The opinion
McCrain v Metropolitan Transp. Auth.
2025 NY Slip Op 31394(U)
April 21, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number: Index No. 160051/2019
Judge: Nicholas W. Moyne
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
State and local government sources, including the New
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publication.
INDEX NO. 160051/2019
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 47 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/21/2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
PRESENT: HON. NICHOLAS W. MOYNE PART 41M
Justice
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SCOTT MCCRAIN,
MOTION DATE 06/24/2022
Plaintiff,
MOTION SEQ. NO. 002
-v-
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY DECISION + ORDER ON
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN MOTION
Defendant.
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The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46
were read on this motion to/for ARTICLE 78 (BODY OR OFFICER) .
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner commenced the instant proceeding on October 16, 2019, seeking a declaratory
judgment directing respondents to credit his three years and eight months of service as a
custodian with the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) toward his
pension, which he subsequently earned as a police officer for the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority’s Police Department (MTA PD). After this court granted respondents’ prior motion to
the extent of converting this action to an Article 78 proceeding, petitioner filed the instant
petition challenging defendants’ determination that his time employed as a custodian would not
apply toward his pensionable service credit time.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Respondent Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is a state public benefit
corporation (NYSCEF DOC No. 36, Meehan aff at 1, ¶ 2) created by the Public Authorities Law
§ 1263 (1) (a). The MTA “maintains and operates a Police Department (MTA PD) [which]
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employs Police Officers” (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition ¶ 10) as authorized by Public
Authorities Law § 1266-h (1). Metro-North is “a state public benefit corporation that was
organized by the MTA pursuant to its statutory powers . . . [and] is a subsidiary of MTA”
(NYSCEF DOC No. 36, Meehan aff at 1, ¶ 2). Respondent Metropolitan Transportation
Authority Defined Benefit Pension Plan (the pension plan or the plan) is a pension plan the MTA
provides pursuant to the Public Authorities Law § 1266-h (4), (5) (see NYSCEF DOC No. 36,
Meehan aff at 1, ¶ 2). The Board of Managers (the Board) administers the plan (NYSCEF Doc
36, Meehan aff at 3, ¶ 8; NYSCEF Doc No. 37, exhibit A at 40, § 6.02).
On January 10, 1994, petitioner began working as a custodian with Metro-North
(NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition ¶ 10; NYSCEF DOC No. 36, Meehan aff at 1, ¶ 4). While
employed as a Metro-North custodian, petitioner participated in the Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Company Defined Contribution Pension Plan (the Vanguard plan1 or the contribution
plan) (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition ¶ 13; NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 4). Under
this plan, Metro-North contributed 3% of employees’ salaries to their individual participant
accounts, which the employees could opt to match (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at ¶ 13;
NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 4). Regardless of whether an employee elected to
match, Metro-North placed its contributions into the Vanguard plan for the employee’s benefit
(id.) and “the balance in the account [was] distributed . . . at retirement or upon death” (NYSCEF
Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 4).
On August 27, 1997 or August 28, 1997, without a break in service, petitioner
became a police officer in the Metro-North Police Department (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at
¶ 14; NYSCEF Doc No 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 5). As a Metro-North police officer, petitioner
1
Employees referred to the contribution plan as the Vanguard plan “because its assets were held at one time in trust
at The Vanguard Group” (NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 4).
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remained enrolled in the Vanguard plan (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at ¶ 14; NYSCEF Doc
No 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 5). As such, his contributions did not change, and his other
employment benefits allegedly remained undisturbed (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at ¶¶ 14-
15; NYSCEF Doc No 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 5).
In January 1998, the Metro-North Police Department and the Long Island Rail Road
(LIRR) Police Department merged and formed the MTA PD (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at ¶
16; NYSCEF Doc No 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 5). Public Authorities Law § 1266-h, which
authorized the merger, required the MTA to provide its own twenty-year retirement program to
MTA PD’s police force or to join the New York State Police and Fire Retirement System (id.;
NYSCEF Doc No 36, Meehan aff at 2, ¶ 6). The MTA elected to create its own twenty-year
retirement program, which required MTA PD police officers to contribute to the plan “for the
equivalent of twenty (20) years of credited police service” (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition ¶ 19;
see NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 3, ¶ 7). Under the pension plan, the benefit at retirement
was calculated according to a formula based on police officers’ final average salaries and years
of credited police service (NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff. at 3, ¶ 7).
After the merger, the MTA PD continued to employ petitioner as a police officer until he
retired on June 26, 2019 (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at 6, ¶ 20). Petitioner contends that
although respondents transferred the funds in his Vanguard plan into the pension plan after the
merger, they failed to credit his time employed as a custodian in contravention of Public
Authorities Law § 1266-h (7), which, according to petitioner, provided that service members
“would not lose any of the rights, privileges and status previously earned within a pension or
retirement system” (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at 6, ¶ 16). According to petitioner, he has
lost approximately $10,000 per year as the result of respondents’ alleged miscalculation of his
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pensionable service credit time (NYSCEF Doc No. 33, petition at ¶ 28).
Respondents object that they were under no obligation to credit petitioner’s non-
uniformed service with Metro-North and that they informed petitioner in writing on at least two
occasions that his credited service began when he became a police officer in 1997 (NYSCEF
Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 7-9, ¶¶ 14-19). Respondents oppose the petition because their
determination not to credit petitioner’s time employed as a custodian was not arbitrary and
capricious; petitioner improperly interposed an estoppel claim against a municipality; petitioner
has failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and this Article 78 proceeding is time-barred
(NYSCEF Doc No. 35, affirmation of respondents’ counsel at 1-2).
DISCUSSION
Article 78 Standard
In a challenge to an administrative determination pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3), judicial
review is limited to an inquiry into whether the challenged determination had a rational basis, or
whether the action was arbitrary and capricious or affected by an error of law (CPLR 7803 [3]
[“The only questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article are . . . whether a
determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion”]; see Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept.
of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 280 [2010], rearg denied 15 NY3d 841 [2010]; Matter of
Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]; Matter of Gilman v New York State Div. of
Hous. & Community Renewal, 99 NY2d 144, 149 [2002]). An agency determination is “arbitrary
and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” (Peckham,
12 NY3d at 431; Matter of Heintz v Brown, 80 NY2d 998, 1001 [1992]). Rational basis exists
where there is evidence in the record to support an administrative agency’s determination (see
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Matter of Nelson v Roberts, 304 AD2d 20, 23 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Pell v Bd. of Ed. of
Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34
NY2d 222, 231 [1974]).
Analysis
A. Timeliness of the instant Article 78 proceeding
At the outset, the court considers the potentially dispositive issue of this proceeding’s
timeliness. In respondents’ answer in opposition to the petition, they argue that the instant Article
78 proceeding should be dismissed as untimely because the agency’s determination became final
and binding on petitioner, at the very latest, on May 9, 2019. In support of this argument,
respondents rely on a May 9, 2019 letter addressed to petitioner. The letter informed petitioner
that upon making elections based on the retirement benefit estimate sheets attached to the letter
and retiring, his elections would become final, and he would not be able to change them.
Respondents claim that this letter constituted a final and binding determination and that
petitioner’s failure to commence an Article 78 proceeding within four months of May 9, 2019,
precluded him from maintaining the instant action. Although petitioner does not challenge this
argument in his reply, the facts are not in dispute.
Pursuant to CPLR 217 [1], “a proceeding against a body or officer must be commenced
within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the
petitioner.” An agency determination “generally becomes binding when the aggrieved party is
‘notified’” (Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 62,
72 [1989] [citations omitted]; Matter of Ijbara v City of New York, 300 AD2d 251, 254 [1st Dept
2002]). The Court of Appeals has additionally held that
“[a]n administrative determination becomes ‘final and binding’ when two requirements
are met: completeness (finality) of the determination and exhaustion of administrative
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remedies. First, the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that
inflicts actual, concrete injury and second, the injury inflicted may not be ... significantly
ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining
party” (Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Matter of Center for Discovery, Inc. v
NYC Dept. of Educ., 162 AD3d 83, 86 [1st Dept 2018]).
Where a government body creates ambiguity and uncertainty as to whether its
determination is final, “the courts should resolve any ambiguity created by the public body
against it” (Mundy v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 44 NY2d 352, 358 [1978] [citation
omitted]; Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983] [“[F]or the
purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be
aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an
ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final”]; see Matter
ofHasberry, 61 AD3d 523, 523 [1st Dept 2009]).
The relevant portions of the May 9, 2019 letter informed petitioner that, as per his
request, the Service Pension estimates were enclosed (NYSCEF Doc No. 41, exhibit E) and that
“[u]pon retirement and electing an option once the form has been filed, you cannot change your
option selection after your retirement date” (id. [emphasis in original]). According to the letter,
however, the Board could grant an extension for a period of up to 60 days after the retirement
date based on reasonable cause (id.). By its own terms, the letter informed petitioner that his
pension benefits would not be final until he made his elections and retired. The letter referenced
estimates, not final elections, and did not address the dispute regarding petitioner’s date of hire.
The body of the letter was silent regarding petitioner’s date of hire. Based on these facts, the
May 9, 2019 letter failed to apprise petitioner of a final and binding determination regarding his
pensionable service credit.
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Moreover, the service pension estimate sheets attached to the May 9, 2019 letter listed
petitioner’s date of hire as January 10, 1994. Despite respondents’ contentions, the letter failed to
notify petitioner that the date of hire respondents would ultimately use to calculate his
pensionable service credit would be August 28, 1997. Thus, there was nothing to appeal until
petitioner retired because the attachments to the May 9, 2019 letter contained a date of hire
petitioner believed to be the accurate date for the purposes of calculating his pension benefit.
The May 9, 2019 letter created ambiguity concerning petitioner’s date of hire and,
consequently, his pensionable service credit. The agency previously sent petitioner a letter dated
April 20, 2018, informing him that, upon review of his employee contribution history,
contributions to his pension were not properly withheld from his earnings for 72 pay periods and
that they would have to be recouped (NYSCEF Doc No. 40, exhibit D).2 The attachments to the
April 20, 2018 letter, detailing petitioner’s contributions, listed his MTA Police Date of Hire as
August 28, 1997 (id.), whereas the May 9, 2019 letter contained pension estimate information
sheets that listed petitioner’s date of hire as January 10, 1994 (NYSCEF Doc No. 41, exhibit E).
Resolving this ambiguity against the respondents (Mundy, 44 NY2d at 358), petitioner did not
become aggrieved, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run against him, until he
actually retired on June 26, 2019 and his elections to his pension benefit became final (see id.;
see also Matter ofHasberry, 61 AD3d at 523). Petitioner commenced this proceeding on October
16, 2019, which fell within the four-month limitations period contemplated by CPLR 217 (1)
(see CPLR 304; Matter of Grant v Senkowski, 95 NY2d 605, 608 [2001]).
B. Exhaustion of remedies
This court also rejects respondents’ argument that this proceeding should be dismissed
2
In its prior decision dated May 26, 2022, this court determined that the letter dated April 20, 2018 did not apprise
petitioner of a final and binding determination as to his pension benefits (NYSCEF Doc No. 20).
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because petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In their opposition, respondents
argue that, at the very least, the May 9, 2019 letter “was clear that it was a final calculation of
McCrain’s benefits if he were to retire without taking any other action” (NYSCEF Doc No. 35,
affirmation of respondents’ counsel at 9). Respondents insist that petitioner never attempted to
appeal the May 9, 2019 letter, despite having the right to do so and, instead, accepted its terms
when he applied to retire on May 24, 2019 (id. at 9). Petitioner counters that he made numerous
efforts to resolve the issue of his pension service credit and his paycheck deductions prior to his
retirement (NYSCEF Doc No. 42, affirmation of petitioner’s counsel at 2, ¶ 7 & 4, ¶ 14).
Petitioner contends that he sent multiple emails regarding this issue that went unanswered
(NYSCEF Doc No. 42, affirmation of petitioner’s counsel at 4, ¶ 14).
The Court of Appeals has held that “[i]t is hornbook law that one who objects to the act
of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before being
permitted to litigate in a court of law” (Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57
[1978]). However, it is also deeply held that “[t]he exhaustion rule ... need not be followed, for
example, when an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its
grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit
would cause irreparable injury” (Matter of Community Related Services, Inc. (CRS) v Novello, 41
AD3d 323, 323 [1st Dept 2007] [citation omitted]).
Respondents rely heavily on the plan document in support of their opposition
(NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 3-6, ¶¶ 8-12, 17, & 8, ¶ 19; NYSCEF Doc No. 37, Exhibit
A, section 11.9.01) but fail to point to a section that sets forth petitioner’s rights to appeal agency
determinations generally. The section of the plan document titled “Appeals” states in relevant
part:
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“In the event an application for a benefit pursuant to the provisions of the Plan is denied,
the applicant shall be notified in writing of the denial by certified mail, return receipt
requested, which notice shall set forth the reasons(s) for denial and the applicable
provisions(s) of the Plan or the interpretation thereof adopted by the Board of Managers.”
(NYSCEF Doc No. 26, exhibit A at 125).
The appeals section does not designate an appeals process for agency determinations as a
whole but, by its plain language, limits the process to challenges of denials of applications for
benefits. It also mandates that the notice set forth the reasons for denials and the applicable
provisions of the plan or the interpretations adopted by the Board.
Here, petitioner has not alleged that his retirement benefit was denied. The parties agree
that petitioner has been receiving a pension (NYSCEF Doc No. 35, affirmation of respondents’
counsel at 8; NYSCEF Doc No. 42, affirmation of petitioner’s counsel at 3). Petitioner’s claim is
that respondents have improperly declined to credit him for his time employed as a Metro-North
custodian, which he accumulated prior to becoming a Metro-North Police Officer in August,
1997 (NYSCEF Doc No. 42, affirmation of petitioner’s counsel at 3). Respondents have not
cited any language in the letter, in the plan document, or in any provision of Public Authorities
Law § 1266-h that describes petitioner’s rights to appeal agency determinations that do not fall
into the category of benefit denials (see Matter of Barrett v Morgenthau, 74 NY2d 907, 909
[1989] [where a District Attorney failed to advise petitioner of the availability of an
administrative appeal and failed to demonstrate that procedures for such an appeal had been
established, “he cannot be heard to complain that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies.”]).
Further, the May 9, 2019 letter failed to inform petitioner of the section of the plan, or
respondents’ interpretation thereof, that formed the basis of respondents’ determination as
required by the appeals section of the plan document. For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s
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injury could not be “significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps
available” to him (Walton, 8 NY3d at 194; see Center for Discovery, Inc., 162 AD3d at 86), and
he has properly interposed this Article 78 petition as directed by this court in its prior decision
dated May 26, 2022.
C. Respondents’ determination and the Article 78 rational basis standard
Lastly, having decided that this Article 78 proceeding is properly presented before the
court, it next considers whether respondents’ determination not to credit petitioner’s civilian
service as a custodian with Metro-North was arbitrary and capricious or had a rational basis in
the applicable laws and rules. Respondents cite the plan document and contend that the plan, by
its terms, only counts Metro-North police service toward its credited retirement time.
Respondents maintain that even if the terms of the program were ambiguous on this issue,
interpreting its own policy falls within the Board’s discretion pursuant to the plan document.
Respondents insist that limiting credited service to police service has a rational basis because the
retirement program provides a generous benefit intended to incentivize individuals to “join the
police force early and commit to it for a full twenty years” (NYSCEF Doc No. 35, affirmation of
respondents’ counsel at 5).
Respondents further argue that Public Authorities Law § 1266-h purposefully excluded
non-police service as the result of labor negotiations with petitioner’s union. Respondents argue
that they have not violated the guarantees of Public Authorities Law § 1266-h (7), which
provides that prior rights, privileges, or status should survive the effects of decisions and
determinations made in accordance with Public Authorities Law § 1266-h, as long as the benefit
of those rights, privileges, or status is greater than the benefit imposed by the MTA. Respondents
contend that they have provided a greater benefit to petitioner since the retirement program
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guarantees a fixed benefit based on years of service and a police officer’s final average salary, as
opposed to a plan where employee contributions determine the benefit amount.
Petitioner does not specifically address respondents’ contentions but, instead, interposes
an estoppel argument based on the fact that respondents initially stopped withholding
contributions from his earnings in January 2014. According to petitioner, this evinces that prior
to seeking to recoup contributions as outlined in the April 20, 2018 letter, respondents conceded
that he had reached twenty years of service toward the retirement program in January 2014.
Respondents challenge this argument and characterize this as mere error, which the agency is
required to correct since the plan “must be administered in accordance with its terms” (NYSCEF
Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 8, ¶ 17).
It is well settled that “[w]here a rational basis exists for an agency's action, a court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and the agency's determination, acting pursuant
to legal authority and within its area of expertise, is entitled to deference” (Roberts v Gavin, 96
AD3d 669, 671 [1st Dept 2012]; Matter of Roberts v Gavin, 96 AD3d 669, 671 [1st Dept 2012]
[“Where a rational basis exists for an agency's action, a court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency”]; Awl Indus., Inc. v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 41 AD3d 141, 142
[1st Dept 2007] [“[A] ‘court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency responsible
for making the determination, but must ascertain only whether there is a rational basis for the
decision or whether it is arbitrary and capricious’”] [citations omitted]). Moreover, the courts
have consistently held that “the construction given statutes and regulations by the agency
responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld’” (Matter
of City of New York v New York State Nurses Assn., 130 AD3d 28, 34 [1st Dept 2015] [citation
omitted], affd 29 NY3d 546 [2017]; see also Matter of Tommy & Tina, Inc. v Department of
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Consumer Affairs of City of N.Y., 95 AD2d 724, 724 [1st Dept 1983] [citation omitted], affd 62
NY2d 611 [1984]).
Here, the plan document gives the Board the authority to
“take all actions and make all decisions with respect to the eligibility for, and the amount
of, benefits payable under the Plan and . . . interpret and apply rules, regulations and
policies necessary to administer the Plan in accordance with its terms; . . . decide
questions, including legal or factual questions, relating to the calculation and payment of
benefits under the Plan; [and] . . . process, and approve or deny, benefit claims and rule
on any benefit exclusions” (NYSCEF Doc No. 37, exhibit A at 40, section 6.02;
NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 4, ¶ 8).
The Board exercised its discretion to interpret and apply plan rules in accordance with the
provisions of the plan document. This determination fell squarely within the scope of the Boards
authority, and this court declines to set it aside.
Additionally, respondents’ determination that petitioner’s time employed as a custodian
should not be credited toward his pensionable service credit has a rational basis since, according
to the plan document, the types of credited police service listed in the “Credited Police Service”
section include, among others, service “in the Uniformed Authority Police Force”; service by
participants who were LIRR police officers; service by participants who were Metro-North
police officers; service by participants who were SIRTOA police officers; service as police
officers in any MTA-affiliated agency, subject to certain conditions; and military service
rendered during period of military conflict (NYSCEF Doc No. 37, exhibit A, at 50-52). The plan
document does not include a section for credited non-uniformed service. Petitioner has not
pointed to any relevant caselaw, statutory authority, or agency rule that would demonstrate that
respondents were required to credit his civilian service as a custodian (see Ahmed v Metropolitan
Transp. Auth., 2024 NY Slip Op 30679[U], *4 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024], affd 233 AD3d 429
[1st Dept 2024]). For these reasons, respondents’ construction of the plan document’s provisions
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determining that non-uniformed civilian service should not be credited toward a police officer’s
retirement benefit was not arbitrary and capricious and may not be set aside (see Matter of
Rubenstein v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 145 AD3d 453, 454 [1st Dept 2016]).
Further, petitioner has not demonstrated that respondents violated Public Authorities Law
§ 1266-h (7). The retirement benefit respondents supplied is a defined benefit plan calculated
using a formula based on an MTA PD police officer’s number of years of service and the final
average salary, which would “provide him or her with a retirement allowance equal to one-half
of his or her Final Average Salary” upon retirement or upon turning 62 years of age (NYSCEF
Doc No. 35, affirmation of respondents’ counsel at 6, NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 4, ¶
9; NYSCEF Doc No. 37, exhibit A, at Section 10.3.02). In contrast, the Vanguard plan relied on
employer contributions and would only pay a retirement benefit “relative to the contributions
made” by the employer or employee (NYSCEF Doc No. 35, affirmation of respondents’ counsel
at 6). For this reason, petitioner has not demonstrated that his retirement benefit was diminished,
suspended, or abolished under the meaning of Public Authorities Law § 1266-h (7) as there is a
reasonable basis for respondents’ argument that the pension plan provided a greater benefit than
the Vanguard plan.
To the extent that respondents were required to credit petitioner’s contributions to the
Vanguard plan, the agency transferred $13,000 from that plan to the pension plan as petitioner’s
initial participant balance (NYSCEF Doc No. 36, Meehan aff at 6, ¶ 12; NYSCEF Doc No. 42,
affirmation of petitioner’s counsel at 3, ¶ 12; NYSCEF Doc No. 37, exhibit A at 50 & 154).
Petitioner has not cited a section of the plan document that confers an additional right to apply
non-uniformed service time to his pensionable service credit.
The court also rejects petitioner’s argument that respondents should be estopped from
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calculating his pension benefit from his date of hire as a Metro-North police officer because
beginning in January 2014, for a period of time, respondents ceased withholding contributions
from his earnings. Estoppel is not available as a remedy against respondents because “estoppel
may not be invoked against a municipal agency to prevent it from discharging its statutory
duties” (Matter of Parkview Assoc. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 282 [1988], rearg denied
71 NY2d 995 [1988], cert denied 488 US 801 [1988]), except in rare circumstances that are not
present in the instant case. Moreover, estoppel is “not available against an administrative agency
for the purpose of ratifying administrative error” (Matter of Renaud v City of New York, 269
AD2d 283, 283 [1st Dept 2000]).
Although petitioner argues that the three years and eight months in dispute would provide
him with a greater retirement benefit, he has not demonstrated that he was entitled to this time
under the terms of the Vanguard plan, the MTA pension benefit plan, or pursuant to the
provisions of any statute (Litod Paper Stock Corp. v City of New York, 154 AD2d 280, 282 [1st
Dept 1989] [“Estoppel would be available to plaintiffs against these governmental entities only if
failure to apply the doctrine would operate to defeat a right legally and rightfully obtained. It
cannot operate to create a right”] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). For the
reasons discussed above, the court declines to substitute its judgment for that of the respondents,
where respondents’ determination not to credit petitioner’s service as a custodian was not
arbitrary and capricious and had a rational basis in law and in fact.
160051/2019 MCCRAIN, SCOTT vs. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION Page 14 of 15
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INDEX NO. 160051/2019
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 47 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/21/2025
CONCLUSION
Accordingly it is hereby
ADJUDGED that the petition is denied and this proceeding is dismissed.
4/21/2025
DATE NICHOLAS W. MOYNE, J.S.C.
CHECK ONE: X CASE DISPOSED NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
GRANTED X DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER
APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE
160051/2019 MCCRAIN, SCOTT vs. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION Page 15 of 15
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[* 15]