The Board of Education of Du Page High School District 88 v. Pollastrini

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Board of Education of Du Page High School District 88 v. Pollastrini,

2013 IL App (2d) 120460

Appellate Court THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF Du PAGE HIGH SCHOOL

Caption DISTRICT 88 and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT CREEK

SCHOOL DISTRICT 48, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LAURA

POLLASTRINI, in her official capacity; TIMOTHY WHELAN, in his

official capacity; JAMES SHEHEE, in his official capacity; GENE

CAMPBELL, in his official capacity; JOSEPH WOZNIAK, in his official

capacity; MARTHA J. RODGERS, in her official capacity; GLORIA

SCIGOUSKY, in her official capacity; THE Du PAGE COUNTY

REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES; NANCY

BARNHARDT, SHELLY BLEDSOE, STEVEN BOUCHER, JOHN

GEAREN, BENJAMIN KLOSTERMAN, ELLIOT LEWIS, KEITH

LOPATKA, KATHLEEN OCZAK, ANN SCOTT, and BRETT

SIMONS, Collectively Known as the Committee of Ten; THE BOARD

OF EDUCATION OF BUTLER SCHOOL DISTRICT 53; and THE

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HINSDALE TOWNSHIP HIGH

SCHOOL DISTRICT 86, Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-12-0460

Filed August 29, 2013

Held A trial court’s reversal of plaintiff school boards’ orders granting

(Note: This syllabus defendants’ petition to detach their subdivision from plaintiff districts and

constitutes no part of annex the subdivision to two other districts was affirmed, since

the opinion of the court defendants failed to file the requisite number of signatures substantially

but has been prepared complying with the statutory mandate that the signers’ signatures match

by the Reporter of the signatures on the voters’ registration cards.

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, Nos. 11-MR-152, 11-

Review MR-897; the Hon. Bonnie M. Wheaton, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on J. Timothy Eaton and Patricia S. Spratt, both of Shefsky & Froelich, Ltd.,

Appeal of Chicago, and Christopher J. Stull, of Law Office of Christopher J.

Stull, P.C., of West Chicago, for appellants.

William F. Gleason and Daniel M. Boyle, both of Sraga Hauser, LLC, of

Flossmoor, for appellee Board of Education of Du Page High School

District 88.

Peter K. Wilson, Jr., of Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi & Andersson,

P.C., of Aurora, for appellee Board of Education of Salt Creek School

District 48.

Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice Hutchinson specially concurred, with opinion.

Justice Birkett specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This case involves a detachment petition affecting the Timber Trails-Merry Lane

Subdivision (Timber Trails) in Oak Brook. The subdivision is located directly south of

Roosevelt Road and is bordered by the Yorkshire Woods to the east and the Oak Brook

shopping center to the west. The subdivision has been sending children to Salt Creek School

District 48 (District 48) and Willowbrook High School District 88 (District 88) for more than

30 years. On September 8, 2010, pursuant to the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq.

(West 2010)), the petitioners, Nancy Barnhardt, Shelly Bledsoe, Steven Boucher, John

Gearen, Benjamin Klosterman, Elliot Lewis, Keith Lopatka, Kathleen Oczak, Ann Scott, and

Brett Simons, filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees of Du Page County

(the Board) for detachment. The petitioners sought to detach the Timber Trails area from

Districts 48 and 88 and have the area annexed into Butler School District 53 (District 53) and

Hinsdale Central High School District 86 (District 86). On June 3, 2011, the Board entered

an order granting the petition for detachment. On April 6, 2012, the circuit court of Du Page

County reversed the Board’s order. The petitioners appeal from that order. We affirm.

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¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 On September 8, 2010, the petitioners filed the petition for detachment. In support of the

petition, the petitioners attached 256 signatures. In response, Districts 48 and 88 (the

Districts) filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 97 of the signatures filed in support of the

petition were not valid, because they did not match the official signatures on file with the

Du Page County election authority. Because the petitioners had filed only 159 (256 minus

97) valid signatures, the Districts argued, the petitioners had not filed enough signatures to

confer jurisdiction on the Board.

¶4 On January 10, 2011, the Board conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. The

petitioners’ attorney made an offer of proof that all of the people who circulated the petition

would testify that all the people who had signed the petition were registered voters who

resided in the petitioning territory and had given their valid signatures. Further, all the people

who had circulated the petition had sworn and attested to a circulator’s oath in the presence

of a notary public. One of the Board members stated:

“I don’t understand why we don’t trust the circulator, the circulator’s signature for all of

the names on the sheet. And so, just compare the circulators’ signatures that the Notary

Public has attested to.”

In response, the Districts’ attorneys argued that, under the applicable statute, it did not matter

what the circulators would testify to; what mattered was whether the voters’ purported

signatures on the petition matched their official signatures with the Du Page County election

authority. At the close of the hearing, the Board denied the motion to dismiss. The Board

explained that it had “considered the challenged signatures and determined that there were

enough valid signatures contained within the Petition to meet the jurisdictional requirements”

of the School Code.

¶5 On June 3, 2011, the Board entered an order granting the petition for detachment. The

Districts thereafter filed a timely complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of

Du Page County. On April 6, 2012, the circuit court reversed the Board’s order. The

petitioners appeal from that order.

¶6 ANALYSIS

¶7 The Districts argue that 97 of the signatures on the petition did not match the verified

voter registration signatures on file at the Du Page County Election Commission. If those 97

signatures are removed, only 159 remain, which is insufficient for the petition to proceed.

¶8 Section 7-1(a) of the School Code provides that two-thirds of the registered voters in any

territory to be detached must sign the underlying petition. 105 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2010).

Each signature contained on the petition “shall match the official signature and address of

the registered voters as recorded in the office of the election authority having jurisdiction

over the county.” Id. The number of signatures called for by the statute is a jurisdictional

requirement for detachment. Board of Education of Community High School District 94 v.

Regional Board of School Trustees, 242 Ill. App. 3d 229, 237-39 (1993).

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¶9 According to the petition, there were 362 registered voters residing in the proposed

detachment territory at the time the detachment petition was filed. Thus, in order to comply

with section 7-1(a) of the School Code, the petition needed to be supported by the signatures

of 242 registered voters.1 The petition contained 256 signatures.

¶ 10 “The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

intention of the legislature by giving the language of the statute its plain and ordinary

meaning.” Board of Education of Chenoa Community Unit School District No. 9 v. Regional

Board of School Trustees, 266 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465 (1994). “The sections of the School

Code are in pari materia, and they must be construed with reference to one another in order

to give harmonious meaning to the act as a whole.” Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education,

82 Ill. 2d 373, 389 (1980).

¶ 11 The term “shall” typically indicates a mandatory rather than a directory provision. Schultz

v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120405, ¶ 13. A mandatory provision does

not always require strict compliance and might be satisfied through substantial compliance.

Id. Strict compliance will be required if the term “shall” is accompanied by some sort of

penalty or consequence. Id. ¶ 14. Where the term is not accompanied by some sort of penalty

or consequence, substantial compliance is sufficient. Id. Our courts have interpreted section

7-1 of the School Code to require only substantial compliance. See Ambrose v. Thornton

Township School Trustees, 274 Ill. App. 3d 676, 684 (1995). The term “match” is defined

as a “thing equal or similar to another.” www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/match (last

visited Feb. 28, 2013).

¶ 12 The issue thus becomes whether the signatures on the petition substantially complied

with the statutory mandate that they match the signatures on the voter registration cards. In

finding that the signatures matched, the Board necessarily determined that there was

substantial compliance.

¶ 13 In reviewing the Board’s decision, the parties disagree as to the proper standard of

review. The petitioners argue that the Board’s finding as to the validity of the signatures is

no different from any other finding that the Board makes; thus, its decision is entitled to

deference and should be reversed only if against the manifest weight of the evidence. See

Board of Education of Marquardt School District No. 15 v. Regional Board of School

Trustees, 2012 IL App (2d) 110360, ¶ 20 (factual determinations by an administrative agency

are held to be prima facie true and correct and will stand unless contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence). Relying on Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill. 2d 446, 453

(2009), the Districts insist that the standard of review should be de novo because this court

can review as well as the Board whether the signatures on the detachment petition match the

signatures on the verified registration signature forms.

¶ 14 In Fay, at issue was what standard of review the court should employ in reviewing certain

factual findings that the trial court had made. Id. at 451. The supreme court stated:

“In this case, the trial court heard no live testimony. Both parties acknowledged at

1

Two-thirds of 362 is 241.33. Thus, the petition needed to have at least 242 signatures to

comply with the statute.

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oral argument that all testimony was submitted by admitting discovery depositions into

evidence. The trial court was not required to gauge the demeanor and credibility of

witnesses. [Citation.] Instead, the trial court made factual findings based upon the exact

record presented to both the appellate court and to this court. Without having heard live

testimony, the trial court was in no superior position than any reviewing court to make

findings, and so a more deferential standard of review is not warranted. Thus, although

this court has not done so recently, we reiterate that where the evidence before a trial

court consists of depositions, transcripts, or evidence otherwise documentary in nature,

a reviewing court is not bound by the trial court’s findings and may review the record de

novo.” Id. at 453.

Here, the Board’s decision as to the validity of the signatures was not based on any live

testimony but rather was based on the exact record that has been presented to this court.

Thus, it is proper for this court to employ a de novo standard of review. See id.; see also

Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 681 (a reviewing court may evaluate de novo documentary

evidence presented in an administrative proceeding).

¶ 15 In so ruling, we find the petitioners’ reliance on Hoxha v. LaSalle National Bank, 365 Ill.

App. 3d 80, 85 (2006), to be misplaced. In Hoxha, at issue was whether the decedent had

signed a document that provided for the sale of certain property to the plaintiffs upon her

death. The plaintiffs presented the testimony of a forensic document examiner who testified

that the signature on the document was the decedent’s. There was also evidence that,

although the document had been notarized, the notary had backdated the document. Further,

the executor of the decedent’s estate testified that, although she had been the decedent’s

friend for over 25 years, she was not aware of the document until the plaintiffs sent it to her

after the decedent’s death. At the close of the trial, the trial court determined that the

plaintiffs had failed to prove that the decedent had executed the document. The reviewing

court affirmed, explaining that the trial court’s determination that the signature at issue was

not authentic was not against the manifest weight of the evidence in light of the suspicious

circumstances of the case. Id. The reviewing court further stated that “[t]he trial court, as

finder of fact, had the right to make its own handwriting sample comparisons when deciding

whether the signature was authentic, expert opinion or not.” Id. As “the trial court had more

than comparisons; it had circumstances that led it to the conclusion [that the plaintiffs] were

not worthy of belief,” the reviewing court would not disturb its decision. Id. Thus, as live

testimony was at issue in Hoxha, that case is not applicable to the case before us.2

¶ 16 We therefore turn to a consideration of the signatures that the petitioners submitted in

support of their detachment petition. We note that there is a dearth of Illinois law on the

subject of how such signatures should be analyzed. However, in considering existing Illinois

law as well as foreign authorities, certain standards emerge. Substantial compliance will be

2

We note that either party could have sought to have the people who purportedly signed the

petitions testify that the signatures appearing on the petition were in fact (or were not in fact) their

signatures. If there had been such testimony, we would necessarily defer to the Board’s credibility

determinations and employ a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review.

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found if the signature transposes the first name and middle initial (Board of Education of

Wapella Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 247

Ill. App. 3d 555, 560 (1993)), if the middle initial is omitted (People ex rel. Owen v. Dunn,

247 Ill. 410, 413 (1910)), if a suffix, such as Junior, is omitted (Morton v. State Officers

Electoral Board, 311 Ill. App. 3d 982, 985 (2000)), or if a common shortened version of a

first name (such as Ray) is used instead of the full first name (such as Raymond) (Bonardo

v. People, 182 Ill. 411, 424 (1899); In re Nomination Petition of Gales, 54 A.3d 855, 859

(Pa. 2012)). Substantial compliance will not be found if one uses an initial for a first or last

name. In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 770 A.2d 327, 332 (Pa. 2001). Similarly, if

using an initial instead of a full first name is not substantial compliance, then omitting a first

or last name completely is not substantial compliance. See id. Further, substantial compliance

will not be found if the signature is printed rather than in cursive as it appears on the

corresponding registration form. State ex rel. Rogers v. Taft, 594 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ohio

1992).

¶ 17 Based on the above standards, the petitioners did not submit sufficient signatures to

confer jurisdiction on the Board. Sixteen of the people signing the petition used initials for

either their first names or both their first and last names instead of spelling out their first and

last names as they did on their voter registration cards. Moreover, four of the signatures at

issue, in contrast to the voter registration cards, did not give any first name at all. One of the

people signing the petition wrote in cursive rather than printing as she did on her voter

registration card. Thus, these 21 signatures must be subtracted from the 256 that the

petitioners submitted, which means that the petitioners submitted only 235 valid signatures.

As this was less than the statutory minimum (242) to confer jurisdiction on the Board, we

need not consider the other signatures that the Districts complain of on appeal. Accordingly,

the circuit court properly reversed the Board’s decision granting the petitioners the relief they

sought.

¶ 18 In so ruling, we note this court’s disagreement with some of the analysis set forth in

Ambrose. In Ambrose, at issue was whether the signature sheets that were submitted in favor

of a detachment petition were insufficient because the addresses listed on the signature sheets

did not perfectly match the addresses listed on the signers’ official voter registrations cards.

Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 683. Specifically, the addresses at issue omitted such words as

“avenue,” “street,” and “road.” Id. The Ambrose court determined that the word “match” in

section 7-1 meant “that the identity of the registered voter must be capable of being

determined.” Id. at 684. Based on this interpretation of section 7-1, the Ambrose court

concluded that the signatures at issue did not have to be stricken, because the discrepancies

between the signature sheets and the official registration cards were minor and it was

possible to determine whether there was a “match” so that the identities of the signers could

be ascertained. Id.

¶ 19 We do not disagree with the result in Ambrose as it is apparent that the addresses in

dispute in that case were in substantial compliance with section 7-1. However, we believe

that the Ambrose court’s definition of the term “match” is too narrow, in that this definition

does not promote the principle that signature requirements are incorporated into various

statutes so as to deter fraud and to protect the integrity of the political process. See DeFabio

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v. Gummersheimer, 192 Ill. 2d 63, 68-69 (2000). In DeFabio, an election judge failed to

comply with the statute and write his initials on ballots that had been cast in a particular

precinct. The circuit court invalidated all of the ballots that had not been properly initialed

and the supreme court subsequently affirmed, explaining:

“ ‘As our statute makes it absolutely necessary that every ballot shall bear the official

endorsement in the manner aforesaid, we must hold that the election in this case was

void, although there is no evidence in the record that discloses any fraud or intended

fraud upon the part of the election judges. We think it would be a very dangerous rule to

establish that the election judges may disregard the plain provisions of this statute, and

thereby defeat the intention of the law to prevent actual frauds from being committed in

elections and to disarm the constituted authorities of the efficient means provided by the

statute for detecting such frauds. Such salutary laws should not be repealed, in effect, by

the action of election judges simply because their mistakes are innocent or because an

honest voter may lose his vote by holding such mistakes fatal. It is more preferable that

a voter should lose his vote by the innocent action of the judges and by his own neglect

to see it that he votes a ballot properly endorsed by a judge, than to open the doors to

wholesale fraud and corruption. Every voter is presumed to know the law, and by proper

care on his part he can know, and should know, that the ballot delivered to him is

properly endorsed by one of the election judges with his own initials.’ ” Id. (quoting

Laird v. Williams, 281 Ill. 233, 241-42 (1917)).

¶ 20 Here, as stated above, the plain language of section 7-1 provides that the signature in the

petition shall match the official signature on file. Not only is this to ensure that the identity

of the registered voter can be determined, it is also to ensure that the doors to fraud and

deceit are not opened. See id. As the petitioners failed to file the requisite signatures, the

Board did not have jurisdiction to consider their petition. To hold otherwise would thwart

the clear purposes of the statute. Accordingly, the circuit court properly reversed the Board’s

decision granting the petitioners the relief they sought.

¶ 21 In so ruling, we reject Justice Birkett’s assertion that the circulators’ proffered testimony

was sufficient to establish the validity of the signatures in question. Initially, we disagree

with his determination that, by not objecting to the petitioners’ offer of proof that the

circulators would testify that the signatures they had collected were authentic, the Districts

somehow “stipulated” that the petitioners had submitted enough valid signatures. In making

this argument, Justice Birkett relies extensively on criminal law authority. Such authority has

limited relevance in the civil dispute before us. See Board of Education of Indian Prairie

School District No. 204 v. Du Page County Election Comm’n, 341 Ill. App. 3d 327, 334

(2003) (criminal liability and civil liability are very different things as criminal defendants

are typically provided more protection than civil defendants). Further, to the extent that such

authority is applicable, it is clear that an offer of proof is not equivalent to a stipulation.

People v. Williams, 329 Ill. App. 3d 846, 856 (2002).

¶ 22 Most importantly, even if the Districts somehow stipulated what the circulators would

have testified to, that testimony would not have been sufficient to establish that the signatures

at issue were valid. The circulators could testify only that the people who signed the petition

represented that they were eligible to sign the petition. The circulators could not testify that

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a person signing the petition was indeed the person he or she claimed to be. To find

otherwise would open the doors to fraud and deceit. See DeFabio, 192 Ill. 2d at 68-69. It

would also render the signature requirement of section 7-1(a) meaningless as a circulator’s

testimony could trump the fact that a signature on a petition bore no resemblance to the

voter’s official signature. This court, of course, must not interpret any statutory provision as

meaningless. See Madison Two Associates v. Pappas, 227 Ill. 2d 474, 493 (2008) (Illinois

courts must construe statutes so that no part is rendered a nullity).

¶ 23 Finally, I note that I do not disagree with anything that Justice Hutchinson states in her

special concurrence. However, as there were not enough valid signatures to confer

jurisdiction on the Board, this court may not address any of the other issues that the Districts

raise. See People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 153 (the appellate court should not engage in

an analysis of issues that are unnecessary to its resolution of the appeal).

¶ 24 CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is

affirmed.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

¶ 27 JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.

¶ 28 I agree with Justice Schostok that the petitioners failed to submit enough valid signatures

to confer jurisdiction on the Board. Even if enough signatures had been submitted, however,

I note that the trial court correctly determined that the petition for detachment was without

merit. This conclusion becomes inescapable once the applicable law and the evidence in this

case are considered.

¶ 29 School district boundary changes are governed by section 7-1 et seq. of the School Code

(105 ILCS 5/7-1 et seq. (West 2010)). Section 7-6(i) of the School Code provides that, at a

hearing on a petition for detachment and annexation, the regional board of school trustees:

“shall hear evidence as to the school needs and conditions of the territory in the area

within and adjacent thereto and as to the ability of the districts affected to meet the

standards of recognition as prescribed by the State Board of Education, and shall take

into consideration the division of funds and assets which will result from the change of

boundaries and shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the schools of the area

and the educational welfare of the pupils that such change in boundaries be granted.” 105

ILCS 5/7-6(i) (West 2010).

¶ 30 The parties seeking annexation and detachment have the burden of proving that “the

overall benefit to the annexing district and the detachment area clearly outweighs the

resulting detriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole.” Carver

v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees, 146 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (1992).

Petitioners must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. See 5 ILCS 100/10-15

(West 2010). The party bearing the burden of proof retains throughout the proceedings the

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burden of persuasion as to the facts underlying its claim. Ambrose v. Thornton Township

School Trustees, 274 Ill. App. 3d 676, 680 (1995). The party also bears initially the burden

of production, which it satisfies by presenting sufficient evidence on each element of its

cause of action to establish a prima facie case. Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 680. A prima

facie case is established by evidence that would enable the trier of fact to find each element

of the cause of action more probably true than not. Anderson v. Department of Public

Property, 140 Ill. App. 3d 772, 778 (1986). If the opposing party produces no evidence that

contradicts or impeaches this evidence, the trier of fact must rule for the burdened party.

Anderson, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 778.

¶ 31 The regional board of school trustees’ decision on a petition for detachment and

annexation is an administrative decision for purposes of the Administrative Review Law

(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2010)). A reviewing court considers the factual findings of

an administrative agency to be prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2010).

The reversal of an administrative agency’s factual finding is warranted only where the

finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence, i.e., it is clearly evident that the agency

should have reached the opposite conclusion. City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor

Relations Board, 135 Ill. 2d 499, 507 (1990); Pochopien v. Regional Board of School

Trustees of the Lake County Educational Service Region, 322 Ill. App. 3d 185, 193 (2001).

When we review an administrative order that involves mixed questions of fact and law, the

proper standard of review is “clearly erroneous.” City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor

Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). Decisions of an administrative agency on

questions of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, are reviewed de novo. City of

Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 507.

¶ 32 In applying the “benefit/detriment test,” regional boards and the courts reviewing their

actions should consider the following factors: (1) the differences between school facilities

and curricula; (2) the distances from the petitioners’ homes to the respective schools; (3) the

effect detachment would have on the ability of either district to meet the state’s standards of

recognition; (4) the impact the proposed boundary change will have on the tax revenues of

both districts; and (5) whether a detaching district will remain financially healthy and able

to meet state standards of recognition. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356; Dukett v. Regional Board

of School Trustees, 342 Ill. App. 3d 635, 641 (2003). The mere absence of substantial

detriment to either district is not sufficient to support a petition for detachment and

annexation. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 358. However, petitioners need not demonstrate a

particular benefit to the annexing district as long as the overall benefit to the annexing

district and the detachment area considered together outweighs the resulting detriment to the

losing district and the surrounding community as a whole. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 358 (citing

Board of Education of Golf School District No. 67 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 89

Ill. 2d 392, 400-01 (1982)). In the absence of substantial detriment to either district, some

benefit to the educational welfare of the students in the detachment area is sufficient to

warrant the granting of a petition for detachment. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 358.

¶ 33 The Carver court offered some advice regarding the balancing test and the relevant

factors. The loss of revenue is not a determinative factor in detachment proceedings and

alone will not prevent a boundary change if the district subject to detachment is not levying

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at the maximum tax rate. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356-57. Although financial loss to the

detaching district is not irrelevant, it cannot serve as the basis for a denial of detachment

unless it is serious. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 357.

¶ 34 Educational welfare is broadly interpreted. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 359. Students’

educational welfare is bettered not just through improved educational programs or facilities.

Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 359-60. Improvement may occur by way of a shortened distance

between students’ homes and their school. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 359-60; see Pochopien, 322

Ill. App. 3d at 194 (citing examples of educational welfare).

¶ 35 In addition to the factors set forth above, courts may consider the “whole child” and

“community of interest” factors. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356. These factors examine “the

identification of the petitioning territory with the district to which annexation is sought and

the corresponding likelihood of participation in school and extracurricular activities.”

Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356.

¶ 36 I turn to a consideration of each of the Carver factors.

¶ 37 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCHOOL FACILITIES AND CURRICULA

¶ 38 Carolyn Shield, an expert witness on school curriculum, testified that she had compared

the curricula of Willowbrook High School (District 88) and Hinsdale Central High School

(District 86). She concluded that the curricula in both schools were “substantially the same,”

although the test scores in District 86 were higher than those in District 88.

¶ 39 Ann Scott, one of the petitioners, testified that she had 10 years’ experience in

developing youth programs and curricula. Relying on the same documents that Shields had,

Scott determined that District 86 offered 26% more advanced placement and honors courses

and 31% more total courses than District 88.

¶ 40 No expert testimony regarding the difference in curriculum between Districts 48 and 53

was presented. There was evidence that District 53 had better standardized test scores than

District 48. The petitioners extrapolate that District 53 must be better than District 48

because “there is nothing else in the Record to explain the test score differentials between

children in the two Districts other than the method of instruction and the quality of the

teaching staff.” To this point, Districts 48 and 88 respond that there was no evidence in the

record to demonstrate that the differences in the test scores will provide any educational

benefit to the students.

¶ 41 District 88 further argues that there was evidence (the testimony of Darryl Thompson)

that many of the students at Hinsdale Central have their education supplemented by private

tutors, which undoubtedly leads to greater academic success and higher school test scores.

Further, District 88 had 31% of its students identified as low income in comparison to 4%

at Hinsdale. At District 88, 3.5% of the students were identified as having English as a

second language while 0.9% had that identification at Hinsdale. At District 88, there was a

7.9% mobility rate (students who would transfer in or out of school) while the mobility rate

at Hinsdale was only 3.2%. These factors demonstrate that there are more socioeconomically

disadvantaged students at District 88 than Hinsdale, as well as more students who enter or

leave the school after freshman year.

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¶ 42 In its findings the Board found that “the evidence showed that if the Petition was granted,

the facilities of the affected districts would be substantially the same, and that the curriculum

would be substantially the same.” Such a finding cannot be said to be against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Such a finding would also weigh against granting the detachment

petition.

¶ 43 DISTANCE FROM PROPOSED DETACHMENT AREA TO SCHOOLS

¶ 44 The evidence showed that the distances from the detachment area to the schools in

District 48 were somewhat similar to the distance to the Butler school. However, the distance

from the detachment area to Hinsdale Central High School is considerably longer than it is

to Willowbrook High School. According to a school bus driver (Patricia Wudi), the travel

from the area to Willowbrook High is between 14 and 15 miles and takes 27 to 33 minutes

(including bus stops). If she did not make any bus stops and drove directly to Willowbrook

High from the area, the trip would be about 6½ miles and would take her 12 to 14 minutes.

If she drove straight to Hinsdale Central High School, it would take her approximately 27

minutes. Given her experience in planning and driving bus routes, she thought that, because

of the cost, it would be highly doubtful that a bus to Hinsdale Central High School would be

dedicated solely to the children of the detachment area. She testified that, if regular bus stops

were made, it would take much longer than 27 minutes to reach Hinsdale Central High

School.

¶ 45 Further, according to the school bus driver, the route to Hinsdale Central has significantly

more safety hazards than the route to Willowbrook High School, including several major

intersections, exits from the expressway, and rough railroad crossings. The route to

Willowbrook High School has minimal exposure to major highways, no railroad crossings,

and far fewer safety obstacles than the route to Hinsdale Central. The regional

superintendent’s report stated that “new and young drivers will be driving farther distances

for those times bus transportation is not provided for after school sports and activities.”

¶ 46 The Board found that “issues such as distance of the petitioning territory to all of the

schools and school bus availability to be relatively equal in terms of any effect on the

districts.” This finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wudi’s testimony

clearly indicated that Hinsdale Central High School was approximately twice as far away

from the Timber Trails subdivision as Willowbrook High School was. This factor weighs

against detachment.

¶ 47 EFFECT BOUNDARY CHANGE WOULD HAVE ON TAX REVENUE

¶ 48 District 48 presented evidence that it is having financial struggles. For the 2011-12 fiscal

year, it was projecting a $209,000 deficit, even without the detachment. District 48 is at

maximum tax rates (under the property tax extension limitation law) and has a history of five

failed referendums to increase its tax rates. If the detachment petition were approved, using

the calculations of the petitioners’ witness, Jim Scott, the detachment would present a loss

of at least $442,519 annually in tax revenues. If District 48 were to lose that much revenue,

it would have to cut special services for low income people as well as services for its gifted

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program.

¶ 49 District 88 would lose approximately $614,503 if the detachment petition were granted.

District 88 pointed out that, the year before the detachment hearing, it had reduced its

teaching staff by 30, reduced the supplies that it was purchasing, reduced travel expenses,

reduced contractual obligations with outside vendors, and reduced the number of custodians,

clerical staff, and office assistants in order to save approximately $3 million. District 88

argued that it was already operating on a severely lean budget; any future cuts will be to

teachers.

¶ 50 The Board found that the “loss of tax revenue to the detaching districts was minimal

when compared to the schools’ overall budgets.” (The record reveals that the loss of tax

revenue at issue made up about 2% of District 48 and District 88’s respective budgets.) The

Board further stated that it had

“considered the credibility of the financial testimony and evidence presented by the

objecting school districts and found that evidence to be flawed, presenting a skewed

calculation of the possible financial loss to the districts. [We] found that the explanation

for these inaccuracies was less than sufficient to support the objectors’ claim of dire

consequences if the Petition was granted.”

¶ 51 The loss of tax revenue must be considered in the context of the detaching district’s tax

rates; if the district is levying the maximum rates and thus cannot increase its revenue, the

detachment might be unduly severe. Richmond v. County Board of School Trustees, 93 Ill.

App. 2d 142, 145 (1968). A substantial reduction in tax revenue to the detaching district,

with a corresponding adverse financial impact, can represent a significant reason to reject a

detachment petition. Oakdale Community Consolidated School District No. 1 v. County

Board of School Trustees, 12 Ill. 2d 190, 193 (1957).

¶ 52 The Board’s decision on this point was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Even

if District 48 overstated how much money it would lose and its overall poor financial

condition (there is no allegation that District 88 overstated its poor financial condition), the

facts remain that both Districts 48 and 88 would lose a significant amount of money (at least

$442,519 for District 48 and $614,503 for District 88) at a time when both were struggling

financially. This factor weighed against detachment. See Oakdale, 12 Ill. 2d at 193;

Richmond, 93 Ill. App. 2d at 145.

¶ 53 ABILITY TO MEET STATE STANDARDS OF RECOGNITION

¶ 54 The Board found that “the evidence showed that the effect of the detachment would have

little impact on the ability to meet state standards of recognition.” District 88 does not

specifically refute this finding. District 48 argues that, in light of its recent budgetary cuts,

if it had to make additional cuts due to the detachment petition, it would have a difficult time

in the future meeting state standards. District 48 raises a seemingly valid concern; at the

least, it would mean that this factor weighs against detachment.

¶ 55 WHOLE CHILD AND COMMUNITY INTEREST FACTORS

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¶ 56 The Timber Trails subdivision is in an isolated area. All of the students in the subdivision

go to the same school system. From the testimony at the hearing, it could be deduced that the

residents do not have a lot of interaction with Oak Brook (the area where Districts 48 and 88

are) or the Hinsdale area, where the students would attend if the detachment petition were

granted. Kelly Schmidtke, the only affected student to testify, stated that her friends and

community are tied to Districts 48 and 88. She further testified that the majority of her

friends are from Villa Park. She believed that this was because there are not a lot of school-

aged children in the Timber Trails area and most of the school-aged children do not go to

public school with her.

¶ 57 The Board found:

“[I]n considering evidence related to the community interest factors, the community

cohesiveness of the Petitioners with the Oakbrook area and the ability to connect families

and children with the area they live in, participate in carpooling with neighbors, library

and park district use, and other facilities they use was a strongly considered factor in

favor of granting the Petition.”

¶ 58 The “whole child” factor recognizes that extracurricular participation in social, religious,

and commercial activities is important in a child’s development as a beneficial supplement

to the child’s academic involvement. Golf, 89 Ill. 2d at 398. If a child attends school in his

or her natural community, it enhances not only his or her educational opportunity but

encourages his or her participation in social and other extracurricular activities that figure

importantly in the “whole child” idea. Golf, 89 Ill. 2d at 397. The “community of interest”

factor looks at whether the petitioning area is identified with the school district and the

community to which annexation is requested. Golf, 89 Ill. 2d at 397-98. This factor figures

importantly with the “whole child” concept in determining the benefits and detriments to the

school districts involved in a section 7-6 detachment petition. Pontiac Township High School

District No. 90 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 183 Ill. App. 3d 885, 890 (1989). It

is also appropriate to consider the personal preferences or convenience of the petitioning

parents and their children; however, more than the personal preferences on the part of the

petitioners is required for a change in school district boundaries. Board of Education of St.

Charles Community Unit School District No. 303 v. Regional Board of School Trustees of

the Kane County Educational Service Region, 261 Ill. App. 3d 348, 364 (1994).

¶ 59 Here, regardless of whether the detachment petition were granted, the residents of Timber

Trails would continue to live in an isolated subdivision. Their connections to the new school

system community would not be that different from those with their existing school system

community. Most likely, their connections to the new school system community would be

weaker since it is farther away than the existing school system community. As such, since

these factors show no improvement over the status quo, they do not weigh in favor of

detachment.

¶ 60 CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE CHILDREN

¶ 61 In its findings, the Board stated:

“[I]f the Petition was not granted, it would negatively impact future children in the

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neighborhood by sending them to different schools than their neighbors and that some

neighborhood children could join the same T-ball team or participate in other library and

park district programs as their neighbors because of the school district separation.”

¶ 62 In reversing the Board’s decision, the circuit court specifically stated that the Board erred

in considering the impact on future children over the children who were presently living in

the proposed detachment area.

¶ 63 Each detachment case should be determined on the basis of the facts and the record

presented as opposed to speculative observations. Wheeler v. County Board of School

Trustees, 62 Ill. App. 2d 467, 476 (1965). The effect of the detachment petition on children

currently attending school should be considered over the possible impact on future children.

Fixmer v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 146 Ill. App. 3d 660, 665-66 (1986); see also

Phillips v. Special Hearing Board, 154 Ill. App. 3d 799, 807 (1986) (the preferences of the

most directly impacted persons should be strongly considered).

¶ 64 Here, the vast majority of people who were sending their children to public school, or

who themselves were public school students, testified against the detachment petition.3 Karen

Schmidtke testified that she had a son attending Salt Creek elementary school and that

requiring him to change schools would adversely affect him. Kelly Schmidtke testified that

she was attending Willowbrook High School and that it would be very difficult for her to

switch schools. Diana Kaye testified that her son was extremely depressed over the thought

of having to switch schools and that she believed a switch would be devastating to him. John

Lapinski testified that it would not be in his children’s best interests to be removed from the

only school system that they have ever known.

¶ 65 As such, even if future students would arguably benefit from changing school districts,

it is clear that such a change would negatively impact current students. Thus, this factor

weighs against detachment. See Dukett v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 342 Ill. App.

3d 635, 642 (2003) (the benefit of maintaining the same educational setting for children is

considerable as disrupting children’s lifestyles would not serve to benefit anyone).

¶ 66 SUMMARY OF CARVER FACTORS

¶ 67 Most, if not all, of the relevant factors indicated that the detachment petition should not

be granted. The Board’s decision to grant the petition was therefore against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

¶ 68 CONSIDERATION OF IMPROPER EVIDENCE

¶ 69 I also note that the Districts complain that, at the hearing on the detachment petition, the

3

Only two parents of public school students testified in favor of detachment: Mary Olszewski

and Robert Ludwiak. However, Olszewski testified that she was not unhappy with Salt Creek schools

and had no concerns with the district. Ludwiak testified that he thought Hinsdale was more interested

in working with parents, but he had never been to the Willowbrook High School and had no

knowledge concerning its curriculum offerings.

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Board allowed 27 people to “testify” during public comment without being sworn under oath

or subject to cross-examination. Some of the people who “testified” had signed the

detachment petition and therefore were actual parties to the proceeding. The Districts

acknowledge that the Board stated on the record that it did not consider the comments at

issue. However, as the comments were “pervasive,” the Districts contend that it was “human

nature to recall and process the statements made at the beginning of each hearing session.”

Thus, as it was impossible for the Board not to consider all the prejudicial evidence that was

presented at the hearing, the Districts insist that the Board’s consideration of improper

evidence is another basis to reverse its decision.

¶ 70 Fundamental due process principles apply to administrative hearings. Abrahamson v.

Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 92 (1992). When reviewing

an administrative order, the court has a duty to examine the procedural methods employed

at the administrative hearing, to ensure that a fair and impartial procedure was used.

Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 92-93. “A fair hearing before an administrative agency includes

the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and impartiality in ruling

upon the evidence.” Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95.

¶ 71 “It is fundamental that a decision pursuant to an administrative hearing must be based

upon testimony and other evidence received at the hearing and that a conclusion influenced

by extraneous considerations must be set aside.” Des Plaines Currency Exchange, Inc. v.

Knight, 29 Ill. 2d 244, 247 (1963). Parties before an administrative body exercising quasi-

judicial powers are entitled to have that body base its decision upon the facts disclosed by

the evidence, and a failure of such body to acquaint itself with the facts as revealed by the

evidence, if proved, is sufficient grounds to warrant setting aside its order. Knight, 29 Ill. 2d

at 247-48.

¶ 72 Here, the extensive comments that the Board allowed during the public comment stage

of the hearing were clearly improper. As “[t]he overarching objective of [an administrative

hearing] should be to create a procedure that provides for and safeguards the due process

rights of the interested parties” (People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d 164,

188 (2002)), I encourage the Board to adopt a procedure that allows all substantive

comments made at an evidentiary hearing to be subject to cross-examination.

¶ 73 For these reasons, I specially concur.

¶ 74 JUSTICE BIRKETT, specially concurring.

¶ 75 I agree with my colleagues that the order of the Board granting the petition for

detachment must be reversed. However, I respectfully disagree with their finding that

petitioners failed to file the requisite number of valid signatures to confer jurisdiction. The

Board’s decision on the questioned signatures is a factual matter that does not permit a de

novo assessment of the evidence. Having determined that the Board had jurisdiction, I would

reach the merits and hold that the Board’s decision to grant the petition was against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 76 ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

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¶ 77 The Districts filed “Objections to and Motion to Dismiss Petition for Detachment and

Annexation” in which they argued that 97 signatures on the petition “should be deemed

invalid because the signer’s signature is not genuine when compared with his or her signature

on file at the Commission.” (Emphasis added.) In their reply to the petitioners’ response, the

Districts requested that the Board delegate the task of conducting “signature verification”

to the Election Commission because the Commission has experience in comparing disputed

signatures with “verified voter registration cards to determine authenticity of the disputed

signatures.” (Emphases added.) The Districts also pointed out that this process of delegating

the task to the Commission would save time and expense. The Districts maintained that, by

providing the pages of the petition containing the questioned signatures, along with copies

of the corresponding voter registration signatures, they had “provided evidence to rebut any

presumption that the signatures on the petition are genuine.” (Emphasis added.) The Districts

cited section 8-1501 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the proposition that “it is proper for

the trier of fact to determine whether handwriting is genuine, without expert opinion, based

upon proven and disputed handwriting samples.” See 735 ILCS 5/8-1501 (West 2010).

¶ 78 The “Committee of Ten” objected to the Districts’ proposal to delegate signature

verification to the Election Commission. Citing to section 7-2.6 of the School Code (105

ILCS 5/7-2.6 (West 2010)), the Committee of Ten requested a hearing on the Districts’

motion before the Board.

¶ 79 On January 10, 2011, the Board conducted a hearing on the Districts’ motion to dismiss.

The Districts indicated that they had no witnesses. The petitioners announced that they had

14 witnesses. There was a discussion as to whether the Board would hear testimony. Board

member Ms. Pollastrini indicated that the decision had been made to limit testimony and

“basically” go on the briefs. Board member Mr. Whelan then called upon the attorney for the

Committee of Ten, Mr. Stull, to make an offer of proof so the Board could determine if they

wanted to accept it. Mr. Stull then provided an offer of proof that the 14 circulators would

testify to the following:

“We would have presented these circulators, who would have provided testimony this

evening that they, in fact, were the circulators of these signature petitions that were

attached to the packet in the orange-covered volume, Pages 1 through 90; that, in fact,

they swore and attested to a circulator’s oath, in the presence of an Illinois Notary Public;

that all of the individuals that signed those various sheets were, in fact, registered voters

that resided in the petitioning territory; that all of the signatories signed in their presence;

that all of those signatures were, in fact, valid; that they witnessed those signatures; and

that they so attested as part of their notarial oath.

That would be the sum and substance of their testimony, that all of the 256 signatures

that were submitted were, in fact, valid.

We would further offer testimony that the strike-through signatures, of which there

are seven on the sheets–there are seven that are identified by a line striking them through

***; and that those seven signatures were not counted in the total 256, which can be

verified simply by counting the number of valid signatures on the sheets numbered 1

through 90. Further, we would not offer testimony of these witnesses.”

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¶ 80 Board president Ms. Rogers then asked whether the Board wished to hear testimony

regarding the signatures. Mr. Whelan then made a motion “that we accept the offer of proof

as proffered.” Ms. Pollastrini seconded the motion. It was then explained by Mr. Whelan and

the assistant State’s Attorney that accepting the offer of proof means that “we don’t hear

witnesses” and “you’ll just, basically, take what Mr. Stull said here at face value.” Mr.

Whelan then indicated that “[t]he only caveat that I would ask is the Chair to give the

respondents the opportunity to respond to that, if they want, you know, in any form or

fashion.” (Emphasis added.) The motion to accept the offer of proof was approved by

unanimous vote. The Districts’ attorneys raised no objection to this procedure. Instead, Mr.

Wilson, on behalf of District 48, simply argued that “there should not be witnesses at this

type of hearing.” He argued that “it’s a fairly straightforward process–look and see if there

is a match.” Mr. Boyle, on behalf of District 88, argued that “the School Code does not allow

for the consideration of witness testimony.” Neither Mr. Wilson nor Mr. Boyle cited any case

law in support of the contention that live testimony was not permissible on the question of

whether signatures on the petition “match the official signature and address of the registered

voters as recorded in the office of the election authority.” See 105 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West

2010). Mr. Wilson argued that “the testimony of the circulators really has no bearing in this

particular proceeding.” He argued that “[i]f, when I sign a petition and I’m left-handed, if I

decide to sign it right-handed and my signature doesn’t match the signature card, it’s not

gonna [sic] be counted.”

¶ 81 Board member Ms. Scigousky asked why the Districts were “not trusting the circulators.”

In response, Mr. Boyle stated that “[t]he School Code is straightforward. The School Code

requirement doesn’t depend on any witness testimony. So, whether I trust the circulator or

not is immaterial.” Mr. Whelan indicated that the Board would look at the signatures but

would also consider the proffer made by Mr. Stull for “whatever consideration that it’s due.”

¶ 82 In response to the Districts’ arguments, Mr. Stull argued that the Districts had the burden

to rebut the presumption of the validity of the signatures. He argued that the Districts

provided “no evidence at all–no witness testimony.” Mr. Stull pointed out that signatures

change over time and that “[s]ome of the registered voters have been registered voters for

over 30 years.” Mr. Stull pointed out that the circulators’ testimony also would have

described their review of the petition, which included striking out any signatures that were

questionable. Mr. Stull argued that “[a]ll 256 of our signatures are valid.” Lastly, he argued

that “[i]f there was a legitimate question raised by the Districts, why didn’t they contact a

single signatory or a single circulator, if they had a question?”

¶ 83 In response to Mr. Stull’s argument, the Districts argued again that the Board did not

need testimony and that the Board could make the decision simply by comparing the disputed

signatures with the signatures on file with the Election Commission. Mr. Boyle also added

that the notarized signatures on the petition were the signatures of only the circulators, not

the people whose signatures “appear on that page of the petition.” Mr. Stull pointed out that

the circulator’s oath disclosed the verification that the “signatures on this sheet were signed

in my presence on the date indicated and are genuine.” Mr. Boyle added that the oath also

included this sentence: “And to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the persons so

signing were, at the time of signing the petition, registered voters residing in the petitioning

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territory, based upon information obtained from the Election Commission of Du Page

County.” After deliberating in closed session, the Board voted unanimously to deny the

Districts’ motion to dismiss.

¶ 84 ANALYSIS

¶ 85 I disagree with my colleagues that our review of the Board’s decision regarding the

requisite number of valid signatures is de novo. In Illinois, as in the majority of jurisdictions,

the determination of genuineness/authenticity of handwriting and/or a signature is for the

finder of fact. “Findings of fact are determinations from the evidence of a case, either by a

court or an administrative agency, concerning facts averred by one party and denied by

another.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Illinois Department of Children &

Family Services, 384 Ill. App. 3d 770, 774 (2008). In their pleadings before the Board, the

Districts maintained that the Board could determine whether the signatures were “genuine”

or “authentic” by comparing them to the signatures on file with the Election Commission.

“An administrative agency’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed prima

facie true and correct. In examining an administrative agency’s factual findings, a reviewing

court does not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Instead,

a reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether such findings are against the manifest

weight of the evidence. An administrative agency’s factual determinations are against the

manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Cinkus v.

Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210 (2008).

¶ 86 The Districts were correct in arguing that the Board could make its own determination

whether the signatures were genuine (or a match). The Districts were incorrect, however, in

arguing that the Board could consider only the signatures. The Committee of Ten, on behalf

of the petitioners, correctly pointed out that the Board had the authority to take testimony on

the issue of authenticity/genuineness or “match.” There is nothing in the School Code that

restricts the Board to simply comparing the questioned signatures to the voter signatures on

file with the Election Commission, and the Districts have cited no authority to support such

a restriction. District 48 cites Hoxha v. LaSalle National Bank, 365 Ill. App. 3d 80, 85

(2006), for the proposition that “it is proper for the trier of fact to determine whether

handwriting is genuine, without expert opinion, based upon a comparison of proven and

disputed handwriting.” Likewise, District 88 cites Hoxha for the same proposition, but then

cites Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill. 2d 446 (2009), and argues that our review of the

signatures is de novo because the evidence was documentary. Id. at 453. My colleagues agree

with this argument and have concluded that, because a number of signers used only an initial

for a first or last name instead of their full names as reflected on their voter registration cards,

their signatures are invalid. The Districts did not make this particular argument before the

Board or in their briefs before this court. Rather, their argument is simply that the signatures

do not match. In their pleadings below, although the Districts maintained that 97 signatures

were bad, they then listed 25 that, they said, clearly do not match.

¶ 87 Most states, including Illinois, have adopted evidentiary standards to guide trial courts

in determining whether a writing is sufficiently authenticated. “A finding of authentication

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is merely a finding that there is sufficient evidence to justify presentation of the offered

evidence to the trier of fact and does not preclude the opponent from contesting the

genuineness of the writing after the basic authentication requirements are satisfied.” People

v. Downin, 357 Ill. App. 3d 193, 202-03 (2005). Illinois Rule of Evidence 901(b)

(Requirement of Authentication or Identification) provides a nonexhaustive list of methods

of authentication, which include the following:

“(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is

claimed to be.

(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of

handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation.

(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or by

expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.

(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal

patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.”

Ill. R. Evid. 901(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

¶ 88 Illinois reviewing courts have historically held that the issue of authorship of a document

is for the trier of fact to determine. Downin, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 203 (citing People v. Munoz,

70 Ill. App. 3d 76, 86 (1979)). Further, when the issue of authorship is before the reviewing

court, that issue has been reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. See

Shelby Loan & Trust Co. v. Milligan, 372 Ill. 397, 408 (1939) (in a will contest where the

evidence as to authenticity was conflicting, no reversal unless the verdict is contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence). In Krueger v. Dorr, 22 Ill. App. 2d 513 (1959), the

appellate court held that the mere fact that evidence is conflicting in some respects does not

mean that the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court in Dorr also

observed that a notary public has the duty to ascertain the truth of the matters about which

he or she is to certify. Also, “[p]arties act on the faith of that certificate, and public policy,

the security of titles, and the peace of society require that in the absence of fraud and

collusion it is entitled to full credit.” Id. at 528.

¶ 89 In Canter v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 170 Ill. App. 3d 364 (1988), the

appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court that upheld the board’s decision

invalidating three sheets of petition signatures. The court said, “in an administrative review

proceeding, it is not the function of either the trial court or the appellate court to reweigh the

evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. [Citation.] Rather, the findings and

decision of the electoral board will not be disturbed unless those findings are against the

manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. at 368-69. The board in Canter found that on one of

the sheets the signatures on “lines 18 through 25 appeared to be written in the same

handwriting.” Id. at 367. On another sheet, the board found, “six names appeared twice, and

lines 10 through 25 also appeared to be written in the same hand as that of Hamilton.” Id.

Hamilton was the purported circulator of these sheets. He was subpoenaed to testify at the

hearing but refused to do so, invoking the fifth amendment. The objectors in Canter called

witnesses at the hearing. These witnesses were the purported signers, who testified that

several of the signatures on the petition were not valid. Id. at 366. In Benjamin v. Board of

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Election Commissioners, 122 Ill. App. 3d 693 (1984), the appellate court stated that

“[w]hether a person is a registered voter and whether he or she is registered at the residence

address indicated on the nominating petition are both questions of fact.” Id. at 696. The court

also commented that the petitioner did not “produce any affidavits from signatories nor did

he call any witnesses to testify that they were registered voters in the 46th Ward and had

signed his petition.” Id. at 695.

¶ 90 The Districts acknowledged before the Board, before the trial court, and before us that

they made no independent effort to prove that any of the 97 signatures that they challenge are

invalid because they do not match. The Districts did not hire an expert witness to express an

opinion as to whether the questioned signatures were in the same handwriting as the

signatures on the voter registration cards. According to the Districts, they effectively rebutted

the presumption that the signatures were genuine by presenting the questioned signatures

along with the voter registration cards for comparison. In my view, this is the type of

“hypertechnical” argument that we should be reluctant to embrace in order to avoid the

merits. It is clear from the Districts’ arguments before the Board that their objection had

nothing to do with any contention that the signatures were not genuine. Rather, their

arguments were simply that you can look only at the signatures, that even a voter’s own

words cannot save a nonmatch.

¶ 91 Contrary to my colleagues’ conclusion, the petitioners presented unrebutted evidence

from the 14 circulators by way of an offer of proof, which was accepted by the Board without

objection from the Districts, that the signatures on the petition were genuine. Mr. Whelan

made clear to everyone that, by accepting the offer of proof, the Board would consider this

evidence as if the circulators testified. The Board has the authority to determine how it will

receive evidence. 105 ILCS 5/7-2.6 (West 2010) (“The Hearing Board may administer oaths,

determine the admissibility of evidence and issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses

and subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents.”); see Board of Education of

Community High School District No. 94 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 242 Ill. App.

3d 229, 234 (1993). It was made clear to the parties that the Board received in evidence and

would consider the agreed testimony of the 14 circulators during its deliberations. The

Districts did not object to this evidence at the time it was received and their failure to do so

results in forfeiture. Prior to deliberations it was made clear again that the Board would

consider the proffer. Illinois Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1) provides that testimony of a witness

with knowledge is a proper method of authentication. Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1,

2011). My colleagues say in footnote 2, “[w]e note that either party could have sought to

have the people who purportedly signed the petitions testify that the signatures appearing on

the petition were in fact (or were not in fact) their signatures.” Supra ¶ 15 n.2. That is

precisely what happened here. The Committee of Ten presented the testimony of the

circulators by way of stipulation. While Mr. Whelan used the term “offer of proof” and stated

that it would be accepted “as proffered” and would be considered, the Districts, by failing

to object, stipulated to this evidence because to them it made no difference what the

circulators said. A “stipulation” is an agreement between parties or their attorneys with

respect to an issue before the court, and courts look with favor upon stipulations because they

tend to promote dispositions of cases, simplifications of issues, and the saving of expense

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to litigants. People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 468-69 (2005). “A stipulation is conclusive as

to all matters necessarily included in it ***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 469.

Here, there is no question that the Districts knew that the Board would consider the proposed

testimony and they failed to object. Stipulation by silence will be found to exist in similar

circumstances. See People v. Blankenship, 406 Ill. App. 3d 578, 597-98 (2010) (stipulation

by silence to street-value fine). The Districts’ argument was not directed to the substance of

the circulators’ testimony but rather to the legal effect. They mistakenly assumed that the

Board could consider only the signatures themselves. As such, even if my colleagues’ de

novo review argument is otherwise correct, since the Board’s determination was not based

entirely on documentary evidence, we must “defer to the Board’s credibility determinations

and employ a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review.” Supra ¶ 15 n.2. As

District 48 points out in its statement of facts, “[t]he purported reasoning for this decision

was set forth in the Regional Board’s January 25, 2011 order.” Paragraph 4 of that order

reads:

“That after hearing the arguments and receiving the evidence, the Board moved to

enter into executive session to review the challenged signatures and deliberated in closed

session to consider testimony and evidence pursuant to 5 ILCS 120/2(c)(4) of the Illinois

Open Meetings Act.”

The only testimony received was the stipulation to the circulators’ testimony.

¶ 92 I have no quarrel with my colleagues’ observation that an offer of proof is not equivalent

to a stipulation. They cite People v. Williams, 329 Ill. App. 3d 846 (2002), for this

proposition. In Williams there was an oral stipulation between defense counsel and the

prosecutor. However, “[t]he police reports mentioned in the oral stipulation were not made

a part of the common law record.” Id. at 856. The stipulation therefore lacked “clarity” and

was “an inadequate substitute for impeachment testimony by the police.” Id. No such

problem exists in this case. The stipulation was clear. The Districts did not contest the

proposed testimony that formed the stipulation. Instead, they argued that the only thing that

mattered was the side-by-side comparison to determine whether there was a “match.”

¶ 93 This court recently stated in People v. Valle, 405 Ill. App. 3d 46 (2010), that “the rule in

Addison Insurance is inapplicable when, as here, the trial court has heard live testimony

relating to a disputed issue of fact.” Id. at 56. In Valle, the defendant maintained that, because

we had video of his interrogation, we were equally situated with the trial court for deciding

the issue of voluntariness and therefore our review should be de novo.

¶ 94 With all due respect to my colleagues, I do not believe that the rule in Addison Insurance

was ever meant to apply to handwriting/signature comparisons. I believe that, unlike the

situation in Addison Insurance, the Board was in a superior position to make factual findings

regarding the validity of signatures. It has more experience in weighing such evidence.

Further, duplication of the fact finder’s efforts will contribute negligibly to the accuracy of

factual determinations and divert our scarce judicial resources. See Anderson v. City of

Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).

¶ 95 Here, the Districts took the position that the testimony of the circulators was irrelevant

to the Board’s determination of whether the signatures matched. They even went so far as

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to say that, even if the voter who signed his or her name testified that he or she signed, if the

signature is different in any material respect it is not a match. For example, they argued that

if a person signed his voter registration card with his right hand and the petition with his left

hand there would be no match. Such a position is at odds with reality. The Districts had the

opportunity to cross-examine the circulators instead of simply accepting the proposed

testimony as true. The Board properly considered the evidence in reaching its findings. The

role of the circulator ensures fairness and honesty in the petition process. See Canter, 170

Ill. App. 3d at 369.

¶ 96 As the Board argues in its reply brief, the process suggested by the Districts would

require us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the Board, a

process that is not countenanced in the law. Board of Education of Golf School District No.

67 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 89 Ill. 2d 392, 397 (1982). The question of whether

the signatures “match” is a question of fact. I believe that we should apply the same standard

of review that has historically been applied in reviewing decisions regarding the genuineness

of signatures, including in election cases, which is the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

standard. Benjamin, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 696.

¶ 97 While I disagree with my colleagues on the standard of review regarding the signature

findings by the Board, I agree with my colleagues that we have a duty to examine the

evidence in an impartial manner and set aside a finding that is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. I agree with my colleagues that section 7-1 of the School Code requires only

substantial compliance. In support of this view that we should apply a de novo standard of

review to “the Board’s decision as to the validity of the signatures,” my colleagues use a “see

also” citation to Ambrose v. Thornton Township School Trustees, 274 Ill. App. 3d 676, 681

(1995). Supra ¶ 14. The Ambrose court was discussing its review of a specific document, a

map, which I submit is far different from the task of comparing a questioned signature to a

known standard. Ambrose also involved a question of the signature and address requirements

of section 7-1. With respect to the decision of the Thornton trustees on that issue, the

Ambrose court applied the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Ambrose, 274 Ill. App.

3d at 683.

¶ 98 Under either standard of review, to determine whether the Board’s decision on the

validity of the signatures was proper, we must determine the meaning of the term “match”

in section 7-1. 105 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 2010). My colleagues disagree with the interpretation

of this term by the Ambrose court. They are correct that the precise issue in that case was the

address component of the “signature and address” match requirement. The court said in

Ambrose:

“Reading the School Code as a whole, we conclude that the word ‘match’ in section 7-1

means that the identity of the registered voter must be capable of being determined. Here,

using the signers’ names and addresses listed in the petition sheets and the official voter

registration lists, it is possible to determine whether they match. We do not require a

‘perfect match’ as the defendants suggest.” Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 684.

¶ 99 In arriving at this interpretation, the Ambrose court relied upon Board of Education of

Wapella Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 247

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Ill. App. 3d 555 (1993). In Wapella, a petition was filed with the regional board of school

trustees, seeking dissolution of the Wapella district. Objections were filed challenging the

validity of 109 signatures on the petition and other aspects of the petition. The regional board

held a hearing on the petition. The regional board recited various steps that it had taken to

check the validity of the petition and the signatures, but it denied the objectors’ request to be

heard on their objections. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the regional board’s

decision in all respects, except the decision to deny the right of the objectors to be heard. The

case was remanded for that hearing. Board of Education of Wapella Community Unit School

District No. 5 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 245 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779 (1993). Upon

remand, a hearing was held and the regional board found that, although a few of the

signatures were invalid, the petition contained enough valid signatures to constitute a

majority of the registered voters of the district. Wapella Community Unit School District No.

5, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 557.

¶ 100 One of the objectors’ complaints concerned the execution of certificates by a circulator

named Margaret Marlene Spray. Ms. Spray was registered to vote as M. Marlene Spray. She

signed a petition circulated by another person as Marlene M. Spray and signed the

certification on three sheets she had circulated as M. Marlene Spray. The court said that

“[t]he evidence was undisputed that she was one and the same person who performed all the

acts involved.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 560. As the court noted, Ms. Spray signed the

circulator’s certificates the same as her voter registration card. The court then said:

“Moreover, presumption of identity of a person has been held to exist when two used

surnames are identical but one of the initials in the given name is transposed. (65 C.J.S.

Names § 15(b)(2), at 47 (1966).) No signature to the petition was invalidated by Spray’s

use of slightly different names.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 101 As the court in Ambrose said, in ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the

legislature, while we give language in the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, we also read

sections of the School Code in pari materia in order to give harmonious meaning to the act

as a whole. Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 683. The first paragraph of section 7-1(a) provides

that “[r]egistered voters shall be determined by the official voter registration lists as of the

date the petition is filed. No signature shall be added after the date the petition is filed.”

(Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2010). Paragraph 2 of section 7-1(a) describes

what the pages of the petition “shall” include. Id. To me it is clear that the term “match”

means that the circulator in the first instance must make sure that the signatures match up

with the names and addresses on the “official voter registration list.” I doubt that the

circulator of any petition would be in possession of voter registration cards.

¶ 102 We should avoid hypertechnical reasons for avoiding decisions made on the merits when

neither party suffered any delay or harm as the result of the hypertechnical violation. See

Seelhoefer v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 266 Ill. App. 3d 516, 519 (1994). In

Seelhoefer, the appellants argued that the amended petition failed to comply with section 7-1

of the School Code because (1) the circulator did not sign each page of the petition and (2)

the full prayer was not on each page of the petition. The appellate court found that the

“appellees substantially fulfilled the requirements of the School Code” and rejected the

argument that the regional board and circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Id.

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¶ 103 There is no question that signatures of the requisite number of voters are essential to

jurisdiction. However, not every irregularity in a petition is fatal to jurisdiction. Id. Here, the

Districts’ objection to the petition’s signatures is technical. The Districts acknowledged at

oral argument that they had an opportunity to investigate the authenticity of the signatures

and to present such evidence at the hearing. They chose not to do so, relying instead on visual

comparisons of the signatures on the petition with the signatures on the voter registration

cards. This technical challenge was rejected by the Board. It appears that the Board must

have rejected the Districts’ interpretation of the statutory term “match” in finding that there

were a sufficient number of valid signatures. I believe that the Board’s determination on this

issue should not be disturbed unless from our review of the evidence, including the signers’

names and addresses, the voter registration lists, the voter registration card signatures, and

the agreed testimony of the circulators, the identities of the signers are not “capable of being

determined.” Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 684.

¶ 104 Requiring a perfect match, for example invalidating any signature that used an initial as

opposed to a full first name, is inconsistent with the legislative intent, which is to delegate

to the local level the discretionary power to decide issues of detachment and annexation. See

Hepner v. County Board of School Trustees, 8 Ill. 2d 235, 240-42 (1956). “[T]he intent of

the signature and address requirements is to guarantee that petitioners are supported by the

required number of voters in a given area.” Ambrose, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 684 (citing Greene

v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 862 (1983)). If the requisite number

of voters is “capable of being determined” we should reject the Districts’ argument and

decide the case on the merits.

¶ 105 This definition recognizes the reality that people are not machines. Our handwriting and

signatures change from one moment to the next. Internal physiological factors, along with

external influences, constantly affect our writing processes. See 27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts

3d § 41 (1994).

¶ 106 As my colleagues point out, the Board must not have agreed with the Districts’ position

so it therefore must have determined that an initial used in combination with a first or last

name was acceptable as long as from the evidence presented the identity of the voter could

be determined. The Board’s interpretation of the statute is not binding on this court as we

review questions of law de novo. “However, courts ‘must give substantial weight and

deference to statutory interpretations made by an administrative agency charged with

administration of a particular statute.’ ” Boylan v. Matejka, 331 Ill. App. 3d 96, 98 (2002)

(quoting Oregon Community Unit School District No. 220 v. Property Tax Appeal Board,

285 Ill. App. 3d 170, 175 (1996)). “When a statute is ambiguous, it will be given a

construction that is reasonable and that will not produce absurd, unjust, or unreasonable

results which the legislature could not have intended.” In re Application of the County

Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Taxes for the Year 1993, 187 Ill. 2d 326, 332

(1999) (citing Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill.

2d 103, 110 (1993)). In discerning the meaning of the term “match” we should consider

which interpretation better effectuates the legislative intent and is more consistent with the

goals of the legislation of which this provision is a part. Id.

¶ 107 The legislative intent of section 7-1 is to leave to the resident voters the settlement of all

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questions involving school district territory. People ex rel. Smail v. Board of Education of

Community Unit School District No. 202, 343 Ill. App. 362, 370 (1951) (citing People v.

Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 41 (1948)). The second paragraph of section 7-1(a), which includes

the questioned language, was added in 1983 by Public Act 83-733 (eff. Sept. 23, 1983). It

appears clear to me that the legislature added the provision in order to provide a method of

authentication to local boards, much the same as the language in our Election Code that

provides that voter signatures on absentee ballot envelopes “match” the signatures on file

with the election authority. 10 ILCS 5/19-8(g) (West 2010). If a ballot is rejected, the voter

is notified of the reasons for rejection and he or she is given an opportunity “to show cause

as to why the ballot should not be rejected.” 10 ILCS 5/19-8(g-5) (West 2010). This process

safeguards the integrity of the voting process and at the same time protects the individual

voter’s right to vote. I view the petition process in section 7-1 of the School Code in much

the same way. 105 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 2010). The Districts made their general objection that

97 signatures did not match. The petitioners through the Committee of Ten were provided

an opportunity to show cause why the challenged signatures should be determined to be

valid. This process safeguards the resident voters’ rights to participate in disputes regarding

school boundaries and it deters fraud. My colleagues’ concerns as expressed in paragraph 19

are satisfied by the process followed by the Board in this case. As the court stated in Shelby

Loan, “[t]he general rule is that where forgery and fraud are charged, courts permit evidence

to take a wide range and every fact and circumstance, no matter of how little probative value,

which throws any light on the issue, is admissible.” Shelby Loan, 372 Ill. at 407.

¶ 108 Before discussing my view of the Board’s finding that there were a sufficient number of

valid signatures, I will comment on the out-of-state cases the majority relies upon to

conclude that variations in signature do not meet the substantial compliance requirement.

Both cases are distinguishable. The majority cites In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 770

A.2d 327 (Pa. 2001), from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for the proposition that

“[s]ubstantial compliance will not be found if one uses an initial for a first or last name.”

Supra ¶ 16; see Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 332. Actually, the Flaherty court struck signatures

because they were printed rather than cursive as they appeared on the voter registration cards.

However, my colleagues fail to note that the court struck these signatures because, in the

absence of “substantial proof that the person intended her printed name to be her signature,

a person may not validly print her name upon a nomination petition.” Flaherty, 770 A.2d at

332.

¶ 109 The Flaherty court noted that other signatures were stricken “based on the following

reasons: the signatures were illegible, the signature on the petition did not match the

signature on the electors’ registration card, the signatures were printed and Candidate did not

offer any rehabilitating testimony, or the electors were not registered and Candidate failed

to present rehabilitating testimony.” (Emphases added.) Id. at 331 n.4. Here, the petitioners

did offer “rehabilitating” testimony from the circulators.

¶ 110 Next, my colleagues cite State ex rel. Rogers v. Taft, 594 N.E.2d 576 (Ohio 1992), for

the proposition that “substantial compliance will not be found if the signature is printed

rather than in cursive as it appears on the corresponding registration form.” Supra ¶ 16. The

Supreme Court of Ohio made this determination because, based on the language in the

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relevant Ohio statute, “the General Assembly obviously did not mean to include printing

within the term ‘signature’ as used in the statute, since the relevant law clearly distinguishes

the two.” Taft, 594 N.E.2d at 579. Under the Ohio statute at issue, “[s]ignatures shall be

affixed in ink. Each signer may also print his name, so as to clearly identify his signature.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court noted that in State ex rel. Green v. Casey,

554 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio 1990), it held that this provision “implicitly requires a cursive

signature.” Taft, 594 N.E.2d at 579. The provision at issue in this case does not provide this

distinction. With respect to one of the contested signatures, the Casey court also noted that

there was “no proof offered that the signer and the registered voter were the same persons.”

Id. Again, in this case there was proof that the signers and the registered voters were the

same persons.

¶ 111 I also note that, in both out-of-state cases that my colleagues rely upon, the courts applied

a more deferential standard of review. In Flaherty, the court stated, “our standard of review

is whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether there was an

abuse of discretion, or whether errors of law were committed.” Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 331.

In Taft, the court, in affirming the election board’s refusal to accept a candidate’s nominating

petition, stated: “we find no fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of the

law in the board’s rejection of these signatures.” Taft, 594 N.E.2d at 580.

¶ 112 I have reviewed the questioned signatures, along with the addresses and the other

information on the petition sheets, and compared the signatures to the signatures on file with

the election commission. There is no question that the 21 signatures identified by my

colleagues leave a lot to be desired. Circulators, whether they are working to get a candidate

on the ballot or to raise a public question, would be well advised to remind voters to sign

their full names. As an aside, I also note that the State Board of Education provides public

education online and in print regarding “School District Detachment/Annexation” but that

no information concerning the “match” requirement for signers is contained therein. That

said, I would hold that the Board’s decision that the petition had met the signature

requirement is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the opposite conclusion

is not clearly evident. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210.

¶ 113 It is important to remember that marks of different sorts may qualify as signatures, as

long as the mark “manifests that the instrument has been executed or adopted by the party

to be charged by it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roti v. Roti, 364 Ill. App. 3d 191,

196 (2006). The petitioners, through the Committee of Ten, presented a prima facie case for

jurisdiction to be found. The burden of production shifted to the Districts to show that the

petitioners did not present the requisite number of signatures. The Districts presented the

questioned signature pages along with the official voter registration card signatures. In order

to counter the Districts’ claims, the Committee of Ten presented the testimony of the

circulators by way of an accepted proffer, which has the legal effect of a stipulation. The

Districts’ arguments against the relevance of the stipulated evidence are not evidence. As my

colleagues acknowledge, testimony as to the genuineness of the signatures is admissible on

the question of whether they match the official signatures.

¶ 114 Additionally, it appears from the petition sheets that they were the product of door-to-

door canvassing by the circulators. Many of the signatures that my colleagues invalidate due

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to the use of an initial appear on the same petition sheets as signatures of other voters in the

same household who signed on the same date as the purported bad signer. Even in those

instances where an initial is used, in most cases the signature in its entirety bears a strong

resemblance to the signature on the voter registration card. It would be reasonable for the

Board to conclude that the petition corroborated the circulators’ agreed testimony that the

signatures were genuine. In my review of the signatures I saw nothing that would indicate

fraud or forgery. This perhaps explains why the Districts made no attempt whatsoever to

independently ascertain from the signers whether their signatures on the petition were

“genuine,” the term they repeatedly used in their initial pleadings. It also helps to explain

why the jurisdictional argument is the last argument raised in the Districts’ briefs and why

they never bothered to touch upon the signature issue during the arguments before the trial

court. For all of the foregoing reasons I would affirm the Board’s finding that the signature

and address requirement was met and move on to the merits.

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