Anthony Oliver v. Warden Wilcox State Prison

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11968

____________________

ANTHONY OLIVER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, WILCOX STATE PRISON,

CAPTAIN LAWSON,

OFFICER DEESE,

OFFICER SEAN WEAVER,

OFFICER STANFIELD,

Wilcox State Prison, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00183-TES

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Following an attack by a fellow inmate at Wilcox State

Prison, Anthony Oliver filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against certain prison guards and their supervisors alleging that

they were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious

harm Oliver faced from his assailant. After discovery, the defend-

ants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were enti-

tled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants, finding they were entitled to

qualified immunity because they were not deliberately indifferent

to the substantial risk of serious harm Oliver faced.

Oliver now appeals that order as it relates to three defend-

ants, Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver. After carefully consid-

ering the record and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm

the district court’s ruling.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anthony Oliver is an inmate at Wilcox State Prison. When

he arrived at Wilcox State Prison in the late summer of 2020, he

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told prison staff that he identified as a woman. 1 Oliver, however,

“is not on hormone therapy, has not started hormone therapy, and

has not otherwise begun the process of making a transition from

male to female.” Oliver’s transgender identity thus was not evi-

dent from his appearance.

On October 28, 2020, Oliver was moved into an administra-

tive segregation dormitory after the Wilcox State Prison warden

learned that Oliver had sent threatening messages to the Clerk of

Chatham County. In segregation, Oliver was placed in a single cell

across from another inmate, Anquavious Morgan (“Morgan”). Be-

cause there was “nothing to do in segregation except talk through

the door,” Oliver and Morgan started “talking back and forth” to

one another. According to Oliver, over the next few weeks, Mor-

gan made sexual comments and was “trash-talking” Oliver. Specif-

ically, Morgan tried “to entice [Oliver] . . . to move into the cell

with him,” asked him “[i]f [he] was homosexual,” and said

“[e]xplicit sexual things” like “I’m going to get you in a cell” and

“fuck your tight, pink ass.” Oliver recounted that “[t]here was a lot

of [Morgan] arguing through the door, going back and forth, and a

lot of what you would call trash-talking . . . [saying] [a] bunch of

filthy things about ejaculating all over my face, and how he wants

to do this and that.”

Oliver never informed correctional officers that Morgan

threatened to sexually assault him. Instead, Oliver generally

1 The record does not contain any evidence that Oliver conveyed this infor-

mation to Officers Stanfield, Deese, or Weaver.

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

informed Officer Stanfield that Morgan had made “a lot of sexual

comments and statements about doing stuff.” And he generally

informed Officers Deese and Weaver that he wanted to “go [] to

another cell.”

On November 25, 2020—several weeks after Oliver’s trans-

fer to segregation—Officer Stanfield and another prison guard told

Oliver that he had to move into Morgan’s cell. Oliver told the of-

ficers that he did not “want to go in there” and that Morgan’s nick-

name was “the booty bandit.” 2 They moved him into Morgan’s

cell anyway.

Shortly after Oliver moved in, “Morgan took off all his

clothes down to his underwear.” According to Oliver, Morgan

“kept pulling out his penis and playing with it, and he kept asking

sexual questions.” Morgan asked Oliver if he wanted “to give him

oral sex and [Oliver] told him, no.” Rebuffed by Oliver, Morgan

then “talked about other stuff, him getting out of prison, prison-

talk . . . to bypass the time[.]” After about “four hours,” Oliver “got

pulled out for a medical follow-up . . . to be checked for COVID.”

During his check-up, Oliver told Officer Stanfield, another

officer, and a nurse: “I don’t feel comfortable with this guy in there.

He’s going [to] do something. He’s already got his penis hanging

2 According to Oliver, that nickname was given to Morgan by one of the fe-

male officers and “all” of the officers used it. Oliver also testified that he “heard

inmates calling [Morgan] that” and that the other inmates “would yell it out

at night.” But there is no record evidence showing that Morgan ever sexually

assaulted another inmate.

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out and making . . . a lot of sexual comments and statements about

doing stuff.” Oliver also told them that Morgan has been “asking

[sexual] questions, and [] was playing with himself in the cell.” Ol-

iver “protested” going back into the cell, but Officer Stanfield made

him.

When Oliver got back to the cell, he saw Morgan in bed “do-

ing a masturbation simulation with his penis out.” Morgan asked

Oliver if he “wanted to help him out,” but Oliver said no. Morgan

and Oliver then ate lunch and Morgan got “extremely high” off ma-

rijuana. Morgan kept talking to Oliver—going “on and on” “about

some bizarre things, mostly sexual.”

Around 6:00 p.m.,3 Officers Deese and Weaver arrived for

their evening shift. Oliver told Officer Deese: “I need to leave this

room . . . I don’t feel safe in here.” Officer Deese told Oliver to

“take [it] up with the captain tomorrow.”

About two hours later, Oliver told Officer Weaver: “[S]ir, I

don’t feel safe in here. I’d like to go back to another cell. There’s

plenty of open cells.” But Weaver did not move Oliver. Oliver also

told Officer Deese: “[T]here’s something not right about this guy.

He’s on . . . narcotics, drugs and I need to be moved out.”

3 As the district court noted, the record does not lay out a clear timeline of the

events of the assault. For example, Oliver testified that “it was probably 8:30,

9:00, maybe eight o’clock” when Morgan assaulted him. The above account

presents our best understanding of how the evening’s events unfolded.

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

Sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., Morgan started

smoking “paper . . . dipped into animal tranquilizer.” Morgan then

“pulled [Oliver] from the top bunk and began punching [him].” Ol-

iver “felt an instant pop” in his back when he hit the ground. Mor-

gan then grabbed a “knife from underneath his mattress,” and

when Oliver tried to get up, Morgan hit him with “a plastic dinner

tray that he had inside the cell.” Morgan continued to beat up Ol-

iver and then raped him anally. He then ordered Oliver to perform

oral sex on him at knifepoint. Oliver yelled for help during the as-

sault, but no one came.

Despite Oliver communicating to Officers Deese and

Weaver that he did not “feel safe in [his cell],” neither Officer was

in the building during the assault. When Officer Deese eventually

returned, Oliver discretely informed him about the attack. Six or

seven officers then came to separate Oliver from Morgan.

On June 1, 2021, Oliver filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Georgia alleging, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that a handful of Wilcox State Prison officials—

including Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver—acted with delib-

erate indifference to his safety by failing to protect him from Mor-

gan in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 4 After discovery, the

defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were

4 Oliver originally made a claim under the Georgia Constitution. The district

court found that this claim was abandoned. Oliver does not appeal that ruling

here and therefore has abandoned the issue on appeal as well. See United States

v. Willis, 649 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.2011).

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23-11968 Opinion of the Court 7

entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was not un-

constitutional, let alone clearly established as unconstitutional.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion, holding that

no reasonable jury could find that Oliver faced a substantial risk of

serious harm, or that any Defendants actually knew that Oliver

faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Accordingly, the court con-

cluded that the Defendant-Officers were entitled to qualified-im-

munity.

Oliver timely appealed, challenging the district court’s deci-

sion on his deliberate-indifference claim only as to Officers Stan-

field, Deese, and Weaver.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). In

doing so, “we view all the evidence and draw all reasonable infer-

ences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Cald-

well v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014)

(citing Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 616 (11th

Cir. 2007)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the evi-

dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

‘presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment

as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.’” Id. (quoting

Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 571 U.S. 1045 (2013)). But if, based on the evidence pre-

sented, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party,” there is a genuine factual dispute and summary judgment

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

should not be granted. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta,

281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Oliver contends that, based on the record evi-

dence, a reasonable jury could find that (1) Oliver faced a substan-

tial risk of being seriously harmed by Morgan; (2) Officers Stanfield,

Deese, and Weaver were “deliberately indifferent” to that risk be-

cause they put Oliver in a cell with Morgan and failed to appropri-

ately supervise them; and (3) the Officers’ deliberate indifference

caused Oliver’s injuries. The Defendants respond that they cannot

be found liable because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Af-

ter consideration of the relevant case law and the record, we hold

that the Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the sub-

stantial risk of serious harm Oliver faced. Since Oliver has not met

his burden to show an Eighth Amendment violation, his claim fails.

“The defense of qualified immunity completely protects

government officials performing discretionary functions from suit

in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227,

1232 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325

F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted)). A

government official must prove that he was acting within his dis-

cretionary authority before being granted qualified immunity.

Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1098. Because Oliver concedes that the offic-

ers here were acting “within the scope of their discretionary

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23-11968 Opinion of the Court 9

authority,” he “bears the burden to show that the defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (cleaned up); see Marbury,

936 F.3d at 1232 (explaining that “the burden shifts to the plaintiff”

to defeat qualified immunity after it has been established that an

official was acting within his discretionary duties).

To meet this burden, Oliver must “show (1) that the offi-

cial[s] violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Marbury,

936 F.3d at 1232 (emphasis added) (citing Caldwell, 748 F.3d at

1099). The district court determined that because Oliver could not

show that Defendants violated a constitutional right, Defendants

were entitled to summary judgment. 5 We agree.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and

unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “[T]he treatment a

prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”

Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Because prisoners have

shown “proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent, con-

duct,” are stripped of almost all means of self-protection, and can-

not receive help from the outside world, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 833 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984))

(internal quotations omitted), the Eighth Amendment requires

5 The district court did not consider the “clearly-established” prong of the qual-

ified-immunity analysis—it found that the Defendants were entitled to quali-

fied immunity after determining there was no constitutional violation.

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

“prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee” in-

mates’ safety. Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Caldwell, 748 F.3d

at 1099). In practice, this means that prison officials must protect

prisoners from “violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. (quot-

ing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

But not every injury sustained “by one inmate at the hands

of another” “translates into a constitutional liability for prison offi-

cials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A “prison official [only] violates

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment if he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.” Lane v. Philbin, 835

F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). To establish a deliberate-indiffer-

ence claim, “a plaintiff must show (1) a substantial risk of serious

harm; (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that risk; and

(3) causation.’” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d

at 1307).

“The first element of deliberate indifference—whether there

was a substantial risk of serious harm—is assessed objectively and

requires the plaintiff to show ‘conditions that were extreme and

posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or

safety.’” Id. (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307). 6

6 The district court determined that Oliver failed “to show an objectively sub-

stantial risk personal to him.” Drawing all factual inferences in Oliver’s favor,

we would not necessarily reach the same conclusion. Oliver provided evi-

dence that Morgan told him that he was “going to make arrangements” to

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The second element—whether officials were deliberately in-

different to that risk—requires a plaintiff to prove both an objective

and subjective component. Id. “The subjective component re-

quires” the plaintiff to provide “evidence that the defendant officer

actually (subjectively) knew of the risk to the plaintiff inmate.” Nel-

son v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub

nom. Sellers v. Nelson, 145 S. Ct. 178 (2024) (citing Mosley, 966 F.3d

at 1270–71) (internal quotations omitted). “‘This standard is one of

subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law’ and it is ‘a diffi-

cult burden for a plaintiff to meet[.]’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

825, 839–40; then quoting West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th

“get [him] in a cell, and . . . fuck [his] tight, pink ass.” That is not evidence of

Morgan’s “propensity to misbehave,” but instead evidence of a specific and

particularized threat made to Oliver by Morgan. Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1296–97;

see also Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 at 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2003) (per cu-

riam) (explaining that evidence of an attacker’s “generally problematic nature”

will not alone suffice to prove that he posed a substantial risk of serious harm;

however, showing “a particularized threat or fear” can); and compare Rodri-

guez, 508 F.3d at 617 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding summary judgment in favor

of prison officials inappropriate where plaintiff-inmate had provided evidence

that his life was threatened by members of his former gang who were inmates

in the same prison) and Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1297 (finding that a white inmate

faced a substantial risk of serious harm when he had to share a cell with an

inmate whose underlying offense was stabbing a white man only because he

was white) with Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per cu-

riam) (finding that summary judgment in favor of prison officials was appro-

priate when an inmate-plaintiff reported an unspecified “racial problem” in his

shared cell). But even if we disagreed with the district court’s holding on the

first element, it would not change the outcome of this case because we con-

clude that Oliver has not shown that the defendants were subjectively aware

of that objectively substantial risk.

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

Cir. 2007)). The objective component requires the plaintiff show

that the official “responded to the known risk in an unreasonable

manner, in that he or she ‘knew of ways to reduce the harm’ but

knowingly or recklessly declined to act.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233

(quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620). Finally, the plaintiff must

show that the officer’s failure to reasonably respond caused his or

her injury. See id. In sum, to establish deliberate indifference, a

plaintiff must show (1) that an official was subjectively aware of a

(2) substantial risk of serious harm and (3) disregarded that known

risk by not responding to it in an objectively reasonable manner

that (4) caused plaintiff’s injury. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099; Rodri-

guez, 508 F.3d at 617.

Oliver argues that Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver

were subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm

Morgan posed to him. He also argues that all three defendants

were deliberately indifferent because they allowed Oliver to re-

main in a cell with Morgan, leaving him vulnerable to a serious risk

of harm.

As we explain, Oliver’s arguments fail because the record

lacks evidence that any of the defendants were aware of a “partic-

ularized threat” that would “enable them to conclude that” Oliver

faced a “strong likelihood,” rather than a “mere possibility,” of in-

jury. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350; Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1236; Brown, 894

F.2d at 1537. Because Oliver’s communications with Officer Stan-

field were separate from his communications with Officers Deese

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and Weaver, we will analyze Oliver’s claims against Officer Stan-

field separately. See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 618–24.

A. Officer Stanfield

Oliver argues that the district court erred in finding for Of-

ficer Stanfield because there is sufficient circumstantial evidence in

the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Of-

ficer Stanfield was aware of the harm Oliver faced. Specifically, Ol-

iver contends that the record shows that he told Officer Stanfield:

(1) that he didn’t “feel comfortable with [Morgan]. He’s going [to]

do something. He’s already got his penis hanging out and making

a - - a lot of sexual comments and statements about doing stuff.”;

(2) that Morgan’s nickname was “Booty Bandit”; and (3) that he

was transgender. Oliver also argues that the record shows that Of-

ficer Stanfield was assigned to the building that Oliver and Morgan

lived in and therefore could hear Morgan’s specific threats to Oli-

ver. Oliver argues that this evidence is sufficient to show Officer

Stanfield actually knew Oliver faced a substantial risk of being

harmed by Morgan.

We disagree, as this Court’s precedent establishes that no

reasonable jury could reach such a conclusion based on this sum-

mary judgment record. The record evidence does not show that

Oliver told Officer Stanfield that Morgan had explicitly threatened

him, nor does it contain evidence that Oliver provided any addi-

tional information to Officer Stanfield about what he thought Mor-

gan planned to do. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837) (“Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of specific

facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists—and the prison official must also ‘draw that

inference.’”).

We have repeatedly held “that officials must possess enough

details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a

‘strong likelihood’ of injury, not a ‘mere possibility.’” Marbury, 936

F.3d at 1236 (quoting Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537). Officer Stanfield

simply did not possess enough details here. Oliver only told Officer

Stanfield that Morgan would do “something” and that he didn’t feel

“comfortable” in the cell. He never told Officer Stanfield that he

“feared [Morgan] or that [Morgan] clearly threatened [him].”

Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349; cf. id. at 1349–50 (finding no deliberate in-

difference by a deputy warden despite Plaintiff complaining to him

about Plaintiff’s cellmate “acting crazy, wanting to fake a hanging,

and making a statement that Plaintiff would help in the fake hang-

ing ‘one way or another,’” because the Plaintiff never communi-

cated to the deputy warden that the cellmate clearly threatened

him or scared him). And while it is understandable that Oliver

would prefer not to share a cell with someone who masturbated in

front of him and made sexual remarks, we can’t say that this be-

havior alone put Officer Stanfield on notice that Morgan would at-

tack Oliver.

This Court’s decision in Marbury v. Warden is instructive. See

936 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2019). In that case, an inmate “was at-

tacked by a fellow prisoner after making multiple requests to be

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transferred to a different dormitory or put in protective lock-up.”

Id. at 1231. In one of his requests, the inmate asked a correction

officer “to have the captain put him in lock-up until he could be

transferred because he had heard from a friend that another inmate

wanted to hurt him.” Id. One day later, he wrote a letter to a

prison warden that said: “I was told by a friend to watch my back,

because he got word someone was out to do harm to me.” Id. at

1232. He also said in the letter that he needed to be put in lock-up

quickly because “he was in fear of being hurt or possibly killed.” Id.

In Marbury, we held that a reasonable jury could not con-

clude that the defendants were aware of a substantial risk based on

“Marbury’s statement that he had heard from a friend that an un-

armed prisoner intended to hurt him, and that he was afraid of be-

ing hurt or killed, without any further details.” Id. at 1236. In ex-

plaining our decision, we noted that usually further information—

“beyond the plaintiff having informed the defendant officers of [a]

threat”—is needed for a prison official to conclude “that a particu-

lar threat evidenced a substantial threat.” Id.

Unlike in Marbury, Oliver did not repeatedly convey that he

was fearful of being harmed or killed due to threats he had received.

Instead, Oliver only vaguely speculated to Officer Stanfield that he

thought Morgan was going to “do something.” And that is just

simply not enough.

Officer Stanfield’s knowledge of Morgan’s nickname and Ol-

iver’s transgender identity does not change this analysis. The rec-

ord does not indicate the significance of Oliver’s nickname. And

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

the record contains no evidence that Morgan had ever engaged in

a sexual assault before. Without knowing more, Officer Stanfield

cannot be expected to infer that a substantial risk of harm existed.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (A defendant “must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).

And because Oliver presents as a man, Officer Stanfield would have

no reason to think—much less know—that other inmates knew Ol-

iver was transgender. Officer Stanfield’s personal knowledge of Ol-

iver’s gender identity is irrelevant. What would matter is if Officer

Stanfield knew that Morgan was aware of Oliver’s gender identity.

And the record provides no evidence of that contention.

Oliver’s argument that Officer Stanfield knew about Mor-

gan’s specific threats to Oliver because he overheard them also falls

flat. There is no evidence in the record that Officer Stanfield was

within ear-shot of Morgan’s cell any of the times Morgan made

threatening or sexual statements to Oliver. Oliver points to the

evidence that (1) Officer Stanfield was “permanently assigned to

[Oliver’s] building at the time” Morgan threatened Oliver and (2)

that he was sometimes around to run showers or move inmates

between cells. But nothing in the record suggests that Officer Stan-

field’s “permanent assignment” to Oliver’s building would entail

monitoring Oliver’s cell block at all hours. And there is no evi-

dence that Morgan made threatening remarks to Oliver when Of-

ficer Stanfield was running showers or moving inmates between

cells. Accordingly, a reasonable jury would have no basis for con-

cluding that Officer Stanfield overheard—and therefore knew

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23-11968 Opinion of the Court 17

about—Morgan’s threats due to being within hearing-distance of

Morgan at the time he made threats to Oliver.

In sum, the record lacks sufficient evidence to show that Of-

ficer Stanfield had actual knowledge that Oliver faced a serious risk

of harm. We thus conclude that Officer Stanfield was not deliber-

ately indifferent in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

B. Officers Deese and Weaver

Oliver’s claims against Officers Deese and Weaver fare no

better. Oliver argues that: (1) he orally told Officers Deese and

Weaver that “there’s something not right [with Morgan]. He’s on

- - on narcotics, drugs, and I need[] to be moved out.”; (2) Officers

Deese and Weaver had a substantial amount of daily contact with

the inmates, making them aware of Morgan’s threats; and (3) Of-

ficers Deese and Weaver, like Officer Stanfield, knew about Mor-

gan’s nickname. Similar to his arguments about Officer Stanfield,

Oliver asserts that this evidence is enough to show Officers Deese

and Weaver’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm. Again, we disagree.

Oliver’s statements to Officers Deese and Weaver, like those

made to Officer Stanfield, are vague and do not convey any “spe-

cific facts” that would enable Officers Deese or Weaver to draw an

inference that Oliver faced a substantial risk of serious harm.

Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. They also do not convey to Officers Deese

or Weaver that Morgan ever made a particular threat to him. Cf.

id. at 1350 (affirming summary judgment on a deliberate indiffer-

ence claim because the prison official was only aware of the

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-11968

attacker-inmate’s “propensity for being a problematic inmate” and

not any “particularized threat or fear”).

Oliver’s statements to Officers Deese and Weaver are like

those made by the plaintiff in Carter. See id. at 1348. In that case,

the plaintiff complained to prison officials that his cellmate was

“acting crazy, wanting to fake a hanging,” and told the plaintiff that

he “would help in the fake hanging ‘one way or another.’” Id. at

1349. We held in Carter that those statements were not sufficient

for the prison officials “to make the inferential leap that [the plain-

tiff faced] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1350. We fur-

ther explained that the plaintiff’s statements only made the prison

officials aware of the plaintiff’s cellmate’s generally problematic na-

ture and that such “a generalized awareness of risk in these circum-

stances does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.” Id.

Oliver’s statements similarly lack the requisite particularity.

Like the plaintiff’s statements in Carter, Oliver’s comments to Of-

ficers Deese and Weaver only made them aware of generalized

risks Morgan posed, not specific or particularized ones. See id. Be-

cause Officers Deese and Weaver only possessed awareness of a

general risk, we cannot conclude that they had subjective

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.

Lastly, Oliver’s arguments about the Officers’ daily contact

with inmates and their knowledge of Morgan’s nickname are iden-

tical to those made for the claim against Officer Stanfield, and they

fail for the same reasons.

IV. CONCLUSION

USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 19 of 19

23-11968 Opinion of the Court 19

What happened to Oliver was awful. But on this record, he

simply has not carried his burden to show that Officers Stanfield,

Deese, and Weaver had actual knowledge about any specific

threats made by Morgan to Oliver. So we must conclude that Of-

ficers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver were not deliberately indiffer-

ent to a substantial risk Oliver faced. Because no constitutional vi-

olation has been established against any of the defendants, we af-

firm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor

of Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver.

AFFIRMED.