Opinion

McQuaid v. Wetzel

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Apr 22, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH A. MCQUAID, Individually ) CIVIL NO. 4:21-CV-02019

and as the Administrator of the Estate )

of Dominic Ingle, ) (WILSON, D.J.)

Plaintiff )

) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)

v. )

)

JOHN WETZEL, et al., )

Defendants )

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has subpoenaed Dr. Laurel Harry, the Superintendent of SCI Camp

Hill during the events of this lawsuit and now Secretary of the Department of

Corrections, for deposition. On March 12, 2025, a telephone conference was held

via Teams in response to letters from counsel raising discovery disputes. (Docs. 79,

81). In accordance with the Court’s policy on discovery, after discussion, defense

counsel was granted permission to file a motion to quash the subpoena requiring Dr.

Harry’s attendance at a deposition. The motion, (Doc. 82), and brief in support, (Doc.

83,) were filed on March 12, 2025. Plaintiff’s brief in opposition, (Doc. 87), with

twenty-one (21) exhibits, was filed on March 19, 2025. A reply brief, (Doc. 88), with

eleven (11) exhibits, was filed on March 24, 2025.1 The matter is ripe for decision.

1 Plaintiff’s brief in opposition, (Doc. 87), and Dr. Harry’s reply brief, (Doc.

88), provided the Court with over 1100 pages of exhibits.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

State inmate Dominic Ingle hung himself in his cell on December 4, 2019,

and died eleven days later from his injuries while incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill. His

estate, through his father Joseph A. McQuaid (“Plaintiff”), initiated this action in

federal court, (Doc. 1), seeking damages against officials and employees of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the medical company contracted to

provide care at the facility, and employees of the medical company. Ingle’s lengthy

history of mental illness and incarceration is set forth in our earlier Report and

Recommendation, (Doc. 50, pp. 2-9), is familiar to the parties, and will not be

repeated herein. In that Report we recommended dismissal of the Monell claims

against Dr. Harry, (Doc. 50., pp. 13-19), but recommended the personal capacity

claims against Dr. Harry proceed, (Doc. 50, pp. 19- 24), and that qualified immunity

not be applied at that stage, (Doc. 50, pp. 24-31). Judge Wilson adopted in part and

denied in part the Report and by Order, (Doc. 61), and dismissed all claims against

Dr. Harry while giving Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. No second

amended complaint was filed, and Dr. Harry was terminated from this lawsuit on

November 23, 2022.

Beginning in August 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sought to schedule depositions

of numerous employees of the DOC, including Dr. Harry. (Doc. 87-5). Counsel

communicated regularly about dates for those depositions, including Dr. Harry’s,

and filed a joint motion to extend the discovery deadline, (Doc. 75), which was

granted, (Doc. 76). The email exchanges regarding scheduling of depositions

continued until February 19, 2025, when for the first time, counsel for the remaining

Corrections Defendants, the Attorney General’s Office, objected to the deposition of

Dr. Harry.2 As noted in the Introduction above, the motion to quash, (Doc. 82), was

then filed.

In support of the motion, the Attorney General contends that: (1) the Plaintiff

has not demonstrated the relevance of Dr. Harry’s testimony; (2) now Commissioner

Harry’s policy-based testimony is barred by the “apex doctrine;” and (3) the

objection is timely. (Doc. 83, p. 3).

Plaintiff responds that: (1) the remaining Corrections Defendants lack

standing to object; (2) the requirements for the application of the “apex doctrine”

have not been met, and (3) the delay in time from the first request to depose and the

filing of the motion makes the motion at this juncture “unfair.” (Doc. 87).

In the Reply Brief, (Doc. 88), defense counsel argues that the Attorney

General represents both the remaining correction defendants and Dr. Harry, making

the standing objection “an irrelevant distraction.”

Defense counsel then argues as to relevance that to prevail on the remaining

claims, Plaintiff must show that each remaining Defendant, which Dr. Harry is not,

2 See Doc. 87, pp. 2-6.

“knew or should have known” that there was a “strong likelihood” that Mr. Ingle

would attempt suicide, and that each remaining Defendant “acted with reckless or

deliberate indifference” to that risk. (Doc. 83, p. 3).3 Dr. Harry disputes that her

testimony would be relevant, arguing that the remaining Corrections Defendants

admitted that they knew Ingles was a suicide risk, thereby providing the necessary

information from “lower level” employees, invoking the apex doctrine.

We will address each contention in turn.

III. LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION TO QUASH

Rule 45(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:

(d) Protecting a Person Subject to a Subpoena; Enforcement.

(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena.

(A) When Required. On timely motion, the court for the district

where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena

that:

(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;

(ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical

limits specified in Rule 45(c);

(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter,

if no exception or waiver applies; or

(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.

3 Citing Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017).

(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a

subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required

may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires:

(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research,

development, or commercial information; or

(ii) disclosing an unretained expert's opinion or information

that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and

results from the expert's study that was not requested by a

party.

(C) Specifying Conditions as an Alternative. In the circumstances

described in Rule 45(d)(3)(B), the court may, instead of quashing

or modifying a subpoena, order appearance or production under

specified conditions if the serving party:

(i) shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that

cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship; and

(ii) ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably

compensated.

Discovery is not limited to admissible evidence but must be relevant to the

issues in each case and proportional to the needs of the case.4 The courts have broad

discretion when deciding discovery questions.

Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to

which discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s

discretion and judgment.

. . . .

This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States

Magistrate Judges on discovery matters.

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

. . . .

“The ‘apex doctrine’ is an analytical framework used by courts in

assessing whether to permit the depositions of individuals at the ‘apex’

of corporations and other entities. The doctrine recognizes that

depositions of high-level officers severely burdens those officers and

the entities they represent, and that adversaries might use this severe

burden to their unfair advantage.” United States ex rel. Galmines v.

Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. CV 06-3213, 2015 WL 4973626, at *1

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2015).

In deciding if the deposition of an individual at the ‘apex’

of a corporation or other entity is appropriate, district

courts within the Third Circuit consider two factors: “1)

whether the executive has personal, superior, or unique

knowledge on the relevant subject; and 2) whether the

information can be obtained in a less burdensome way,

such as through lower-level employees or other discovery

methods.” Cartagena v. Serv. Source, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-

742, 2019 WL 355728, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2019).5

IV. DISCUSSION

A. STANDING TO MOVE TO QUASH

We do not need to answer the question of the remaining Corrections

Defendants standing to quash the subpoena. We interpret the motion to quash, (Doc.

82), as brought by the proposed witness, non-party Dr. Laurel Harry. She clearly has

standing.

5 George v. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm’n, No. 1:18-CV-766, 2020 WL 2745724,

at *1–3 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2020).

B. RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION SOUGHT VIA DEPOSITION

The Plaintiff has established the relevance of Dr. Harry’s testimony about her

personal involvement in the placement of Ingle while at SCI Camp Hill and the

investigation following his death by suicide. We note in particular the following

exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition:

(1) Exhibit “K” 10/17-10/18/2019 SCI-Camp Hill emails regarding

placement of Mr. Ingle in a POC (copied to Dr. Harry on 10/18/2019).

(Doc. 87-14).

(2) Exhibit “M” Email thread starting with a 12/4/2019 email from Dr.

Harry summarizing the known circumstances surrounding Mr. Ingle’s

suicide within an hour of its occurrence and ending with 12/5 and

12/6/2019 emails regarding Dr. Harry’s requested information about

Mr. Ingle’s girlfriend. (Doc. 87-16).

(3) Exhibit “N” Draft Clinical Review Report dated 1/23/2020 from Dr.

Harry for suicide investigation of Mr. Ingle. (Doc. 87-17).

(4) Exhibit “O” Selected relevant pages of the deposition (Part 2) of Dr.

Elicia Stein. (Doc. 87-18).

(5) Exhibit “P” Email thread starting with emails of 1/8/2020, including

those from Dr. Harry seeking additional information about Ingle from

parole and ending with a request for additional information from Dr.

Harry to SCI-Camp Hill employee Carberry dated 1/9/2020. (Doc. 87-

19).

(6) Exhibit “Q” Emails of 12/2/2021 between Dr. Harry and her assistant

about the instant lawsuit and Dr. Harry’s statement that she had been

deposed about the incident “3-4 years ago.” (Doc. 87-20).

(7) Exhibit “R” Email thread of 1/27-1/28/2020 regarding Mr. Ingle’s death

designated by prison as “Natural” and Dr. Harry’s discussions that it

should be changed to “Suicide.” (Doc. 87-21).

These exhibits establish, to the Court’s satisfaction, that Dr. Harry had both

personal knowledge and involvement in the institutional placement before and

investigation after the death of Mr. Ingle. Her testimony on these topics is relevant.

C. APPLICATION OF THE “APEX DOCTRINE”

In reviewing the record, we must apply two factors: 1) whether the executive

has personal, superior, or unique knowledge on the relevant subject; and 2) whether

the information can be obtained in a less burdensome way, such as through lower-

level employees or other discovery methods.

For the reasons stated in the previous section I find that Dr. Harry has personal

and unique knowledge on relevant subjects. While counsel for Dr. Harry has pointed

out ways that the information sought was and could be gleaned from lower-level

employees, I am not satisfied that her testimony would necessarily be cumulative,

especially regarding her understanding of the DOC policies on suicide prevention as

it related to her supervision of the post incident investigation.6 The apex doctrine

does not apply to these limited areas.

D. TIMELINESS OF THE OBJECTION

While the objection to Dr. Harry’s deposition could have been raised when

her name was first listed as a possible witness, Plaintiff has not shown how the

6 See Doc. 83, p. 5 (the witness’s knowledge of the Mental Health Care

policy), p. 6 (cumulative discussion of the policy matters by thirteen other

witnesses).

timing in this case has prejudiced his development of the record. The objection based

on timing is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has established the relevance and proportionality of the testimony of

Dr. Harry if it is limited to matters within her personal knowledge when she was the

Superintendent of S.C.I. Camp Hill. With these limitations the apex doctrine does

not apply. The Court has discretion to limit discovery and, in this case, will do so.

VI. ORDER

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

(1) Dr. Harry’s motion to quash her deposition subpoena, (Doc. 82), is

DENIED.

(2) Plaintiff may depose Dr. Harry on her personal knowledge and her

understanding of the DOC policies on suicide prevention as it relates to

her supervision of the post incident investigation and her personal

involvement in the investigation.

(3) Dr. Harry’s deposition will be limited to not more than three hours.

(4) The parties will cooperate to find a mutually convenient time and place

to conduct the deposition on or before Wednesday, May 21, 2025.

Date: April 22, 2025 BY THE COURT

s/William I. Arbuckle

William I. Arbuckle

U.S. Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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