Brown v. Does

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION

TIEQUAIL BROWN PLAINTIFF

ADC #185015

V. NO. 2:24-cv-00216-KGB-ERE

DOES DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

I. Procedure for Filing Objections:

This Recommendation for the dismissal of Mr. Brown’s complaint has been

sent to United States District Chief Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. Any objections filed must: (1)

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for the objection; and (2) be

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this

Recommendation. If no objections are filed, Chief Judge Baker may adopt this

Recommendation without independently reviewing all the evidence in the record.

By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

II. Background:

On December 3, 2024, pro se plaintiff Tiequail Brown, an Arkansas Division

of Correction (“ADC”) inmate, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1.

Mr. Brown’s complaint alleges that: (1) on September 18, 2024, he was the victim

of an inmate attack; (2) unidentified ADC staff members punished him for his

involvement in the attack; (3) unidentified ADC staff members denied him medical

care for the injuries that he sustained during the attack; and (5) unidentified ADC

staff members have retaliated against him. However, Mr. Brown’s complaint failed

to allege facts: (1) identifying any individual Defendants by name; (2) stating in what

capacity he sues any individual Defendant; or (3) describing the relief he seeks.

On March 13, 2025, I entered an Order explaining to Mr. Brown that the

original complaint was deficient but giving him the opportunity to file an amended

complaint. Doc. 8.

To date, Mr. Brown has not filed an amended complaint, and the time to do

so has passed. As a result, I will screen Mr. Brown’s original complaint, as required

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

III. Discussion:

A. Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to screen prisoner

complaints and to dismiss any claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b)

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) & (b).

When making this determination, a court must accept the truth of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider documents attached to

the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire,

636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations must “raise a right to relief

above the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Mere “labels and

conclusions” are insufficient, as is a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action.” Id. at 555. Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations may be

disregarded. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

B. Personal Involvement

Mr. Brown’s complaint fails to allege facts to show how any individual

Defendant personally participated in unconstitutional conduct or was directly

responsible for a constitutional violation. “Liability under section 1983 requires a

causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v.

Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, as stated, Mr. Brown’s

complaint fails to state a plausible constitutional claim against any individual

Defendant.1

1 To the extent that Mr. Brown seeks to hold any supervisor individually liable for

the actions of their subordinates, such a claim would not survive screening. Established

law holds that a supervisor may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the

constitutional violations of a subordinate. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding that “vicarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits”); Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637, 644-45

(8th Cir. 2016) (because a supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable for the constitutional

violations of a subordinate, prisoner must “show that the supervisor personally participated

in or had direct responsibility for the alleged violations” or “that the supervisor actually

knew of, and was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized, the unconstitutional

acts”).

C. Capacity

As mentioned above, Mr. Brown does not indicate in what capacity he is suing

any Defendant or state what relief he seeks from the Court.

If Mr. Brown seeks money damages from a Defendant, he should make clear

that he is suing that Defendant in his/her individual capacity. Money damages are

not recoverable for official capacity claims. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58 (1989).

D. Medical Deliberate Indifference

To state a plausible claim for medical deliberate indifference against any

named Defendant, Mr. Brown must allege facts that, taken as true, support a

reasonable inference that: (1) he had “objectively serious medical needs”; and (2)

each Defendant “actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.”

Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Saylor v. Nebraska,

812 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2016).2

2 A medical need is objectively serious if it has been “diagnosed by a physician as

requiring treatment” or if it is “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018).

When a prisoner alleges that a delay in medical treatment has violated his constitutional

rights, the “objective seriousness of the deprivation should also be measured ‘by reference

to the effect of delay in treatment.’” Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005);

see Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 2001) (a prisoner must demonstrate

that the delay in obtaining medical treatment adversely affected his prognosis, or that

defendants ignored an acute or escalating situation). Importantly, “the Constitution does

not require jailers to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might

wish.” Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minnesota, 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009).

Under the subjective component of an inadequate medical care claim, prison

Mr. Brown’s complaint contains no facts to show: (1) what medical care he

needed but was denied; (2) how any specific individual was aware of his need for

medical treatment; (3) how any specific individual denied his requests for medical

treatment; or (4) how he was harmed as a result of medical care being delayed or

denied.

Mr. Brown’s proposed medical deliberate indifference claims, as currently

stated, cannot survive screening.

E. Retaliation

To state a retaliation claim, Mr. Brown must allege that: (1) he engaged in

constitutionally protected activity; (2) Defendants took adverse action against him

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that activity; and (3)

retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse action. Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d

1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007).3

officials may not “deliberately delay or deny prisoners’ medical care,” but a prisoner “must

show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence,” to make out a constitutional

violation. Hamner, 937 F.3d at 1177; see Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.

2019) (deliberate indifference requires a mental state “akin to criminal recklessness”).

Significantly, prisoners “have no right to receive a particular or requested course of

treatment,” and prison medical personnel “remain free to exercise their independent

medical judgment.” Barr v. Pearson, 909 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2018). It is well-settled

that a prisoner’s “mere difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a

course of medical treatment fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. at

921-22 (citation and alterations omitted).

3 See Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted)

(holding that an inmate “must show that impermissible retaliation was the actual

motivating factor for his transfer”). Moreover, allegations of retaliation must be more than

As explained in Rienholtz v. Campbell, “an inmate cannot immunize himself

. . . merely by filing [grievances] and then claiming that everything that happens to

him is retaliatory.” 64 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (internal citation

omitted). “If that were so, then every prisoner could obtain review of non-cognizable

claims merely by filing a lawsuit or grievance and then perpetually claiming

retaliation.” Id.

Mr. Brown’s amended complaint generally alleges that unidentified ADC

staff members have retaliated against him. However, Mr. Brown does not allege any

facts to support his conclusory assertion that any ADC employee was motivated by

unlawful retaliation.

Mr. Brown’s conclusory, speculative assertions are insufficient to state a

plausible constitutional claim for relief. See Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129

(8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support

retaliation claim).

IV. Conclusion:

For the reasons explained above,

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Mr. Brown’s complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice, based on

speculative and conclusory. Atkinson v. Bohn, 2009 WL 4825169, *904 (8th Cir. 2009)

(per curiam) (holding that plaintiff “failed to state a retaliation claim because he . . . failed

to allege which defendants were involved in or affected by his grievances.”).

his failure to state a plausible constitutional claim for relief.

2. In the future, this dismissal be considered a “strike” for purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).

3. The Court certify that an in forma pauperis appeal of this dismissal

would be frivolous and not taken in good faith.

4. The Clerk be directed to close this case.

Dated 23 April 2025.

at A S tr MAGISTRATE JUDGE