chief Williams is his allegation that Chief Williams

“is the Officer’s immediate supervisor.” ECF No. 19 at 2. But merely alleging that an individual

is liable because he is a supervisor is insufficient. Vo v. Wetzel, No. 1:19-CV-00084-RAL, 2021

WL 6197743, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2021) (Lanzillo, M.J.), aff’d, No. 22-1210, 2022 WL

1467978 (3d Cir. May 10, 2022) (“Allegations that broadly implicate multiple defendants without

delineating individual conduct are legally insufficient.”). Mr. Pearce has not alleged how Chief

Williams was personally involved in his arrest, detention, or prosecution. And he has not alleged

that Chief Williams was involved in any other conduct that violated Mr. Pearce’s rights. Therefore,

Mr. Pearce has failed to allege Chief Williams’ personal involvement and will dismiss him as a

Defendant. The Court will, however, grant Mr. Pearce leave to amend so as to add additional

allegations sufficient to show Chief Williams’ personal involvement. See Mullin v. Balicki, 875

F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that courts should permit a curative amendment in the

civil rights context unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile).

B. Mr. Pearce Has Failed to State a Claim for First Amendment Interference.

In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Pearce asserts that Defendants violated his First

Amendment right to record the police. ECF No. 19 at 2. Defendants seek to dismiss this claim,

arguing that he was not engaged in a protected activity because the right to record police is

restricted in certain situations. ECF No. 23 at 7–8. Mr. Pearce responds that he advised Chief

Williams of his intent to record the police, and that Chief Williams “had a duty to inform his

subordinates of this fact.” ECF No. 30 at 1. According to the Third Circuit, “under

the First Amendment’s right of access to information, the public has the commensurate right to

record—photograph, film, or audio record—police officers conducting official police activity in

public areas.” Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017). But not “all recording is

protected or desirable,” and “the right to record is subject to reasonable restrictions on time,

manner, and place.” Credico v. Krenitsky, 845 F. App’x 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2021).

Here, Mr. Pearce provides very little detail regarding his recording of police activity. See

generally ECF No. 19. While he alleges that he informed Chief Williams that he would be “legally

photographing the police in the performance of their duties,” he does not state whether he actually

recorded the officers, when or where this occurred, or how it was interrupted and by whom. Id. at

1. Instead, he merely alleges that the “arrest and parole of the Plaintiff also forbid the Plaintiff

from observing the police.” Id. at 2. Such bare allegations are insufficient to establish a violation

of the First Amendment right to record police. See Aguilar v. Moyer, No. 3:21-CV-595, 2021 WL

5804619, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2021) (identifying when and where plaintiff began recording

police activity, who interfered with the recording, and how the individual interfered); Morales v.

Maxwell, 600 F. Supp. 3d 497, 512 (D.N.J. 2022) (discussing plaintiff’s proper recording of police

activity where he was filming an arrest in a public area); Booker v. Borough of North Braddock,

No. 2:19-cv-1649, 2021 WL 37618, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2021) (Wiegand, J.) (finding plaintiff

sufficiently pled that she properly recorded police where she did not interfere with the traffic stop

or any police activity, followed police orders to move her vehicle, remained in her vehicle, and

was legally parked during the entire encounter). Therefore, because Mr. Pearce has failed to allege

an instance in which he recorded police activity and explain how it was interrupted, he has failed

to state a claim for the violation of his First Amendment right to record police.5 Accordingly, the

Court will dismiss this claim, but it will, however, permit Mr. Pearce leave to amend. Mullin, 875

F.3d at 151.

C. Mr. Pearce Has Failed to State a Claim for Fourth Amendment Violations.

Liberally construing Mr. Pearce’s Amended Complaint, it appears that he is bringing

claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under the Fourth

Amendment. ECF No. 19. Defendants seek to dismiss these claims, arguing that Mr. Pearce’s

arrest, detention, and prosecution were proper because there was probable cause to arrest Mr.

Pearce. ECF No. 23 at 9–10, 14. Mr. Pearce responds that he “has made statements that the

Defendants arrested [him] without probable cause. . . based on False SWEARING made by the

Defendants.” ECF No. 30 at 1. The Court will address each claim below.

5 Defendants’ Motion interprets the Amended Complaint as potentially asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim.

ECF No. 23 at 8–9. Construing the Amended Complaint liberally, the Court does not perceive such a claim, but even

if one were asserted, it cannot survive Defendants’ Motion. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff

must allege that (1) he engaged in protected conduct, (2) the defendant “engaged in retaliatory action sufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising [his] constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link existed between

the protected activity and the retaliatory action.” Falcone v. Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193, 205 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

Here, as explained, Mr. Pearce has failed to allege an instance in which he actually recorded police activity. Thus, he

cannot show that he engaged in protected conduct. Further, while he alleges that his “arrest and parole” “forbid [him]

from observing the police,” he does not claim that he was arrested because he was recording police. ECF No. 19.

Therefore, Mr. Pearce also has not alleged a causal link between his protected activity and the retaliatory action.

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

To state a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) that there was an arrest;

and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199

(3d Cir. 2020). And to state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) that

he was detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.” Pinkney v. Meadville, PA, 648 F. Supp.

3d 615, 633 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (Lanzillo, M.J.), aff’d, 95 F.4th 743 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing James v.

City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)). While Defendants acknowledge that Mr.

Pearce was arrested and detained, ECF No. 23 at 9, they assert that probable cause existed for his

arrest and that, therefore, his detention was lawful.

False arrest and false imprisonment claims “will necessarily fail if probable cause existed

for any one of the crimes charged against the arrestee.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199. “Probable

cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed the crime at issue.” Id. To

determine if probable cause existed when, as here, plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant, he

must allege “(1) that the officer, with at least reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements

or omissions that created a falsehood in applying for a warrant, and (2) that those assertions or

omissions were material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Giddens v. Stewart, No.

20-cv-01474, 2021 WL 3100188, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2021) (cleaned up) (citing Andrews v.

Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Here, Mr. Pearce has alleged that two of the statements in Officer Wagner’s affidavit were

false. Specifically, he identifies Officer Wagner’s assertions that “the dumpster was next to the

handicap spot and that the Ford Escort was not on Highland at all” as false and contradicted by

Officer Wagner’s testimony at a preliminary hearing. ECF No. 19 at 2. Mr. Pearce, however, has

not alleged that these assertions were made with “at least reckless disregard for the truth.” Instead,

he merely alleges that Officer Wagner’s later testimony contradicted his prior statements in the

affidavit—but he does not indicate whether, or how, Officer Wagner knew these statements were

false at the time he made them or how he recklessly disregarded their truth. See Pinkney, 95 F.4th

at 748 (finding officer recklessly disregarded the truth when he asked leading questions that

increased the risk of a false identification, overlooked a discrepancy in a witness’s identification,

and omitted three key facts from the affidavit that “any reasonable person would have known . . .

was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.”).

Furthermore, Mr. Pearce has also failed to allege that these false statements were material

to the issuance of the warrant. He identifies two other statements in the affidavit which served as

the basis for two of the charges against him, but he does not challenge their truthfulness. ECF No.

19 at 2 (alleging that Officer Wagner stated in his affidavit that “Plaintiff admitted to calling in

complaints when the Plaintiff knew the officers were on priority calls” and that “Plaintiff was

causing a scene by yelling [obscenities],” which served as the bases for his harassment and

disorderly conduct charges). Indeed, Mr. Pearce does not allege that these statements were false

or that they were insufficient to establish probable cause on their own. Accordingly, because he

has not alleged that probable cause was absent for all of the crimes charged against him, his “[f]alse

arrest and false imprisonment claims [] necessarily fail.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199.

Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Pearce has failed to state a claim for false arrest and

false imprisonment, and it will dismiss these claims. But because Mr. Pearce may be able to allege

sufficient facts to state a plausible claim, the dismissal will be without prejudice and with leave to

amend. Mullin, 875 F.3d at 151.

2. Malicious Prosecution

To state a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that

(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) without probable cause; (3) for a malicious

purpose or a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (4) the proceeding ended in

plaintiff’s favor; (5) causing him to suffer “a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of

seizure.” Shelley v. Wilson, 152 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, Mr. Pearce has failed to

state a malicious prosecution claim. His Amended Complaint alleges very little regarding a trial

or his conviction. Indeed, it merely asserts that Officer Wagner “knowingly and Willfuly [sic]

committed FALSE SWEARING and PERJURY to arrest and convict [Mr. Pearce].” ECF No. 19

at 3. The Amended Complaint, however, does not include factual allegations about which of the

charged offenses Defendants pursued against Mr. Pearce, why they prosecuted him for those

offenses, and whether it was for an improper or malicious purpose. See generally ECF No. 19;

Tucker, 2024 WL 4434965, at *2 (explaining that plaintiff failed to state a malicious prosecution

claim where he did not allege that Defendants prosecuted him with a malicious purpose).

Therefore, Mr. Pearce’s bare bone allegations that Defendants lied under oath to convict him are

insufficient to state a claim. Chetty Holdings Inc. v. NorthMarq Capital, LLC, 556 F. App’x 118,

121 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that conclusory or bare bones allegations without factual support

are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Mr. Pearce’s

malicious prosecution claims, but it will grant him leave to amend those claims. Mullin, 875 F.3d

at 151.

D. Mr. Pearce Has Failed to State a Monell Claim.

While Mr. Pearce’s Amended Complaint does not clearly allege a Monell claim, because

he is suing the Forest Hills Police Department as well as other institutional entities, the Court will

broadly construe his Amended Complaint as alleging such a claim. “[A] municipality can be held

liable [for constitutional violations] when the ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom. . .

inflicts the injury.’” Bhatnagar v. Meyer, No. 22-2848, 2023 WL 5378834, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug.

22, 2023) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). But “a local

government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or

agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Therefore, to state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that

his “harm was caused by a constitutional violation” and that “the municipality is responsible for

that violation.” Bhatnagar, 2023 WL 5378834, at *3. A plaintiff may allege that the municipality

is responsible because it implemented an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice or because it

failed to train or supervise its employees. See Est. of Kamal by & through Kamal v. Twp. of

Irvington, 790 F. App’x 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2019). Here, Mr. Pearce has failed to state a Monell

claim because, as explained above, he has failed to allege an underlying constitutional violation.

Bhatnagar, 2023 WL 5378834, at *3 (explaining that Monell claims are based on an underlying

constitutional violation, and where plaintiff has no such claims remaining before the court, the

Monell claims must also fail). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any such Monell claim and

dismiss Forest Hills Police Department as a Defendant. It will, however, grant Mr. Pearce leave

to amend. Mullin, 875 F.3d at 151.

E. The Court will Dismiss Mr. Pearce’s Remaining Claims.

Liberally construing Mr. Pearce’s Amended Complaint, he also appears to bring claims

regarding Officer Wagner’s “false swearing” and “felonious perjury.” Mr. Pearce does not,

however, indicate under what legal provision he is bringing these claims or in what context they

occurred. To the extent Mr. Pearce is attempting to allege constitutional violations pursuant to

§ 1983 for false statements Officer Wagner made during Mr. Pearce’s pre-trial and trial

proceedings, such a claim fails. “A trial witness, including a police officer, sued under § 1983 has

absolute immunity with respect to any claim based on the witness’s testimony.” Leith v. Middlesex

& Somerset Cnty. Prosecutor’s, No. 15-7227, 2016 WL 3647995, at *9 (D.N.J. July 8, 2016)

(citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983)). Furthermore, to the extent Mr. Pearce is

attempting to bring false testimony claims under a state law, he has failed to state such claims. He

has not identified under which legal provision he is bringing these claims or the facts and

circumstances surrounding the false testimony. Dennis v. Evans, Civil Action No. 1:09-0656,

2011 WL 900911, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2011) (explaining that conclusory or bare-bones

allegations are insufficient; instead, a plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief” with “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.”). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any state-law false testimony

claim without prejudice and with leave to amend, but it will dismiss any § 1983 false testimony

claim with prejudice as amendment would be futile.

IV. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.

22, such that Mr. Pearce’s First Amendment claims, Fourth Amendment claims, Monell claims,

and any state-law false testimony claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and any

§ 1983 false-testimony claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Chief Williams and the Forest Hills Police

Department are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Furthermore, Defendants the Borough of Forest Hills, the Borough of Chalfant, Forest Hills

Mayor Frank Porco, and Chalfont Mayor James Perry are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Finally, Mr. Pearce is granted leave to file a second amended complaint to correct the

deficiencies identified in this Opinion. Any such second amended complaint shall be filed on or

before May 19, 2025. If no second amended complaint is filed by that date, the dismissals without

prejudice will be converted to ones with prejudice without further action by the Court. The second

amended complaint must not include any new claims, and must be limited to the claims for which

the Court permitted leave to amend and all allegations supporting those claims.6

DATED this 28th day of April, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND

United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):

All Counsel of Record

cc (via US mail):

Michael Pearce

Pro Se

201 Wilkins Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15112

6 In his responses to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Pearce sought leave to file a second amended complaint

because he had inadvertently omitted from his Amended Complaint the type of relief he was seeking. ECF Nos. 30,

33. Because the Court is dismissing Mr. Pearce’s Amended Complaint and granting him leave to amend, Mr. Pearce

may file a second amended complaint that includes all of the relief he is seeking.