Erika Mabes v. Shannon Thompson

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

Nos. 24-1048 and 24-1082

ERIKA MABES and BRIAN MABES, individually and on behalf

of L.M., J.R.M., and J.A.M., minor children,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

SHANNON THOMPSON, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:21-cv-02062-JRS-MKK — James R. Sweeney II, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 28, 2025

____________________

Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This case arose out of tragic cir-

cumstances. In July 2019 Indiana Department of Child Ser-

vices workers encountered a two-month-old infant with a se-

vere skull fracture and extensive brain damage after being

taken to an emergency room by his parents who had discov-

ered him unresponsive and struggling to breathe. And so be-

gan lengthy child abuse and custody proceedings against the

2 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

parents of the child, Erika and Brian Mabes. The Mabeses ul-

timately regained custody of the infant and their other two

children and sued nine Indiana DCS workers and a consultant

doctor at the hospital, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging

violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

under the Constitution.

The district court denied the defendants’ motions for sum-

mary judgment because it found that unresolved factual dis-

putes precluded their requests for qualified immunity. The

defendants now appeal. After conducting our own review of

the factual record and evaluating each defendant and claim

individually, as the law of qualified immunity demands, we

reverse.

I

A

Because this appeal comes to us from the district court’s

denial of qualified immunity, we accept the plaintiffs’ version

of the facts as true. See Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 735–36

(7th Cir. 2021).

Shortly after midnight on July 20, 2019, Brian Mabes

dozed off while watching his two-month-old twin sons. He

awoke to find one of the twins, L.M., struggling to breathe

and unresponsive. L.M. had been fussy that night, so to ease

the infant’s discomfort, Brian placed him on his stomach on a

soft memory-foam mattress—an unsafe sleeping arrange-

ment, all parties seem to agree.

After waiting to see if L.M.’s condition would improve,

Brian woke up his wife Erika, a fellow at Indiana University

training to become a pediatric plastic surgeon. The couple

called 911 and emergency responders transported L.M. to a

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 3

nearby regional hospital. Shortly after his arrival, L.M. began

vomiting and aspirating. The doctors administered CPR and

attempted to intubate L.M. multiple times. According to the

Mabeses, L.M. was without oxygen for at least 12 minutes.

After stabilizing L.M., the medical team arranged a lifeline

transfer by helicopter to Riley Hospital for Children, a spe-

cialty hospital in Indianapolis. A CT scan taken upon L.M.’s

arrival showed extensive brain damage in addition to a sig-

nificant Y-shaped fracture on his skull. Doctors also observed

abdominal bruising. Although the Riley team managed to sta-

bilize the infant, L.M. remained in critical condition with a

grave prognosis.

The Riley doctors reported L.M.’s condition to the Indiana

Department of Child Services, which enlisted Dr. Shannon

Thompson, a member of Indiana University School of Medi-

cine’s child protection program division, as a consultant. In

her role as a DCS consultant, Dr. Thompson had the ability to

order tests and conduct medical evaluations. DCS also dis-

patched Natasha Davis and Courtney Oakes, the family case

managers on call that night, to investigate.

Davis and Oakes interviewed Brian and Erika Mabes at

Riley Hospital. They asked how L.M. might have sustained

his injuries. With respect to his abdominal bruising, Erika

noted that L.M. “bruised easily when swaddled.” As for his

head injury, Erika explained that L.M. had developed a

“goose egg” on his head the prior month and suggested that

his three-year-old brother, J.A.M., may have hit him on the

head with a plastic toy or perhaps L.M. had been accidentally

bumped into a wall. Because L.M. was otherwise asympto-

matic at the time, the Mabeses had not sought medical assis-

tance for the goose egg. Brian reported that Erika had taken

4 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

L.M. to the emergency room about a week before the July 20

incident because he was vomiting profusely. The ER physi-

cians advised Erika that L.M. had a stomach illness.

While Davis remained at the hospital to interview Erika

alongside Dr. Thompson, Oakes went to the Mabes family

home, accompanied by law enforcement. With Brian’s con-

sent, police officers searched the home and discovered mari-

juana and associated paraphernalia, as well as medications

that had been prescribed to Erika’s deceased father. Oakes

confronted Brian about the drugs, and he admitted to using

marijuana. (The parties dispute whether Brian further admit-

ted to using marijuana at times when he was the only parent

watching the children.)

Dr. Thompson provided her initial findings to Case Man-

agers Davis and Oakes on the afternoon of July 20 and classi-

fied the case as “intermediate, highly suspicious for non-acci-

dental injury,” because of the parents’ inability to provide an

explanation that matched L.M.’s injuries. Dr. Thompson also

recounted showing Erika the scan of L.M.’s skull fracture, to

which Erika remarked, “Oh my gosh, it’s almost half of his

skull.” Shortly after meeting with Erika, Dr. Thompson ad-

vised Davis that a skull fracture of this type and size could not

have resulted from being hit in the head with a plastic toy or

contact with a corner of a wall. Erika, however, offered no al-

ternative explanation.

Case Managers Davis and Oakes communicated their

findings with their supervisor at DCS, Hannah Lyman, who

decided to remove all three of the Mabeses’ children—the

two-month-old twins, L.M. and J.R.M., and the couple’s three-

year-old, J.A.M.—on an emergency basis. Because L.M.’s

medical emergency occurred early on a Saturday morning

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 5

when no judge was on call, DCS did not attempt to secure a

court order before removing the children from the Mabeses’

home.

Two days later, on Monday, July 22, Davis—acting under

Lyman’s supervision—submitted a Petition to declare the

Mabeses’ children as “children in need of services” (a CHINS

Petition) to the Indiana court. At a hearing that afternoon, the

court issued an order approving DCS’s custody of the chil-

dren. Brian and Erika Mabes attended the hearing, repre-

sented by separate counsel.

That same day DCS reassigned the case from Oakes and

Davis to Angela McFeeley, another Case Manager, who took

over the investigation on a permanent basis. In the weeks that

followed, doctors conducted additional physical exams of

L.M. and found several fractured ribs, which Dr. Thompson

opined did not occur as a result of the CPR administered at

the regional hospital. Dr. Thompson also identified a fracture

in L.M.’s arm and several areas where the child’s limbs had

been dislocated.

Dr. Thompson ordered examinations of the other two chil-

dren, and the Riley medical team identified what they be-

lieved to be a partially healed skull fracture on the head of the

other two-month-old, J.R.M. But upon a later reevaluation,

Dr. Thompson clarified that she found J.R.M.’s CT scan to be

“indeterminate for abuse” because she could not rule out that

the previously identified fracture was a nutrient vessel, which

would be inconsistent with a traumatic injury.

In October 2019, following several months of investiga-

tion, DCS informed Erika Mabes that it intended to substanti-

ate allegations of abuse and neglect against her as L.M.’s

6 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

mother. To advance such a claim against a caregiver, DCS

must conclude that it has sufficient information to prove by

“a preponderance of evidence that child abuse or neglect has

occurred.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-123. When DCS substantiates a

claim of abuse, the caregiver faces several negative conse-

quences, including placement on the public child protective

index.

Later the same month, as part of an agreement with DCS,

Brian and Erika Mabes admitted that their three children

qualified as children in need of services, requiring the court’s

coercive intervention, “as a result of the Father’s neglect to

supply the children with necessary services.” The agreed stip-

ulation continued “no determinations [had been made] in re-

gard to the mother.”

Because Erika Mabes’s work as a physician qualified her

as a childcare worker, Indiana law provided her with a “Child

Care Worker Assessment Review Process,” before DCS could

move forward with formally substantiating its allegations.

This Review Process must be conducted by a person “who

was not involved in the assessment or the preparation of the

assessment report, and does not have a conflict of interest.”

Courtney Crowe, the local DCS office director, conducted the

first Review Process and substantiated the abuse against

Erika.

Erika appealed the determination, claiming that Crowe

was not qualified to conduct the review due to her involve-

ment in the decision to substantiate the abuse allegations.

Erika’s appeal was successful so a new Review Process com-

menced and concluded with a new reviewing officer likewise

substantiating the allegations of abuse and neglect against

Erika. She appealed again, but in February 2022, the central

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 7

DCS office elected to unsubstantiate all allegations against

Erika while her appeal was still pending because it found that

DCS lacked sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations.

B

The Mabeses then invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed suit

in federal court in Indianapolis against Dr. Thompson and

nine DCS employees. The first claim arises from the initial sei-

zure of the three children, which the Mabeses contend vio-

lated both the children’s Fourth Amendment right against un-

lawful seizures as well as the parents’ Fourteenth Amend-

ment substantive and procedural due process rights. Next,

the Mabeses allege that several of the DCS workers misrepre-

sented facts in the CHINS Petition, violating their procedural

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally,

the Mabeses claim that the defendants violated their proce-

dural due process rights in the subsequent child abuse pro-

ceedings by refusing to consider mitigating evidence and hav-

ing a DCS employee (Courtney Crowe) with a conflict of in-

terest conduct a Child Care Worker Assessment Review Pro-

cess. The Mabeses raise each of these claims against Dr.

Thompson as well.

Dr. Thompson and the DCS defendants separately moved

for summary judgment. Both sets of defendants invoked qual-

ified immunity, contending that their actions did not violate

the Mabeses’ clearly established rights. The district court de-

nied both motions, determining that factual issues precluded

any award of qualified immunity to any defendant.

All ten defendants now appeal.

8 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

II

A

We begin with a word on our jurisdiction. As a general

matter, Congress has limited our appellate jurisdiction to re-

viewing “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. The Supreme Court has recognized that a denial of

qualified immunity, “to the extent that [the denial] turns on

an issue of law,” qualifies as a “final decision” subject to ap-

pellate review. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

Appellate review, then, is available only where the appeal fo-

cuses “exclusively on legal questions about immunity, rather

than factual disputes tied up with the merits of the case.” Jones

v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2011).

To be sure, the mere existence of some disputed facts does

not deprive us of jurisdiction. Instead, the question is whether

those disputed facts affect the qualified immunity analysis.

See Estate of Williams v. Cline, 902 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2018).

“If we can decide the appeal without resolving disputed facts,

then we can proceed to the merits.” Davis v. Allen, 112 F.4th

487, 493 (7th Cir. 2024). If not, we must dismiss the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction. See Finkley, 10 F.4th at 750.

The Mabeses contend that we lack jurisdiction to resolve

this appeal because the defendants’ arguments turn on dis-

puted facts. No doubt “the line between abstract legal ques-

tions and fact-bound inquiries is not always readily appar-

ent.” Davis, 112 F.4th at 492. And there is no shortage of dif-

ferent perspectives in this case. But the defendants make clear

that, for purposes of this appeal, they accept the plaintiffs’

version of events as true. See Manery v. Lee, 124 F.4th 1073,

1078–79 (7th Cir. 2025); Jones, 630 F.3d at 680.

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 9

We see no reason to dismiss this appeal for lack of juris-

diction because, after undertaking our own careful review of

the record, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to the Mabeses as plaintiffs, we can resolve the defendants’

assertion of qualified immunity on the merits. See Johnson v.

Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995) (explaining that, where the dis-

trict court does not “state those facts” which led to the denial

of qualified immunity, courts of appeals may review that le-

gal determination by “undertak[ing] a cumbersome review of

the record” and evaluating the facts “in the light most favor-

able to the nonmoving party”).

B

“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials

‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Upon a defendant’s invo-

cation of qualified immunity at summary judgment, the

plaintiff shoulders the burden of demonstrating both that the

defendant violated a constitutional right and that the consti-

tutional right was clearly established at the time, such that “a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). For the latter inquiry, “the clearly established law must

be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580

U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640); see also

Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc).

We review denials of qualified immunity without deference

to the district court and cabin our review to legal questions.

See Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 487 (7th Cir. 2021).

10 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense

“available to each individual defendant in his individual ca-

pacity,” a court must structure its analysis defendant-by-de-

fendant and claim-by-claim. Cline, 902 F.3d at 651 (quoting

Bakalis v. Golembeski, 35 F.3d 318, 326–27 (7th Cir. 1994)). And

this is especially important where, as here, the plaintiffs ad-

vance multiple claims against multiple defendants. See id.

(describing the “painstaking commitment to an individual-

ized qualified-immunity analysis” that our case law de-

mands).

The district court did not approach its own qualified im-

munity assessment this way. To our eye, we see the district

court’s analysis as painting with too broad a brush. The dis-

trict court concluded that none of the ten defendants were en-

titled to qualified immunity because the case “could turn on

a single disputed factual question of credibility: ought DCS

and Dr. Thompson to have had second thoughts?” But

whether it might have been a “mistake[] in judgment” to re-

move the children and substantiate abuse allegations against

the Mabeses does not broadly resolve whether any particular

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on any particular

claim. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citation omitted). The district

court had a duty to focus on each claim and “determine

whether each defendant violated [the Mabeses’] rights and, if

so, whether that right, defined at an appropriate level of spec-

ificity, was clearly established at the time.” Cline, 902 F.3d at

651.

III

We begin our assessment of qualified immunity with Dr.

Shannon Thompson, the child abuse specialist at Riley Hos-

pital, who assessed the children and provided her medical

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 11

opinion to DCS throughout its investigation. The Mabeses’

theory of liability as to Dr. Thompson is not that she caused

their injuries in ordering certain tests and reaching particular

medical conclusions, but rather that she provided advice to

DCS which set in motion a series of events that ultimately led

to the various alleged constitutional deprivations. So even

though Dr. Thompson did not engage in any of the actions

that the Mabeses allege violated their constitutional rights—

removing the children, preparing the CHINS Petition, and the

like—they nonetheless urge us to affirm the denial of quali-

fied immunity because Dr. Thompson “knew” that DCS

would rely on her “recklessly” incorrect opinion in making

the decision to remove the children. We disagree and con-

clude that Dr. Thompson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Dr. Thompson is situated differently than the other de-

fendants. At all relevant times, she acted as a medical profes-

sional and, unlike DCS employees, did not have any decision-

making authority or direct control over the child abuse inves-

tigation. It should not be surprising, then, that the Mabeses

point to no analogous case establishing that a physician vio-

lates an individual’s constitutional rights by offering a medi-

cal opinion to state child welfare officials, even if the opinion

later proves incorrect. See, e.g., Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th

545, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that, in the context of an

Eighth Amendment prison medical care claim, medical mal-

practice, without more, does not rise to the level of a constitu-

tional violation).

Recognizing this deficit, the Mabeses attempt to reframe

the inquiry to remove Dr. Thompson’s lack of personal in-

volvement and status as a physician from the qualified im-

munity question, describing her direct participation in the

12 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

constitutional violations (or lack thereof) as “irrelevant.” As

the Mabeses see things, our statement in Brokaw v. Mercer

County that “[a]n official causes a constitutional violation if he

sets in motion a series of events that defendant knew or rea-

sonably should have known would cause others to deprive

plaintiff of constitutional rights” makes this case an easy one:

Dr. Thompson’s medical opinion that L.M.’s injuries were

consistent with abuse led to the removal of the children and

other ensuing constitutional violations, so, the argument con-

tinues, a jury could choose to find Dr. Thompson liable on all

of the plaintiffs’ claims. 235 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000).

Not so in our view. For one, the passage from Brokaw ex-

plains when an individual may be considered personally lia-

ble for a constitutional violation under § 1983—it says noth-

ing about whether the rights the Mabeses claim Dr. Thomp-

son violated were clearly established in July 2019. These are

separate inquiries, and the Mabeses, as plaintiffs, bear the

burden to prove both: that Dr. Thompson “caused the depri-

vation of a constitutional right,” and that the constitutional

right was “clearly established at the time.” Surita v. Hyde, 665

F.3d 860, 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]o be liable

under § 1983, a government official must have caused the

deprivation of a constitutional right”) (citing Brokaw, 235 F.3d

at 1012)). Put most simply, the Mabeses cannot side-step their

burden to identify “a closely analogous case” clearly estab-

lishing the constitutional right they claim Dr. Thompson vio-

lated by invoking Brokaw’s broad language describing

§ 1983’s causation standard. Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 547

(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 899

(7th Cir. 2013)).

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 13

In any event, we see no evidence in the record (or identi-

fied in the Mabeses’ brief), that Dr. Thompson acted in a reck-

less or otherwise improper manner in providing her recom-

mendation to DCS. To the contrary, the record shows that she

acted reasonably at all points in time. Remember the grave

and urgent situation that Dr. Thompson confronted on July

20, 2019: a two-month-old infant arrived at Riley Hospital

with significant brain trauma and a severe skull fracture,

among other injuries, after almost dying while being intu-

bated at another hospital. While the Mabeses take Dr. Thomp-

son to task for her medical evaluation, contending that she

failed to consider mitigating evidence (namely, the possibility

that L.M.’s injuries were the result of failed resuscitation at-

tempts at the regional hospital), among other shortcomings,

they have not established that Dr. Thompson was on notice

that any aspect of her interactions with DCS was unlawful or

unreasonable in light of the difficult and uncertain circum-

stances she encountered with L.M.

Qualified immunity “‘gives ample room for mistaken

judgments,’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law,’” neither of which is a

fair descriptor of Dr. Thompson—particularly in light of the

circumstances she confronted at the hospital. Hunter v. Bryant,

502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (citation omitted). Dr. Thompson’s en-

titlement to qualified immunity naturally follows from the

Mabeses’ failure to carry their “burden of demonstrating the

violation of a clearly established right.” Forman v. Richmond

Police Dep’t, 104 F.3d 950, 957–58 (7th Cir. 1997). The Mabeses

have identified no precedent (and we are aware of none) es-

tablishing that a medical professional violates an individual’s

constitutional rights by providing a medical opinion to DCS,

14 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

even if that opinion, in hindsight, was incorrect, compelling

our conclusion that Dr. Thompson is immune from suit.

IV

We turn next to the nine DCS defendants, each of whom

had varying involvement in the investigation and adjudica-

tion of the child abuse allegations against the Mabeses. We

take each of the plaintiffs’ claims in turn and conclude that

none of the defendants violated the Mabeses’ clearly estab-

lished rights, entitling the DCS defendants to qualified im-

munity across the board.

A

The Mabeses allege that Natasha Davis and Courtney

Oakes (the two family Case Managers on call when L.M. ar-

rived at Riley Hospital), Hannah Lyman (their supervisor),

and Courtney Crowe (the DCS office director) took custody

of their three children in violation of the children’s Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, as well as

Brian’s and Erika’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to proce-

dural due process and substantive due process, specifically

their right to familial relations.

Taking the unreasonable seizure claim first, we have ex-

plained that “a seizure is reasonable if it is pursuant to a court

order, if it is supported by probable cause, or if it is justified

by exigent circumstances, meaning that state officers ‘have

reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy.’”

Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1010 (citation omitted). Although Hannah

Lyman did not secure a court order prior to removing the chil-

dren from the Mabeses’ custody—the Indiana court’s author-

ization came two days later—she claims the seizure was

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 15

nevertheless reasonable because it was supported by proba-

ble cause.

Probable cause is an objective inquiry, focused in these cir-

cumstances on whether “a prudent caseworker (meaning one

of reasonable caution) could have believed that [the children]

faced an immediate threat of abuse.” Siliven v. Ind. Dep’t of

Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 927 (7th Cir. 2011). Applying this

standard in the context of qualified immunity, Davis, Oakes,

Lyman, and Crowe are entitled to immunity “as long as a rea-

sonable [DCS] investigator … could have believed [the re-

moval was] lawful, in light of clearly established law and the

information [they] possessed” at the time. Hernandez ex rel.

Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 475 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Upon viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

Mabeses, as we must, we have little difficulty concluding that

standard is met here. By the afternoon of July 20, 2019, Case

Managers Davis and Oakes were investigating the “near fa-

tality” of a two-month-old infant following an unexplained

medical emergency. They had discovered evidence of unsafe

sleep practices and drug use by one of the parents during a

home visit. Even more, Dr. Thompson, a certified child abuse

specialist, advised Davis that Erika Mabes failed to provide

an explanation consistent with L.M.’s injuries. Indeed, Dr.

Thompson told Davis that she considered the case “highly

suspicious for non-accidental injury.” Davis and Oakes com-

municated these findings to their supervisor, Hannah Lyman,

who ultimately ordered the children’s removal.

The Mabeses seek to diminish the severity of L.M.’s phys-

ical condition when the child arrived at Riley Hospital, de-

scribing the child’s abdominal bruising as “insignificant,” and

16 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

the skull fracture as “clearly old.” But their after-the-fact say-

so does nothing to negate the uncertainty and urgency of the

situation Case Managers Davis and Oakes faced in July 2019.

See United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 607 F.3d 504, 510 (7th

Cir. 2010) (explaining that “saying so doesn’t make it so” to

create a genuine dispute of fact at summary judgment). And

regardless of any genuine dispute about the severity of L.M.’s

injuries, we conclude that a reasonable DCS investigator

could have believed that removing the Mabeses’ children was

lawful at the time—with an eye toward assuring their safety

while the investigation progressed.

This conclusion finds ample support in our case law. In-

deed, we have granted DCS employees immunity in cases

where the facts were less stark and severe than the ones before

us. See, e.g., Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 475–77 (finding that child

protection workers were entitled to qualified immunity

where DCS seized a fifteen-month-old child with a broken

arm after the parents provided “seemingly inconsistent state-

ments,” even though a home visit uncovered “nothing … sus-

picious”); Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 290 (7th Cir. 2012)

(granting child welfare workers qualified immunity where

the child’s school contacted DCS after discovering bruises on

the child’s arm and leg, which the child said had been in-

flicted by his parents, and the parents admitted to leaving him

home alone for extended periods of time).

The Mabeses try to distinguish our opinion in Hernandez.

They explain that, unlike in Hernandez, their children were not

in Brian’s and Erika’s custody at the time DCS ordered their

removal—they were being watched by extended family. And,

from that observation, the Mabeses contend that their chil-

dren did not face any risk of imminent abuse. But we have

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 17

never held that a DCS employee cannot order a child’s re-

moval, where it otherwise had probable cause to do so,

simply because the child is presently residing with another

adult. The state-sanctioned removal of a child deprives a par-

ent of their right to legal custody over the child, not merely

physical custody.

Our conclusion that Davis, Oakes, Lyman, and Crowe are

immune from suit on the children’s Fourth Amendment un-

reasonable seizure claim also serves to dispose of Erika and

Brian Mabeses’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due pro-

cess claim, as we apply the same probable cause standard to

both. See Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 486 (“[G]overnment officials

may remove a child from his home without a pre-deprivation

hearing and court order if the official has probable cause to

believe that the child is in imminent danger of abuse.”).

As for the Mabeses’ claim that Davis, Oakes, Lyman, and

Crowe violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial

relations, the standard is even lower, requiring only that a

caseworker have “some definite and articulable evidence giv-

ing rise to a reasonable suspicion” of danger to the child be-

fore separating them from their parents. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at

1019. The lesser standard makes our analysis straightforward:

because we have concluded that a reasonable DCS worker

could have believed probable cause existed to seize the chil-

dren, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the

Mabeses’ substantive due process claim as well. See Siliven,

635 F.3d at 928 (explaining that where the court already “con-

cluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable

cause” it followed that the evidence “must also be sufficient

to satisfy the less demanding reasonable suspicion stand-

ard”).

18 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

In the end, our analysis roots itself in the recognition that

“child welfare caseworkers are often called upon to make dif-

ficult decisions without the benefit of extended deliberation.”

Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 525 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Brokaw,

235 F.3d at 1023 (recognizing that “it is generally the case”

that “social workers and other state actors who cause a child’s

removal are entitled to qualified immunity because the al-

leged constitutional violation will rarely—if ever—be clearly

established”). This case fits that bill to a T, with state officials

having to make tough calls under substantial time pressure.

So while we are sympathetic to the Mabeses’ genuine distress

at DCS’s decision to seize their children, we cannot conclude

that Natasha Davis, Courtney Oakes, Hannah Lyman, or

Courtney Crowe violated their clearly established constitu-

tional rights.

B

We turn next to the Mabeses’ procedural due process

claim arising from the CHINS Petition. Erika and Brian assert

that several DCS defendants violated their constitutional

rights by submitting the Petition to an Indiana court with mis-

representations of fact and omissions of critical information,

which led to the temporary loss of their three children. The

Mabeses brought their claim against Case Managers Davis

and Oakes, Lyman (their supervisor), and Crowe (the office

director). On appeal, however, the Mabeses only refer to Da-

vis, Oakes, and Lyman, pressing no contentions relating to

Crowe’s involvement. So we dispose of any claims against

Crowe and focus our analysis on Davis, Oakes, and Lyman.

“[D]ue process ‘at a minimum … requires that govern-

ment officials not misrepresent the facts in order to obtain the

removal of a child from his parents.’” Hernandez, 657 F.3d at

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 19

484–85 (quoting Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020). The Mabeses claim

that the CHINS Petition is replete with such misrepresenta-

tions, including that “L.M. had a ‘life-threatening’ skull frac-

ture and bruise,” that “the only explanation given [by the Ma-

beses] for the [abdominal] bruise was swaddling,” and that

“L.M. presently had a goose egg.” Accepting the Mabeses’

views that these statements and omissions were misleading,

the three defendants at issue are still entitled to qualified im-

munity on the procedural due process claim. It is not clearly

established that officials categorically may not make any mis-

statements of fact in a CHINS Petition. And considering the

expedited basis on which the defendants filed the Petition and

the immateriality of these alleged misstatements to the re-

moval determination, we cannot conclude these DCS workers

should have reasonably understood that their actions violated

the law.

The Mabeses rely heavily on our decision in Brokaw, where

we first held that government officials may not misrepresent

facts to secure a child’s removal. See 235 F.3d at 1020. But

Brokaw is not “particularized to the facts of [this] case.” Pauly,

580 U.S. at 79. There the plaintiff, who had been removed

from his parents as a child, alleged that the entire proceeding

to secure his removal was a sham, with no merit to any of it.

The Mabeses make no such claim here, nor could they. The

preliminary inquiry submitted to the state court consists of

almost 50 pages of narrative, setting out the basis for DCS’s

probable cause assessment and chronicling the investigation

to that point in time. The Mabeses do not challenge the accu-

racy of most of the report. Instead, they draw out, with a rel-

atively fine-toothed comb, seven alleged misstatements and

omissions by DCS. But even if the Mabeses are correct that

20 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

these specific statements are misleading, unlike Brokaw, many

of them came from medical professionals who provided their

assessment of L.M.’s condition to DCS. And we have recog-

nized that state officials may reasonably rely on the judgment

of medical professionals without exposing themselves to lia-

bility. See McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 483 (7th Cir. 2013)

(applying this principle in the context of an Eighth Amend-

ment deliberate indifference claim).

It also matters that Brian and Erika were both present at

the deprivation hearing and represented by counsel when the

state court, relying upon the information contained in the

CHINS Petition, authorized the removal of the three children.

The facts here stand in stark contrast to Brokaw, where it ap-

pears the decision to remove the child came after an ex parte

meeting with law enforcement, a DCS employee, and a judge

present. 235 F.3d at 1007. Further, the plaintiff in Brokaw

claimed that the state presented a report containing false in-

formation at a subsequent hearing and that his parents “were

denied the opportunity to disprove those allegations because

they were not given access to the report” in advance. Id. at

1008. It was against these facts that we identified a procedural

due process claim.

Here, however, the Mabeses had every opportunity in the

CHINS proceeding to clarify a misstatement of fact, with the

court telling them “you’re certainly welcome” “to make an ar-

gument about why I shouldn’t detain these children.” And,

unlike the report in Brokaw, DCS prepared the CHINS Petition

and preliminary inquiry within one day of DCS first making

contact with the Mabes family. These factual dissimilarities

lead us to conclude that Brokaw did not clearly establish that

any misstatement of fact in a petition for the removal of a child

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 21

violates a parent’s procedural due process right—particularly

where, as here, DCS prepared the CHINS Petition on an ex-

pedited basis and the parents had the opportunity to object.

In any event, the CHINS report did not run afoul of

Brokaw’s conclusion that a state actor violates due process

when they misrepresent a fact “in order to” obtain a child’s

removal. 235 F.3d at 1020. Not just any misrepresentation will

do under Brokaw—it must be made with intent to secure the

child’s removal and therefore material to the removal deter-

mination. The Mabeses’ strongest claim on this point arises

from DCS’s representation that Brian admitted to smoking

marijuana when he was the only caregiver present with the

children—a fact the state court referenced in upholding the

removal of the children. Brian sees the point as overstated,

underscoring that he never admitted to using marijuana when

he was home alone with the children.

The Mabeses urge us to affirm the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity, characterizing the materiality of any

statements in the CHINS Petition as “a question for the jury.”

But even absent Brian’s alleged admission to using marijuana

while being the only adult present, we return to our earlier

determination that, in the totality of circumstances, based on

the uncertain and urgent situation DCS encountered with the

Mabeses, a reasonable official could have believed probable

cause existed to support removing the children. This conclu-

sion confirms that DCS’s alleged misstatements were not ma-

terial.

Because the Mabeses have failed to demonstrate that Na-

tasha Davis, Courtney Oakes, or Hannah Lyman violated

their clearly established rights and included false statements

“in order to” secure the children’s removal, the district court

22 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

committed error in not awarding these defendants qualified

immunity.

C

Finally, the Mabeses contend that Case Manager Natasha

Davis, Angela McFeeley (the case manager assigned to the

case on a permanent basis following the initial investigation),

Hannah Lyman (the supervisor), Courtney Crowe (the office

director), and Jaclyn Allemon (the regional DCS manager) vi-

olated their due process rights during the child protection

proceedings that followed the initial removal of the children.

The Mabeses also advance this claim against Kristin Miller

and Stephanie King, two other DCS employees, but we

quickly conclude that both are entitled to qualified immunity,

as the Mabeses acknowledged in their briefing before the dis-

trict court that neither defendant was “personally involved in

Plaintiffs’ constitutional violations.” And they take no con-

trary position on appeal.

As for the remaining defendants, Davis, McFeeley,

Lyman, Crowe, and Allemon, the Mabeses claim that the DCS

employees involved in the investigation (McFeeley and

Lyman in particular) failed to consider all available evidence,

including information which was exculpatory. In support of

their contention that this conduct violated their clearly estab-

lished constitutional rights, the Mabeses rely on Dupuy v.

Samuels, 397 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2005). There we held that an

investigator must “take into account all of the available evi-

dence that tends to show that abuse or neglect did or did not

occur,” before determining “whether that totality of evidence

would cause a reasonable individual to believe that a child

was abused or neglected.” Id. at 506. But, as we later clarified,

Dupuy “merely requires DCFS workers to consider

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 23

exculpatory evidence—not to treat it as dispositive.” Sebesta

v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 235 (7th Cir. 2017).

We see no record evidence supporting the Mabeses’ asser-

tion that any DCS official consistently ignored and disre-

garded evidence that did not fit their predetermination that

the parents should be held accountable for L.M.’s condition.

The Mabeses contend, for example, that the investigators

never looked into the events that took place at the regional

hospital. But McFeeley requested records from the regional

hospital the same day Lyman assigned her to the case and

then shared those records with medical professionals at Riley

Hospital. And when the Mabeses submitted expert opinions

and new evidence challenging DCS’s substantiation of abuse

in connection with Erika’s Child Care Worker Assessment Re-

view Process, Case Manager McFeeley consulted with Dr.

Thompson and other physicians. Dr. Thompson explained

that she disagreed with the Mabeses’ suggestion that L.M.’s

skull fracture was the result of birth trauma or an accident,

rather than an acute injury caused by intentional contact or

neglect.

In no way does the record demonstrate that Dr. Thompson

or any DCS official closed their minds or became unwilling to

consider new developments. As one example, after the radi-

ologist who reviewed J.R.M.’s initial CT scan changed his as-

sessment because he was unsure whether the scan evidenced

a skull fracture, as he originally thought, Dr. Thompson also

changed her assessment to “indeterminate for non-accidental

trauma.”

At the end of the day, beyond their claims that DCS ig-

nored evidence and failed to conduct a diligent investigation,

the Mabeses have put forth no evidence by which a

24 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

reasonable jury could conclude that Natasha Davis, Angela

McFeeley, Hannah Lyman, Courtney Crowe, and Jaclyn Alle-

mon violated their constitutional rights by conducting a bi-

ased investigation. See Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 858

(7th Cir. 2023) (“[B]are allegations, without more, do not cre-

ate genuine disputes of material fact.”).

The Mabeses also claim that the Child Care Worker As-

sessment Review Process violated their procedural due pro-

cess rights because the review must be performed by an indi-

vidual who was not involved in the underlying decision to

substantiate allegations of abuse. Courtney Crowe, the local

DCS office director who conducted the initial Review Process,

was too involved in the investigation, the Mabeses claim, as

was DCS employee Waylon James, a non-party to this suit,

who conducted the second review. The Mabeses contend that

defendant Jaclyn Allemon, the regional DCS manager, vio-

lated their procedural due process rights when she approved

James’s finding from the second Review Process substantiat-

ing abuse allegations against Erika.

The Mabeses are correct that we have recognized the im-

portance of appointing a decision maker in child abuse pro-

ceedings who had “no part in the investigative process.”

Dupuy, 397 F.3d at 508. But while a “new decision-maker” is

preferable, we have not clearly established that due process

always entitles parents to administrative review by an official

with no connection whatsoever to the underlying investiga-

tion. Id.; see District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)

(concluding that “[i]t is not enough that the rule is suggested

by then-existing precedent” to be clearly established).

And we see no due process concern arising out of Crowe’s

or James’s involvement in the Review Process. An impartial

Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082 25

decision maker is surely an important component of due pro-

cess, but as the Supreme Court has acknowledged in the wel-

fare context, “prior involvement in some aspects of a case will

not necessarily bar [an official] from acting as a decision

maker.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). The same

reasoning applies here. The Mabeses provide no basis to con-

clude that Crowe’s limited prior involvement—correspond-

ing with her role as the local office director overseeing all on-

going investigations and providing updates to her manager—

compromised her ability to impartially evaluate the claims

against Erika. The same is true for James, who the Mabeses

claim developed a conflict of interest after he ordered the local

DCS office to reassess the case and update him on their posi-

tion in advance of the second Review Process.

Because the Mabeses failed to allege any constitutional vi-

olation with respect to the DCS defendants’ consideration of

mitigating evidence and can point to no case clearly establish-

ing their entitlement to a decision maker with no prior in-

volvement in the investigation, no matter how benign or in-

significant, we grant the defendants qualified immunity.

* * *

Cases like these are hard because they require us to bal-

ance a fundamental individual interest—the right to care for

and have custody of one’s child—against the state’s interest

in protecting young children from abuse. But we see this dif-

ficulty as inherent in the work of child protection officers,

who often find themselves tasked with making difficult deci-

sions on tight timelines that carry significant consequences. It

is in a context like this one that qualified immunity has a par-

ticularly important role to play as it gives officials the “breath-

ing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about

26 Nos. 24-1048 & 24-1082

open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743

(2011). And, applying our clearly established precedent, we

see nothing plainly unreasonable in the actions taken by Dr.

Thompson or the DCS defendants in the difficult circum-

stances they encountered with the Mabeses.

After conducting the fact-specific and individualized anal-

ysis that the law of qualified immunity demands, we con-

clude that all defendants are immune on all the plaintiffs’

claims. We REVERSE the district court’s judgment and

REMAND for entry of judgment for the defendants.