“Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of 20 discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment 21 would be futile.”
How later courts described this case
- “Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of 20 discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment 21 would be futile.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12
13 SHARRY ASHCROFT, Case No. 24-cv-0035-MMA-MMP
14 Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
15 v. DISMISS
16 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA [Doc. No. 31]
PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP,
17
Defendant.
18
19
20
21
22 On February 28, 2025, Defendant Southern California Permanente Medical Group
23 (“Defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Sharry Ashcroft’s (“Plaintiff”) third
24 amended complaint. Doc. No. 31. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, to which
25 Defendant replied. Doc. Nos. 32, 34. On April 1, 2025, the Court found this matter
26 suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal
27 Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 36. For the
28 reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Defendant, a private health care organization, employed Plaintiff as an office
3 assistant. Doc. No. 302 (“TAC”) ¶¶ 3–4. In early August 2021, following the COVID-19
4 pandemic’s outbreak, Defendant issued a requirement that all employees receive COVID-
5 19 vaccinations before September 30, 2021, or otherwise obtain a medical or religious
6 exemption. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Plaintiff, however, “is a follower of the Christian faith” who
7 believes “that her body belongs to God and is a temple of the Holy Spirit” that “it is
8 against [her] religious beliefs to ingest or inject her body with possible harmful
9 substances” and that her “[d]ue to her pro-life beliefs, [her] faith strongly opposes
10 injecting her body with the COVID-19 vaccine[]” as she believes that the manufacturers
11 of the vaccine use aborted fetal tissue, the lining of aborted fetal tissue, or both in
12 producing the vaccine. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. While she was unwilling to receive the COVID-19
13 vaccination, she was “willing to adhere to safety protocols, such as regular testing and
14 masking.” Id. ¶ 17.
15 On previous occasions, Plaintiff provided Defendant “religious based declinations
16 for the flu and tetanus vaccinations, which have been granted.” Id. ¶ 12. Accordingly,
17 Plaintiff requested a religious exemption for Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccine requirement
18 policy in August 2021. Id. ¶ 13; Doc. No. 30 at 21–26 (“Ex. 1”). To assist her in this
19 effort, Plaintiff “us[ed] her own words as well as language from a template.” Id ¶ 14. On
20 or around August 31, 2021, Defendant provisionally approved her request. Id. ¶ 18.
21 However, on or around October 12, 2021, Defendant requested additional information
22 from Plaintiff, expressing concern for use of templates and “chat groups” among its
23 employees, though Plaintiff was never involved in any such groups. Id. ¶ 19–20.
24
25
26
1 Reviewing Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged in the amended
27 complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions
LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017).
28
1 The questions Defendant posed to Plaintiff in its request, and Plaintiff’s answers
2 submitted on or around October 15, 2021, are as follows:
3
[1.]
4
[Q] Have you ever received a vaccination or immunization as an adult? If so,
5 when: How is the COVID-19 vaccine different[?]
6
[A] Yes, but while I have had vaccines in the past, my views have changed.
7 My religious convictions no longer allow me to defile my body in a way that
modifies the design of my immune system. I have declined vaccines for a
8
number of years due to my sincerely held religious beliefs.
9
[2.]
10
[Q] What else besides the COVID-19 vaccine do you refuse to put in your
11 body as a result of your religious belief?
12
[A] I refuse to put anything into my body which goes against my sincerely
13 held religious beliefs. That includes any vaccine which alters my God given
immune system.
14
15 [3.]
[Q] Have you put this belief into practice in any other areas of your life?
16
17 [A] My sincerely held religious beliefs are put into practice every day. All
that I do, is done to glorify God.
18
19 [4.]
[Q] Have you ever taken another vaccine or medication as an adult? (Please
20
answer yes or no. We are not asking you to tell us what medications you have
21 taken and why you took them.) If so:
22
[A] Yes, but I was not aware then that by doing so, it was a sin to my soul. I
23 do not take anything that is against my sincerely held religious beliefs.
24
[5.]
25 [Q] If you have taken other vaccines or medications knowing that they
involved the use of fetal stems in some way: Please explain why receiving
26
them did not violate your sincerely held religious beliefs.
27
28
1 [A] I have NEVER knowingly taken anything which included those
substances.
2
3 [6.]
[Q] If you have taken other vaccines or medication but do not know whether
4
they involved the use of fetal stem cells in any way:
5
[A] I have never knowingly taken anything which included those substances.
6
7 [7.]
[Q] Describe anything you did before taking them to find out whether they
8
involved the use of fetal stem cells in any way. Did taking them violate your
9 sincerely held religious belief?
10
[A] I am not aware that I have taken anything which contained those
11 substances.
12
13 [8.]
[Q] If not, why not? If so, why were you willing to violate your belief as to
14
them but not as to the COVID-19 vaccine?
15
[A] All vaccines are against my sincerely held religious beliefs and to take
16
them would be against my God given conscience.
17
[9.]
18
[Q] Please resubmit your request for accommodation in your own words
19 without using template or stock language from the internet or other sources.
20
[A] I have declined vaccines and will continue to do so due to my sincerely
21 held religious beliefs. My body is a temple of the Holy Spirit and it is against
my religious creed to defile my body with a vaccine that alters my God given
22
immune system.
23
24 TAC ¶ 19–21; Doc. No. 30 at 26–32 (“Ex. 2”) p. 3–4.
25 On or around October 22, 2021, Plaintiff was informed her request for exemption
26 was denied. TAC. ¶ 24. Soon after, Defendant informed Plaintiff that she was not in
27 compliance with its COVID-19 policy and that it was therefore placing her on unpaid
28 leave. Id. ¶ 25. It also informed her that failure to comply with its vaccine policy by
1 November 30, 2021, would result in termination of her employment. Id. On or about
2 January 10, 2022, Defendant terminated Plaintiff for failing to comply with its vaccine
3 policy. Id. ¶ 26. Prior to Plaintiff’s termination, Defendant did not specify if her
4 religious exemption form or her responses to the additional questions were deficient, nor
5 was she given “an opportunity to supplement her application and responses for any
6 perceived deficiencies.” Id. ¶ 23, 30, 31.
7 Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on January 5, 2024. Doc. No. 1. After the
8 Court granted in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss this action, Defendant filed the Her
9 second amended complaint on October 17, 2024. Doc. Nos. 22, 24. Upon Defendant’s
10 second motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety, with
11 leave to amend. Doc. Nos. 25, 29. Plaintiff filed the operative TAC on
12 February 14, 2025. Doc. No. 30.
13 II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
14 Alongside her response in opposition, Plaintiff request that the Court take judicial
15 notice of a tentative decision in the California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles,
16 case Katherine Katz v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 23STCV23907. Doc. No. 33.
17 Plaintiff attaches a copy and provides the state court website from which one can access
18 the original. Id.; Doc. No. 33-1. Defendant opposes judicial notice, arguing that “there is
19 no basis to take judicial notice of legal authority” because “judicial notice is reserved for
20 adjudicative fact[s] only.” Doc. No. 35 at 2 (quoting Nguyen v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs.,
21 LLC, No. 3:15-cv-00063-CAB-BLM, 2015 WL 12672149 *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015)).
22 Though review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the contents of a
23 complaint, the Court may consider certain materials, including matters of judicial notice.
24 See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Pursuant to Federal Rule
25 of Evidence 201, a judicially noticeable fact is one that is not subject to reasonable
26 dispute because it is generally known within the jurisdiction or can be accurately and
27 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed.
28 R. Evid. 201(b). This can include information on government websites, as well as
1 “official acts” of government officials, legislatures, or agencies. See Daniels-Hall v.
2 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010); Gallagher v. Philipps, 563 F.
3 Supp. 3d 1048, 1070–71 (S.D. Cal. 2021); Greenfield MHP Assocs., L.P. v. Ametek, Inc.,
4 145 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2015). The Court may also “take judicial notice of
5 court filings and other matters of public record.” Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA,
6 Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).
7 Federal courts generally do not take judicial notice of other courts’ opinions or
8 decisions, as they are not “adjudicative facts,” so much as legal authority that courts
9 “routinely consider[] . . . in doing . . . legal analysis . . . .” Nguyen, 2015 WL 12672149
10 at *2 (quoting Lucero v. Wong, No. C 10-1339 SI PR, 2011 WL 5834963 *5 (N.D. Cal.
11 Nov. 21, 2011)). As the Lucero court, quoted in Nguyen, further notes, “[t]o the extent . .
12 . the existence of published or unpublished cases [are] judicially noticed as adjudicative
13 facts, doing so is of very limited value because the court can take notice that such
14 decisions exist, but the court does not take judicial notice that those decisions are
15 correct.” Id. (quoting Lucero, 2011 WL 5834963 at *5).
16 Plaintiff’s proposed item for notice is an official—if tentative—government act
17 and court record found on an official government website. Therefore, the Court
18 determines this item is judicially noticeable and GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial
19 notice. However, as Nguyen and Lucero correctly direct, the Court takes notice only that
20 this tentative decision exists, not that it is correct. See Nguyen, 2015 WL 12672149 at *2
21 (quoting Lucero, 2011 WL 5834963 at *5).
22 III. LEGAL STANDARD
23 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests a complaint’s sufficiency. Navarro v.
24 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “While a complaint . . . does not need detailed
25 factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
26 relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
27 elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
28 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
1 (2007) (internal quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that
2 the complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
3 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
5 Upon review, the Court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must
6 construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut.
7 Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions need not be taken as
8 true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. W. Mining Council v.
9 Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and
10 unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. Fed.
11 Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). In determining the propriety of
12 dismissal, generally, a court generally may not look beyond the complaint for additional
13 facts. Id.; Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705–06 (9th Cir. 1998).
14 When granting dismissal, the court must also decide whether to grant leave to
15 amend. The Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments, and thus leave to
16 amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d
17 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a court need not grant leave to amend when
18 permitting a plaintiff to amend would be futile. Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo
19 Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of
20 discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment
21 would be futile.”).
22 IV. DISCUSSION
23 Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s three remaining causes of action:
24 (1) religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
25 (“Title VII”) based on a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs; (2) religious
26 discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
27 (“FEHA”) based on a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs; and
28 (3) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Doc. No. 31. Plaintiff argues that
1 she has sufficiently pleaded all causes of action. Doc. No. 32. The Court will address
2 each.
3 A. Failure to Accommodate
4 Defendant seeks once again to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action:
5 religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
6 VII”) based on a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, and religious
7 discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
8 (“FEHA”) based on a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Doc. No. 31.
9 Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not made sufficient allegations that she
10 informed Defendants of a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with Defendant’s
11 vaccination requirement. Id. at 8–10. Plaintiff responds that she both identifies a bona
12 fide religious belief and sufficiently communicated a conflict. Doc. No. 32 at 14–23.
13 Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any employee or job
14 applicant on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). “The . . . effect . . . is to make
15 it an unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer not to make reasonable
16 accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practice of [its]
17 employee[s] . . . .” Heller v. EBB Auto. Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting
18 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1976)). Title VII religious
19 discrimination claims have a two-part framework, under which courts also evaluate
20 FEHA claims. See Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438; Borrello v. Respironics California, LLC, No.
21 23-CV-580-GPC-VET, 2024 WL 1496215 *10 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2024) Keene v. City &
22 Cnty. of S.F., No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1 (9th Cir. 2023). First, the
23 employee must establish that: (1) the employee had a bona fide religious belief, the
24 practice of which would conflict with an employment duty; (2) the employee informed
25 their employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer threatened or subjected the
26 employee to discriminatory treatment because of the employee’s inability to fulfill the job
27 requirements. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438; see also Keene, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1.
28 However, “[this] prima facie case does not include a showing that the employee made
1 any efforts to compromise his or her religious beliefs or practices before seeking an
2 accommodation from the employer.” Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438 (emphasis original). If the
3 employee makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that they
4 initiated good faith efforts to accommodate the employee’s religious practices. Id.
5 In its order on Defendant’s first motion to dismiss, the Court found that Plaintiff’s
6 allegations were insufficient to establish a bona fide religious belief because she
7
8 allege[d] vague references to phrases such as “my body is a temple of the Holy
Spirit,” safety concerns regarding the vaccine as a “biological substance” that
9
would “alter the design of [her] immune system” and refusal to participate in
10 “pharmakeia,” conscience-based justifications, assertions of “Constitutional”
privileges, and “Christian faith” buzz words.
11
12
13 Doc. No. 22 at 7. It reaffirmed this finding in its second order, but found that “Plaintiff
14 . . . clearly states therein that her religious beliefs oppose abortion, and that she believes
15 the COVID-19 vaccine to be based, in its manufacture, upon aborted fetal tissue. This is
16 sufficient[] . . . to establish a bona fide religious belief.” Doc. No. 29 at 8–9 (internal
17 citation omitted). Plaintiff now argues, again, that the Court erred in finding that “her
18 allegations pertaining to her body as a temple of the Holy Spirit which she cannot defile
19 are insufficient to communicate the religious nature of her beliefs.” Doc. No. 32 at 14–
20 15.
21 Whether the employee’s belief is bona fide depends on whether it is: (1) sincerely
22 held and (2) religious, in the employee’s scheme of things. See Africa. v. Commonwealth
23 of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981); cf. Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d
24 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended (Sept. 19, 1996) (citing Africa favorably). Three
25 indicia that a belief is religious are whether it: (1) addresses “fundamental and ultimate
26 questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters;” (2) is a belief-system,
27 comprehensive in nature; and (3) has certain recognizable formal and external signs.
28 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032; Borrello v. Respironics California, LLC, No. 23-CV-580-GPC-
1 VET, 2024 WL 1496215 *11 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2024) (under FEHA, courts analyze
2 whether beliefs “(1) . . . ‘address fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with
3 deep and imponderable matters’; (2) . . . are ‘comprehensive in nature; . . . consisting of a
4 belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching’; and (3) . . . ‘can be recognized by the
5 presence of certain formal and external signs.’”) (cleaned up, internal quotation marks
6 omitted); see also Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, No. 3:23-cv-00206-SB,
7 2023 WL 7612395, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023) (finding the Africa factors helpful
8 guideposts for analyzing Title VII). While the belief should be “sincerely held,” it “need
9 not be consistent or rational to be protected under Title VII.” Keene, 2023 WL 3451687
10 at *2. However, this “does not mean that courts must take . . . conclusory assertions of
11 violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of Cal. State
12 Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023).
13 Plaintiff now includes a purported version of her original exemption request,
14 referenced in her first amended complaint and attached to Defendant’s first motion to
15 dismiss. Within, she states:
16
I am writing to request a religious exemption from vaccines because
17
these are violations of my sincerely held religious beliefs. ‘Do you not know
18 that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have
received from God?’ (1 Cor 6:19). As a Christian and a member of the Body
19
of Christ, my sincerely held religious beliefs are an all-encompassing aspect
20 of my life. My religious beliefs are protected and guaranteed by the US
Constitution and the Constitution of this state. My sincerely-held Christian
21
beliefs DO NOT ALLOW ME to have a biological substance injected into my
22 body. My blood is sacred and life is found in the blood. My own salvation
was bought and paid for by the blood of Jesus Christ and I CANNOT taint my
23
blood with vaccines. The Bible warns against this type of pharmakeia, and I
24 will not violate my sincerely-held Christian beliefs. The body is the temple
of the Holy Spirit and as such, should not be used for such medical treatments.
25
26 Ex. 1. at 3–4.
27 Plaintiff points to decisions by other Ninth Circuit district courts, dealing with
28 similar language, to support her conclusion that her “temple of the Holy Spirit” wording
1 establishes a bona fide religious belief. See, e.g., Thompson v. Asante Health Sys., No.
2 1:23-CV-00486-CL, 2023 WL 7348812 *5 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2023), R&R adopted, No.
3 1:23-CV-00486-CL, 2023 WL 7326496 (D. Or. Nov. 7, 2023); Camp v. L.A. Arena Co.,
4 LLC, No. EDCV 22-2220 JGB (KKX), 2023 WL 4680797 *2, 7 (C.D. Cal. June 15,
5 2023); cf Beuca v. Washington State Univ., No. 2:23-CV-0069-TOR, 2023 WL 3575503
6 *2 (E.D. Wash. May 19, 2023), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, No. 23-35395,
7 2024 WL 3450989 (9th Cir. Jul. 18, 2024). Plaintiff likewise identifies recent decisions
8 from circuit courts of appeal in support. See Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc.,
9 126 F.4th 76, 83 (1st Cir. 2025); Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Michigan, P.C., 103 F.4th
10 1241, 1243 (6th Cir. 2024); Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 902
11 (8th Cir. 2024); Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2024).
12 Though Plaintiff has, in previous iterations of her briefing, cited to some of these
13 authorities before, the Court finds her expanded pleadings and arguments are persuasive.
14 Especially convincing is the First Circuit’s Thornton holding that similarly-worded
15 requests demonstrate not “‘isolated moral teaching[s],’ but rather . . . part of a
16 ‘comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate matters[,]’” a concern
17 this Court drew as to Plaintiff’s request in prior iterations of this motion. Thornton, 126
18 F.4th at 83. That court also collects additional similar cases, including some that
19 Plaintiff cites here, suggesting a growing agreement among the circuits as to similar
20 language, variations of which appear to have cropped up en masse in opposition to
21 COVID-19 mandates. Id. at 83–84 (citing, for example, Barnett v. Inova Health Care
22 Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 471 (4th Cir. 2025), Passarella, and Ringhofer). The only
23 explicitly contrary decisions among federal courts of appeal, to this Court’s assessment,
24 are two unreported cases from the Third Circuit. See McDowell v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr.,
25 Inc., No. 24-1157, 2024 WL 4799870 *2–3 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2024); Gatto v. Johnson &
26 Johnson Servs., Inc., No. 24-1992, 2025 WL 816732 *1–4 (3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2025)
27 (noting that “body is a temple of the Holy Spirit which would be violated by the nasal
28 swab tests” is “based on [the plaintiff’s] personal and medical preference, not religion”).
1 Given Plaintiff’s arguments, her inclusion of the original request for
2 accommodations in the TAC, the appellate courts’ general vector in similar cases since
3 this action was filed, and the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that “the burden to allege a
4 conflict with religious beliefs is fairly minimal[,]” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1223, the
5 Court determines that Plaintiff is correct and reverses its previous findings on this
6 element. Though Plaintiff did not articulate her religious beliefs so cleanly in her request
7 as she does in her opposition, the Court finds that she makes references to overarching
8 religious beliefs and sufficient connection to her anti-vaccine position, for example, that
9 her “sincerely-held Christian beliefs DO NOT ALLOW ME to have a biological
10 substance injected into my body. My blood is sacred and life is found in the blood. My
11 own salvation was bought and paid for by the blood of Jesus Christ and I CANNOT taint
12 my blood with vaccines.” Ex. 1 at 2–3. This articulates, at minimum, a connection
13 between her belief concerning vaccines and her belief in the existence of a higher power
14 or deity. Id. It also evidences an overarching belief that her blood is sacred due to
15 “salvation bought and paid for by the blood of Jesus Christ” and that therefore nothing
16 can be injected into it, rather than a merely scientific or moral objection to a single
17 vaccine. Ex. 1 at 2–3. Plaintiff likewise quotes a Bible verse, demonstrating a
18 connection between her beliefs and external and established religious belief systems. Id.
19 While the cases discussed above each differ slightly from the facts here, they are
20 sufficiently analogous and contain similar recitations to Plaintiff’s request, albeit often
21 with additional details to allow inference into the respective requests’ religious nature.
22 See, e.g., Lucky, 103 F.4th at 1243 (“She pled further that—as to the Covid vaccine in
23 particular—‘God spoke to [her] in her prayers and directed her that it would be wrong to
24 receive the COVID-19 vaccine.’”). As Plaintiff noted in its reply here and in briefing its
25 first motion to dismiss, when this issue was first raised, this is certainly not a finding
26 unanimously shared by Ninth Circuit trial courts. See Doc. No. 15 at 9–12 (collecting
27 cases); Doc. No. 34 at 7–9. It is, however, how this Court determines the Ninth Circuit
28 and U.S. Supreme Court would rule under the circumstances. See Bolden-Hardge, 63
1 F.4th at 1223 (“The Supreme Court has . . . cautioned against second-guessing the
2 reasonableness of an individual’s assertion that a requirement burdens her religious
3 beliefs, emphasizing that a court’s “‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’
4 whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby
5 Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725 (2014). Thus, at this stage in proceedings, Plaintiff
6 sufficiently alleges a bona fide religious belief.
7 With this new finding in mind, the Court now examines whether Plaintiff
8 sufficiently pleads that she communicated these religious beliefs and conflict with
9 employment requirements to Defendant. A plaintiff must provide “only enough
10 information about an employee's religious needs to permit the employer to understand the
11 existence of a conflict between the employee's religious practices and the employer’s job
12 requirements.” Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439. As with its prior order, the Court first finds no
13 new facts to suggest that Plaintiff informed Defendant of her “religious objection to fetal
14 stem cell-based vaccines due to her anti-abortion beliefs . . . .” Doc. No. 29 at 10.
15 However, Plaintiff clearly does communicate that her “sincerely-held Christian beliefs
16 DO NOT ALLOW ME to have a biological substance injected into my body. My blood
17 is sacred and life is found in the blood. My own salvation was bought and paid for by the
18 blood of Jesus Christ and I CANNOT taint my blood with vaccines[,]” that “the body is a
19 temple of the ‘Holy Spirit[,]’” and that that her beliefs “prevent her from receiving a
20 biological substance into her body” in her initial request for exemption. Ex. 1 at 3–4.
21 This evinces a clear conflict between Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, which prohibit
22 vaccination, and Defendant’s vaccine requirement, which mandates it.
23 Finally, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the third element of a failure to accommodate
24 claim, namely that her request was denied and that she was terminated for failing to
25 comply with Defendant’s vaccine requirement, a failure caused by her religious objection
26 to vaccination. TAC ¶¶ 24–26. Plaintiff also alleges that, after submitting responses to
27 Defendant’s questionnaire requesting additional information, she was “never contacted . .
28 . with any questions” and that Defendant did not take any additional steps to consider
1 || possible accommodations. /d. at 23, 30,31. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s
2 ||motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's first and second causes of action.
3 ||B. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
4 Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs final cause of action, wrongful termination
5 || in violation of public policy, asserting that it is a derivative claim that cannot succeed if
6 others fail. Doc. No. 31 at 10. A plaintiff claiming termination in violation of public
7 || policy must allege: (1) an employer-employee relationship; (2) that the employer
8 || terminated their employment; (3) that the termination was substantially motivated by a
9 || violation of public policy; and (4) that the discharge caused the plaintiff harm. Yau v.
10 || Santa Margarita Ford, Inc., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (citing
11 || Haney v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336, 348-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).
12 || One category of conduct subject to protection under a claim of wrongful termination in
13 || violation of public policy is an employee’s “exercising a statutory right or privilege.”
14 || Yau, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 831 (quoting Casella v. SouthWest Dealer Serv., Inc. (2007) 69
15 Rptr. 3d 445, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). FEHA and Title VII claims “may provide
16 || the policy basis for a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” Phillips
17 || v. St. Mary Reg’l Med. Ctr., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770, 776, 784-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). As
18 maintains claims both for violation of FEHA and Title VU, Plaintiff's wrongful
19 || termination in violation of public policy claim may proceed as a derivative. The Court
20 DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss that claim.
21 IV. CONCLUSION
22 Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
23 || Defendant must file its answer to the third amended complaint within fourteen (14) days
24 || of the date of this Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).
25 IT IS SO ORDERED.
26 ||Dated: April 21, 2025 Miku Ml -£ ol ihr
27 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO
28 United States District Judge