Haynes v. Martin Correctional Institution

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-cv-14118-ALTMAN

MARQUISE HAYNES and

DAESHAWN FREEMAN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARTIN CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTION,1

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER

The Plaintiffs, Marquise Haynes and Daeshawn Freeman, have filed a two-in-one civil-rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint [ECF No. 1]. Haynes avers that a prison sergeant

sought “sexual favors” from him, “remove[d] all the food” from his tray, and threatened him “to keep

[his] mouth close[d].” Id. at 9 (cleaned up). Haynes says he “need[s] to speak to a psychiatri[st]” or else

he will “kill [him]self or someone[.]” Id. at 10 (cleaned up). Freeman claims that a “gang member [is]

after [him],” that his “life is in great danger at Martin [Correctional Institution],” and that staff

routinely “throw away” his grievances and requests. Id. at 4. (cleaned up). But neither Haynes nor

Freeman names a single defendant, and their allegations are sandwiched between random, garbled

grievances lacking any clear connection to their claims. They also haven’t paid the Clerk’s filing fee or

moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See generally Docket. For all these reasons, we DISMISS

their Complaint without prejudice.

1 As we’ll explain, the Plaintiffs haven’t named a single defendant in their Complaint. See generally

Compl. [ECF No. 1]. Since their allegations and attached grievances are directed at various officers at

Martin Correctional Institution, we’ll use “Martin Correctional Institution” as a placeholder defendant.

THE LAW

The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (emphasis

added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility

who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” Id. §1915A(c). In conducting

its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint,” when it is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. §

1915A(b).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require, in relevant part, that a well-pled complaint

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Every pleading . . . must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s

name—or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). In this Court, a

civil-rights complaint submitted by a pro se prisoner “must be signed under penalty of perjury.” S.D.

Fla. L.R. 88.2; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading

need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, “complaints

must substantially follow the form, if any, prescribed by the Court.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 88.2(a).

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this

standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a

claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply with the Federal Rules, the

Local Rules, or court orders. See, e.g., Brutus v. Int’l Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape

Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The court may dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails

to prosecute it or comply with a court order.”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)

(“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where

the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.”). And pro se litigants are not

exempt from procedural rules. See Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Despite

construction leniency afforded pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to

procedural rules.”); see also Heard v. Nix, 170 F. App’x 618, 619 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Although pro se

complaints must be liberally construed, such complaints still must comply with the procedural rules

governing the proper form of pleadings.” (cleaned up)); S.D. Fla. L.R. 1.1 (“When used in these Local

Rules, the word ‘counsel’ shall be construed to apply to a party if that party is proceeding pro se.”).

The Court may not assist a pro se plaintiff in constructing “a theory of liability from facts never alleged,

alluded to, or mentioned” in the complaint. Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir.

2011). Instead, “to prevail on a particular theory of liability, a party must present that argument to the

district court.” Ibid.; see also GJR Inves., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto

counsel for a party.”), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

ANALYSIS

There are at least three major problems with the Complaint.

First, the Complaint has all the hallmarks of an impermissible shotgun pleading. In the words

of the Eleventh Circuit, a complaint is a shotgun pleading if it:

(1) contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding

counts; (2) is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action; (3) fails to separate into a different count

each cause of action; or (4) asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which defendant is responsible for which act.

Embree v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 779 F. App’x 658, 662 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2015)).

The Complaint fits into the third and fourth categories of shotgun pleadings because it “fails

to separate into a different count each cause of action” and “asserts multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which act.” Ibid. Haynes and

Freeman (it’s true) complain about the abuse, retaliation, and neglect they say they’ve suffered at the

hands of prison staff, but they haven’t named any defendants—let alone connected them to any cause

of action—or specified who violated which of their constitutional rights. See generally Compl. They’ve

also failed to list their claims “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single

set of circumstances,” as required by the Federal Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a). So, it’s “impossible

for [anyone] to determine with any certainty which factual allegations give rise to which claims for

relief.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). And, because

the Complaint isn’t composed of “short and plain statement[s] . . . showing that the [Plaintiffs are]

entitled to relief[,]” it’s a shotgun pleading that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (cleaned up); see also Poole v. Bradshaw, 2024 WL 1675304, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr.

17, 2024) (Altman, J.) (“[B]y definition, a shotgun pleading is a complaint ‘that violates either Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both.’” (quoting Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321,

1324 (11th Cir. 2021))).

Second, the Complaint violates our Local Rules. Haynes and Freeman randomly inserted ten

pages of prison grievances, see Compl. at 1–3, 5–8, 11–12, 14, and filled the Complaint’s remaining six

pages with sprawling, single-paragraph narratives, id. at 4, 9–10, 13, 15–16. The Complaint thus doesn’t

“substantially follow” the forms this Court has prescribed for civil-rights complaints. S.D. FLA. L.R.

88.2(a)(4). Plus, the Complaint isn’t signed under penalty of perjury, as our Local Rules unambiguously

require. See S.D. FLA. L.R. 88.2(a) (providing that a civil-rights complaint submitted by a pro se prisoner

“must be signed under penalty of perjury”).

Third, Haynes and Freeman can’t proceed together in this case for two reasons. One, because

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) “requires that each prisoner proceeding IFP pay the full

filing fee,” indigent prisoners must file their cases separately. See Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1198

(11th Cir. 2001). In Hubbard, the Eleventh Circuit held that, to the extent Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 20—which permits permissive joinder of parties—conflicts with the PLRA, “the statute

repeals the Rule.” Ibid. On this basis, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently affirmed the dismissal of

multi-prisoner-plaintiff actions, see id. at 1997–98 (holding that eighteen prisoner-plaintiffs could not

join in the same action because the PLRA “clearly and unambiguously” requires each prisoner to pay

the filing fee, which “deter[s] frivolous inmate lawsuits”); Bowens v. Turner Guilford Knight Detention, 510

F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of six inmates’ joint civil-

rights complaint alleging “exigent danger” because “the PLRA, as interpreted by Hubbard, did not

provide exceptions for joinder of inmate plaintiffs based on the nature of the claims that they raised”),

and the denial of inmates’ motions to intervene in other inmates’ lawsuits, see Gandy v. Bryson, 799 F.

App’x 790, 792 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that the district court properly denied a prisoner’s motion to

intervene in another prisoner’s civil action and explaining that, “[a]lthough Hubbard involves joinder

rather than intervention, its reasoning applies” all the same); Daker v. McLaughlin, 806 F. App’x 939,

940 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Daker was not entitled to circumvent the requirement that he pay a filing fee .

. . by intervening in another prisoner’s lawsuit.”).

Two, even if the Plaintiffs could join together under Rule 20, they cannot do so here. “A party

seeking joinder of claimants under Rule 20 must establish two prerequisites: (1) a right to relief arising

out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) some

question of law or fact common to all persons seeking to be joined.” Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1197 (citing

FED. R. Crv. P. 20). As we’ve said, however, we can’t tell who the Plaintiffs are suing or what they’re

suing them for. In any event, the Plaintiffs’ various claims plainly arise from different (and unrelated)

circumstances. Compare, ¢.g., Compl. at 4 (alleging that “Centurion Staff’ and “Florida Department of

Corrections” officers have failed to protect Freeman from inmate violence and, instead, continue

“harass[ing| and retaliati[ng]” against Freeman by “throw[ing] away” his grievances), with id. at 9

(alleging that a prison sergeant “took food off [Haynes’s] tray” and 1s “seeking retaliation” against

Haynes for complaining of “sexual harassment,” while “[t]he Warden [knows] what [1s] going on” and

is “doing nothing” (cleaned up)).

For all these reasons, the Complaint must be dismissed. And, since the Plaintiffs can’t proceed

jointly in this case, we won’t grant them leave to amend, as any amendment would be futile. See Cockrell

v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (‘Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the

complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed|.]”). We therefore ORDER AND

ADJUDGE that this case is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). All pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall

CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on April 23, 2025.

de

-ROYK.ALTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Marquise Haynes, pro se

Daeshawn Freeman, pro se