Bohanon v. Vantrell

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

NAKIA BOHANON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 1:22-cv-01161-SHM-tmp

)

VINCE VANTELL and )

CHIEF F/N/U HUGGINS, )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER MODIFYING THE DOCKET;

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) WITH PREJUDICE IN PART AND

WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART; AND

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND THE CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff Nakia Bohanon filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) When Bohanon filed the

complaint, he was incarcerated at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (the “HCCF”), in

Whiteville, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) On July 29, 2022, the Court granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.)

In the complaint, Bohanon alleges claims of: (1) failure to protect (ECF No. 1 at PageID

4-5); (2) failure to train and supervise (id. at PageID 5); and (3) negligence (id.).

Bohanon sues: (1) HCCF Warden Vince Vantell; and (2) HCCF Chief F/N/U Huggins.

(Id. at PageID 1, 3 (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”).)

Bohanon seeks (1) one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) in “compensatory

damages” from each Defendant; (2) two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00) in “general

damages” from each Defendant; and (3) one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in “actual

County Correctional Facility and (b) CoreCivic; and (2) change Defendant Vince Vantrell’s

surname to “Vantell.” (See https://www.corecivic.com/facilities/trousdale-turner-correctional-

center (CoreCivic website, showing that “Vince Vantell […] served as warden at Hardeman

County Correctional Facility”) (last accessed Apr. 21, 2025).)

The complaint (ECF No. 1) is before the Court.

For the reasons explained below: (1) the complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE in part and WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part; and (2) leave to amend the claims

dismissed with prejudice is GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint —

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts

the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the

allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations

are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported

by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides

guidance on this issue. Although Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted

by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383

(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)

(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”

and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”

(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

II. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983

Bohanon sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the complaint, Bohanon alleges that, “[o]n June 2 or 3,” he asked inmates in cells near

Bohanon’s unit at the HCCF (the “Other Inmates”) to “hold down the noise [because] I’m trying

to sleep.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) The Other Inmates “started to argue” with Bohanon. (Id.)

Bohanon alleges that, when “no officer was present anywhere,” “the guy that lived in 207 went

back inside his cell and got a knife and stabbed me under my left eye,” causing Bohanon to “bleed[]

bad[ly].” (Id. (the “Incident”).) Bohanon alleges that some inmates “finally got hold of an officer,”

who “called a code.” (Id.) Bohanon was taken to the HCCF’s medical unit, where a nurse stopped

shift in HCCF’s medical unit re-called Bohanon to the medical office and transported him to an

outside hospital, where doctors told Bohanon that his “nose was broken in two places and [his]

face bone was broken to[o] bad[ly] for them to handle, so they sent [Bohanon] to the Med [in]

Memphis” for “stitches on the side of my nose.” (Id. at PageID 4-5.) Bohanon alleges that the

injuries from the Incident persist: (1) “some bones loose in my face”; and (2) blurry vision in his

left eye. (Id. at PageID 5.)

Bohanon alleges that “[t]here are no officer’s [sic] in the pod control booths for hours at a

time, which causes a danger to inmates [and] staff at [the HCCF].” (Id.) Bohanon’s allegations

are construed as claims of failure to protect, failure to train and supervise, and negligence.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Claim Of Failure To Protect Against: (1) The Individual Defendants In Their

Official Capacities; (2) The HCCF; And (3) CoreCivic

Bohanon does not allege whether he sues the Individual Defendants in their official or

individual capacities. (See ECF No. 1.) The Sixth Circuit requires plaintiffs to “set forth clearly

in their pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages,

not simply in their capacity as state officials.” Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. “Absent a specification of

capacity, it is presumed that a state official is sued in his official capacity.” Northcott v. Plunkett,

42 F. App’x 795, 796 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 593). The Court construes

Bohanon’s claims against the Individual Defendants as official capacity claims.

Bohanon’s official capacity claims against the Individual Defendants are treated as claims

against the Individual Defendants’ alleged employer — the HCCF, which houses inmates in the

custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. See Jones v. Union Cnty., Tennessee, 296

F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)). (See

also ECF No. 1 at PageID 3 (alleging that the Individual Defendants are employed by the HCCF);

facility.html (Tennessee Department of Correction website, stating that the HCCF “contracts with

CoreCivic for management of the [HCCF]”) (last accessed Apr. 21, 2025).) Bohanon’s claim of

failure to protect against the HCCF is construed as a claim against CoreCivic, the private company

that manages the HCCF.1 See, e.g., Glenn v. Walker, No. 21-1013, 2021 WL 4269474, at *2 (W.D.

Tenn. Sept. 20, 2021); Talley v. McKinney, No. 20-1118, 2021 WL 1254681, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Tenn.

Apr. 5, 2021). (See also https://www.corecivic.com/about (CoreCivic website’s “About Us” page)

(last accessed Apr. 21, 2025).)

Bohanon does not state a claim to relief for failure to protect against the HCCF or

CoreCivic.

“A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts

under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir.

2003) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit

applies the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that

operate prisons or provide medical care to prisoners. Id. at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-

18. CoreCivic “cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Braswell v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). To prevail on a § 1983 claim against

CoreCivic, Bohanon “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the

‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of Bohanon’s rights. See id. Bohanon does not

identify or describe any policy or custom of CoreCivic, much less an unconstitutional policy or

custom of CoreCivic pursuant to which the Individual Defendants acted to deprive Bohanon of a

constitutional right. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 4-5.) Bohanon alleges instead personal misconduct

1 See https://www.tn.gov/correction/sp/state-prison-list/hardeman-county-correctional-facility.html

(“Hardeman County Correctional Facility is owned by the Hardeman County Correctional

Facilities Corporation, which contracts with CoreCivic for management of the prison”) (last

accessed Apr. 21, 2025).

No. 1 at PageID 5.) Bohanon fails to state a claim under § 1983 against CoreCivic. For these

reasons, Bohanon’s claim of failure to protect against (1) the Individual Defendants in their official

capacities and (2) CoreCivic is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts

stating a claim to relief.

To the extent Bohanon alleges a claim under § 1983 against the HCCF, the complaint fails

to state a claim to relief as a matter of law. Under § 1983, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit.

Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., 238 F.3d 422 (table), No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir.

Nov. 6, 2000). Bohanon’s claim against HCCF is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim to relief as a matter of law.

B. Claim Against The Individual Defendants And CoreCivic For Failure To Train

And Supervise; And Claim Against All Defendants For Negligence

In addition to the defects in Bohanon’s claim of failure to protect against the Individual

Defendants in their official capacities, CoreCivic, and the HCCF described supra, Bohanon’s

claims of (1) failure to train and supervise and (2) negligence also fail to state claims to relief.

(1) The Individual Defendants’ Failure To Train And Supervise HCCF Staff

Bohanon makes the conclusory allegation that Vantell and Huggins “fail to properly train

officer’s [sic] regarding the safety of inmates and staff.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) Bohanon’s

allegation does not demonstrate that Vantell and Huggins directly participated or implicitly

authorized, approved, or acquiesced in the conduct or events related to the Incident. (Id.) At a

minimum, a plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1983 must show that a defendant-official implicitly

authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending

officers. See, e.g., Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 646–48 (6th Cir. 2012); Shehee

v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Bohanon makes no such allegation in the complaint.

Absent evidence of personal involvement in the alleged Incident, Vantell and Huggins cannot be

inactions of Vantell and Huggins solely on the basis that the Individual Defendants are supervisory

officials at the HCCF. For CoreCivic to be liable for supervisory employees’ conduct, Bohanon

must show that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or had some direct,

personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Knott v. Sullivan, 481

F.3d 561, 574 (6th Cir. 2005); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir. 1988). As

explained supra, Bohanon’s allegations fail to demonstrate that encouragement and involvement.

For these reasons, Bohanon’s claim against the Individual Defendants and CoreCivic for failure to

train and supervise is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating a

claim to relief.

(2) Negligence

Bohanon seeks damages from the Defendants because “they were the proximate cause of

[Bohanon’s] injuries.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) The plausible inference is that Bohanon seeks

to bring a claim of negligence against all Defendants. See, e.g., Weaver v. Cox Transp. Serv., Inc.,

No. 2:23-cv-02596, 2025 WL 368569, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 29, 2025) (“To recover on a theory

of negligence per se in Tennessee, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant violated a law that

imposes a duty or prohibits some conduct for the benefit of the public; (2) the plaintiff was within

the class of persons intended to benefit or be protected by the law; and (3) the

defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury”) (internal citations

omitted) (emphasis added); Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv-00272, 2024 WL 4993391, at *24

(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2024) (internal citations omitted) (same). Negligent conduct is not actionable

under § 1983 because negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional

deprivation. See Lewellen v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 34 F.3d 345, 348-49

(6th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is now firmly settled that injury caused by negligence does not constitute a

‘deprivation’ of any constitutionally protected interest”) (internal citation omitted). Bohanon’s

For these reasons, Bohanon’s claim against all Defendants for negligence is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief as a matter of law.

V. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App'x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other

circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to

amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see

also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App'x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal

for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the

deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a

deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.

2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice

to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint

would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284

(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe

the right of access to the courts”).

The Court grants leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice, under the

conditions set forth below.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. To the extent Bohanon alleges (ECF No. 1) (1) claims against the HCCF and (2)

claims against all Defendants for negligence (collectively, the “Claims Dismissed With

Prejudice”), all of those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to

relief as a matter of law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend

the Claims Dismissed With Prejudice is DENIED.

B. The claims in the complaint against (1) the Individual Defendants and CoreCivic

for failure to protect and (2) the Individual Defendants and CoreCivic for failure to train and

supervise (collectively, the “Claims Dismissed Without Prejudice”) are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

C. Leave to amend the Claims Dismissed Without Prejudice is GRANTED. An

amended pleading must be filed within twenty-day (21) days of the date of this Order and must

comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s

requirement of a short and plain statement of Bohanon’s claims. An amended complaint

supersedes the initial complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior

pleadings. Bohanon must sign the amended complaint, and the text of the amended complaint

must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document.

Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be

attached to the amended complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from

the facts alleged in the initial complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count

and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. If Bohanon decides to amend his claims, he

must use the “Complaint For Violation Of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” form.2 If

2 See https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/sites/tnwd/files/CivilRightsComplaint.pdf (last accessed

Apr. 21, 2025).

complaint with prejudice in its entirety and enter judgment. The Court recommends that any such

dismissal should be treated as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington,

996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021).

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of April, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE