Wilcox v. Molina Healthcare CA2/4

Filed 4/25/25 Wilcox v. Molina Healthcare CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This

opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MAURILIO WILCOX, B334728

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

v. 21STCV07894)

MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Upinder S. Kalra, Judge. Affirmed.

Employees First Labor Law, Jonathan P. LaCour and Lisa

Noveck for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Al M. De La

Cruz and Mark R. Wilson for Defendant and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

When Maurilio Wilcox did not return to work after his

approved medical leave expired on August 4, 2020, Molina

Healthcare, Inc. (Molina) terminated his employment. Wilcox

sued Molina for disability-related causes of action under the Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). After trial, a jury

returned a special verdict, and the trial court entered judgment

in favor of Molina based on the jury’s factual findings.

On appeal, Wilcox argues he is entitled to a new trial

because of inconsistent factual findings by the jury. The jury

found that Wilcox requested a reasonable accommodation for a

physical condition. It also found that Molina was unaware of

Wilcox’s physical condition. Wilcox asserts that these positions

are inherently inconsistent. Wilcox does not rely on any facts to

support his position. Indeed, neither the record nor argument on

appeal discloses the specific physical condition from which Wilcox

suffered. Nonetheless, Wilcox argues that a jury can never find

an employer is unaware of an employee’s physical condition if it

also finds that the employee requested a reasonable

accommodation for that physical condition.

We disagree with Wilcox. A request for a reasonable

accommodation does not necessarily impart knowledge to the

employer that the employee does, in fact, suffer from any specific

physical condition that limits a major life activity.1 In fact, the

1 A qualifying physical disability under FEHA is one that

limits a major life activity. (Gov. Code., § 12926, subd. (m)(1)(B).)

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limited record before us supports the jury’s findings.2

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We limit our recitation of the facts to those necessary to

provide context for the narrow issue we are deciding in this

appeal.

Wilcox worked for Molina until he was terminated in

August 2020. In May of that year, Wilcox’s doctor completed an

“ADA Medical Assessment Form.” The form stated Wilcox

required a leave of absence until August 4, 2020, which,

according to the doctor, would “[allow Wilcox] to improve [his]

condition possibly[.]” The form did not specify the physical

condition that required an accommodation.3

The following month, Wilcox contacted Molina’s Human

Resources Department and expressed a desire to return to work

2 Perhaps because Wilcox makes only a legal argument not

premised on any facts, Wilcox provided us with a truncated

record on appeal (i.e., only some of the trial testimony, no closing

arguments, and no trial exhibits).

3 It appears the form was hastily completed. In response to

question number 5 on the form asking whether the employee has

a physical or mental impairment, the doctor checked the box next

to the word “no.” Underneath the checked box, the doctor wrote

Wilcox is “unable to work until 8/4/2020.” Then, in response to

question number 6, which is only supposed to be answered if the

answer to question number 5 is “yes,” the doctor checked the box

next to “yes” in response to whether the employee’s impairment

substantially limits one or more major life activities. Those

major life activities included, according to the doctor, bending,

lifting, performing manual tasks, reaching, sitting, walking,

working, and musculoskeletal.

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early on a reduced schedule. Then, on July 6, 2020, Molina

received a doctor’s note dated July 1, 2020 specifying the

requested reduced schedule: Wilcox could work 6 hours per day,

with three 10-minute breaks in addition to his lunch break. No

other details were provided. The note did not identify the

physical condition that required accommodation, and did not

indicate when the restriction would end.

On July 30, 2020, Molina informed Wilcox that it could not

accommodate his proposed reduced work schedule and asked

Wilcox to confirm he would be returning to work on August 4,

2020. Molina further noted that a “return to work clearance

note” from his doctor was required before his return date. When

Wilcox neither submitted a clearance note nor returned to work,

Molina terminated his employment.

Wilcox sued Molina for several causes of action under

FEHA, including failure to accommodate a disability, failure to

engage in the interactive process, disability discrimination,

retaliation, and wrongful discharge. After a nearly three-week

trial, a jury returned a special verdict. As relevant here, the jury

made the following findings. As to the failure to accommodate

cause of action, the special verdict form stated: “Did [Molina]

know of [Wilcox]’s physical condition?” The jury responded “[n]o.”

As to the failure to engage in the interactive process cause of

action, the form stated: “Did [Wilcox] request that [Molina] make

a reasonable accommodation for his physical condition so that he

would be able to perform the essential job requirements?” The

jury responded “[y]es.” The jury further found, however, that

Molina did not fail to participate in a timely, good-faith

interactive process with Wilcox to determine whether reasonable

accommodation could be made. And on the disability

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discrimination cause of action, the form stated: “Did [Molina]

know that [Wilcox] had a physical condition that limited his

major life activities?” The jury responded “[n]o.” Based on these

factual findings, the trial court entered judgment in favor of

Molina.

Wilcox timely appealed from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

“[A] special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts

only, leaving the judgment to the Court. The special verdict

must present the conclusions of fact as established by the

evidence, and not the evidence to prove them; and those

conclusions of fact must be so presented as that nothing shall

remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 624.)

“‘Inconsistent verdicts are “‘against the law’”’ and are

grounds for a new trial.’” (City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San

Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668, 682

(Horton).) “‘The inconsistent verdict rule is based upon the

fundamental proposition that a factfinder may not make

inconsistent determinations of fact based on the same evidence.’”

(Ibid.) “An inconsistent verdict may arise from an inconsistency

between or among answers within a special verdict [citation] or

irreconcilable findings.” (Ibid.) Whether a jury’s special verdict

findings are inconsistent with each other is a legal question that

we review de novo. (Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009) 177

Cal.App.4th 700, 707.)

Wilcox contends the jury’s findings are inconsistent.

Without citation to authority, he argues that because the jury

found Molina knew Wilcox requested accommodations for his

physical condition, Molina “necessarily knew that [Wilcox] indeed

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had a physical condition.” Thus, according to Wilcox, the jury

could not have simultaneously concluded that he requested an

accommodation for his physical condition and that Molina did not

know about his physical condition.

But that is not the law. That an employee requests an

accommodation based on an unspecified physical condition does

not mean the employer knows that the employee suffers from a

physical disability within the meaning of FEHA. (See, e.g.,

Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group

(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1166-1167 [an employer’s duty to

accommodate an employee’s disability is not triggered until the

employer knows of the disability and “‘“[v]ague or conclusory

statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient

to put an employer on notice of its obligations under the

[FEHA]”’”].) This is so, among other reasons, because “‘[n]ot

every illness qualifies as [a] disability.’” (Avila v. Continental

Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1249.) Accordingly,

doctors’ notes that fail to identify a specific disability or its extent

or duration may be insufficient to put an employer on notice of an

employee’s disability. (See Doe v. Department of Corrections &

Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 739 [a doctors’ note

was insufficient to put an employer on notice of disability when

the note failed to identify a specific disability, its extent, or its

duration].)

Here, the record supports the jury’s finding that Molina did

not know Wilcox suffered from a qualifying physical condition

under FEHA. Based on Wilcox’s doctor’s notes, Molina’s

knowledge was limited to the following: (1) Wilcox was suffering

from an unspecified medical condition that required him to be off

work until August 4, 2020; and (2) Wilcox could return to work

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before August 4, 2020 if Molina could accommodate his request

for a reduced work schedule. Thus, Molina neither knew the

physical condition Wilcox was suffering from nor that such

condition would last beyond August 4, 2020. Moreover, Wilcox

neither claims, nor points us to evidence in the record

demonstrating, that he told Molina anything specific about his

physical condition. Even on appeal, Wilcox fails to provide any

details regarding his medical condition. He refers to it only as a

“physical condition.” Accordingly, a jury could reasonably—and

consistently—conclude that Wilcox requested an accommodation

(in the form of medical leave until August 4, 2020 and/or a

reduced work schedule if he returned before August 4, 2020) but

Molina did not know that he suffered from a physical condition

within the meaning of FEHA or that his condition would last

beyond August 4, 2020.

Wilcox cites to several disanalogous cases. In those cases,

the jury findings were in direct conflict with each other. (See,

e.g., Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336,

1345 [the jury’s findings were irreconcilable because they implied

plaintiff “was an at-will employee and that he was not”]; Lambert

v. General Motors (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183-1184, 1186

[the jury inconsistently found there was no defect in the design of

the car and defendant negligently designed that car]; Horton,

supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 681-682 [the jury rendered

inconsistent special verdict findings by implicitly finding the

same property had two different fair market values].) Here, the

jury’s findings are reconcilable for the reasons discussed above.

Accordingly, a new trial is not warranted.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own

costs on appeal.4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

DAUM, J.5

We concur:

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

COLLINS, J.

4 “An appellate court may not award costs or fees on appeal

to a prevailing FEHA defendant without first determining that

the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless

when brought, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it

clearly became so.” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services,

Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 950-951.) Molina, a prevailing FEHA

defendant, has not asked us to determine that Wilcox’s action

was at any point frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

5 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the

Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California

Constitution.

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