Stephens v. Child Support Services of Oklahoma Department of Human Services

Qnited States District Court

for the s2orthern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 24-cv-216-JDR-CDL

LINH TRAN STEPHENS,

Plaintiff,

versus

CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES OF OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF

HUMAN SERVICES; CHARLES SCHWAB AND Co., INC.; CIERRA

FREEMAN, individually and in her official capacity as court-appointed

attorney for child-support enforcement, MARY JOHNMEYER, ?ndividually

and in her official capacity as legal counsel of Charles Schwab and Co., Inc.;

RENEE BANKS, individually and in her official capacity as Director of Child

Support Services of Oklahoma Department of Human Services; JASON

HOENSHELL, individually and in his official capacity as Oklahoma FDIM

Coordinator, EMMALENE STRINGER, individually and in her official

capacity as attorney for Child Support Services of Oklahoma Department of

Human Services, JOHN DOES 1-10, employees of Child Support Services of

Oklahoma Department of Human Services; JOHN DOES 11-20, employees

of Charles Schwab and Co., Inc.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

In February 2024, the District Court in and for Tulsa County ordered

Plaintiff Linh Tran Stephens to pay $61,794.52 in past-due support to her ex-

husband, the primary custodian of their minor child. Attempting to collect

the arrearage, Defendant Oklahoma Child Support Services levied Ms. Ste-

phens’s account with Defendant Charles Schwab and Co., Inc. Ms. Stephens

sued CSS, Charles Schwab, and their respective employees for violating the

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, committing fraud, participating in a

Case No. 24-cv-216

conspiracy to violate Ms. Stephens’s rights, violating and depriving Ms. Ste-

phens of her civil rights under color of state law, fraudulently obtaining con-

fidential financial records, abusing the legal process, engaging in malicious

prosecution and harassment, intentionally inflicting emotional distress on

Ms. Stephens, misappropriating state funds, participating in extortion and

abusive debt-collection practices, and defamation. Dkt. 2. Charles Schwab,

CSS, and the individual defendants have filed motions to dismiss Ms. Ste-

phens’s complaint. The Court grants the parties’ motions.

[!

Plaintiff Linh Tran Stephens is a Vietnamese citizen who resided in

Tulsa, Oklahoma and has been engaged in a long custody dispute with her ex-

husband, Adam Stephens. Ms. Stephens filed a petition for divorce in Tulsa

County District Court in August 2015. While that action was pending, Mr.

Stephens filed a petition for divorce in Columbia County, Oregon, which Ms.

Stephens had executed. In January 2016, the Oregon court entered an order

dissolving the marriage and requiring Ms. Stephens to pay child support for

their then-two-year-old child and assume certain marital debts.”

In May 2017, Ms. Stephens asked the Tulsa court to set aside the Or-

egon order, arguing that the Oregon court lacked jurisdiction over the parties,

child, and subject matter, and that the order did not represent the parties’

intentions as to custody and visitation. By July 11, 2017, however, Mr. and

Mrs. Stephens agreed to register the Oregon order with the Tulsa court,

which confirmed the Oregon order.

' The following information was obtained by reference to the publicly filed docu-

ments in Stephens v. Stephens, Case No. FD-2015-2228 and Appeal No. DF-122022. The

Court may, in its discretion, take judicial notice of the publicly filed records in those pro-

ceedings insofar as they bear on the disposition of this matter. United States v. Ahidley, 486

F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007).

? The minor child was born in July 2013.

Case No. 24-cv-216

Since July 2017, the Tulsa court has overseen proceedings pertaining

to the care and custody of Mr. and Ms. Stephens’s minor child. See Stephens

»v. Stephens, Case No. FD-2015-2228. During those proceedings, Ms. Ste-

phens affirmatively requested relief from the Tulsa court, seeking, among

other things: an interim custody order (July 2017); appointment of a guardian

ad litem (March 2018); appointment of a parenting coordinator (September

2018); appointment of a custody evaluator (January 2019); disclosure of

safety records (June 2020); an order holding Mr. Stephens in contempt (July

2020); and an order requiring reenrollment in school (May 2022).

The Tulsa court awarded emergency physical custody of the minor

child to Mr. Stephens in June 2022 and adjusted Ms. Stephens’s child sup-

port obligations in October of that same year. In February 2024, the Tulsa

court again modified Ms. Stephens’s obligations, ordering her to (1) make

monthly child-support payments of $1,180.12, (2) pay a percentage of various

costs and expenses associated with the child’s care, and (3) pay $61,794.52 in

past-due support. Jd.’

After the Court entered its order, CSS began collection efforts with

respect to the $61,794.52 arrearage and levied Ms. Stephens’s retirement ac-

count with Charles Schwab. Charles Schwab notified Ms. Stephens of the

levy, and informed Ms. Stephens that it was obligated to comply with CSS’s

demands unless it received a release. When it did not receive a release, it sold

securities held in Ms. Stephens’s account to satisfy the levy.

Ms. Stephens has engaged in a multi-pronged attack on the Tulsa

court’s order and the levy that was issued in response to it. In addition to

directly appealing the Tulsa court’s order, Ms. Stephens: sent an email insist-

ing that the original, unmodified Oregon order remains binding, and

order was affirmed on appeal. Ms. Stephens has filed a petition for certiorari,

which is currently pending before the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

Case No. 24-cv-216

threatening to sue those who participated in the Tulsa proceedings; sought

the recusal of Judge Ludi-Leitch and Judge April Seibert and demanded re-

view of the CSS levy and the award of child support; and filed a civil action

in Tulsa County District Court challenging the Tulsa court’s order and the

levy issued by CSS.* In addition, she sued CSS, Charles Schwab, CSS em-

ployees Cierra Freeman, Renee Banks, Jason Hoenshell, Emmalene Stringer,

and Charles Schwab employee Mary Johnmeyer in this Court for violations

of various federal laws. See Dkt. 2.

Each of the named and served Defendants have moved to dismiss this

action. Ms. Freeman argues that Ms. Stephens has failed to state a claim

against her and seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Dkt. 15. Defendants Charles Schwab and Mary Johnmeyer

argue that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this case

under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and, in the alternative, seek dis-

missal for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 20. The

remaining defendants argue that Ms. Stephens’s claims against them should

be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds; that the Court should decline

to hear Ms. Stephens’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and

Younger v. Harris; and that Ms. Stephens has failed to state a claim against

them. Dkts. 24, 25, 35, 37. These motions are fully briefed and ripe for re-

view.’

* The allegations in that case, Stephens v. Oklahoma, No. CV-2024-01311, are similar

but not identical to the allegations in Ms. Stephens’s federal-court complaint.

* Ms. Stephens has filed multiple documents that are not expressly permitted under

this Court’s local rules, including a response to two reply briefs [Dkt. 44] and a notice of

criminal complaint [Dkt. 50]. Although some of the defendants have asked the Court to

strike these documents [Dkts. 45, 46, 52], the Court, in its discretion and in view of Ms.

Stephens’s pro se status, will consider them for purposes of this order. The motions to

strike are denied.

Case No. 24-cv-216

I]

Defendant CSS and its employees Emmalene Stringer, Renee Banks,

and Jason Hoenshell® argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over Ms. Stephens’s claims against them because (a) CSS, a branch of the

State of Oklahoma, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and

(b) this immunity extends to Ms. Stephens’s claims against the State’s em-

ployees, at least to the extent that Ms. Stephens is seeking monetary relief

from them in their official capacities.’ When reviewing this jurisdictional

challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Court has broad discretion to consider records, affidavits, and other docu-

ments necessary to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts. See Wheeler ».

Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987). In this case, however, the

question of the state defendants’ immunity can be resolved from the plead-

ings alone.

The Court begins with Ms. Stephens’s claims against CSS, a branch

of the Oklahoma Department of Human Services. The Eleventh Amendment

° Although Ms. Freeman is sued “individually and in her official capacity as court-

appointed attorney for child-support enforcement,” she does not join the state employees

in asserting a sovereign immunity defense. Dkt. 15. This failure does not necessarily pre-

clude the Court from finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. See ¥-1 Oil Co.

»y. Utah State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that

Utah had not waived its sovereign immunity even though the defendants had “appeared

throughout [the] action without invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity”). At this point,

however, the Court lacks sufficient information regarding the nature of Ms. Freeman’s po-

sition and the claims against her to determine whether immunity applies.

To the extent Ms. Stephens is asserting claims against Ms. Stringer, Ms. Banks,

and Mr. Hoenshell individually, those claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Cornforth v. Univ. of Oklahoma Ba. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). And Ms.

Stephens’s claims seeking injunctive relief against state employees in their official capaci-

ties will survive an Eleventh Amendment challenge. See Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of

NM. »v. Dep’t of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Ex

parte Young doctrine permits plaintiffs to bring actions for injunctive relief against state of-

ficials under certain circumstances). Only the claims seeking damages from Ms. Stringer,

Ms. Banks, and Mr. Hoenshell in their official capacities are resolved on immunity grounds.

Case No. 24-cv-216

precludes this Court from adjudicating suits brought against sovereign states

or branches of the state. U.S. Const. Amend. XI. See Pettigrew v. Oklahoma,

722 F.3d 1209, 1212 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Oklahoma Department

of Public Safety was an “an arm of the State of Oklahoma and therefore . . .

treated as the state for purposes of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh

Amendment”). That jurisdictional bar, which applies to suits brought by for-

eign citizens such as Ms. Stephens, can be overcome only in two circum-

stances. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990).

First, a state may waive its sovereign immunity by, for example, consenting to

suit; second, Congress may expressly abrogate the immunity afforded by the

Eleventh Amendment. See id.; Ellis v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d

1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1998).

There is nothing to support or suggest that Oklahoma waived or con-

sented to jurisdiction in this case. CSS specifically invoked its sovereign im-

munity defense [Dkt. 24], and there is no evidence or allegation that CSS en-

gaged in conduct unequivocally demonstrating an intent to waive that im-

munity and consent to being sued in federal court. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-

06 (recognizing that courts will only give effect to a state’s waiver when the

state demonstrates its intent to subject itself to suit in federal court (citations

omitted)). Cf Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1233

(10th Cir. 1999) (noting that states may waive immunity in their constitution

or statutes, as well as by participating in certain federal programs). To the

contrary, federal courts have routinely held that Oklahoma and its agencies —

including the Oklahoma Department of Human Services—are generally en-

titled to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity, as CSS did here. See Just. v.

Oklahoma Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Child Welfare, 122 F. App’x 938, 940 (10th

Cir. 2004) (holding that the lawsuit against OKDHS was “clearly precluded”

because Congress had not abrogated, and Oklahoma had not waived, Okla-

homa’s right to sovereign immunity); Richter v. Nelson, No. 4:20-cv-00167-

CRK-CDL, 2022 WL 3104974, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 4, 2022) (collecting

Case No. 24-cv-216

cases supporting the proposition that OKDHS “is protected from suit” un-

less it expressly waives immunity).

There has also been no showing that Congress abrogated the states’

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to any of the claims asserted in

this case. Neither the FDCPA (claim 2) nor RICO (claim 4) contains express

limitations on state sovereign immunity. See Allen v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 755

F. Supp. 2d 122, 124 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that “Congress did not waive

sovereign immunity by enacting the FDCPA”); see also Turlington v. Connor,

No. 21-cv-0142-CVE-CDL, 2021 WL 6051067, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21,

2021), aff'd, No. 22-5001, 2022 WL 4857025 (10th Cir. Oct. 4, 2022). And

the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 (claims 5 & 6) does not abrogate the

States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-

41 (1979). With respect to the claims for violations of Title 18 of the United

States Code (claims 3, 6, 8, 9 & 10), there has been no showing that Congress

has authorized suits to proceed against states for violations of those criminal

provisions.® And Ms. Stephens has not pointed to any authority demonstrat-

ing an express abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to any of Ms.

Stephens’s remaining claims (claims 1, 7, 8 & 11). Because there is no evi-

dence of either waiver or express abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment’s

protections, the Court must conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars

Ms. Stephens’s claims against CSS. Those claims are dismissed with preju-

dice.

A subset of Ms. Stephens’s official-capacity claims for damages

against Emmalene Stringer, Renee Banks, and Jason Hoenshell are barred for

the same reasons. Suits against state employees in their official capacities

8 Indeed, Ms. Stephens has not provided any support for the proposition that any

defendant may be sued for alleged violations of those provisions. See Andrews v. Heaton, 483

F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of claims concerning “‘criminal stat-

utes that do not provide for a private right of action and are thus not enforceable through a

civil action”); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 641, 643-44, 648-53, 912, 1201 & 2340.

Case No. 24-cv-216

operate as suits against the state itself. Whitney v. State of N.M., 113 F.3d 1170,

1173 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that “a suit against an individual in his of-

ficial capacity is, in reality, a suit against the agency which the individual rep-

resents”). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bar “remains in effect when State

officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.” Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Because Ms. Stephens cannot proceed against CSS

on any of her claims, her official-capacity claims for damages against Ms.

Banks, Mr. Hoenshell, and Ms. Stringer are likewise barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. /d. Those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Ill

The Court next considers whether Ms. Stephens’s remaining

claims—her claims against Emmalene Stringer, Renee Banks, and Jason

Hoenshell in their individual capacities, her claims seeking equitable relief

against those same individuals in their official capacities, and her claims

against Charles Schwab, Ms. Freeman, and Ms. Johnmeyer—are barred by

the Younger abstention doctrine,’ which recognizes that principles of equity

and comity require federal courts to refrain from exercising federal jurisdic-

tion over certain cases when doing so would cause undue interference in on-

going state-court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).

See Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1392 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing Younger

and its application in civil proceedings).

Although this abstention doctrine is mandatory, its applicability is cir-

cumscribed. “[T]he possibility of Younger abstention is triggered only when

the state proceeding falls into one of the following categories: ‘(1) state

° Although Ms. Freeman did not invoke Younger abstention as a basis for dismissal,

the Court may raise the abstention issue sua sponte. See Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386,

1391 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing federal courts’ power to refrain from resolving disputes

in a manner that would interfere with state-court proceedings). It would make little sense

to consider the propriety of addressing Ms. Stephens’s claims against all defendants save

one. Accordingly, the Court will evaluate whether it should abstain from resolving the

claims against Ms. Freeman together with the remaining claims.

Case No. 24-cv-216

criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings [that take on a

quasi-criminal shape], and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that

are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial

function.’” Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th

1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Graff». Aberdeen

Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023)). See also Sprint

Commens, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 79 (2013). A court may evaluate the

propriety of abstaining if—and only if—a case falls within one of these three

enumerated categories. Travelers Cas. Ins., 98 F.4th at 1317.

This case passes threshold inquiry of Travelers Casualty because it in-

volves “orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the [Oklahoma] courts’

ability to perform their judicial function.” /d. (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Although Ms. Stephens does not directly challenge any state-court

orders pertaining to divorce in her motion, she does contest the seizure of

funds to pay a child-support award and she disputes the power and authority

of those involved in the state-court proceedings. And in her recent filings,

Ms. Stephens makes clear that she is asking this Court to directly intervene

in state-court proceedings. See Dkts. 58, 60 (asking the Court to dismiss the

state-court actions and stay enforcement of state child-support orders). Be-

cause these claims arise out of, relate to, and exist only as a result of the state-

court proceedings, the Court finds that they involve orders that are “uniquely

in furtherance” of the Oklahoma state courts’ ability to perform the im-

portant, state-specific function of addressing family and custody disputes.

Travelers Cas. Ins., 98 F.4th at 1317 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

See Gibson v. Lopez, No. 21-cv-02610-WJM-NYW, 2022 WL 2158986, at *5,

*6 (D. Colo. June 15, 2022) (concluding that the plaintiff’s challenge to the

“state’s efforts to collect child support payments from him” fell within the

third category of exceptional cases). It is therefore appropriate for this Court

to consider whether it must abstain from exercising jurisdiction under

Younger.

Case No. 24-cv-216

Courts utilize a three-part inquiry when evaluating the propriety of

abstaining under the Younger abstention doctrine: A court “must abstain from

exercising jurisdiction when: (1) there is an ongoing state . . . proceeding, (2)

the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the

federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state inter-

ests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or im-

plicate separately articulated state policies.” Chapman v. Barcus, 372 F. App’x

899, 901 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,

187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999)). If these factors weigh in favor of absten-

tion, the federal court must dismiss any claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief without prejudice, while staying claims for monetary damages. Jd. at

902."°

The three requirements for Younger abstention are satisfied in this

case. First, there can be no dispute that Ms. Stephens seeks relief from an

active, ongoing state action. Ms. Stephens has pending appeals in the divorce

proceeding in which the child-support award was issued, and the Tulsa court

will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the domestic relationships in that

case during the years to come. Gibson, 2022 WL 2158986, at *5, “6 (holding

that the plaintiff’s efforts to challenge child-support collections were borne

out of an ongoing domestic-relations dispute)."

'° In Chapman, the Tenth Circuit indicated that district courts abstaining from the

exercise of jurisdiction under Younger should dismiss without prejudice any claims for in-

junctive or declaratory relief while staying any claims for damages. Chapman, 372 F. App’x

at 902 (remanding with instructions to stay proceedings on the claims for damages while

dismissing the remaining claims). See also D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223,

1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the “rationale for Younger abstention can be satisfied

... by just staying proceedings on the federal damages claim until the state proceeding is

final”).

"| See also Wiland v. Stitt, No. 24-cv-00443-GKF, 2024 WL 4271570, at *2-*3 (N.D.

Okla. Sept. 23, 2024) (dismissing challenge to child-custody award where the state-court

case concerning the minor children remained open).

Case No. 24-cv-216

The second requirement—the adequacy of the state forum—is like-

wise satisfied. “American jurisprudence is unwavering in holding that domes-

tic matters are the purview of state courts, and federal courts do not attend

matters of domestic relations outside of extraordinary circumstances.”

Wiland, 2024 WL 4271570, at *2. Claims concerning child custody, such as

Ms. Stephens’s, are “best left to their traditional forum where there is the

infrastructure to handle them: state court.” Jd.; see Gibson, 2022 WL

2158986, at *6 (concluding that the second factor was met because the chal-

lenge regarding child-support collections implicated important state inter-

ests).

Third, and finally, the Tulsa court is an adequate, appropriate forum

where claims concerning the propriety and collectability of child-support

awards can, and should, be addressed—a finding corroborated by Ms. Ste-

phens’s ongoing attempts to have her concerns addressed there. Gibson, 2022

WL 2158986, at *6 (concluding the state-court forum was adequate based, in

part, on the plaintiff’s decision to raise issues related to his support obliga-

tions in that forum); Wiland, 2024 WL 4271570, at *2 (concluding that the

second and third Younger factors are congruent, and that the third factor

clearly favored abstention because legal proceedings involving child custody

are ‘“‘textbook issues for state courts’’).

The Court concludes that all of the Younger factors weigh in favor of

abstention. As a result, abstention is mandatory, and the Court dismisses Ms.

Stephens’s claims for equitable and declaratory relief against the individual

defendants and Charles Schwab without prejudice.”

2 Some of the defendants argue, in the alternative, that abstention is proper under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But that doctrine applies only to cases brought after state-

court proceedings have ended. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006).

Ms. Stephens has appealed the child-support award, and that appeal remains pending.

Thus, Rooker-Feldman abstention is not appropriate in this case.

a4

Case No. 24-cv-216

Lv

Ordinarily, the Court would stay the only remaining claims— Ms. Ste-

phens’s claims for damages against Charles Schwab and the individual de-

fendants—under Younger. But every defendant has argued that Ms. Ste-

phens’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief and should be dismissed un-

der Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court agrees

and dismisses the remaining claims.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege sufficient factual

matter to state a facially plausible claim for relief and “nudge[] their claims

across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

USS. 544, 570 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because

Ms. Stephens appears pro se, the Court construes her pleadings liberally; if

the Court can reasonably read her complaint to state a valid claim, it should

do so. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But it is not this

Court’s role to act as Ms. Stephens’s advocate. /d. The burden of setting

forth sufficient facts to state a claim against each defendant and providing the

defendants with notice of the theories under which those claims are made

remains, at all times, with Ms. Stephens. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,

1249-50 (10th Cir. 2008).

The Court concludes that Ms. Stephens has failed to state a claim for

relief against Charles Schwab and the individual defendants. As a preliminary

matter, Ms. Stephens’s complaint lacks details concerning the actions (or in-

actions) of each specific defendant. The complaint contains few allegations

describing what each defendant did—or did not do. See Dkt. 2 at 39 (indi-

cating that Ms. Banks, Mr. Hoenshell, Ms. Stringer, and Ms. Johnmeyer ig-

nored notices); id. at 721, (identifying Ms. Freeman without setting forth any

conduct attributable to her). The complaint provides some specifics with re-

spect to Mr. Hoenshell (who issued a liquidation request without notifying

Ms. Stephens) and Ms. Stringer (who failed to return a form and inform Ms.

Stephens of a decision), but it fails to link these actions to any of the twelve

19

Case No. 24-cv-216

claims asserted by Ms. Stephens. Jd. at J] 33, 37, 39, 49. With respect to

Charles Schwab, the complaint alleges only that it notified Ms. Stephens of

the levy, responded to her inquiries, and advised of its obligation to comply

with the levy request. /d. at [J 27-31, 34, 39. The complaint fails to provide

specific factual allegations of misconduct, fails to link the actions of each de-

fendant to Ms. Stephens’s claims, fails to establish which claims are being

asserted against which defendants, and fails to show how any defendant par-

ticipated in any of the alleged violations of either Ms. Stephens’s rights or

federal law. Based on these failures, dismissal is warranted. See Reinhardt v.

City of Krebs, Oklahoma, No. 15-cv-330-JHP, 2016 WL 4916801, at *4-*5

(E.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss where the pro se

plaintiff’s complaint was vague, conclusory, and unsupported by factual alle-

gations concerning who did what to whom).

The Court’s dismissal of Ms. Stephens’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6)

would ordinarily be without prejudice. In this case, however, a subset of Ms.

Stephens’s claims are legally barred: There has been no showing that Con-

gress has authorized civil suits for violations of any of the federal criminal

laws identified in the complaint. See Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1076 (affirming dis-

missal of claims concerning “criminal statutes that do not provide for a pri-

vate right of action and are thus not enforceable through a civil action”). And

it does not appear that those criminal laws expressly authorize the relief Ms.

Stephens is seeking here. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 641, 643-44, 648-53, 912, 1201

& 2340. Absent any indication that Congress intended to create civil causes

of action for violations of these federal laws, dismissal with prejudice is war-

ranted. To the extent Ms. Stephens is attempting to bring a civil action for

violation of those statutes, her claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Case No. 24-cv-216

In conclusion, the Court holds as follows:

(1) The motions to strike Ms. Stephens’s supplemental documents

[Dkts. 45, 46, 52] are denied;

(2) Ms. Freeman’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. 15] is granted. Ms. Ste-

phens’s claims seeking equitable and declaratory relief against Ms.

Freeman are dismissed without prejudice under Younger. Her

claims for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 641, 643-44, 648-53, 912,

1201 & 2340 are dismissed with prejudice. All remaining claims are

dismissed without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(3) The motion to dismiss filed by Charles Schwab and Ms. Johnmeyer

[Dkt. 20] is granted. Ms. Stephens’s claims seeking equitable and

declaratory relief against these defendants are dismissed without

prejudice under Younger. Her claims for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§

242, 641, 643-44, 648-53, 912, 1201 & 2340 are dismissed with prej-

udice. All remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(4) CSS’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. 24] is granted. CSS is immune from

suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and Ms. Stephens’s claims

against CSS are dismissed with prejudice.

(5) The motions to dismiss filed by Ms. Stringer [Dkt. 25], Ms. Banks

[Dkt. 35] and Mr. Hoenshell [Dkt. 37] are granted. To the extent

Ms. Stephens seeks damages against these individuals in their offi-

cial capacities or asserts claims for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 641,

643-44, 648-53, 912, 1201 & 2340, those claims are dismissed with

prejudice. Ms. Stephens’s claims seeking equitable and declaratory

relief against these defendants are dismissed without prejudice un-

der Younger. All remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case No. 24-cv-216

(6) All remaining pending motions [DKts. 54, 56, 58, 60] are denied as

moot.

DATED this 24th day of April 2025.

JOHN D. RUSSELL

United States District Judge