Wayne Taylor III v. Leslie A. Barnett

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 WAYNE TAYLOR III, ) Case No. CV 25-2433-KK (JPR)

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13 Plaintiff, )

) ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

14 Vv. ) COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

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15 LESLIE A. BARNETT, )

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16 Defendant.

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18 On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed pro se

19 a Complaint labeled “First Amended Civil Rights Complaint,”

29 | alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.

21S 1983. On March 24, he filed a First Amended Complaint.* Three

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23 1 The Complaint and FAC are identical except that the FAC has

DA attached to it a 14-page document. (FAC, ECF No. 4 at 17-30

(throughout, the Court uses the pagination generated by its Case

25 || Management/Electronic Case Filing system) .) The attachment is

labeled “Civil Rights Complaint.” (Id. at 17.) Although the first

26 || two pages of the attachment differ from the FAC, it is identical to

the FAC from the third page on. (Compare id. at 5-16, with id. at

27 19-30.)

28 When Plaintiff filed the FAC, he also filed a request for a

1 days later, the district judge granted his request to proceed

2 without prepayment of the filing fee.

3 Plaintiff sues Leslie A. Barnett, a “court-appointed

4 guardian ad litem” (FAC, ECF No. 4 at 3), apparently for

5 Plaintiff’s mother (id. at 10), in her individual and official

6 capacities. His claims arise from Defendant’s allegedly

7 defamatory remarks at a state-court probate hearing (see id. at

8 4-6, 9, 11, 12), which he claims caused him to be denied letters

9 of support from the community for his upcoming parole hearing

10 (see id. at 5-6).

11 After screening the FAC under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

12 1915A, the Court finds that its allegations fail to state a claim

13 on which relief might be granted. Because at least some of the

14 deficiencies might be cured by amendment, the FAC is dismissed

15 with leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31

16 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that pro se litigant must be

17 given leave to amend complaint unless it is absolutely clear that

18 deficiencies cannot be cured). If Plaintiff desires to pursue

19 any of his claims, he is ORDERED to file a second amended

20 complaint within 28 days of the date of this order, remedying the

21 deficiencies discussed below.

22 ALLEGATIONS OF THE FAC

23 On February 13, 2025, a hearing took place in Los Angeles

24 County Superior Court regarding Plaintiff’s petition for

25 appointment as his mother’s conservator. (See FAC, ECF No. 4 at

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27 temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. That

request remains pending and will be ruled on separately, by the

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assigned District Judge.

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1 5, 6, 10, 16.) Defendant, an attorney, was Plaintiff’s mother’s

2 court-appointed guardian ad litem. (See id. at 3, 10, 16.) At

3 the hearing, Defendant stated that Plaintiff was “petitioning

4 [the] court for . . . appointment as probate conservator, for the

5 sole purpose of manipulating the Board of Parole Hearings into

6 granting [Plaintiff] ‘Compassionate Parole’ from his present

7 incarceration.” (Id. at 6.) That statement allegedly caused

8 Plaintiff reputational injury, leading to his being “without

9 letters of support from members of the community” for his May 28,

10 2025 parole-suitability hearing. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff also

11 alleges that “commencing in November 2024,” Defendant “conspired”

12 with “Superior Court of California Judge Gus T. May” but provides

13 no supporting allegations. (Id. at 12.)

14 Plaintiff claims violations of the 14th Amendment’s due-

15 process and equal-protection clauses and state law. (Id. at 4-

16 13.) He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief; money damages;

17 costs, “including but not limited to, future attorney’s fees and

18 costs for retained counsel, if any”; and any other relief the

19 Court “deems to be appropriate, proper, just and equitable.”

20 (Id. at 14-16.)

21 STANDARD OF REVIEW

22 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure

23 to state a claim when “there is no cognizable legal theory or an

24 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal

25 theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d

26 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citing Navarro v. Block,

27 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)); accord O’Neal v. Price, 531

28 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). In considering whether a

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1 complaint states a claim, a court must generally accept as true

2 the factual allegations in it. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

3 678 (2009); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.

4 2011). The court need not accept as true, however, “allegations

5 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

6 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536

7 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Sprewell v. Golden State

8 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended by 275 F.3d 1187

9 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Shelton v. Chorley, 487 F. App’x 388,

10 389 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that district court properly

11 dismissed civil-rights claim when plaintiff’s “conclusory

12 allegations” did not support it).

13 Although a complaint need not include detailed factual

14 allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

15 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

16 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

17 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d

18 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible when it

19 “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

20 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

21 at 678. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’

22 and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held

23 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

24 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

25 curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

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1 DISCUSSION

2 I. The FAC Fails to Allege that the Private-Party Defendant

3 Acted as a State Agent or Engaged in Any State Action

4 A. Applicable Law

5 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that

6 a defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the

7 plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. See West v.

8 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824

9 (9th Cir. 2001). A person acts under color of state law only

10 when exercising power “possessed by virtue of state law and made

11 possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority

12 of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326

13 (1941).

14 Generally, action by private parties does not constitute

15 action under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

16 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (as amended); Sutton v. Providence

17 St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999). But

18 private parties may act under color of state law if they engage

19 in joint action with state actors or agents. See Sutton, 192

20 F.3d at 835. The joint-action inquiry focuses on “whether the

21 state has so far insinuated itself into a position of

22 interdependence with the private entity that it must be

23 recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity,”

24 Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation

25 omitted), and thus requires “a substantial degree of cooperative

26 action,” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir.

27 1989). Joint action may be demonstrated by “proving the

28 existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party

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1 was ‘a willful participant in joint action with the State or its

2 agents.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002)

3 (quoting Collins, 878 F.2d at 1154).

4 B. Analysis

5 Generally, court-appointed attorneys, such as public

6 defenders and incompetent persons’ guardians ad litem, are not

7 state actors. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325

8 (1981) (holding that public defenders do not act under color of

9 state law when performing traditional functions as counsel in

10 criminal proceedings); Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1091-92, 1096

11 (private attorney did not act under color of law when appointed

12 by Washington state court to represent minor as guardian ad

13 litem). In Kirtley, the Ninth Circuit looked to the state’s

14 statutory definition of a guardian ad litem, ultimately holding

15 that that role, like that of a public defender, was independent

16 of the state and therefore the defendant was not a state actor.

17 See 326 F.3d at 1092-96. The court highlighted that the main

18 function of the guardian ad litem was to advocate for the minor

19 and represent the minor’s interests. See id. at 1092-94.

20 Although the guardian also acted as an investigator to provide

21 information to the court, that function was more akin to the role

22 of a witness than to an actual extension of the court. See id.

23 Here, Defendant apparently acted as a court-appointed

24 guardian ad litem for Plaintiff’s mother in state-court probate

25 proceedings. (See FAC, ECF No. 4 at 3, 6, 10, 16.) California

26 law describes such a guardian as “represent[ing] the interest of”

27 an individual who lacks the capacity to make legal decisions.

28 Cal. Prob. Code § 1003(a). That role is analogous to the

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1 guardian ad litem in Kirtley. See 326 F.3d at 1092-94.

2 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant somehow acted outside

3 that role or was otherwise a state actor. See Hudacko v. Lee,

4 No. 23-cv-05316-SI, 2024 WL 4894292, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25,

5 2024) (finding that “private attorney appointed by a court to act

6 as counsel for a minor in child custody proceedings” was not

7 state actor for § 1983 purposes); Chambers v. Santa Clara Cnty.,

8 No. C 05-3308 SI., 2006 WL 2433413, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,

9 2006) (concluding that court-appointed counsel representing minor

10 was not state actor because statutory definition indicated

11 counsel’s primary responsibility was to “advocate for the

12 protection, safety, and physical and emotional well-being of the

13 child,” which was similar to statutory definition of guardian in

14 Kirtley, and thus guardian was sufficiently independent from

15 state (citation omitted)).

16 Plaintiff further contends, without any supporting factual

17 allegations, that Defendant conspired with a “judge who is immune

18 from civil liability[] to violate [P]laintiff’s protection

19 guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth

20 Amendment to U.S. Constitution.” (FAC, ECF No. 4 at 12.) Such

21 conclusory allegations are not sufficient to establish a

22 conspiracy. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d

23 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff’s conclusory allegations

24 that lawyer was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of

25 due process were insufficient to show state action); Ryan v.

26 Cnty. of Imperial, No. 21cv1076-JO-KSC., 2022 WL 4819656, at *6

27 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022) (dismissing § 1983 claims because

28 plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide factual, non-conclusory

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1 allegations against Private Defendants that support a conspiracy

2 or joint action with a state actor”).

3 For these reasons, Plaintiff has not alleged deprivation of

4 a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

5 II. Defendant Is Likely Entitled to Absolute Immunity

6 Even if Defendant were a state actor or engaged in state

7 action, she would likely be entitled to absolute immunity.

8 Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against individuals

9 for actions taken while performing certain prosecutorial or other

10 quasi-judicial functions are barred by absolute immunity. See

11 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418-24 (1976) (extending

12 absolute immunity from § 1983 liability to prosecutors when they

13 act in capacity as advocate); Webster v. Bronson, 402 F. App’x

14 280, 282 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent [family-court

15 investigator] performed in a quasi-judicial or quasi-

16 prosecutorial function, she had absolute immunity.” (citing

17 Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)));

18 see also Miller, 335 F.3d at 897 (to be entitled to absolute

19 immunity for particular action, “official must be performing a

20 duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were

21 rendered immune at common law”).

22 Although the Ninth Circuit has held that guardians ad litem

23 who serve as advocates for minors in child-neglect and

24 delinquency proceedings are absolutely immune from liability

25 “because their participation in the court proceedings is an

26 integral part of the judicial process,” Babcock v. Tyler, 884

27 F.2d 497, 502 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds as

28 recognized by Safouane v. Fleck, 226 F. App’x 753, 762 (9th Cir.

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1 2007) (as amended), it clarified in Miller that when individuals

2 “make discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not

3 functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only

4 qualified, not absolute immunity, is available,” 335 F.3d at 898.

5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made the statement at issue

6 as his mother’s guardian ad litem during a state-court probate

7 proceeding. (See FAC, ECF No. 4 at 3, 5, 6, 10, 16.) As

8 explained above, California law defines a guardian ad litem as

9 “represent[ing] the interest of” an individual who lacks the

10 capacity to make legal decisions. Cal. Prob. Code § 1003(a).

11 Thus, it appears that Defendant’s complained-of statement was

12 made when she was acting as an advocate in a judicial proceeding.

13 See Babcock, 884 F.2d at 502. And Plaintiff has not alleged that

14 Defendant made the statement while engaging in functions outside

15 of prosecutorial or other quasi-judicial ones. See Miller, 335

16 F.3d at 898.

17 For these reasons, Defendant is likely entitled to absolute

18 immunity. See Sigal v. Cnty. of L.A., No. 2:17-CV-04851-RGK-AGR,

19 2017 WL 10560636, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017) (minor’s court-

20 appointed attorney who was “considered a guardian ad litem under

21 California law” was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity

22 because her duties fell “within the judicial process”); Balthrope

23 v. Sacramento Cnty. Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2:10-cv-3003-JAM-

24 JFM (PS)., 2011 WL 6130903, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011)

25 (minor’s guardians ad litem were entitled to absolute quasi-

26 judicial immunity because they acted “within the judicial

27 process” by advocating for minor’s best interest and providing

28 information to court), accepted by 2012 WL 260044 (E.D. Cal. Jan.

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1 26, 2012).

2 III. The FAC Suffers from Numerous Other Deficiencies

3 The FAC suffers from numerous other problems. Among them,

4 it fails to state any due-process claim because Plaintiff’s

5 parole hearing has not yet taken place and thus any harm is at

6 this point purely speculative. See Slaughter v. Cate, No.

7 12–cv–03872–VC, 2014 WL 5474025, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014)

8 (plaintiff’s “concern about future parole hearings” being

9 affected by “allegedly false information” was “speculative” and

10 could not “support a liberty interest”); Stevenson v. Bisbee, 696

11 F. App’x 250, 251 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal of plaintiff’s

12 § 1983 claim “relating to potential considerations at a future

13 parole board hearing was proper because [plaintiff] failed to

14 allege facts sufficient to establish an injury as required for

15 Article III standing” (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

16 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))).

17 The FAC does not state any equal-protection claim. Although

18 Plaintiff contends that Defendant conspired to “violate [his]

19 protection guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause in the

20 Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution” (see FAC, ECF No. 4 at

21 12), he has alleged no facts supporting his claim (see id. at 1-

22 16). See Ware v. Bitter, No. 1:16-cv-01302-DAD-SAB (PC), 2017 WL

23 1093887, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017) (plaintiff failed to

24 state cognizable equal-protection clause claim because although

25 he claimed equal protection violation occurred, he failed “to set

26 forth any facts to support an equal protection claim”); see also

27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. As an initial matter, he has not

28 alleged that he is a member of any protected class. See Barren

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1 v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (to state

2 equal-protection claim, plaintiff must allege that defendant

3 acted with intent or purpose to discriminate against plaintiff

4 based on plaintiff’s membership in protected class).

5 IV. The FAC’s State-Law Claims

6 A federal court may decline to exercise supplemental

7 jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims if it has dismissed

8 all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28

9 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383

10 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1565 (9th

11 Cir. 1995). Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal

12 claims, it declines to address his state-law claims until he has

13 adequately pleaded a federal cause of action.

14 *********************

15 The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff can state a § 1983

16 claim against Defendant. But it will give him one more chance to

17 try to do so. If he desires to pursue any of his claims, he is

18 ORDERED to file a second amended complaint within 28 days of the

19 date of this order, remedying the deficiencies discussed above.

20 The SAC should bear the docket number assigned to this case, be

21 labeled “Second Amended Complaint,” and be complete in and of

22 itself, without reference to the Complaint, the FAC, or any

23 documents not attached to the SAC. Plaintiff is warned that if

24 he fails to timely file a sufficient SAC, the Court may dismiss

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1} this action on the grounds set forth above or for failure to

2 || diligently prosecute, or for both reasons.*

p Raenhlrtl~

4 DATED: April 24, 2025

JEAN P. ROSENBLUTH

5 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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24 * Tf Plaintiff believes this order erroneously disposes of any

his claims, he may file objections with the district judge

within 21 days of the date of the order. See Bastidas v. Chappell,

F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a magistrate judge

believes she is issuing a nondispositive order, she may warn the

27} litigants that, if they disagree and think the matter dispositive,

they have the right to file an objection to that determination with

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the district judge.”).

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