Jones v. Spradley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHNNY L. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-1183-MMH-PDB

TREVOR SPRADLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Johnny L. Jones, who is currently housed at Charlotte

Correctional Institution and proceeding as a pauper, initiated this case by

filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1;

Complaint). The Court identified some deficiencies in Jones’s Complaint and

ordered him to file an amended complaint if he wished to proceed with his

claims. See Order (Doc. 5). Jones filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6;

Amended Complaint) on February 27, 2025 (mailbox rule).

In the Amended Complaint, Jones names three Defendants in their

individual capacities: (1) Lieutenant Trevor Spradley; (2) Sergeant Pope; and

(3) Correctional Officer Hartzell. Id. at 2-3. He alleges that while he was

housed at Suwannee Correctional Institution on June 7, 2024, he declared a

medical and psychological emergency “due to having grave pain causing

emotional and mental stress and [Jones] felt his body starting to lock up.” Id.

at 5. He entered the wing and “Defendant Pope stated[,] ‘You’re not going to be

seen by anyone, you’re going to your cell, f*ck your emergency.’” Id. Jones

replied that he needed to see someone and sat on the floor. Id. Jones’s “pain

quickly spread to the neck and lower back and caused [him] to have to lay

down.” Id. Defendant Pope called Defendant Spradley, and when Spradley

arrived, he ordered Defendants Pope and Hartzell to “drag” Jones to his cell.

Id. “Defendants Pope and Hartzell each grabbed a[n] arm and beg[a]n dragging

[Jones] as he screamed.” Id. at 6. “Defendant Spradley ordered them to stop

and grab [Jones] in a different way then continue dragging him.” Id.

Apparently, when they arrived at Jones’s cell, Defendants Pope and Hartzell

“slammed” Jones on his bunk and left him restrained in his cell. Id. Defendant

Spradley brought a nurse to speak to Jones, “but would not allow [Jones] to be

properly examined.” Id. Jones attempted suicide ten days later. Id.

Jones raises several causes of action. He contends that Defendants

violated policy and procedure by denying his medical and psychological

emergency, by not contacting medical when Jones was lying on the floor before

moving him, and by failing to obtain a handheld camera before using force on

him. Id. at 8-10. Jones further alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment rights when Defendant Spradley ordered the use of force and

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Defendants Pope and Hartzell used excessive force on him. Id. Finally, Jones

contends Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical and

psychological needs. Id.

Jones lists several injuries. He asserts that this incident caused “more

damage and pain to an already damaged shoulder” and “pain to [his] head and

back.” Id. at 7. The pain caused Jones “to hold [his] head and arm a certain

way,” which the doctor “thought . . . was a joint disease.” Id. He also suffered

“emotional damages which left [him] crying and feeling alone,” and “mental

damage which caused [him] to fall into depression and paranoia,” ultimately

leading to his suicide attempt. Id.1 As relief, Jones seeks a declaratory

judgment and monetary damages. Id. at 7, 11.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language

of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply

1 According to Jones, he “is a known mental health patient with a ‘S3’ psyche grade.”

Amended Complaint at 8.

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the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490

(11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in

a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection

between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation

omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

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should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-

63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not

required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alternation and internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at

1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts

or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”)

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(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Amended Complaint, the Court must read Jones’s pro

se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972); Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to

a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F.

App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)3 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia,

Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled

in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however,

they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular

point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see

generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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Here, Jones’s Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to

this Court’s screening obligation. First, as the Court previously advised when

directing him to amend (Doc. 5), an allegation that a defendant violated a

prison policy, without more, is insufficient to state a claim. See Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (recognizing that prison regulations are

“not designed to confer rights on inmates”); see also Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d

1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to follow procedures does not, by itself,

rise to the level of deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a form of

negligence.”). Thus, Jones’s allegations that Defendants’ actions violated

prison policy fail to state a claim of constitutional dimension.

Second, Jones fails to state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.

In Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020), the Eleventh

Circuit reviewed “the principles applicable to Eighth Amendment excessive-

force” claims. In doing so, the Court instructed:

The Eighth Amendment, among other things,

prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII. As the Supreme Court has

explained, “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain” qualifies under the Eighth Amendment as

proscribed “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Nevertheless, the

Supreme Court has instructed that what rises to the

level of an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”

differs based on the type of Eighth Amendment

violation alleged. Id.

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Since [the plaintiff] asserts excessive-force . . .

claims, “the core judicial inquiry” requires [the Court]

to consider “whether force was applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins[ v. Gaddy],

559 U.S. [34,] 37 [(2010)] (citation and quotation

marks omitted). This standard requires a prisoner to

establish two elements – one subjective and one

objective: the official must have both “acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind” (the subjective

element), and the conduct must have been “objectively

harmful enough to establish a constitutional

violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (cleaned up).

With respect to the subjective element, “to have

a valid claim on the merits of excessive force in

violation of [the Eighth Amendment], the excessive

force must have been sadistically and maliciously

applied for the very purpose of causing harm.”

Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir.

2002); see also Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304

(11th Cir. 2010).

As for the objective component of an excessive-

force violation, it focuses on whether the official’s

actions were “harmful enough,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8,

or “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

298 (1991), to violate the Constitution. “Not every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a

federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. “The

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and

unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 37-38.

Instead, the Eighth Amendment prohibits force that

offends “contemporary standards of decency,”

regardless of whether “significant injury is evident,”

though the extent of injury may shed light on the

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amount of force applied or “whether the use of force

could plausibly have been thought necessary.”

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 1265-66 (some internal citations modified); see also McKinney v. Sheriff,

520 F. App’x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013). In determining whether an officer’s use

of force was applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing

harm, courts consider five distinct factors:

(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of

force; (3) the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent

of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the

basis of facts known to them.

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). When considering

these factors, courts “must also give a ‘wide range of deference to prison

officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’ including when considering

‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d

1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533

(11th Cir. 1990)).

Notably, a lack of serious injury, while not dispositive, is relevant to the

inquiry. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38; Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 524 F. App’x

511, 513 (11th Cir. 2013). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

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“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one

factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could

plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular

situation.” Ibid.[4] (quoting Whitley, supra, at 321, 106

S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide

some indication of the amount of force applied. . . . An

inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’” that

causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to

state a valid excessive force claim. Id. at 9 (quoting

Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.

1973)).[5]

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly

correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.

An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does

not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim

merely because he has the good fortune to escape

without serious injury.

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

A plaintiff who suffers only de minimis injury does not

necessarily lack a claim for excessive force under §

1983. Stephens[ v. DeGiovanni], 852 F.3d [1298,] 1328

n.33 [(11th Cir. 2017)]; Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d

1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014). However, the resulting

injuries can be evidence of the kind or degree of force

that was used by the officer. See Crocker v. Beatty, 995

F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021).

Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 700 (11th Cir. 2021).

4 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

5 See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional

rights.”).

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Jones’s allegations fail to state a plausible Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim. He acknowledges that he laid down on the floor due to pain and

Defendants Pope and Hartzell “dragged” him to his cell. When he was

screaming in pain, Defendant Spradley ordered Defendants Pope and Hartzell

to stop and adjust their grip on Jones, which they did. When they arrived in

Jones’s cell, they “slammed” him on his bunk. Defendant Spradley then

brought a nurse to Jones’s cell to speak with him.

Defendants Pope and Hartzell’s actions as described by Jones do not

cross the constitutional threshold of an Eighth Amendment violation. Even if

they violated prison policy, they were required to follow orders to return Jones

to his cell, and they readjusted their grip when Jones was “scream[ing],” which

suggests they did not intend to cause pain. While Jones asserts he experienced

pain, he does not allege that he otherwise suffered any serious physical injury,

and he was able to speak with a nurse immediately after the incident. Jones’s

allegations fail to suggest that Defendants acted with a malicious or sadistic

intent to cause harm. Thus, the Court finds that even liberally construing

Jones’s allegations, he fails to state a plausible Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim.6

6 To the extent Jones contends that Defendant Spradley failed to intervene in the use

of excessive force, such claim automatically fails because Jones has not stated a

plausible excessive force claim. Moreover, apparently in response to Jones screaming,

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Third, with respect to Jones’s deliberate indifference claim, the Eighth

Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an

objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct. Swain v.

Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison officials

violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has

instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Spradley ordered the other Defendants to stop and hold Jones in a different manner.

Thus, Jones’s allegations show that Spradley did intervene to assist Jones.

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Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844-45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and

emphasis omitted);7 see Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir.

2024) (recognizing that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff

must show that he suffered “an objectively serious medical need,” and that the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need, meaning that the

defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2)

disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective

recklessness” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

7 For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has described a “more than mere negligence” or

“more than gross negligence” standard in determining whether an official acted with

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255.

In Wade, the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should

apply the “subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 1253.

The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to the

majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Id. at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

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“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Importantly, medical

treatment gives rise to a constitutional violation “only when it is so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973

F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the law is well

settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”).

Thus, a complaint that a medical provider has been negligent “in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d

1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

Here, Jones fails to allege sufficient factual allegations to state a

plausible deliberate indifference claim. He contends that Defendants were

deliberately indifferent by ignoring his medical and mental health emergency.

But after Jones was placed in his cell, a nurse came to his cell and spoke to

him. His allegations also fail to suggest that Defendants acted with “subjective

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recklessness.” Thus, Jones fails to state a plausible Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim.

In light of the foregoing, this case will be dismissed without prejudice for

Jones’s failure to state a claim. If Jones can allege sufficient facts to state a

plausible claim for relief, he may refile his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a

new case. Notably, pro se litigants are subject to the same law and rules of

court that govern other litigants who are represented by counsel. See Moon v.

Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). All filings with the Court must

be made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this

Court’s Local Rules.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. The Clerk of Court shall send Jones a civil rights complaint form

and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (prisoner filings) form. If Jones

chooses to refile his claims, he may complete and file the appropriate forms.

He should not include this case number on any form, as the Clerk will assign

a new case number upon receipt. In initiating such a case, Jones should either

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file a fully completed application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the $405

filing fee.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of April,

2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

JAX-3 4/16

C:

Johnny L. Jones, #V15226

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