“[When] determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply the contract law of the particular state” where the dispute occurred.
How later courts described this case
- “[When] determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply the contract law of the particular state” where the dispute occurred.
- describing an order compelling arbitration as “summary-judgment-like” because it is “in effect a summary disposition of the issue of whether or not there has been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
AHAD B. AZEMI,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 5:24-cv-1398-CLM
BLUE ORIGIN ALABAMA LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Ahad Azemi sues his former employer, Blue Origin
Alabama LLC, for employment discrimination under Title VII and the
ADEA. (Doc. 1). Blue Origin asks the court to compel arbitration. (Doc.
13). For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS Blue Origin’s
request.
BACKGROUND
Ahad Azemi is a 63-year-old United States citizen. Azemi was born
in Iran, moved to the United States as a teenager, and has lived here ever
since. Below, the court briefly recounts Azemi’s allegations against Blue
Origin, then discusses the arbitration clause at issue.
A. Azemi’s allegations
1. National Origin Discrimination
Azemi began working at Blue Origin as a Project Manager in 2020.
Azemi claims that Blue Origin discriminated against him based on his
Iranian origin over the course of his employment. For instance, Azemi
alleges his national origin often came up in conversation with Brian
Harvard, a senior-ranking Blue Origin official. Harvard asked Azemi
questions such as “where are you really from?” and “did you obtain your
citizenship before or after 9/11?”. According to Azemi, his Iranian heritage
“remained a recurring topic, with security-related questions and
comments directed at [him] during technical presentations and meetings
irrelevant to the matters at hand.” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
2. Age Discrimination
Azemi also claims Blue Origin discriminated against him based on
his age. Azemi points to one example where he led a “multimillion-dollar
project for the design and implementation of the heat treatment area at
the Huntsville facility.” (Id.). Even though Azemi received positive
feedback for this work, Blue Origin promoted younger employees over
him.
3. Retaliation & Wrongful Termination
Azemi reported the perceived discrimination to his direct
supervisor, Ken Delgreco. Azemi told Delgreco about receiving repeated
and random questions about his national origin. Azemi claims that after
meeting with Delgreco, Azemi was excluded from important meetings and
was given less significant work. Azemi also began to receive poor
performance reviews “without any valid basis or supporting evidence.”
(Id). At one point, Azemi received accusations of threatening other
employees in violation of Blue Origin policy. According to Azemi, even
though such accusations were false and unsubstantiated, Blue Origin
failed to formally investigative them. Blue Origin ultimately terminated
Azemi based (in part) on these reports.
—
Azemi raised these claims to the EEOC in August 2021, and the
EEOC gave Azemi a write to sue letter in July 2024. (Doc. 1, p. 59). Azemi
then sued Blue Origin here. (Doc. 1).
B. Arbitration clause
Blue Origin now asks the court to compel arbitration. (Doc. 13). In
support, Blue Origin points to an arbitration agreement Azemi signed as
part of his onboarding process. That agreement says:
. . . [A]ll claims, disputes, or controversies relating to or
arising out of my employment with the Company, except
for the Excluded Claims listed below, shall be
determined by binding arbitration before a single,
neutral arbitrator. . . This arbitration agreement
applies to any and all claims, disputes, or controversies
between the Company and [Plaintiff], including,
without limitation, claims arising out of or relating to
[Plaintiff’s] employment application and/or hiring
process, employment with the Company, and/or any
termination of [Plaintiff’s] employment, claims for
breach of this Agreement or otherwise relating to or
arising out of this Agreement . . . and any other . . .
claims under federal, state, and local anti-
discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation
laws and all other statutes governing the employment
relationship . . . .
(Doc. 13-1, p. 17–18) (highlighting added). Blue Origin argues the
highlighted part of the arbitration agreement covers Azemi’s claims.
Azemi does not dispute that he signed the arbitration agreement or
that it applies to his claims. Rather, Azemi claims Blue Origin waived its
right to arbitrate by engaging in “litigation-like conduct before the” EEOC
and by “strategic[ally] delay[ing]” its invocation of the Agreement. See
generally (doc. 19).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, this court applies a
standard like the standard of review applied to rule on a motion for
summary judgment. See In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 754 F.3d
1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing an order compelling arbitration as
“summary-judgment-like” because it is “in effect a summary disposition
of the issue of whether or not there has been a meeting of the minds on
the agreement to arbitrate”). A motion for summary judgment should be
granted if “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” remains in the
action and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is material “if, under the applicable substantive
law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d
1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists
where “the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a
reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Looney v. Moore,
886 F.3d 1058, 1062 (11th Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
As mentioned, Azemi does not dispute that he signed the arbitration
agreement, nor does he dispute that it applies to his claims. He argues
instead that Blue Origin waived the arbitration agreement by not seeking
to enforce it before Azemi filed this lawsuit, particularly during the years-
long EEOC proceedings (2021-2024). But the Eleventh Circuit has
rejected the same argument:
Brown also argues that ITT waived its right to arbitrate . . .
by failing to raise the arbitration issue with the EEOC. This
assertion is also without merit. Waiver results from a party’s
‘substantial participation in litigation to a point inconsistent
with an intent to arbitrate’ which results in prejudice to the
other party. Morewitz v. West England Ship Owners Mut.
Protection and Indem. Assoc., 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th
Cir.1995). . . .
ITT was also under no obligation to make a pre–suit demand
for arbitration. Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366. The demand for
arbitration was made promptly after the lawsuit was filed.
Brown did not incur the delay or expense associated with
litigation that might otherwise demonstrate prejudice. Id.
As there was no delay or action by ITT inconsistent with an
intent to arbitrate, no waiver occurred. The district court
properly granted the motion to compel arbitration.
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 122-23 (11th Cir.
2000). Based on this precedent, the court finds that Blue Origin did not
waive arbitration because (a) Blue Origin took no action inconsistent with
arbitration and (b) Azemi suffered no litigation-related delay or expense.
That leaves only the plain terms of the arbitration agreement,
which the court must place “on equal footing with other contracts and
enforce them according to their terms.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). When determining whether to grant
a motion to compel arbitration, courts must “consider: (1) whether there
is a valid agreement to arbitrate; and (2) whether the dispute in question
falls within the scope of that agreement.” Carusone v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., No. 5:19-CV-01183-LCB, 2020 WL 3545468, at *3 (N.D. Ala. June 30,
2020) (quoting Scurtu v. Int’l Student Exch., 523 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318
(S.D. Ala. 2007)). “To resolve these questions, courts apply state-law
principles relating to ordinary contract formation and interpretation,
construed through the lens of the federal policy favoring arbitration.”
Scurtu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; see also Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[When] determining whether
a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply the contract
law of the particular state” where the dispute occurred.).
Azemi does not dispute that he signed the employment contract that
contained the arbitration agreement. “[W]hen a competent adult . . . signs
a contract, [they] will be held to be on notice of all the provisions contained
in that contract and will be bound thereby.” Ex parte Brown, 26 So. 3d
1222, 1227 (Ala. 2009). Because Azemi signed the contract, he is bound by
its arbitration provision. See id. And the arbitration agreement expressly
covers Azemi’s claims, which arise under “federal, state, and local anti-
discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation laws and all other
statutes governing the employment relationship . . . .” (Doc. 13-1, p. 17).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court GRANTS Blue Origin’s motion to
compel arbitration. (Doc. 13). The court will stay the case pending
arbitration.
DONE and ORDERED on April 22, 2025.
amt MAZE □