Powell v. The School Board of Volusia County, Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

KIMBERLY POWELL, YVONNE

WOLFE, LYNETTE CLEWS, ELICIA

RODRIGUEZ, MORGAN

RICHARDS, GEORGIA HINES,

CRYSTAL COOPER, ANGELICA

AMIS, DONALD FAULKNER, JR.,

JEFFREY BLASSMEYER,

KIMBERLY AMIS, BRYAN SIROIS,

SHANNON ROBINSON, KAYLA

KLINGLER, TENEA PHILLIPS,

BRANDON BRINDLEY, TIFFANY

REINHARDT, SARAH

WINDHOVEN, ANNI SUADI,

AMANDA SULLIVAN, EMMA

VANCURAN, BRENT EULER,

HEATHER DEY, KEVIN TOMAKA,

WENDY WEISHEIMER, DONALD

W. POWELL, PAMELA TOMS,

TERRIE L. FUEHRER, TINA

TRENCHERD, CARLA ANDER, and

MIRANDA FREELAND,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 6:21-cv-1791-JSS-UAM

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF VOLUSIA

COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

ORDER

On January 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the dismissal of this

action, specifically seeking to set aside the court’s January 17, 2025 order (Dkt. 83).

(Dkt. 86.) However, that order merely recognized that the court’s April 16, 2024 order

dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, (Dkt. 57), became a final judgment

when Plaintiffs failed to timely amend their complaint, (see Dkt. 83). Because Plaintiffs

request that the court “permit[] this case to proceed,” (Dkt. 86 at 5), and because

Plaintiffs cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), (Dkt. 86 at 4), under which a

court may relieve a party from a final judgment, the court construes their motion as

requesting relief from the final judgment. Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that

Plaintiffs have “failed to meet [their] burden to establish the extraordinary remedy of

vacating the [c]ourt’s order and judgment.” (Dkt. 87 at 1.) Upon consideration, for

the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action seeking damages in excess of $50

million on behalf of themselves and all persons who suffered disability discrimination

while attending schools operated by Defendant. (Dkt. 59.) They alleged that

Defendant failed to accommodate their disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 130–31, 137–38.) On April

16, 2024, on Defendant’s motion, (Dkt. 40), the court dismissed Plaintiffs’ amended

complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim and granted Plaintiffs leave to

file a second amended complaint “within [thirty] days,” (Dkt. 57 at 14). Plaintiffs’

second amended complaint was due on May 16, 2024. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1).

However, Plaintiffs did not timely amend their complaint or ask for an extension of

time to do so. On May 21, 2024, the court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause as to why

the case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. (Dkt. 58.) Plaintiffs filed

their second amended complaint that same day, (Dkt. 59), along with a response to

the court’s order explaining that “[d]ue to a clerical error,” they “did not realize [that]

the [s]econd [a]mended [c]omplaint was filed out of time,” (Dkt. 60 at 2). The court

discharged the order to show cause and accepted the second amended complaint “as

filed.” (Dkt. 61.)

On June 18, 2024, Defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint,

arguing in part that Automotive Alignment & Body Service, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co., 953 F.3d 707 (11th Cir. 2020), was controlling. (Dkt. 64 at

8.) The Automotive Alignment court held:

[A]n order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend

within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the time

allowed for amendment expires without the plaintiff

seeking an extension. And when the order becomes a final

judgment, the district court loses all its prejudgment powers

to grant any more extensions of time to amend the

complaint.

953 F.3d at 720 (citation and quotation omitted). A plaintiff in such a situation has

only three options: “to appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 3, move to alter or amend the

judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), or move for relief from the final judgment, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b).” Id.

Under this binding authority, the court acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ failure to

timely amend rendered the court’s order dismissing the amended complaint without

prejudice a final judgment on May 16, 2024—the date amendment was due. (Dkt. 83

at 5.) The court explained that it therefore had not had jurisdiction to enter the order

accepting the second amended complaint as properly filed. (Id.) The court had

“surrendered jurisdiction” over the action “when the deadline to amend expired,”

rendering its “orders entered after that time . . . a nullity.” Auto. Alignment, 953 F.3d

at 720 (quotations omitted). The court accordingly dismissed the action without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 83 at 7.) A final judgment has

been entered against Plaintiffs. (Dkts. 57, 84.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court, “[o]n motion and just

terms,” to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding.” Rule 60(b) enumerates six grounds upon which such relief may be

granted, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(1). A motion brought under Rule 60(b)(1) “must be made . . . no more

than a year after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

“[A] Rule 60(b) [m]otion must be equitably and liberally applied to achieve

substantial justice.” Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1980). “Doubt should

be resolved in favor of a judicial decision on the merits of a case, and a technical error

or a slight mistake by [a party]’s attorney should not deprive [that party] of an

opportunity to present the true merits of his claims.” Id. Whether to relieve a party

from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) is “a matter for the district court’s sound

discretion.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000)

(quotation omitted); Lambrix v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1158, 1170 (11th Cir.

2017) (same).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs move to set aside the dismissal of this action under Rule 59, Rule

60(a), and Rule 60(b). (Dkt. 86 at 2–4.) Because the Rule 60(b) analysis is dispositive,

the court considers only that rule. At the outset, the court notes that such a motion is

timely brought—the final judgment in this case was entered on May 16, 2024, and the

instant motion was filed on January 29, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

In their motion, Plaintiffs cite their response to the court’s order to show cause,

(Dkt. 86 at 2–3), where they explained that they had not timely amended “[d]ue to a

clerical error,” (Dkt. 60 at 2). They also note that the court’s subsequent order

“appear[ed] to effectively resolve the issue of [the] untimely filing.” (Dkt. 86 at 3; see

Dkt. 61.) They further cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which permits a

court to relieve a party from a final judgment on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect,” and they argue that although relief from the final

judgment will “arguably . . . not prejudice . . . Defendant,” refusal to grant that relief

would be “manifestly unjust” to Plaintiffs, depriving them “of an opportunity to

litigate the claims” in their second amended complaint. (Dkt. 86 at 4–5.)

In the context of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, “[t]he determination of what

constitutes excusable neglect is generally an equitable one, taking into account the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v.

Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 934 (11th Cir. 2007). Four factors are relevant to the excusable

neglect inquiry: “the danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of the delay

and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including

whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant

acted in good faith.” Conn. State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d

1337, 1355 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.

P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). “[E]xcusable neglect encompasses situations of

negligence within the . . . party’s control.” Safari Programs, Inc. v. CollectA Int’l Ltd.,

686 F. App’x 737, 744 (11th Cir. 2017). The most important factors are the first two;

in other words, “the absence of prejudice [to the non-moving party] and the interests

of efficient judicial administration.” Id.

Here, each of the four factors weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion.

With regard to prejudice, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs’ failure to move for relief

from the final judgment for more than nine months was prejudicial to it, (Dkt. 87 at

15–16), but “simple delay is insufficient for prejudice,” Coniglio v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

638 F. App’x 972, 975 (11th Cir. 2016). Delay is most germane to the prejudice inquiry

where the delaying parties put themselves “in a position of unfair advantage,” as by

“allow[ing] relevant evidence to turn stale.” Jones v. Ala. Mil. Dep’t, No. 2:15-CV-564-

WKW, 2016 WL 5402229, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2016) (citing Cobos v. Adelphi

Univ., 179 F.R.D. 381, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), and In re Guidant Corp. Implantable

Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 867 (8th Cir. 2007)). While Defendant

notes that this case was filed four years ago and “relates to events that occurred many

years before that,” (Dkt. 87 at 15–16), it offers no argument for prejudice beyond the

mere fact of delay, and so the court does not find that granting Plaintiffs’ motion will

substantially prejudice it, (see id. passim).

The second and third factors—the length of and reason for the delay—also

militate in Plaintiffs’ favor. The impact on judicial administration is minimal. The

length of delay that was attributable to Plaintiffs was negligible, as they filed their

second amended complaint only five days late. See Coniglio, 638 F. App’x at 975

(determining that the “length of delay was small” where a defendant “moved to set

aside [a] default judgment mere days after its entry”). Moreover, once the court ruled

that its prior dismissal order had been rendered a final judgment, Plaintiffs filed the

instant motion within two weeks. See Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis.,

181 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that the “court should have set aside

its order of dismissal” under Rule 60(b)(1) when a one-month delay would not have

“had an adverse impact on the . . . court or its resources”). As for the reason given for

the delay, Plaintiffs stated that they failed to file their second amended complaint on

time due to a clerical error, (Dkt. 60 at 2; see Dkt. 86 at 3–4), and a “clerical error

constitutes excusable neglect,” Walter, 181 F.3d at 1202 (citing Advanced Estimating

Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1997)); see id. (concluding that “the

failure of a former secretary of [the plaintiff]’s attorney to record the applicable

deadline” was “the type of ‘innocent oversight’” that constitutes an adequate reason

for delay under Rule 60(b)(1)).

Defendant makes much of the nine-month gap between May 16, 2024, when

the dismissal without prejudice became a final judgment, and January 29, 2025, when

Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. (See Dkt. 87 at 14–16.) This gap is reasonable under

the circumstances. Further, the court focuses on the period from May 16, 2024, until

May 22, 2024—the gap between when Plaintiffs’ amendment was due until when it

was untimely filed. As Plaintiffs note, the court’s endorsed order addressing their

amendment “appear[ed] to effectively resolve the issue of untimely filing.” (Dkt. 86

at 3.) Plaintiffs acted reasonably in relying on the court’s order rather than crediting

Defendant’s argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter that

order.

Finally, Defendant does not contend that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith, (see Dkt.

87), and the court can discern no bad faith in either Plaintiffs’ brief delay in filing their

amended complaint or their failure to move for post-judgment relief given the court’s

order. Cf. United States v. Ferguson, No. 3:07-cv-631-J-34TEM, 2015 WL 164204, at

*12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2015) (finding the defendant acted in bad faith where she made

misrepresentations to the court and the opposing counsel); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of

Am. v. Thorington Elec. & Constr. Co., No. 2:09-CV-37-WKW [WO], 2010 WL 743138,

at *3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2010) (discerning bad faith where the defendants made a

“blatant[]” misrepresentation to the court). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is due to

be granted.

Defendant’s arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion are unavailing. First,

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs fail to specify which of Rule 60(b)’s bases they are

seeking relief under, (Dkt. 87 at 11), but Plaintiffs’ motion expressly cites Rule 60(b)(1),

(Dkt. 86 at 4). Second, Defendant claims Plaintiffs fail to adduce facts in support of

their motion. (Dkt. 87 at 11–12.) Admittedly, Plaintiffs’ motion is not a model of

clarity. (See Dkt. 86.) Nevertheless, the court can readily discern the thrust of

Plaintiffs’ argument: they confess that they failed to timely amend but submit that their

subsequent failure to move for post-judgment relief was based on the court’s order

accepting their amendment as “filed,” (Dkt. 61), which the court has already deemed

a reasonable belief, (see Dkt. 86 at 2–3).

Plaintiffs’ failure to timely file their second amended complaint was

“attributable to negligence.” Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 850

(11th Cir. 1996). It was apparently nothing more than “an innocent oversight by

counsel.” Id. This situation is precisely the sort contemplated by Rule 60(b). See

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 145 S. Ct. 690, 694 (2025) (“The general

‘purpose’ of the [r]ule . . . is ‘to make an exception to finality.’ The [r]ule ‘attempts to

strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be

brought to an end and that justice should be done.’” (internal citation omitted)

(quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005), and 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, &

M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2851 (3d ed. 2012))). As such, Plaintiffs’

motion is due to be granted.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. 86) is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to vacate the final judgment (Dkts. 57, 84) and to

reopen this case.

3. As immediately as practicable, Plaintiffs shall refile their second amended

complaint (Dkt. 59) tn this case.

4. The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer and file a new case

management report on or before May 2, 2025.

5. Defendant shall respond to the second amended complaint on or before May

23, 2025.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on April 24, 2025.

heal “ial

JUFIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

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