Com. v. Brown, J.

J-S07038-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JONATHAN LAWAN BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 1541 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal

Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001263-2018

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: APRIL 24, 2025

Appellant, Jonathan Lawan Brown, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas,

following his bench trial conviction for charges related to driving under the

influence (“DUI”) of marijuana.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows.2

On July 9, 2018, Trooper Matthew Lesher was on patrol in Turbot Township,

Northumberland County, and observed a black vehicle. Upon checking the

vehicle’s registration, Trooper Lesher discovered it was suspended for

insurance cancellation and the trooper activated his lights and sirens to stop

the car.

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(1)(iii), and 3802(d)(2), respectively.

2 On appeal, Appellant challenges solely the denial of his suppression motion.

Accordingly, we discuss the facts as presented at the suppression hearing.

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As Trooper Lesher approached the vehicle from the passenger side, he

observed Appellant in the driver’s seat and smelled a strong odor of air

freshener. Trooper Lesher identified himself and asked Appellant for his

driver’s license, registration, and insurance. Appellant stated that the car

belonged to his brother, who was the passenger. Appellant’s brother

explained that he had canceled his insurance and delayed in getting new

insurance, leading to the vehicle’s registration suspension.

While Trooper Lesher questioned Appellant and his brother, the air

freshener smell began to dissipate, and he smelled the odor of marijuana. The

trooper asked Appellant to exit the vehicle so they could talk, at which time

Trooper Lesher observed Appellant’s dilated pupils, glassy bloodshot eyes, and

an odor of marijuana emitting from Appellant’s person. Trooper Lesher asked

Appellant where they were coming from, and Appellant related that he was

coming from Mercer County, where he had a DUI preliminary hearing.

After asking Appellant and his passenger whether they were in

possession of marijuana, Appellant denied possession of marijuana himself

but stated he was not aware if there was any marijuana in the vehicle.

Appellant’s brother admitted that there would be a clip or a roach in the vehicle

and that he had smoked marijuana earlier.

Trooper Lesher then searched the vehicle and discovered a box with

marijuana residue in the passenger door, and from the glove box, two grinders

with marijuana residue, a knife, and a Bic lighter. Trooper Lesher then

requested that Appellant perform field sobriety tests, which Appellant

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ultimately failed. Appellant was placed in custody and subsequently admitted

that he had smoked marijuana. Trooper Lesher read Appellant the DL-26 form

and requested he undergo chemical testing; Appellant complied with this

request and tested positive for THC. Appellant was charged with DUI and

related offenses.

On April 17, 2019, Appellant filed his first motion to suppress, which the

court denied following a hearing, on June 13, 2019. On June 17, 2019,

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. On

February 11, 2021, Appellant filed a second, supplemental motion to suppress,

arguing that the odor of marijuana alone does not automatically provide police

with probable cause to search an automobile, pursuant to Commonwealth

v. Barr, ___ Pa. ___, 266 A.3d 25 (2021), and that warrantless searches of

automobiles require both probable cause and exigent circumstances, which

Appellant alleged were not present here. The trial court denied this motion

on January 7, 2022.3

On January 10, 2023, following a bench trial, the court convicted

Appellant of the aforementioned charges and acquitted him of careless driving.

On October 13, 2023, the court imposed a term of five years’ probation with

the first 90 days as home confinement. On October 18, 2023, Appellant filed

a counseled motion to stay the sentence, which the court granted on October

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3 The January 7, 2022 order indicates that a hearing was held on Appellant’s

second motion to suppress, but it is unclear from the docket and record on

what day this hearing occurred. Notes of testimony from this hearing do not

appear of record.

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30, 2023. The court stayed Appellant’s sentence for 60 days.

On November 2, 2023, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. 4 On

November 20, 2023, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal. On November 30, 2023,

Appellant complied. On December 11, 2023, Appellant filed an amended Rule

1925(b) statement.5

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

1. Did the [c]ourt below err as a matter of law in its denial

of [Appellant’s] first and second Motion to Suppress?

(Appellant’s Brief at 2).

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his suppression

motions because there was no indication of impaired driving or violation of the

vehicle code. According to Appellant, the sole reason for the continued

investigation was the odor of marijuana, and that smell alone could not justify

the investigation or support reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an

investigative detention. Appellant concludes that the trial court erred by

denying his suppression motions, and this Court must grant him relief. We

disagree.

Our standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a

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4 Appellant’s notice of appeal incorrectly stated that he was appealing from

the orders denying his motion for reconsideration of denial of his motion to

suppress, the denial of his second motion to suppress, and the judgment of

sentence. The docket has been corrected to reflect that Appellant’s appeal is

properly from his judgment of sentence.

5 The statements appear to be identical.

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suppression motion is “whether the factual findings are

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.

Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 607 (Pa.Super. 2021). We are

bound by the facts found by the trial court so long as they

are supported by the record, but we review its legal

conclusions de novo. Id. at 607-08. The trial court has sole

authority to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the

weight to be given to their testimony. Id. at 608. “Our

scope of review is limited to the record developed at the

suppression hearing, considering the evidence presented by

the Commonwealth as the prevailing party and any

uncontradicted evidence presented by the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 329 (Pa.Super.

2019).

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 316 A.3d 1026, 1031 (Pa.Super. 2024).

A police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he

or she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the

vehicle code has taken place, for the purpose of obtaining

necessary information to enforce the provisions of the code.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). However, if the violation is such that

it requires no additional investigation, the officer must have

probable cause to initiate the stop.

Put another way, if the officer has a legitimate expectation

of investigatory results, the existence of reasonable

suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such

expectations of learning additional relevant information

concerning the suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot

be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere suspicion.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal

citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also

Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa.Super. 2020) (noting

that where stop is based on observed violation of Vehicle Code or otherwise

non-investigable offense, officer must have probable cause to make

constitutional traffic stop). A “police officer has probable cause to stop a motor

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vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor

offense.” Id.

Nevertheless,

[a]n investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter,

constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the

protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution. To institute an investigative detention, an

officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that

criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion requires a

finding that based on the available facts, a person of

reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was

appropriate.

* * *

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led

him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that

criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped

was involved in that activity. Therefore, the fundamental

inquiry of a reviewing court must be an objective one,

namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the

moment of intrusion warrant a [person] of reasonable

caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal

citations omitted).

In other words, “the question of whether reasonable suspicion existed

at the time of an investigatory detention must be answered by examining the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was a particularized

and objective basis for suspecting the individual stopped of criminal activity.”

Commonwealth v. Cottman, 764 A.2d 595, 598-99 (Pa.Super. 2000)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 625-26 (Pa.Super.

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2000), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 662, 775 A.2d 801 (2001)). “These

circumstances are to be viewed through the eyes of a trained officer.”

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 543 (Pa.Super. 2006).

In making this determination, we must give due weight ...

to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is

entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our

inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly

indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of

innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further

investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 957 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 591 Pa. 664, 916 A.2d 633 (2006) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Further, we note that the duration of police inquiries during a traffic stop

is determined by the seizure’s “mission” to address the traffic violation that

warranted the stop, and to attend to related safety concerns. See

Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 792 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citing

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492

(2015)). When a stop “lasts longer than is necessary to complete its mission,”

it becomes unlawful. Ross, supra (internal citations omitted). The critical

question is not whether the inquiry occurs before or after the issuance of a

ticket, but whether it prolongs or adds time to the stop. See id. Police officers

are permitted to request that drivers and passengers exit a “lawfully stopped

car without reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 695 A.2d 864, 868-69 (Pa.Super. 1997).

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See also Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 162-63 (Pa.Super. 2023)

(holding that police had reasonable suspicion for DUI despite fact that initial

stop was not based on driver’s impaired driving, based on odor of burnt

marijuana, observation that driver’s eyes were red, bloodshot, teary, and

glassy, and where driver showed confusion and slowed, slurred speech);

Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274 A.3d 1283, 1285-86, 1292-93 (Pa.Super.

2022) (holding that odor of raw marijuana and observation of driver’s dilated,

red eyes were sufficient to supply reasonable suspicion of DUI to support

detention for field sobriety tests despite fact that initial stop was not for

impaired driving). Additionally, while the odor of marijuana alone “does not

amount to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle” it

“may be considered as a factor in examining the totality of the circumstances.”

Barr, supra at ___, 266 A.3d at 44. See also Commonwealth v.

Livingstone, 644 Pa. 27, 36 n.1, 174 A.3d 609, 614 n.1 (2017) (stating “an

arrest or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause to believe

the person is engaged in criminal activity”).

Finally, we note that the Motor Vehicle Code provides that “no person

shall operate and no owner shall permit to be operated upon any highway a

vehicle the registration of which has been suspended.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

1371(a). This Court has further elaborated that, in order to convict a driver

or owner of this summary offense, the Commonwealth must prove that the

driver had notice the vehicle’s registration had been suspended.

Commonwealth v. Akeley, 320 A.3d 106, 112-113 (Pa.Super. 2024).

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Instantly, Trooper Lesher had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic

stop based upon Appellant’s violation of the Vehicle Code, namely, driving a

vehicle with suspended registration. See Brown, supra. Further, Trooper

Lesher had cause to extend the traffic stop and inquire as to whether Appellant

was aware of the suspension, as that is an essential element to prove the

offense of driving a vehicle with a suspended registration. See Akeley,

supra. As well, Trooper Lesher was permitted to request that Appellant exit

the vehicle for any reason, including the smell of air freshener and marijuana.

See Rodriguez, supra. At that time, Appellant’s passenger admitted that

there was marijuana in the car, and Trooper Lesher observed signs of

intoxication in Appellant, including not only the smell of marijuana, but also

Appellant’s dilated pupils and glassy bloodshot eyes and Appellant’s admission

that he was returning from a preliminary hearing in a prior DUI. See Dabney,

supra. On this record, Trooper Lesher had reasonable suspicion of DUI such

that he could search the car and administer field sobriety tests to Appellant,

which Appellant then failed. See id. See also Sloan, supra; Ross, supra.

The aforementioned facts, as well as Appellant’s failure of field sobriety tests,

provided probable cause for Appellant’s arrest. See Livingstone, supra.

Therefore, the court properly denied Appellant’s suppression motions.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/24/2025

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