Jacobs v. Surrogate's Court, Queens County and Kings County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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GLADYS JACOBS,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

22-CV-5903 (LDH) (LB)

-against-

SURROGATE'S COURT, QUEENS COUNTY

AND KINGS COUNTY; GERARD J. SWEENEY;

LOIS M. ROSENBLATT; PETER J. KELLY;

DIANA A. JOHNSON; BARRY SIMON;

DOROTHY JACOBS MOORE; JOHN W.

STEIGLER; ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN;

JUDGE INGRAM; JUDGE HARRIET THOMPSON;

IRVING SINGER; KELVIN FINN,

Defendants.

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LaShann DeArcy Hall, United States District Judge,

Plaintiff Gladys Jacobs, appearing pro se, brings this action against Defendants Queens

County Surrogate’s Court, Kings County Surrogate’s Court, Gerard J. Sweeney, Lois M.

Rosenblatt, Peter J. Kelly, Diana A. Johnson, Barry Simon, Dorothy Jacobs Moore, John W.

Steigler, Eric T. Schneiderman, Judge Ingram, Harriet Thompson, Irving Singer, and Kelvin Finn

(“Defendants”) alleging violations of federal anti-discrimination and civil rights laws in

connection with the probate of her late brother’s estate. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s

request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons

set forth below, the complaint is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took nine years to settle her brother Willie Jacobs’

estate, and that Defendants sold her brother’s properties without her family’s consent. (Compl.

at 6.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants refused to provide information to her family about

Jacobs’ estate and took properties that were worth millions of dollars, along with millions of

dollars in rent and a pension worth millions of dollars. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged

facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant’s liability for the alleged

misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility”

of a defendant’s liability, id., “[i]t is not the [c]ourt’s function to weigh the evidence that might

be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss. Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp.

2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the [c]ourt must merely determine whether the

complaint itself is legally sufficient, and in doing so, it is well settled that the [c]ourt must accept

the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, their pleadings “must be

construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v.

Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Boykin v. KeyCorp,

521 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam)). This is “particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [their] civil rights have

been violated.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still,

“even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil right claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless

their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a ‘right to relief above the

speculative level.’” Jackson v. NYS Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

Nonetheless, a district court may dismiss a pro se action sua sponte, even if the plaintiff

has paid the Court’s filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous or that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d

362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of frivolous pro se complaint where

pro se plaintiff had paid the required filing fee). An action is frivolous when “either (1) ‘the

factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or

fantasy;’ or (2) ‘the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d

605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). A finding of frivolousness is appropriate “when the facts

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are

judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33

(1992).

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish that the court has

subject matter jurisdiction over the action. If the court determines at any time that it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); accord. Yong Qin

Luo v. Mikel, 625 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

No. 11-cv-5369, 2012 WL 1657362, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal

pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and

may not preside over cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”). A lack of subject matter

jurisdiction “is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte.

If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank &

Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is

presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when plaintiffs and defendants have complete diversity of

citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing either type of subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v. United

States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal question jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff’s

cause of action is based on a violation of federal law or where “the well-pleaded complaint

necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bracey v. Bd. of

Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331 because “[eleven] poor black families were disadvantage[d] [] by these [D[efendants” and

because Defendants violated “[t]he federal anti-discrimination and civil rights laws that protect

against racial, age[,] gender, and disability discrimination.” (Compl. at 5.) However, even

liberally construing Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff does not set forth any facts to support a claim that

she was discriminated against based on race, age, gender, or disability, or that her claims arise

under federal law or depend on resolution of questions of federal law.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

because Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of New York. (See Compl. at 1-4.) “A case

falls within the federal district court’s diversity jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship among

the parties is complete, [as in], only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of

the same state.” See Wisconsin Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). Thus,

Plaintiff has not raised any issue arising under federal law or any other basis for this Court's

subject matter jurisdiction.

II. The Probate Exception

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had alleged diversity jurisdiction, “[t]he ‘probate

exception’ is a historical aspect of federal jurisdiction that holds [that] ‘probate matters’ are

excepted from the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction.” Lefkowitz v. Bank of N.Y., 528 F.3d

102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). “[T]he probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or

annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts

from disposing of property that is in the custody of a state probate court.” Marshall v. Marshall,

547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006). It does not, however, “bar federal courts from adjudicating matters

outside those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 312. A federal court

should decline subject matter jurisdiction under the probate exception if a plaintiff seeks to: (1)

administer an estate, probate a will, or accomplish any other purely probate matter; or (2) reach a

res in the custody of a state court. Lefkowitz, 528 F.3d at 106 (citing Marshall, 547 U.S at 312).

Here, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks the assets of her brother’s estate, Plaintiff’s claims fall

within, and are barred by, the probate exception. See Pelczar v. Pelczar, 833 Fed App’x 872, 875

(2d Cir. 2020).

III. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff’s claims against Queens County and Kings County Surrogate’s Courts must also

be dismissed because, as an agency of the State of New York, the Surrogate’s Courts are entitled

to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366–68 (2d Cir.

2009) (finding that “the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an ‘arm of the

State,’ and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity”); McKeown v. N.Y. State

Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 377 Fed. App’x. 121, 122–23 (2d Cir. May 18, 2010) (summary

order) (noting that state courts, as arms of the State, are immunized from suit); see also N.Y.

CONST. art. 6, § 1 (establishing the unified court system). Because the New York State Unified

Court System is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, this complaint against the

Queens County Surrogate’s Court and the Kings County Surrogate’s Court is dismissed because

it seeks monetary relief from an entity that is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

IV. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Peter J. Kelly, Judge Diana A. Johnson, Judge Ingram, and

Judge Harriet Thompson (the “Judicial Defendants”) are also dismissed because judges have

absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate

assessment of damages.”) (citation omitted); Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (“It

is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for

their judicial actions.”). Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants

arise, from their alleged actions and rulings during the Surrogate’s Court proceedings. (See Compl.

at 6.) Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that, in taking any such actions and making any

such rulings, the Judicial Defendants acted beyond the scope of their judicial responsibilities or

outside their jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11–12. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against

the Judicial Defendants are barred by absolute immunity and deemed frivolous. See Montero v.

Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it

is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

327 (1989))).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the Judicial Defendants in their

individual capacities seeking injunctive relief rather than damages, the complaint must also be

dismissed. In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that in “any action

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory

relief was unavailable.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint does not allege that a declaratory

decree was violated or allege facts suggesting that declaratory relief was unavailable. In any

event, “declaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is

ordinarily available by appealing the judge’s order.” Caldwell v. Pesce, 83 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484

(E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 639 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Ashmore v. Prus, No. 13–CV–

2796, 2013 WL 3149458, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2013)). Because Plaintiff has not alleged a

violation of a judicial decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable, her claims against the

Judicial Defendants must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The Court declines to grant leave to amend as it finds

that amendment would be futile. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming

district court decision to dismiss pro se complaint without leave to amend where amendment

would be futile).

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment, close this case, and mail a copy of this

Memorandum and Order to Plaintiff.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken

in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.

Coppedge v. United States, 269 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ LDH_______________________

LaShann DeArcy Hall

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

April 24, 2025